they could not get rid of this order but by appealing ; and if 'they had appealed, the truth might have appeared and when the facts had appeared to the justices, upon the whole truth being disclosed, the paupers might in the end of the inquiry, have been sent to Wharton.-And by THE COURT the rule was discharged, and the order of sessions affirmed. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 661.

So in Spitalfields v. Bromley, Ea. 11 Ann. A was removed to the parish of Stepney. which did not appeal. On removal of that order into the King's Bench, exception was taken, that the removal ought to have been to the township of Spitalfields, for Stepney is divided into four townships, and the poor have been removed from one township to another in the same parish, and the statute takes notice of townships as well as parishes, and Spitalfields is an hamlet of Stepney. But by THE COURT. If a person is removed to a wrong place, that 'place ought to appeal,' and so ought Stepney, if it were a wrong place, or else the order will be conclusive upon 'them;' but this is here a matter not in the record. Jusfices of peace are not obliged to take notice of the division of parishes into townships and villages, which maintain their own poor, severally and distinctly; Stepney upon an appeal might have shown that the person did belong to the township of Spitalfields which might have been a reasonable cause to discharge the order. Two townships within a parish are the same as two parishes, yet the churchwardens are overseers of the poor of the whole parish (though so divided), and have a superin tendancy over the whole township and villages. 18 Vin. Abr. 468.

So an order removing a certificate person from a third parish to the certificated parish, is conclusive upon the certificated parish, if unappealed from. Thus in the K. v. Ealing, Mic. 25 Geo. 3, a man and his family came by certificate from the parish of Ealing,to the parish of Barking, where he resided un til after he had a son born: this son married the present pauper, who sometimes afterwards went with her children to reside in the parish of St. Matthew Bethnal Green, from which they were removed in September 1779, as likely to become charge. able by an order of two justices, to Barking, as the place of their last legal settlement, from which order Barking did not appeal. The pauper and her family remained in Barking till the 2d of August 1783, when the pauper was removed by an order of two justices under the certificate from Barking to Ealing; and the sessions on appeal, confirmed the order.But by lord Mansfield, The order of removal from St. Matthew, Bethnal Green to Barking is unappealed from and conclusive.-Orders quashed. 2 Bott, Const's ed. 801. Caldecot's Cas. 472.

So an order removing a wife, is, if unappealed from, as conclusive as if the husband himself had been removed with her.--Thus in the K. v. Towcester, Hil. 25 Geo. 3, a man and his VOL. IV.

Ff

wife came with a certificate from Harleston to Towcester? during their residence there under the certificate, they had four children born, and the husband gained a settlement in Tow. cester by renting a tenement of 10l. a-year; afterwards, and in the absence of the husband, the wife and children were removed by an order of two justices, and which was unappealed against, from Towcester to Hurleston: subsequent to this re moval, the husband went to Harleston to his family, and after. wards was removed by an order of two justices to Towcester. The question was, Whether the settlement of the husband

was concluded by the first order of removal of his wife and children?' THE SESSIONS thought not, and confirmed the last order. It was moved to quash these orders, on the authority of the above mentioned case of the K. v. Hinxworth; and no counsel appearing to shew cause, both the orders were quashed. 2 Bott, Const's ed. 118. 801.

