SALE-Continued.

sented his financial standing in order to obtain credit, where
he shows that defendant, some 14 months prior to the sale,
made a report to a commercial agency, on which plaintiff
relied, representing his assets at $24,000 and his liabilities
at $9,000, and one year later represented himself to be in
fully as good financial condition, refusing, however, to make
a new itemized report, and within five months thereafter
gave chattel mortgages for $20,000, covering all his property,
and placed the mortgagees immediately in possession. Kirsch-
baum v. Jasspon, 452.

4. That a tradesman, immediately preceding his failure, pur-
chased on credit large and unusual quantities of goods from
firms he had never dealt with before, is admissible in evidence
on the question of fraud. Id.

5. Whether plaintiff, in replevin for goods fraudulently pur
chased, must tender back negotiable paper, past due, given
for the goods, or whether it is sufficient if he show at the
trial that the paper has not been negotiated by him,-quære.
Skinner v. Michigan Hoop Co., 467.

6. A sale of goods is not rendered fraudulent, so as to entitle the
seller to rescind, by the buyer's conceiving the intention,
while the goods are in transit, of not paying for them. Id.
7. A letter ordering goods to be shipped in car lots, for which
the writer agrees to accept 30-day drafts for the cost of filling
the order, and to send check for the balance of the price when
the goods are unloaded, is not a representation that the writer
is solvent. Id.

8. A sale may be rescinded, and the property recovered, where
the buyer, at the time of purchasing, was insolvent or in
failing circumstances, and did not intend to pay for the
goods, or had no reasonable expectation of doing so, and
fraudulently misrepresented or concealed the facts. Id.

9. A vendor of goods under a contract reserving title until pay-
ment of the purchase price does not, by bringing assumpsit
upon the contract, and proceeding to judgment therein,
elect his remedy, so as to preclude his resort to replevin.
Canadian Typograph Co. v. Macgurn, 533.

See CONTRACTS (2, 8-10); FALSE REPRESENTATIONS; FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCES (7, 8); LOGS AND LOGGING; MORTGAGES
(3, 7, 9, 10); PARTNERSHIP (2); TAXES (4, 6, 7, 12, 15-18).

SCALES-See LOGS AND LOGGING (1).

SECURITY FOR COSTS-See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (3, 4).

SERVICE OF PROCESS-See ATTACHMENT; PROBATE COURTS (3).

SETTLEMENT See ACCORD AND SATISFACTION; LOGS AND LOG-
GING (2).

SIDEWALKS-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1, 9).

SIGNALS, EVIDENCE REGARDING-See RAILROAD COMPANIES
(1).

SLANDER-See LIBEL AND SLANDER.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

FRAUDS (2).

-

See HOMESTEAD; STATUTE OF

SPECIFIC TAXES-See RAILROAD COMPANIES (3–5).

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. A promise to pay the debt of another, in consideration of the
debtor's releasing a claim against the promisor, is not within
the statute of frauds. Martin v. Curtis, 169.

2. A vendee of land with notice of the rights of a prior pur-
chaser of the timber thereon will be enjoined from prosecut-
ing an action at law against the latter to recover for the tim-
ber removed by him, even though the former transaction was
insufficient under the statute of frauds, where the circum-
stances are such as would have entitled the claimant there-
under to a specific performance. Oconto Co. v. Lundquist.
264.

3. There can be no recovery against an estate upon an implied
promise of decedent to pay for certain services, which, it
appears, were rendered, not directly to decedent, but to his
lessee, where the only evidence to show the lessor's liability
relates to a contract void under the statute of frauds, and
therefore inadmissible. Bristol v. Sutton, 693.

See TITLE TO LANDS (2, 3).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-See ADVERSE POSSESSION; TITLE TO
LANDS (1).

STATUTES-See BRIDGES (1); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTIONS;
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (3, 4); WITNESSES (2).

STAY OF EXECUTION-See EXECUTION (1).

