tacks as were made by both the Federal and Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station (or Fleetwood) would, we apprehend, never be attempted. It is the characteristic feature of the book before us that it gives all the necessary facts of a transitory yet very interesting phase in the history of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare. We have minute narratives of those daring raids in the rear of our armies, of which Stuart made at least three which were success ful and famous. We have the details of the services performed by him when accompanying a column of infantry. We have careful and impartial, though naturally not always correct, descriptions of those obstinate and spirited handto-hand encounters between cavalry and cavalry which followed immediately on the reorganization of the Federal horse in the spring of 1863, and which will carry down to posterity the names of Buford and Gregg and Custer and Sheridan. The actions at Kelly's Ford, Brandy Station, Aldie Gap, Middleburg, Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, are all described at length; and though there is a great deal that might be written to fill out, or to correct, or even in some cases to reverse, the conclusions of Major McClellan, the Federal historian must acknowledge his indebtedness to him as a fair and honest writer on his own side.

In Stuart the Confederacy had a natural leader of cavalry. Daring, cool, eminently a man of resources in an emergency, full of the spirit of adventure, young, gay, handsome, a fine horseman, he carried into the somewhat prosaic operations of our civil war not a little of the chivalrous spirit of former times. Belonging to one of the distinguished families of Virginia, and possessed of so many undoubted qualifications for his task, his position was an assured one from the very first. He took an active part in the first battle of Bull Run, winning the high commendation of Generals Johnston and Jackson.

He commanded the entire cavalry of the Confederate army on the Peninsula. It was here that he first acquired general reputation by his daring raid around our army, about the middle of June, 1862. Being the first performance of the kind, the effect it produced upon the not very experienced soldiers of McClellan's army was considerable, and the expedition, rash and perilous as it certainly was, may fairly be said to have been justified under the circumstances of the case. In August of that year Stuart tried the same manœuvre again, getting in the rear of the army of General Pope, and capturing some of that officer's headquarter-baggage. But though this was also a very daring and skillfully conducted affair, it did not strike either army as possessing the importance of the former raid. Stuart, however, who evidently enjoyed these expeditions, the management of which was peculiarly suited to his character and talents, undertook, not long after the battle of Antietam, still another, and perhaps more venturesome, incursion. In October, 1862, when Lee's army was in Virginia, Stuart crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry, a short distance above Williamsport; proceeded rapidly to Chambersburg, where he obtained supplies of all kinds; then taking the Gettysburg road as far as Cashtown, he returned by way of Emmitsburg to White's Ferry, just above Conrad's Ferry, where he crossed the Potomac, eluding with great skill and good fortune the Federal troops, by whom his little force seemed to be well

nigh surrounded. What the object of this performance was, beyond exhibiting to the men of both armies what a fine set of fellows Stuart's cavalry were, what risks they were ready to take, and with what audacity and coolness they could escape from the snares laid for them by their foes, we are at a loss to know. But the importance of distributing information of this kind is hardly to be weighed against the danger of los

ing such an auxiliary to an army as Stuart and his command. As it was, everything turned out well enough; the Federal generals were annoyed, and the Northern public was irritated. But suppose that Pleasanton had not been misled by false reports, and that Stuart and his raiders had been taken: any one can see what effect that news would have had upon both armies. It would have been a serious blow to the confidence reposed by the South in their generals, and it could not have failed greatly to encourage the North.

General Stuart was now to have a rare opportunity for distinction. In the campaign of Chancellorsville, as hitherto, he commanded the cavalry. On the evening of the 2d of May, after the crushing assault on the eleventh corps, the great Confederate leader, Stonewall Jackson, was mortally wounded, and his place was filled by A. P. Hill, who, while exerting himself to repair the disorder into which the troops had necessarily fallen in their onward and successful movement, and to resist the counter-attacks which Sickles, at the head of the undismayed veterans of the third corps, was fiercely making to recover the lost ground, was wounded himself. Then Lee sent for Stuart, and put him in command of Jackson's corps. It was a proud moment in Stuart's life, and a great honor for so young an officer, for he was but just thirty years old. The task before him was, fortunately, neither an ambiguous nor a complicated task. There was but one thing to do, and that was to fight. Of the battle which raged so fiercely on Sunday morning; of the repeated, desperate, persistent assaults which Stuart directed against our position; of the energy and enthusiasm which he inspired; and of the gallantry with which from time to time he led the troops himself, we have not time to speak. Fierce and determined as were those repeated attacks, however, nothing but the gross mismanagement of Hooker VOL. LVII. — NO. 341.