And if a feme covert be removed by an order of two justices describing her as widow, and there be no appeal against it, it is conclusive not only as to her settlement, but as to that of her husband also; this was decided in the K. v. Rudgely, Tr. Term, 40 Geo. 3, which was as follows: two justices removed the pauper and his wife from Acton Trussell to Rudgely, and on an appeal to the quarter sessions, the court confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of the court of King's Bench on the following case:-" By a certificate dated the 4th March "1727, directed to the churchwardens and overseers of Acton "Trussell, the then officers of the parish of Rudgely, acknow. "leged John Smith, Joyce his wife, and his son Emanuel "Smith, (the pauper) then about three months old, to "be inhabitants legally settled in Rudgely; about forty years 66 ago the pauper, Emanuel Smith, was married in Glouces "ter to Elizabeth Gettens; they parted in the year 1787, "and since that time never saw or heard of each other "until after the removal next mentioned; that is to say, by an order of two magistrates, the said Elizabeth was removed on the 9th of November, 1799, to Acton Trussell by the "name and description of Elizabeth Smith widow, from the "parish of St. George Hanover Square to Acton Trussell: "there was no appeal against the last mentioned order." THE QUESTION WAS, Whether or not the former order, by which the pauper's wife was removed to Acton Trussell, and against which there was no appeal, was conclusive as to the persons removed by the present order? BY THE COURT. Nothing is more convenient in any part of the law than certainty, and especially in cases of this kind, when it is considered that those who are to sit in judgment at the sessions, are generally speaking not members of the law: it is therefore of great consequence that we should abide by what has been already decided in settlement cases; the general rule, that an order of sessions unappealed from is conclusive, is admitted, and if we were to determine in this cass that the former order of removal was not conclusive, we should

shake the authority of all the decisons on this subject: it has however been objected, in support of the order of sessions that the former order gave no notice to the other parish that the husband's settlement might be litigated under it, because she was only described as widow generally, without saying of whom she was the widow; but this order certainly did upon the face of it point out that the husband's settlement might come in question under it, for the woman who removed as a aidow, in which case the presumption is, that she was removed to the place where her husband was settled; it therefore behoved the parish to which the removal was made, to enquire how that settlement was gained: this would have been an ob ject of enquiry on an appeal against that order: but as the parish did not then litigate the question, we are bound according to all the authorities to determine that the former order of removal is conclusive, and that not as to her only, but as to the husband likewise.-Both orders quashed. 8 Ter. Rep.

620.

And an order of removal, unappealed from, being conclusive as to the pauper's last legal settlement; a new settlement can only be gained by some act wholly subsequent to his removal. Thus in the K. v. Kenilworth, Tr. 28 Geo. 3, the pauper was born and settled in the parish of Kenilworth. On the 10th of May 1765, he was hired to a man at Birminghum for one year. On the said 10th of May he entered into the said service, and continued in the said parish of Birmingham, until the first day of April 1766, when he was taken up on a charge of bastardy, and was married the next day. His master did not make any complaint against him, nor dischargo him from his said service. On the 34 of the same month of April 1766, the pauper was removed, by an order of removal, from Birmingham to Kenilworth, and was delivered with such order to the officers of the said last mentioned parish, and continued under such order in the same parish until the 7th of the said month of April 1766, and then returned back to Birmingbam into his said master's service, who willingly received bint again; and the said pauper continued with his said master in Birmingham in such service until the end of the year for which he was hired to him as aforesaid, and received his full year's wages. The order of removal of the 3d of April 1766 was not appealed against.-By Buller J. There is no proposition in the law of settlements more clear than this, That an order of removal unappealed against is conclusive against all the world; and this is so clearly and so universally established, that it ought never to be impeached. At the same time the rule is, That the order of removal though unappealed from, does not at all affect a subsequent settlement.' Then the question here Whether the pauper gained any settlement in Birmingham, subsequent to the order of removal? Now in this case he did no act by which he could gain a settlement in Birmingham after the order of removal. The circumstances of the pauper's

having been apprehended on a charge of bastardy, and of his marriage, I lay entirely out of the question; for it was competent to the master to receive him again after he was discharged out of custody, if he pleased; and the servant might have served his master after he was married as well as before. But what I rely on is this, that after the order of removal, unappealed from, the pauper could not legally return to the parish from whence he had been removed; it would have been a crime in him to do so; and if he had been indicted for such a disobedience of the order, it would have been no defence to him to have urged that he returned for the purpose of completing his contract. The order of removal put an end to the service; and if he could not return without committing a crime, he could not be liable to an action by the master for not completing the contract. There is a great difference whether the party is disabled by his own act, or by the act of law, from performing his contract; he is answerable for the former; but if the law intervenes, and says he shall not complete the contract, it puts an end to the contract. Now in this case the pauper returned after the order of removal to the parish of Birmingham, where he served a month; but that could not gain him a settlement there for the act subsequent to the order of removal, by which he was to gain a settlement, should be complete in itself.'Grose J. I doubt whether the party was liable to be remov. ed; but there having been an order of removal unappealed from, it is decisive; and he has done no subsequent act to gain a settlement. Rule discharged. 2 Term Rep. 598.