STIPULATION-See APPEAL AND ERROR (3).

STOCK, CORPORATE-See EQUITY PRACTICE (2, 3); FALSE REP-
RESENTATIONS (1, 3); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (5); TROVER (2).

STREET RAILWAYS-See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (4).

SUBCONTRACTORS, WHO ARE - See MECHANICS' LIENS (1);

PUBLIC BUILDINGS.

SUPERVISORS-See BOARDS OF SUPERVISORS.

SURETYSHIP-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

SURVEYS-See PUBLIC LANDS.

TAXES.

1. An affidavit of publication in a tax proceeding is not void be-
cause it refers to the petition of the auditor general and the
order of hearing thereon, copies of which are attached to the
affidavit, as the "annexed printed notice." Spaulding v.
O'Connor, 45.

2. In such case, where the copy attached consists of a single news-
paper clipping, in which the order precedes the petition, it
will be presumed that the publication was made in the same
order. Id.

3. The entry of a tax decree in the chancery record, with the
name of the circuit judge attached, countersigned by the
register, and the date of filing appended, is sufficient evi-
dence that a decree was duly made and filed, although no
decree is found in the files of the court, nor any entry thereof
upon the calendar. Id.

4. Under section 70 of the tax law of 1893 (Act No. 206, Pub.
Acts 1893), providing that the practice with reference to
setting aside sales shall be the same, so far as applicable, as in
cases of mortgage foreclosure, but that no sale shall be set
aside after confirmation except where the taxes were paid or
the land was exempt from taxation, a sale will not be set
aside after confirmation, either on petition or bill of review,
except for one of the reasons specified, or (under Benedict v.
Auditor General, 104 Mich. 269) for defects going to the juris-
diction. Id.

*

*

*

*

*

*

**

5. Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, § 14, subd. 8, provides that "per-
sonal property of nonresidents, and all forest products,
shall be assessed * *
to the person having control of
the premises, * * dock, yard,
* * * or warehouse
where such property is situated
on the second Mon-
day of April.' Certain lumber belonging to a nonresident
was assessed to the owners of a dock by virtue of this sec-
tion, and, their property having been seized under a warrant
for the collection of the tax, they brought replevin, claiming
that the dock was not under their control in such sense as to
authorize the assessment. Held, that in view of 2 How. Stat.
$8318, providing that "no replevin shall lie for any property
taken by virtue of any warrant for the collection of any tax
* in pursuance of any statute of this State," the action
could not be maintained. Forster v. Brown, 86.

*

6. Under section 70 of the tax law of 1893, providing that "no
sale shall be set aside after confirmation, except in cases
where the taxes were paid or the property was exempt from
taxation," leave to file a bill of review should not be granted
in a tax proceeding after confirmation of the sale, unless a
total want of jurisdiction to make the decree is shown, or
one of the two causes mentioned in the statute exists; and
the fact that leave to file such bill is granted for one of the
causes mentioned does not authorize a consideration of other
questions, which were conclusively determined by the orig-
inal decree. Berkey v. Burchard, 101.

7. The provision of section 84 of the tax law, requiring the pur-

TAXES-Continued.

chaser of State tax lands to pay all taxes remaining a lien
thereon at the time of his purchase, has reference solely to
private purchases made at the office of the auditor general,
and does not apply to a purchase of such lands at public sale
made by the county treasurer under section 79 of the law.
Id.

8. An assessment of property in the name of "S. K. M.," instead
of "S. K. M. Lumber Co.," does not invalidate the tax, in
view of the provision of section 99, Act No. 206, Pub. Acts
1893, that no tax assessed upon any property shall be held
invalid on account of the property having been assessed
without the name of the owner, or in the name of any person
other than the owner, where it does not prejudice the prop-
erty rights of the person whose property is taxed. City of
Menominee v. S. K. Martin Lumber Co., 201.

9. A city may maintain assumpsit against the owner of personal
property to recover taxes assessed thereon, though the assess-
ment, through a mistake, was made in the name of one other
than the owner. Id.