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can account for their having overcome the steady and obstinate resistance of the troops of Sickles and Slocum. But we need not dwell on this ever painful episode in the war. Suffice it to say that Stuart acquitted himself admirably. His services were, however, more needed in the cavalry. In the severe actions which occurred in the spring and early summer of 1863, Brandy Station, Aldie Gap, Middleburg, and Gettysburg, cavalry met cavalry, and, as has been before said, the fighting was of the most approved old style, horse to horse, and sabre to sabre. In these engagements the Federals displayed a confidence and courage which had rarely been observed before, and which was the result of the thorough reorganization of our cavalry, for which the army was indebted to General Hooker probably more than to any one else.

Stuart's course in the campaign of Gettysburg has been severely criticised as well by Confederate as by Federal authorities. When Lee determined on the invasion of the North, he left a large force of cavalry to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge. He took a very small force to cover the march of the army. The remainder he entrusted to Stuart, and practically gave him carte blanche as to the route he should take to compass the two objects of ascertaining the movements of the enemy and communicating his information to General Lee. Stuart, instead of keeping on the right flank of the Confederate columns, between them and our army, chose the devious and complicated course of passing to the south of our corps while they were marching north, thus getting between them and Washington, and then crossing the Potomac near Washington at Rowser's Ford. He expected to make a complete circuit around our army, as he had twice done before, and to bring seasonable information of Hooker's whereabouts and operations to his commanding officer. Looked at from

any point of view, this plan was bad. It necessarily involved the separation of the cavalry from the rest of the army for a period, the duration of which no one could guess, and it exposed it, moreover, to be cut off and captured. The only recommendations of the project were its adventurousness, which we suspect was a pretty strong recommendation in the eyes of General Stuart, and the possibility of doing some damage to the communications of the Army of the Potomac by operating between it and Washington. With such a small force as accompanied Stuart, however, no great successes in this direction were to be looked for, while the danger of utter failure from the discovery of his exposed position by the Federal armywhich, contrary to his expectation, was not resting near Washington, but was marching north-daily increased. Not only was Stuart thus made aware of a concentration of the Federal army in Pennsylvania, a fact of the utmost importance to General Lee, but the very movements of the Federal corps by which this concentration was effected prevented Stuart from sending his information to the headquarters of his commander. It must also be admitted that Stuart was far from showing that clear, strong sense which a man like Stonewall Jackson would have shown in a like situation. Having early made a trumpery capture of a lot of wagons and prisoners, he persisted in carrying them along with him, in spite of the delay they were manifestly causing. He never seems to have realized that so long as he was unable to communicate with Lee he was in a false position, from which he ought to make every effort to escape. As for the claim put forward by Major McClellan, that Stuart hindered the movements of the Federal army, that, with all submission, is an entire mistake. My main point," wrote Meade to Halleck, "being to find out and fight the enemy, I shall have to sub

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mit to the cavalry raids around me in some measure." Stuart reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d of July. But by that time the mischief had been done. General Lee, deprived of his cavalry, had been concentrating his army on Gettysburg, in ignorance of

General Meade's movements. His leading divisions had, on the day before, encountered the first and eleventh corps of the Federal army near Gettysburg, and had beaten them after an obstinate struggle. The Federal general had, nevertheless, decided to concentrate his whole army here and await an attack. On the 2d of July Lee followed up his first success by driving the third Federal corps from an untenable position. Unable now to resist the influences of the hour, he was about to essay the hazardous task of assaulting the steady infantry of the Northern army, thinned but not a whit daunted by their ill luck on the past two days, and holding a strong, well-defined position. In truth, Lee's only chance, humanly speaking, lay in compelling the Federal army to attack him; but, owing to his ignorance of our designs and movements, his troops struck their enemy unexpectedly, and having been thus far―owing in part, at least, to adventitious circumstances successful, Lee, on the 3d of July, made that gallant, but rash, assault on our left centre, the utter repulse of which left Meade the victor of the three days' fight. Whether, if Stuart's cavalry had been with the main army, Lee would or could have so managed that Meade would have been induced to assault him in position, no one, of course, can say; all we know is that the battle, as it was fought, was unpremeditated by General Lee,

that it was not the kind of battle which he had intended to deliver.

General Stuart's services in the Wilderness campaign were very brief. In the winter of 1863-4 our cavalry, then under Sheridan, had vastly improved; the cavalry of the Confederates, on the

other hand, was weak in numbers and poorly equipped. Early in the campaign, Sheridan, with some twelve thousand horse, moved in rear of the army of Lee and threatened Richmond. In a severe action at Yellow Tavern, Stuart was mortally wounded. He met his fate like a brave and good man, as he

was. Major McClellan's narrative here is simple and very touching.

We have extended this review to a greater length than we originally intended. But among the heroic figures of the war, the gallant leader of the Confederate cavalry is certainly one of the most attractive.

