hereditary taint might exist in the prisoner. All the evidence, however, failed to show the existence of any delusion in the prisoner's mind which could explain this act. None of his family conceived him to be mad. It was clear that such an idea had not entered into their mind, or they would not have recommended him to go and see Miss Goodwin. They treated him as sane from beginning to end, as a proper person to contract matrimony and reengage the affections of this young woman. The account of his state of mind upon receiving her letters was most probably correct. Most men would probably suffer in the same way under similar circumstances. It had been said by one of the witnesses that the prisoner did not know the difference between good and evil. If that was a test of insanity many men were tried who did not know that difference. In truth it was no test at all. The idea of a conspiracy was a delusion; but the mere setting himself up against the law of God and man was not a delusion at all. The question for the jury was, was the prisoner insane, and did he do the act under a delusion, believing it to be other than it was? If he knew what he was doing, and that it was likely to cause death and was contrary to the law of God and man, and that the law directed that persons who did such acts should be punished, he was guilty of murder. 1863. REGINA v. TOWNLEY. Verdict, guilty (a). (a) Vide Regina v. Burton, ante. 1863. Summer Assizes. Upon a dispute arising between the plaintiffs and the defendant as to the terms upon which some wool had been sold by the latter to the former, the defendant, act direction of a third person, who told him that the plain tiff's had con sented to submit the dispute to arbitration, packed the THIS 'Lincoln, coram Cockburn, C. J. CAWTHRA AND ANOTHER v. BILLIAT. was an action for not delivering certain wool according to agreement. The defendant denied the agree ment. Hayes, Serjt., and Merewether, for the plaintiffs. Macaulay, Q.C., and Beasley, for the defendant. The plaintiffs were in partnership as woolstaplers, at Bradford, and their case was that, on the 14th of June, 1859, Mr. Cawthra went to Newark market, and there saw the defendant, who is a farmer at Honington, in Lincolnshire, about the purchase of his wool. The defendant had about 179 tods of wool for sale, for which he wanted 38s. 6d. per tod; and he also required that the wool should be put up into sheets, and carried away and paid for in the course of a fortnight or three weeks. Mr. loaded it upon Cawthra was willing to agree to this condition, but would wool in the plaintiffs' sheets, and a truck at a but subse quently, on learning that the plaintiffs refused to consent to the arbitration, took it away again. Held, that the deli. railway station, only give 38s. per tod, which the defendant refused to accept. Ultimately it was arranged that Mr. Cawthra should consider the matter for an hour, and, if he decided on agreeing to the defendant's terms, should send a Mr. Rushton, who was the plaintiffs' agent at Newark, down to the station to meet the defendant and tell him so. Mr. Cawthra did decide on accepting the terms offered, and sent Rushton down to the station to say so; but, as Rushton had since died, the plaintiffs could give no evidence of what had passed between him and the defendant. the Statute of On the 25th of June, the plaintiffs wrote to say that Mr. Cawthra would come to the defendant's to put up and pay for the wool on the following Monday or Tuesday. The defendant received this letter on the 26th, and wrote on the same day to say that the week or ten days he had very was conditional merely, and was not sufficient to take the case out of Frauds. 1863. CAWTHRA v. BILLIAT. agreed to allow the plaintiffs had expired, and that he had sold the wool to some one else on the previous day. In the interval between the conversation at Newark and the date and Another of this letter, the price of wool had risen about 3s. a tod. On the following Thursday Mr. Cawthra went to Honington, and saw the defendant, who repeated his statement that the wool had been sold. Mr. Cawthra returned home, but a Mr. Bell took upon himself to arrange matters, and, having gone over to see the defendant, wrote to the plaintiffs to come over to Honington for the wool and pay for it. Mr. Cawthra accordingly sent Rushton to Honington to pack up the wool, and himself went to Grantham to meet the defendant and Bell, and pay for it. On getting to Grantham, Mr. Cawthra found that the wool had already arrived there from Honington, and was standing on a railway truck, packed up in the plaintiffs' sheets. He then went to the Angel Hotel, where he found the defendant and Mr. Bell, the latter of whom produced the paper containing what purported to be a reference of the matter to himself as arbitrator, which he wished both parties to sign. Mr. Cawthra, however, refused to sign the paper, but was willing to pay for the wool at 38s. 6d. per tod. As the defendant refused this offer, the parties separated. The defendant's case was, that, at the interview with Mr. Cawthra in Newark market, nothing had been said about putting up the wool in a fortnight or three weeks, but that, when Rushton came to him at the station to tell him that Mr. Cawthra would buy the wool, the defendant had added a condition that the wool should be taken away or paid for within a week or ten days, as he wanted the money to pay his rent. As the plaintiff had not taken away the wool within the ten days, he had agreed to sell it to some one else, but the sale had gone off. Soon after, Mr. Bell came to the defendant, and said, "I have seen the party that was to have your wool. They are willing 1863. CAWTHRA บ. BILLIAT. that I should arbitrate for it, if you are willing." The defendant expressed his willingness, upon which Mr. Bell and Another told him to put the wool into the sheets and take it to Grantham, and go himself to Grantham, to the Angel, to meet Mr. Cawthra there, and have the arbitration settled. That had all been done accordingly, and they had met at the Angel; but, as Mr. Cawthra would not sign the paper, they had separated again without coming to any arrangement. The wool had afterwards been taken out of the sheets, which were sent back to the plaintiffs. His LORDSHIP remarked that, without adverting to the conflict of evidence as to the existence of any contract at all, it was difficult to see how the plaintiffs could get over the Statute of Frauds. Taking their own account, there was nothing to make a binding contract within the meaning of that Act. Hayes contended that there was a delivery to the plaintiffs when the wool was packed in their sheets and loaded upon the railway truck; but, His LORDSHIP observed that that only amounted to a conditional delivery, and was not intended to take effect unless Bell should succeed in settling the dispute. That had not been done, and, therefore, the delivery never became absolute. Nonsuit. Northampton, coram Williams, J. BROWNSERD v. HARRIS. 1863. Summer Assizes. THIS was an action of trespass for breaking a lock on the Where in an gate of the plaintiff. The defendant justified on the ground that he had a right of way for carts and carriages through the gate, which the plaintiff obstructed by placing the lock on the gate, wherefore the defendant removed the lock, &c. Field and Palmer for the plaintiff. action of trespass the defendant justiground of a right of way, and proved a fied, on the constant user allowed to put Hayes, Serjt., and Bennett for the defendant. Having shown that the defendant had constantly used deed 120 years the way as a cart and carriage way, old relating to the property, as appurtenant way was Hayes, Serjt., proposed to put in evidence certain to which the ancient deeds containing a description of the way in ques- claimed, and tion and purporting to convey the house now occupied by description of containing a the defendant, together with the way as appurtenant thereto, for the purpose of showing that the way had always been enjoyed in conformity with the description contained in these deeds, the earliest of which was executed in 1738. Field objected, that the title-deeds of the defendant not evidence against the plaintiff, who ought not to be prejudiced by deeds, to which he was neither party nor privy. were Hayes submitted that, having proved a constant user of the way in question, he was entitled to show that that user was in accordance with the description of the way contained in ancient deeds purporting to convey the property in right of which the defendant claimed the way, and describing the way as appurtenant to that property. WILLIAMS, J.-I think the deeds are admissible, because they are conformable to the proved exercise of the right by the defendant. They profess to confer a right which 3 M VOL. III. F.F. the way, for the deed. |