10. The tax laws of 1889 and 1893 do not provide that deeds exe-
cuted thereunder shall be prima facie evidence of title in the
grantee, but attempt to make them conclusive evidence,
which it is beyond the power of the legislature to do (Taylor
v. Deveaux, 100 Mich. 581); and therefore one who claims
under such a deed has the burden of showing the regularity
of all anterior proceedings, the same as at common law.
Dawson v. Peter, 274.

11. The tax law does not prescribe the form of the deeds to be
given thereunder, and hence a deed in the form prescribed by
2 How. Stat. § 5729, defining what shall be a sufficient quit-
claim deed, is sufficient to pass title to the grantee. Id.

12. Under section 70 of the tax law of 1893, providing that, for
want of bidders at the annual sale, the land shall be bid off
to the State, "for the State, county, and township, in propor-
tion to the" amount due each; and section 84, providing for
the after sale and conveyance of all the right, title, and
interest of the State" in the lands so acquired, -the pur-
chaser takes a fee in the land, if all the proceedings are
regular. Id.

13. In an action to recover taxes paid under protest, the assess-
ment cannot be shown to be invalid for reasons not specified
in the protest. Aurora Iron Mining Co. v. City of Ironwood,
325.

14. The court will not interfere with an assessment, in the making
and confirming of which the assessor and board of review
acted in good faith, because of an alleged overvaluation of
the property. Id.

15. It is not within the power of the court to set aside a tax sale
after confirmation, even though the decree has not been
enrolled, except for a total want of jurisdiction to enter the
decree, or for one of the causes specified in section 70 of the

TAXES-Continued.

tax law (Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893), namely, that the
taxes were paid or the land was exempt from taxation.
Brooks v. Auditor General, 329.

16. The validity of a tax decree is not affected by the fact that,
after the affidavit of publication of the petition and order of
hearing had been duly filed with the register of the court, as
required by the statute, he inserted it in the tax record. Id.
17. A tax decree is ineffectual, and will be vacated at the instance
of a property owner, where no amounts were extended in the
column of the tax record headed Amount Decreed against
Lands," as required by Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, § 66, ex-
cept by the county treasurer, without the authority of the
court, after the record had passed from the control of the
court. Morgan v. Tweddle, 350.

18. As a condition to relief from an invalid tax sale, the peti-
tioner should be required to pay the taxes, interest, and
charges against the land. Id.

19. A building erected by an association incorporated for the
maintenance of a free public reading room and library is not
occupied by it "solely " for such purpose, within the meaning
of Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, § 7, subd. 4, conferring in such
case exemption from taxation, where the premises were leased
to and used by a social club on condition that it maintain
such room and library, and a part of the building was sub-
let to a military organization. Auditor General v. Women's

Temperance Ass'n of Manistee, 430.

20. Where an amount charged against a city for a special relief
fund is included in the city collector's settlement with the
county treasurer, although no tax for the purpose is spread on
the city rolls, the collector may compel its return, independ-
ent of the question whether he knew of its inclusion. Webster
v. Wheeler, 601..

21. A county treasurer has no right to receive from a city col-
lector an amount charged against the city for a special fund,
when he has knowledge that the city spread no tax for the
purpose. Id.

22. The fact that the amount so received has been credited by
the county treasurer to the specified fund is no defense to a
proceeding to compel its repayment. Id.

23. A personal tax levied upon the mains of a water company
prior to Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, § 8, subd. 16, authoriz.
ing the assessment of such fixtures as personal property, was
without jurisdiction and void. City of Grand Haven v.
Grand Haven Waterworks, 652.

See APPEAL AND ERROR (2, 3); DRAINS (2, 3); MANDAMUS (3,
4); MORTGAGES (11); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1, 3, 5, 6,
12); RAILROAD COMPANIES (3-5, 9, 10); VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER (10).

TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-See MARRIED WOMEN (5).