But an order of removal is only conclusive as to those who are mentioned in it. Thus in the K. v. Southowram, Tr. 26 Geo. 3, the pauper Elizabeth Booth, widow, and her three children were removed by an order of two justices from the township of Southouram to the township of Northowram. On appeal to the sessions, they state, That it appeared by evidence that the father of Jeremiah Booth, the pauper's late husband, was born and settled at Halifax, and that the said Jeremiah was likewise born there, and had not done any act to gain a settlement; that on the 6th of April 1774, two justices for the west riding of Yorkshire, made an order for removing the father of the said Jeremiah Booth and Elizabeth his wife (but nol any of their children) from Halifax to Northowram aforesaid: which order was duly served upon the then overseers of the poor of Northowram, who thereupon received the two paupers, and did not appeal against the order: some years before, and at the time of the said removal, Jeremiah was married to Eli'zabeth, one of the paupers, by whom he had the three other paupers, and from the time of his marriage until his death lived in Halifax, in a dwelling-house which he rented himself, 'se; arate and independent of his father, and was not removed by or mentioned in the said order, nor then was any part of his family. Whereupon the sessions discharged the order of two justices, subject to the opinion of the court, Whether the

settlement of Elizabeth Booth and her three children was by inference to be deemed at Halifax, or to follow the settlement of the father to Northowram ?-By THE COURT. The order of removal, unappealed from, is conclusive as to the father and mother, but not as to the son, because he is not mentioned in it ; and the sessions have expressly found that the son was settled at Halifax.—Order of sessions affirmed. 1 Term Rep. 353.

And an order is not conclusive for want of appeal, if it is deserted and given up by consent.--Thus in the K. v. Llanrhydd, Hil. 10 Geo. 3, two justices, by an order under their hands and seals, removed the paupers from the parish of Llanrhydd to Ruthin; and the paupers were delivered to the offi cers of Ruthin; who maintained them for a while, and for some time after, at the joint expence of both parishes: and notice of appeal to the said order being served on the officers of Lianrhydd, by the officers of Ruthin, on the morning of the quarter sessions, previous to the filing of the said appeal, the officers of 'Llanrhydd consented to take the paupers back to their 'custody, without giving the parishioners of Ruthin the trouble of appealing against such order.' And thereupon the parishioners of Llanrhydd removed the said paupers, by order under the hands and seals of two other justices, from Llanrhydd to Denbigh; and upon appeal, their settlement was proved to be at Denbigh but it appearing in evidence on the behalf of the parish of Denbigh, That the first order, removing them to Ruthin as 'aforesaid, had not been appealed against-THE SESSIONS were of opinion that the said order of removal from Llanrhydd to 'Denbigh ought to be quashed: and it was quashed accordingly. It was moved to quash this order of sessions; and the objection was, That though the principle upon which they grounded their opinion is in general right, namely, That an order of removal submitted to and not appealed from, is conclusive upon the non-appealing parish, as against all the 'world; yet this general rule is to be understood to relate only to a subsisting order, but not to a deserted one: and therefore the sessions have made a great mistake in applying. this general principle to the particular case of the present order made for removing the paupers from Llanrhydd to Ruthin; which being found to be a wrong one, was by consent of both parties concerned in it abandoned and deserted, and the paupers taken back again by the parish in whose favour it was made; and was consequently at an end, and must be considered as if it never had existed.-On the other hand it was said, that it was not in the power of private persons to put an end to the order for removing these paupers to Ruthin, whilst an appeal was thus going on against it. The order has removed them to Ruhin. Ruthin has not appealed. Consequently Ruthin is concluded, as against all other parishes, to dispute their belong. jag to Ruthin-But by lord Mansfield. That order was made in favor of Llanrhydd: and Llanrhydd gave it up, and con. sented to take the paupers back, without giving Ruthin the