chargeable, without saying to what parish, is bad. Thus in St. Nicholas, Gloucester v. Si. Peter, Bristol, Hil. 11 Geo. 1, upon an order of removal, the reciting part of it was, Where as the pauper was likely to become chargeable to the parish of St. Nicholas; but in the adjudicating part, it was only said, that she was likely to become chargeable without saying, to the parish of St. Nicholas.-EXCEPTION being taken to this the Court allowed it to be fatal, and said, they would not take these orders to be good by intendment: for the Court will not intend a jurisdiction in the justices, where they do not entitle themselves to it upon the face of the order. 2 Sess. Cas. 73.

So in the case of Bourne v. Spalding, Ea. 8 Geo, 2, the com. plaint was, that the pauper was likely to become chargeable to the parish of Spalding: and the adjudication was, that the pauper was likely to become chargeable generally, without say ing to the said parish of Spalding.And by lord Hardwicke Ch. J. There must be either an express adjudication, or a plain reference to the complaint, because it is the very point upon which the jurisdiction of the two justices is founded: here the complaint is right; but the adjudication is at large, there being no words of reference; it is only that the pauper is likely to become chargeable: now this may be to his relations or parents, as well as to the parish; and he cited the above case of St. Nicholas, and added, that there was no case that he could meet with, upon the strictest enquiry, where an adjudication at large, without some words of reference to the complaint, was holden to be good. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 39.

So in Uffculm v. Clisthydon, Mic. 13 Geo. 2, in an order of removal, it was objected, that it is said, the paupers are likely to become chargeable, but does not say to what parish. And THE COURT held this to be fatal. A complaint must appear of the paupers being likely to become chargeable to the parish from whence removed: and there must be an adjudication of the truth of it for the justices have no authority without such complaint, and likewise an adjudication of the truth of it. We cannot support an order by implication. There is no necessity indeed for any particular set or form of words, but there must be an adjudication of it in some words or other. Now here is no adjudication of it at all; therefore the order must be quashed. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 138.

And in the same term, an order between the inhabitants of Netherton and Hoblench was given up as indefensible, on the like objection. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 139.

. But in the K. v. Honiton, Ea. 10 Geo. 3, It was moved to quash an order, because it stated that the pauper and his family have become chargeable, not that they have been, or that they are, or are likely to be so.-But THE COURT was of opinion, that have become chargeable, must mean that they are become chargeable, and that the order was sufficient; and therefore discharged the rule for quashing it. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 680. 2 Bott, Const's ed. 778,

And if the order be to remove a certificate-man, it must be adjudged that he is actually chargeable*.-Thus in Walden v. Fletwick, Tr. 2 Ann. an order, reciting that, Whereas com "plaint has been made unto us that J S, who is lately come into the parish with a certificate, is actually chargeable to the parish,' was quashed; for the justices must adjudge him to be chargeable, or at least must say it appeared to them that he was so; though the justices need not adjudge the place that gives the certificate, to be the place of his last legal settlement. 2 Salkeld, 530.

And an adjudication that a certificate-person is actually chargeable, is matter of substance, and cannot be supplied by amendment at sessions.-For in the case of Great Bedwin v. Wilcot, Tr. 15 Geo. 2, in an order of removal of a certificate. person, there was no adjudication that such certificate-person was actually become chargeable. On appeal, the sessions, in pursuance of stat. 5 Geo. 2. c. 19, amended the said order in this particular, considering it as matter of form.-But by Lee Ch. J. A certificate-person must be adjudged to be actually chargeable, otherwise he cannot be removed; and this amendment might be the real merits on which the case depended; and it would be a detrimental construction of the act to take it so Jargely, and would be giving the sessions an original jurisdiction. Order quashed. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 163. 2 Strange, 1158. 2 Sess. Cas. 142.

But it is not necessary, on the removal of a certificate-person, to state in the order that the certificate was allowed. For in the Q. v. Newton, Hil. 9 Ann. an order for removing a certificate-person did not set forth that it was allowed by two justices, but adjudged the parish which granted the certificate, to be the place of the last legal settlement,---And by Probyn J. The order is good; for it sets out that the pauper came by cer tificate, and the justices adjudged he was actually chargeable, and that Newton was the place of his last legal settlement, he having gained no settlement elsewhere since; which sets out the whole reason of their judgment, and would make the settlement good if there had been no certificate. 1 Sess. Cas. 161.

