1862. LAING บ. SMITH. The action was to recover a sum of 71. 10s., paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as a deposit on the letting of a house. It appeared that the defendant had let the house to the plaintiff at 301. a year, the plaintiff paying 71. 10s. as a deposit, which she was to be allowed for when she left. After this had been orally agreed to between them, it appeared in the course of the plaintiff's case that the defendant requested the plaintiff to write a letter to him expressing her assent to the terms so agreed upon, and that the plaintiff had done so. Thereupon Keane objected, that this letter must be put in as containing the terms of the contract. Cole accordingly offered to put it in; but on its being tendered, The officer objected that it was not stamped; upon which, BRAMWELL, B., asked the plaintiff whether there were any further writing between the parties? The plaintiff stated that there was not, but that the next time she saw the defendant he told her that he agreed to the terms of the letter, and that thereupon she paid him the deposit, and went into possession. Cole. No stamp is required. The paper, per se, was a mere proposal. BRAMWELL, B., thought that the document did not require a stamp, but said, he would consult some of his Brethren sitting in banco; and on his return said he had done so, and that they agreed with him that the document might be read without a stamp, as it was a mere proposal. The document was accordingly put in and read (a). Ultimately the case ended in a (a) The ruling of the learned Judge was in accordance with se Verdict for the defendant. veral decisions of the Court, that a written proposal, accepted by parol, requires no stamp; Moore v. Garwood, 4 Exch. 681. See this principle confirmed in Hudspeth v. Yarnold, 19 L. J., C. P. 321, and not at all disputed in Hegarty v. Milne, 14 C. B. 62, which, however, was the case of an oral proposal, accepted in a writing reciting the terms, and written by one party and signed by the other. The ruling was likewise in accordance with that of CRESSWELL, J., in Mott v. Turnage, Vol. II., p. 6 (where the document was only written by one party), and of HILL, J., in Mills v. The British Provident Society, Ibid. p. 608. The ruling of the same learned Judge, in Coker v. Young, Vol. II., p. 101, was not only not at all at variance with, but quite in accordance with, 1862. LAING v. SMITH. Judges' Chambers, coram Bramwell, B. CARRICK AND ANOTHER V. HOLDERNESS. SUMMONS for leave to add a plea. This action was by assignees of a bankrupt for not ac cepting a bill of exchange for goods shipped, with a count for goods sold. Hilary Term. Leave given, after issue joined, to add a plea of a defence arising since the last Pleas: to the first count, denying the contract, the pleading, withshipment, and the readiness and willingness to deliver; and to the Second count, never indebted. Issue joined. Venue, London. The summons was for leave to withdraw the pleas and re-plead them, with another plea to the further maintenance of the action (a). The plea proposed to be added was of an agreement (a) Instead of pleading puis dar- former pleas. See C. L. P. Act, rein continuance, or abandoning the 1852, s. 69. out giving up defences already pleaded. 1862. CARRICK (after action brought and since the last pleading) to take a certain sum in satisfaction of the action, giving up claim to dividends, and paying costs. This agreement was HOLDERNESS. pleaded to have been accepted in satisfaction, the money not having been paid. and Another v. The object of the application was to be allowed to plead this defence without giving up the other pleas; and BRAMWELL, B, deemed it reasonable, and accordingly order made. Baylis for the defendant. Hilary Term. In an action between two persons, each claiming to be entitled to the possession of the premises in tiff was not en Coram Keating, J., and Williams, J. EDWARDS v. BOND. SUMMONS on the part of the plaintiff for an order for production of documents by defendant. On the 11th February, 1862, the declaration was delivered, containing a count in trespass and also a count on dispute, under an agreement for settlement of certain disputes, to give up the outgoing tenant-Held, to the plaintiff possession of a certain house belonging to that the plain- a farm, of which he had recovered possession from one titled to the Smith, the tenant having purchased the crops from him. production of the documents After declaration and before plea, the plaintiff took out showing the a summons before KEATING, J., calling on the defendant defendant's agreement with for a discovery of documents. And on an affidavit on the part of the plaintiff, that the defendant had admitted that he had in his possession certain agreements in writing which he then alleged to have been made between him and Smith, prior to that under which the plaintiff claimed, and under which the defendant claimed to be entitled to the house and lands. KEATING, J., made the order. On which the defendant filed an affidavit in answer, admitting that he had in his possession :-(1) an agreement between the late tenant. himself and Smith; (2) a second agreement between himself and Smith; (3) a memorandum dated the 28th December, 1861; (4) receipts for rent: and he objected to production, on the ground that he occupied the land and premises in dispute, and also a mill, as tenant to Smith (who had since sold all his growing crops and tillage to the plaintiff). That since the plaintiff had taken possession of the farm he had tried to dispossess the defendant of the house and lands he occupied as tenant, and that the deponent believed that the object of the summons was to discover the documents under which they had been let to him. Upon this, the present summons, on the part of the plaintiff for the production of the documents by the defendant, was taken out and heard before WILLIAMS, J. WILLIAMS, J., Considered that there were good grounds. shown for not producing the documents. (a) The defendant then pleaded to issue, and the cause now came on for trial, with notice to the de No order (a). fendant to produce the documents. P. 1862. EDWARDS V. BOND. Coram Williams, J. LASCARIDI AND OTHERS v. GURNEY AND OTHERS (a). The action was on a covenant in a deed of assignment, wherein the plaintiffs assigned over to the defendants certain debts coming in to them, in consideration of which the defendants covenanted to find and supply 125,000l., to discharge the plaintiffs' liabilities to certain firms. Breach, that the defendants did not find and supply funds to discharge the plaintiffs' liabilities to one of these firms, Manuel & Co. (a) Ex relatione Watkin Williams. On a summons to plead several matters, a Judge can con sider whether a plea is frauduof a release by lent, as a plea co-plaintiff may be shown to be, and will be so if he has no real interest. 1862. LASCARIDI and Others V. GURNEY and Others. Plea: inter alia, a release by one of the plaintiffs, also one of the firm of Manuel & Co. The deed was long and complicated, and on a review of the whole matter as disclosed therein, and by the statements on either side, WILLIAMS, J., refused to allow this plea without an affidavit (a), showing good ground for it, as a fair and just plea. Thereupon, on the part of the defendants, an affidavit of the releasor was produced, stating that the defendants had been guilty of no breach of the covenant, and that he was interested to an equal extent with the other plaintiffs : that he was satisfied that the defendants had fairly performed their part; that he deemed the action unfair, and that he desired to stop it.-[It was not alleged that he alone had the beneficial interest in the covenant.] On this affidavit (b), (a) The defendant may, by leave he has just ground to traverse the a different defence, the Judge can require more than an affidavit of truth? So (b) In Emery v. Mucklow, 10 Bing. 23, it was held, that the proper course for a dissenting party was to release the defendant, and that then the question of his right to do so is raised on a suggestion that the release is fraudulent. that it should seem the present decision is to be upheld on the general principle that the Courts have power to prevent abuse of its procedure; Cocker v. Tempest, 7 M. & W. 502. Even before the C. L. P. Act, 1854, allowing equitable pleadings, the Court would not set aside such a plea unless shown to be fraudulent (Philipsv. Clagett, 11 M. & W. 84); and now there may be an equitable replication. Moreover, the release is not fraudulent, if the releasor has any interest. |