assigns, to the only proper use and behoof of the panper an Mary his wife, their heirs and assigns for ever. In conse quence hereof, a house was built on the ground, and th pauper entered on and lived on and enjoyed the same for te years and upwards. The pauper and his wife then joined an levied a fine, and mortgaged the premises for thirty pound and afterwards sold the same for forty guineas, to a person wh is now seized thereof in fee....THE SESSIONS held the settleme to be in Charlton.---And BY THE COURT (after argument a full consideration). The material question is on the constructi of the stat. 9 Geo. 1. c. 7, and we are of opinion it exter 6 only to pecuniary purchases,' and it was so considered by Court in the K. v. Marwood. It does not go to an est in the family conveyed by one part of the family to anoth Order confirmed. 2 Bott, Const's ed. 647. Caldecot's Cases, 4 So in the K. v. Ufton, Ea. 29 Geo. 3, the pauper origin settled at Ufton, came to reside with his father about twe three years ago, on a cottage and premises at Mortimer Ha which his father, by deed of feoffment, dated 10th Oct 1766, duly executed, conveyed to him in fee; in consid tion of natural love and affection, and of ten pounds to paid by the pauper.' About three years and a quarter a wards, the panper obtained from the parish of Ufte "certificate dated 1st June 1770;' and afterwards occasio received relief from Ufton during his residence in the co at Mortimer. The father lived with him upon the premise his death about eight years ago. The pauper was his e 'son and heir at law, and continued to reside upon the 'mises until the year 1788,' when he sold the same for The pauper then returned to Ufton and was removed thence to Mortimer.--By Lord Kenyon. In the K. v. Marwo was contended that purchase under the 9 Geo.1. c. 7. was to b derstood as contradistinguished from descent; as in a former ( upon the subject. But the court exploded that idea; said, that the legislature only intended to prevent persons made small purchases for pecuniary considerations from ga a settlement; but that donations from a father to his chil not come within the statute. Now in this case we are b to take notice that this conveyance was in consideratio natural love and affection as well as 107. And we ca suppose that 10l. was the real value of the estate, for ther circumstances in the case to shew the contrary; the cas self states, that it was afterwards sold for 50%. Perhaps the was taken because the father had some other child, upon he wished to bestow something arising out of his estate he took this mode of doing it. This being a donation f father to a son, is clearly not a purchase within the 9 G c. 7, notwithstanding part of the consideration was in m And though the certificate was conclusive at the time, *The K. v. Saw ridgeworth, supra. ป afterwards done away by the panper's residence on his own property at Mortimer. Ashhurst J. and Buller J. assented. 3 Term Rep. 251. So the surrender of an old lease, and the taking of a new one, is not a purchase within the statute. Thus in the K. v. Tarrant, Launceston, Tr. 22 Geo. 3, the father of the pauper was settled in Stower Paine, and married a woman whose mother was possessed of an ancient cottage in the parish of Marnhull, for a term of 99 years, determinable on three lives; immediately upon the said marriage, the mother gave her daughter and husband, the said pauper's father, an abiding in the said cottage; shortly after which, she built a tenement adjoining thereto, and resided partly in the one and partly in the other of the said tenements, till the time of her death in the year 1750: her son-in-law and his wife occupied the original cottage during the whole of the time; but there was no gift or conveyance of the same made by the mother; the mother had besides her said daughter, a son, and previous to her death, she said she meant to give a house to each of her said children, and if either of them chose, on her death, to buy the other part, he would then have the whole; the mother died intestate, and no letters of administration were taken out; but upon her death, the son-in-law, and his wife continued in the occupation of the original cottage; and her own son took possession of the new tenement; afterwards, in the year 1755, the son-in-law purchased the new built tenement of his brother-in-law for four guineas; and on the 5th of February in the same year, surrendered the old lease to the lady of the manor; who in consideration thereof, and also in consideration of the sum of thirty shillings, 'granted him all the said antient cottage, with certain appurtenances thereto belonging, for the term of 99 years, determinfable on three lives, at the yearly rent of 2s. 6d. per annum ;' and it was declared by the renewed lease, that his executors or administrators should hold the said premises after his death, in trust for his wife, if she survived him, and after both their deaths, for the benefit of their son John, in case he should survive; the paper's father continued in the possession of the said original cottage from the time of the death of his mother-in-law, in 1750, and from the time of the renewal of the said lease to the time of his death, in 1767; after which his widow continued in the possession of the said premises till the year 1771; when she conveyed the same to her son John; and the pauper Thomas (another son) continued to live with his mother, as part of her family, for near a twelvemonth after the death of his father.'-By lord Mansfield. This was not a purchase within the meaning of the statute 9 Geo. 1. c.. 7, but only a surrender of the old lease and getting a new one, paying the fine. Willes, J. After such a length of possession, the vendor has. reserved the use and occu the case of the K. v. Cold Ashton is in point-Ashhurst J. and Buller J. concurred. Cald. Cas. 209. And one who is resident on an estate, granted to him for lives, in consideration of two guineas price, and one shilling rent, cannot be removed therefrom, though actually chargeable. For BY THE COURT, the power of the justices to remove any person is founded on the stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12, which extends 66 to any person who shall come to settle in any "tenement under the yearly value of 10%." and those words having never been deemed to relate to persons living on their own estates, whether acquired by purchase or otherwise, or at whatever value; it followed that every person residing irremoveably for 40 days in the parish where his own property was, gained a settlement; this encouraged persons to make small purchases for the purpose of settling themselves in particular parishes, and it was to remedy that inconvenience that the statute of 9 Geo. 1, was passed, which provides that "no person shall be deemed to acquire any settlement in any parish by virtue of any estate or interest in such parish, whereof "the estate doth not amount to 30l. for any longer or further "time than such person shall inhabit on such estate, and shall "there be liable to be removed," &c. The K. v. Martley, Ea. Ter. 44 Gev. 3. 