IT has been said, as a mark of the high civilization of London, that no person can be interested in any subject however recondite, or have any taste however fantastic, that he does not sooner or later meet in that vast city some one pursuing exactly the same study, or humoring the same hobby. It is a healthy sign, too, with us that the number of our special scholars is yearly increasing, but it is regrettable, although natural, that they should often be better known in Europe than at home. Although Mr. Crane's name is by no means unfamiliar to the general public, it may safely be said that for his special studies he is, outside of the precincts of his university, far more highly appreciated in Rome and Palermo, in Paris and Berlin, than in Boston or New York. While Mr. Crane's last work on Italian Popular Tales will add still more to the esteem and respect in which he is held by scholars like Pitrè, De Gubernatis, Gaston Paris, Köhler, and Ralston, it will reveal to us at home what thorough and excellent work is doing here, and will at the same time win increased favor and popularity for studies in the peculiarly interesting subject of folk-lore. In saying that Mr. Crane's book marks an epoch in this science in America, we do not forget what has already been done here, the numerous publications of Dr. Daniel G. Brinton on the my

thology and traditions of the early American races, the papers of Mr. John Fiske on Myths and Mythmakers (originally published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1867); but, for careful, accurate, and brilliant scholarship, we can compare it with nothing but the remarkable notes of Mr. Francis J. Child, in his edition of the English and Scottish Popular Ballads. It may be mentioned, by the way, that the best and largest collection of works on folk-lore and early popular literature accessible to the student is that in the library of Harvard College, obtained through the care of Mr. Child. Cornell University possesses a smaller collection, peculiarly rich in books relating to the Slavonic people and the races of Russia and Northern Asia.

Fairy tales had long been liked, the Piacevoli Notti of Straparola, their first appearance in literature, was published in 1550, the Pentamerone of Basile in 1637, the charming Contes de ma Mère Loye of Charles Perrault from 1691 to 1697, to say nothing of others, - but the scientific study of such stories, of traditions, superstitions, and popular customs, began with the publication in 1816 of the Kinder- und Hausmärchen, collected by the brothers Grimm. Since 1840 such collections have been made everywhere, in nearly all countries, civilized and barbarous, and with

each new contribution the surprise increased at the wide diffusion of certain tales and certain types. The necessity grew also of rigorous scientific study of such tales, as expressions of the popular imagination, together with that of usages and beliefs that might seem to be derived from an earlier religion and an earlier stage of civilization. This branch of learning received the appropriate name of folk-lore; and so suitable is the word that it has been adopted bodily in several languages, and has such odd-looking derivatives as folklorico and folklorismo. For the convenience of scholars folk-lore societies have been founded in England, Sweden, Spain, and Italy during the past seven years, and several journals have been started for this specialty. These societies and these journals are very useful, because, although so much has been already done, more remains undone. The tales of the Aryan races show a similarity close enough to serve as proof that they all had a common origin; but how does the case stand with similar tales among people of non-Aryan race, with whom, such as Samoans and Zulus, no Aryan influence can be imagined? Until we have further data it is impossible to decide with certainty even the source of some of the commonest superstitions which govern us from our cradles, or of the customs which accompany the great fes

tivals of the church.

The question of the origin of popular tales was the first to present itself as soon as it was noticed that the same story, differing only in local color or in the subordinate details, was to be found among peoples separated by long distances, and when it was seen that the whole body of tales could be reduced to certain types or formulas, admitting of endless variation within certain lines. The tale of Beauty and the Beast, for instance, exists in English, German, Danish, Norwegian, Russian, Bohemian, Serbian, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portu

guese, French, and Breton. These languages and races had a common origin; it seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that this story was the common property of these peoples before they separated from their early Aryan home in Central Asia. Proofs for this theory, which was originally that of the brothers Grimm, were sought in the earliest literature of India, and Max Müller, with the Vedas in his hands, tried to explain such tales as degraded myths, chiefly solar, representing the conflict between light and darkness, the sun, night, and the dawn. By a disease and a corruption of language, by a forgetfulness of the original meanings of words, pure personifications of natural phenomena became mythical and popular heroes, just as the Rikshas, the "bright ones," became the constellations of the Bears. This theory seemed so plausible, and was urged with such eloquence, that it took strong hold, especially in England, where there prevailed an exaggerated opinion of Max Müller's learning. But the vagaries of some of his followers, like Sir George Cox, who wished to explain the Iliad and the Trojan war as a solar myth, soon began to excite distrust. The supporters of the mythic or philological theory were, besides, divided among themselves. Where the English school saw dawn myths, one German school under Kuhn saw fire myths, and another under Schwartz saw storm and thunder-cloud myths. The classical tale of Cupid and Psyche has been interpreted in all three ways with equal plausibility. But the tale of Cupid and Psyche is found among non-Aryan races; and that of Beauty and the Beast exists in much the same form among peoples as widely separated as the Mongols and the Kaffirs. Now, while it is pleasant to believe that an individual tale is a degraded myth from the Vedas, it is hard to admit this of all, and doubly hard to believe that "philological corruption" worked in exactly the same