And in an order, removing a man and his family, the persons composing the family ought to be particularly named and described.---Thus in the K. v. Johnson, Hil. 10 Will. 3, the order adjudging Sandhurst in Kent to be his last legal settlement, ordered, that Johnson and his wife and family should be remop. ed to Sandhurst, and this was quashed, because it did not appear what was meant by his family, and some of them might have a legal settlement in the parish, though Johnson had not. 2 Salk. 485.

*For the justices have no power to remove certificated persons, until they become actually chargeable to the parish. See the cases of Little Kire v.. Woodfall; and the K. v. St. Mary Westport, and the Q. v. Whiten, 11 Mod. Rep. 64. and Teelby v. Willerton, 1 Strange,

77.

So in Beaston v. Scisson, Mic. 5 Geo. 1, an order for the removal of Thomas Black and his family, was upon the first reading quashed as to the family, because too general. 1 Strange,

114.

So in Flixton v. Royston, Tr. 9 Will. 3, an order to remove Jane Smith and her five children was quashed, because it neither tells the names nor ages of the children: for she might have more children than five, and some of those five might have gained settlements. 1 Sess. Cus. 11. Foley, 278.

But in Hobey v. Kingsbury, Tr. 8 Geo. 1, two justices adjudging the settlement of the husband to be at Kingsbury, and that he is likely to become chargeable to Hobey, send him, his wife, and son of one year old, to Kingsbury: and, Whether this was good as to the wife and child? was the question-And it was held well enough, and the order confirmed. 1 Strange, 527. And an order of removal, which includes children, ought to state their several ages.-Thus in the K. v. Trinity in Chester, Hil. 11 Geo. 1, exception was taken to an order removing a father, wife and children, that it ought to have set forth the ages of the children; and though it was said, that these are the children, and they gain a relative settlement as part of the father's family, therefore the ages of them need not be set out, yet the exception was allowed by the Court to be good: and THIS RULE was laid down: Every order that concerns the removal of a fa= ther and his children, ought to shew the ages of the children: for they may have gained a settlement in some other right, as by serving as apprentices, as servants, &c. therefore their age ought to be set forth, that it may appear to the Court, that by reason of their infancy they have not gained any settlement in their own right, but have only a relative settlement from their father. Se ten years is an age that the Court would presume a child could gain a settlement at in his own right; but if it appears upon the order, that the child was above seven years old, the order ' must set forth, that such child hath not gained a settlement in 'his own right;' and if the child hath gained no settlement, then his father's settlement is derived to him. 2 Sess. Cas. 74.

So in the case of the K. v. Bowling, Ea. 15 Geo. 2, the order removed the father and children (without setting forth their ages) from Bradford to Bowling, and adjudged Bowling to be the place of the father's last legal settlement.-BY THE COURT. The establshed rule is; That when children are sent in consequence of their father's settlement, either the ages of the children must be set out, to shew they are of such tender years as not to have gained a settlement for themselves, or there must be an express adjudication of their having gained no other settlement. Burrow's Sett. Cass. 177.

But if there is an express adjudication that children were last legally settled in a parish, their ages need not be set forth in the order. Thus in Ringmore v. Petworth, Tr. 10 Ann. the order was, "Whereas such a person and his children "likely to become chargeable, and their last legal settle**ment was at Ringmore."-It was moved to quash the same,

are

Direction of the order.

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the children's ages were not set forth.-But by THE COURT. It is not necessary in this case, for the order says, that they were last legally settled in Ringmore: and then no matter what their ages are. Cas. of Sett. & Rem. 41.

So in culm v. Clisthydon, Mic. 13 Geo. 2, it was objected to an order of removal of a man, his wife, and three chil dren, naming them, that the ages of the children were not men. tioned: to this it was answered, that the objection to the omis sion of specifying the ages of the children, has been often over. ruled, where it is expressly adjudged to be the settlement of the children themselves. And tha: here it was adjudged, that their last legal settlement is in the parish of Uffculm.—And by Lee Ca. J. The distinction is right, that if it be expressly adjudg. ed to be the settlement of the children themselves, there is no need to set out their ages; otherwise it is necessary in conse quential settlements. Burrow's Sett. Cas. 138.