5 East's Rep. 40. 1 Smith's Rep. 344. Residing in a But a person does not gain a settlement by residing on an espurchased tate which he has purchased, if the grantor has reserved the use estate of which and occupation of the whole premises for life.--Thus in the K. v. Eatington, Hil. 31 Geo. 3, one Malings, who was seised in fee of a cottage in Eatington, in which he resided, being old pation for life, and infirm, applied to the pauper and his wife, who were set. tled at Hooke Norton, to come and live with him at Eatington, and take care of him; and, in order to induce him so to do, agreed to convey the cottage to the pauper. He accordingly, by indentures of lease and release, of the 28th and 29th of No vember 1783, 'in consideration of 361. therein mentioned, to be * paid by the pauper,' granted and conveyed the cottage to the pauper in fee. But in the release there was a proviso, 'that it should be lawful to and for Malings to live, inhabit, dwell iD, AND OCCUPY the said cottage or tenement with the appur tenances as he heretofore had done, and now does, for and • during the term of his natural life. No money was paid by the pauper to Malings at the time of the execution of the deed, as a consideration for the purchase; but the premises were then of the full value of 301. Immediately after the deed was exe. cuted, the pauper and his wife went to reside at Eatington with Malings at this house so conveyed, and resided there with him till they were removed by the present order to Hooke "Norton.' in 1785 a mortgage of the cottage was executed by the pauper for 12. the whole of which he received. In by the terms of the proviso, the father is to be considered as having reserved merely the liberty to live in the cottage, or 'an estate for life?' and there is no doubt but that the latter was intended. Something more was meant than a bare licence to inhabit or live in the house, for the word occUPY is added to them and it does not even rest there, for these are followed by other words, as he heretofore has done, and now does, for life.' Then how did he occupy it before? He had the whole before. If it had been intended that the father-in-law should reserve merely a right to live in the cottage, and that the son-in-law should also have the same right during the father's life, the former would have reserved a right to inhabit particular rooms in the house; but he reserved the whole for his life. The intention therefore clearly was, that the father-in-law should enjoy the es tate for his life, and that the pauper should only take the remainder expectant thereon.-Grose J. not being in court when the case was argued, gave no opinion. 4 Term Rep. 177. Han estate be granted for a pecuniary consideration, and such Of the value of consideration does not amount to 301. a residence thereon for the estate if forty days will not gain a settlement.--And it seems that apurchased. graat of a copyhold on the payment of a fine, reserving also an heriot and rent, is to be considered as a purchase, and the fine being less than 30%. will not gain a settlement. Thus in the K. v. Warblington, Ea. 26 Geo. 3, the father of the paupe came into the parish of Havant with a certificate from Warbling ton: afterwards, the lord of the manor of Havant granted t him and his heirs, by copy of court-roll, a parcel of the wast ground within the parish of Havant, which did not appear ever have been granted before: the pauper's father built a hous thereon, and lived therein for several years as the owner ther of: he afterwards borrowed 100%. and for securing the san surrendered the premises; and on the money not being pai the mortgagee was admitted: after his death, his heir at la sold the equity of redemption to the mortgagee for 20. 17 It appeared from the copy of the court-roll, that the pauper father was admitted on the lord's grant to one parcel of la ⚫ called the Gravel land, and in the copy of his admission we these words, "fine one shilling, heriot one shilling, quit-re one shilling." It appeared that the lord of the manor w used to grant parcels of the waste of the said manor for sm pecuniary considerations, and he was never known to make a grant without a pecuniary consideration.-THE COURT incli to the opinion that this was a purchase *, for by Willes J. ] case states a grant by the lord of the manor, of a small parce waste: however small the consideration might be, I should hold it a purchase, for the smallness of the consideration is im terial. From all the facts stated in this case, it appears that grant was made for a small pecuniary consideration; then i not a voluntary grant; and it being a purchase under 30!. it d not give a settlement since the statute of 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. Supp ing it be true, as contended, that the fine is a fee for aliena at all events that is no answer to the heriot and rent reserv for if a person meant to make a free gift, he would not res a heriot or rent; but both are here reserved.-Ashhurst J. think there appears sufficient in this case to shew that it w purchase. A purchase is the acquisition of something for equivalent. It is a quid pro quo. If there is a valuable co deration, it is a purchase in the legal sense; and it makes difference whether it comes in the form of a present paym or in any other way. Here there appears to be a quid pro from the state of the case, and from the entries in the le court, which have been read: for there was a fine paid a admission, and there was a valuable reservation of a heriot rent, and that is a sufficient foundation for a purchase; there having been a consideration, it cannot be called a vo tary gift. 1 Term Rep. 241. But a copyhold tenement, which, with the fine and fees is of the value of 30%. is sufficient to gain a settlement, afthe the parish officers may have paid part of the money to pay fine and fees. Thus in St. Paul's Walden v. Kempton, * But the case was determined or another point. See this unde head relating to certificates, infra. |