1862.

REGINA

v.

COBDEN and Others.

it at another; and they were all so connected that the Court went through the history of the three different burglaries."

BRAMWELL, B.-I think that evidence of the acts of the prisoners during the same night is admissible, in order to explain why none of the property taken from Nether Whitacre was found upon one of the prisoners. If it is proved that he was in possession of other property stolen from another station on the same night, that, with other circumstances, might be evidence that all the men had been engaged in each burglary, and that the third man had received his share of the booty wholly from what was taken from the other stations. The events of that night, relating to these burglaries, are so intermixed that it is impossible to separate them.

Verdict, guilty.

Spring Assizes.

Upon an indictment for uttering a forged bill, the previous uttering by the prisoner of other bills forged in other

names may be

given in evidence in proof of guilty knowledge.

It is impossible to lay

down any general rule as

Coram Williams, J.

REGINA v. SALT.

THE prisoner was indicted for forging a bill for 40l.,

drawn on one Tansley.

A second count charged him with uttering it, knowing it to be forged.

Shee, Serjt., especially retained (O'Brien and Beasley with him), for the Crown, proposed to prove guilty knowledge by showing that the prisoner had, at different times, uttered other forged bills drawn on different persons.

Kennedy, for the defendant, objected to the reception of this evidence. It is competent to the prosecution to give evidence of the uttering of other forged bills drawn on the same person, in order to prove that the defendant knew that the acceptance of Tansley was forged; but the utterto be admissi- ing of other forged bills, drawn upon other persons, cannot

to the time within which such previous uttering must have taken

place in order

ble in evidence.

be given in evidence, for that can have no tendency to prove that the defendant knew the acceptance to the bill in question to be forged. It would only be general evidence of bad character, which cannot be adduced. It is admitted that, in the case of coin and bank notes, the uttering of other coin or bank notes of different denominations may be given in evidence with a view to prove guilty knowledge; but they stand on a different footing. A person may be easily deceived as to coin, and may readily utter a counterfeit coin without knowing that it is a counterfeit. In such a case the possession or uttering of other counterfeit coin will be very strong proof of guilty knowledge. The case is the same with bank notes. It is different with bills of exchange. How can the uttering of a forged note on A. prove that the utterer knew that another bill accepted by B. was forged? The defendant comes here prepared to meet one case-that charged in the indictment and is called on to prove himself innocent of a vast multitude of charges ranging over five years. If that can be done, the whole of a man's life might be enquired into upon an indictment for uttering one forged instrument. It is also contended that any uttering of other forged bills which is tendered as evidence of guilty knowledge must be of recent occurrence. In R. v. Millard (a), six weeks was considered a long time. It is there said, that "Some of the Judges seemed to think that bills of a different description and denomination from that on which the prisoner was indicted, ought not to be given in evidence against him; and some seemed to doubt, too, whether the distance of time was not too great."

WILLIAMS, J.—I am clearly of opinion that I am bound to receive the evidence. The question involved has passed through the minds of eminent judicial personages. BAYLEY, J., in the fourth edition of his book on Bills of Exchange,

(a) Russ. & Ry. 245.

1862.

REGINA

บ.

SALT.

1862.

REGINA

v.

SALT.

expresses great doubts whether the uttering of other forged bills, drawn on different persons, can be given in evidence in proof of guilty knowledge; but those doubts have since been put to rest by authority. In Reg. v. Geering (a), the principle has been carried still further. There the prisoner was indicted for poisoning her husband with arsenic; and evidence that she had committed other murders with arsenic was allowed to be given, in order to show that in the principal case the arsenic was not administered by mistake. Upon the question of time I entertain more doubt.

Shee, Serjt.-There is no limit as to time laid down in the books. It is entirely a question for the consideration of the jury. The object of the evidence is to prove guilty knowledge; and the proof will be more or less cogent in proportion as the uttering is recent or otherwise. A systematic uttering of forged notes, extending over some period, would be very important in proof of guilty knowledge. In R. v. Ball (b), evidence was given of an uttering which had taken place three months previously.

WILLIAMS, J.-I am not aware of any authority upon this point. The evidence must not be illusory; but the Judge reposes confidence in counsel, that they will not give in evidence what has no tendency to prove guilty knowledge, but only to prejudice the prisoner.

The evidence was then admitted; and the prisoner was afterwards convicted.

Nottingham, coram Willes, J.

REGINA v. CRADOCK.

THE prisoner was indicted for bigamy.

Cave appeared for the prosecution.
Merewether defended the prisoner.

It was proved that the first marriage was performed in an Independent Chapel by a Wesleyan Methodist minister, in the presence of the registrar of the district and two witnesses; and a certificate of the marriage was produced.

Merewether objected that the proof of the marriage was insufficient. It should have been proved that the chapel was duly registered for the celebration of marriages. There is no case that goes to the length that proof of the registration of the chapel is unnecessary. Reg. v. Manwaring (a) is generally cited for that purpose; but in that case there was proof that the chapel was duly registered. So, also, in Reg. v. Hawes (b), the superintendent registrar produced the register of the place where the marriage was celebrated, although that fact is not stated in the marginal note.

WILLES, J.-This point was discussed in Reg. v. Munwaring, where four of the Judges were of opinion that proof that the marriage was celebrated in a chapel, in presence of the registrar of the district, was sufficient without proving that the chapel was registered. I do not think I ought to throw any doubt on the validity of these marriages by reserving the point. I will, however, consult the CHIEF BARon.

WILLES, J., after consulting the CHIEF BARON, stated, that they were both of opinion that there was nothing in the point.

(a) Dears. & B. C. C. 132. VOL. III.

The prisoner was convicted.

1862.

Winter Assizes.

If a man is selling an article by weight, and falsely represents the weight to be greater than it is, and thereby obtains payment for a quantity

greater than that delivered,

THE

Warwick, coram Bramwell, B.

REGINA v. RIDGWAY AND ANOTHER.

prisoners were indicted for obtaining three shillings from John Smith, by falsely pretending that a load of coal contained fourteen hundred weight, whereas, in truth and in fact, it contained only ten hundred weight.

It appeared from the evidence, that the prisoners brought the load of coal to the prosecutor's door, and agreed to sell it to him for ninepence a hundred weight. They weighed the coal into the prosecutor's cellar, and he is indictable stated the weight to be fourteen hundred weight, wherefor obtaining money by false upon the prosecutor gave them ten shillings and sixpence. Suspicion, however, having afterwards crossed his mind, he had the coal re-weighed, and found it to weigh ten

pretences.

Secus, if he is selling the article for a

lump sum, and hundred weight only.

merely makes

the false representation as to the weight to induce the purchaser fo conclude the bargain.

Elers, for the prisoners, contended that there was no sufficient false pretence. The statement of the prisoners that the coal weighed fourteen hundred weight was a mere naked lie, and not a false pretence. In Rex v. Reid (a), it was held, that a mere false affirmation as to the weight of a load of coals is not indictable. It is true that that case is in some points overruled by Regina v. Sherwood (b); but in the last-named case, COCKBURN, C. J., says, "It is to be observed, that it was not while selling the article that the prisoner represented the quantity to be greater than it was; but, having sold the article and delivered it, when there came to be a question about the price, he represented the quantity to be four hundred weight more than it really was. Here the false affirmation as to the weight was made in the course of the bargain, and was nothing more than a puff.”