And the order of removal must state the name of the pauper removed, or describe him as a person unknown...-Thus in Southell v. Needwell, Mic. 11 Ann. the order was thus: "where. 66 as a certain woman was brought-to-bed of a female bastard "child in Needwell, and after dropped in Southell: these are "therefore to require you to convey"...It was objected, that it was not said who this woman was.---1 And by Parker, Ch. J. You must either name her, or say you do not know her: as where a person is indicted for stealing the goods of a person unknown, you must aver it to be a person unknown; but for stealing the goods of a certain person without saying unknown, would be ill.---Order quashed. Cas. of Seit. & Rem. 57.

An order of removal must be directed to the officers of the parish from which the paupers are removed.---Thus in St. George's v. St. Olave's, Ea. 1 Ann, the order was to convey a pauper to the parish of St. Olave's, and it was directed to the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of St. Olave. Quashed; for they ought and can only order the parish.othicers, where the intrusion is made, to make the removal. 2 Salk. 493.

And as one parish removes, and the other is to receive, if the order be directed to both parishes to remove and receive, it will be bad. Bedwich's Case, Ea. 7 Will. 3. Comber. 325.

If the county be named in the margin, it is sufficient if there be a clear reference to it in the body of the order. Thus in Ufculm v. Clisthydon, Mic. 13 Geo. 2, it was objected, that the direction does not mention in what county the parish of Clisthydon lies to this it was answered, that "Devon" is in the margin; and the order is directed to the churchwardens and overseers of Clisthydon, and to the churchwardens and overseers of Uffculm, in the said county; and it appears, that the justices are justices of the county of Devon. The county being in the margin is sufficient in an order.-Lee Ch. J. was somewhat doubtful, whether it was sufficiently answered.---Page J. said, he took it to be settled, that the county in the margin is sufficient, if there be a clear reference to it. The order, how.

er, was quashed on another ground *. Burrow's Sett. Cats. 138.

But in the K. v. Holbeck in Leeds, Mic. 16 Geo. 2, it was abjected in this case to the order of removal, that the borough of Leeds is not mentioned in the body of the order, but only in the margin, and therefore it does not appear that the two justices had jurisdiction to make it.---But by Lee Ch. J. I take it to be settled, that, in orders, the margin is to be considered as part of the order, and a plain clear reference to it is sufficient. The margin is, "The borough of Leeds," and the direction is, To the church-wardens and overseers of the township of Holbeck in the said borough," This reference is sufficient in order.The other three judges concurred. Burrow's Sett. Caes, 198.

And an order of removal to a parish by the name of a town, will be sufficient, though the proper name of the parish be mitel, if there be no other parish in the town. Thus in the

Tapham, Tr. Ter. 46 Geo. 3, on an appeal to the sessions from a order of removal; before the merits of the case were pet, an objection was taken to the order for its uncerty, from the order being directed to the parish of Poole or and county of Poole, there being but one parish there, the per description of which was St. James's, but the sessions rraled the objection and proceeded to hear the appeal; and it being objected that even if this error were amendable at dons by the statute, they had not amended it, but mereoverruled the objection. THE COURT said there was no objecto the description of the parish of Poole, in omitting the 's name, there being but one parish in the town, and Poole the common name of the place: and that the parish of of Poole had themselves considered this description sufto call upon them, to appeal to the sessions against the by whom the objection to the misnomer had been over. 7 East's Rep. 466.

But in the K. v. Moor Critchil, Mic. Ter. 4 Geo. 3, where order of removal was in this form: "Wilts to wit.---To the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of D in the county of Wilts aforesaid to remove and convey, and to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the path of M. C. in the county of Dorset, to receive those Whereas complaint has been made by you the churchwar s&c. of D. in the county of Wilts aforesaid, unto us wicze hands and seals are hereunto subscribed and set, being of his majesty's justices of the peace in and for the suid ty (one whereof is of the quorum) that E. S. &c." It Boved that this original order of the two justices and the af sessions eonfirming the same, might be quashed for a of jurisdiction in the magistrates making the original

See p. 391 supra.