1862. HENDERSON V. LLOYD. in the hands of the wife would probably not be got at by the sheriff, the settlement was with intent to delay or defeat a creditor, and so would be void; for that, if it defeated the sheriff, it would defeat a creditor; and it was enough if Lloyd, the particular creditor, had been delayed or defeated by the deed. It appeared, however, that the other debts had been paid, and at the time of the deed he had not any idea that he would be called upon to pay the present debt, for which he was only surety. At that time he swore the debt to Lloyd did not enter into his mind at all, nor had he any desire or intent to delay or defeat the creditor. Indeed, the money was in Court, and the creditor might have it if he pleased, without the costs, and he asked the creditor Lloyd, if he would accept the money, but Lloyd objected to accept it without the costs. The case therefore went on, and ERLE, C. J., told the jury the question would be, whether the deed was entered into with intent to defeat or defraud creditors. The jury thereupon said they had made up their minds upon that question. The plaintiff, the trustee, was called, and the attorney who had prepared the deed, and who swore that he considered the assignor was solvent, and had told him that he must be so to make the deed valid. There were no witnesses called to controvert the facts thus proved. Wood went to the jury on behalf of the defendant, the execution creditor, urging that this was not an ordinary marriage settlement, as it conveyed all chattels, down to the smallest articles, and could only have been to avoid execution. ERLE, J., left it to the jury, whether the deed had been entered into with intent to delay or defraud creditors. No 1862. ย. LLOYD. doubt, if the sheriff were defeated or delayed, the creditor would be so, and it would probably be very difficult to get HENDERSON at the money in the hands of the wife, although, if he got at it, he could seize it under a fi. fa. (a); and the debts could not be taken under a writ of execution, and the deed assigned every chattel, the effect must have been to delay or defeat any creditor who pursued his remedy. But whether that was the object and intent was for the jury. If they thought that it was made with that intent, they should find for the execution creditor, the defendant; if not, then for the trustee under the deed, the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff, thinking (they said) that the deed had been fairly entered into. (a) Vide 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. THIS Verdict for the plaintiff (b). (b) Vide Michael v. Gay, Vol. I., p. 409. LOVATT v. TRIBE. Spring Assizes. money lent on an I O U, was an action for 201., dated the 29th of June, 1861. The defendant denied the debt, and pleaded that at the time of the contract he of unsound mind, as the plaintiff well knew. On a plea of insanity at the time of making a contract, the was opinion of the Chambers, Q. C., and Philbrick were for the plaintiff. medical men who gave certificates on which the defendant was confined as in sane, at or is The case for the plaintiff was, that on the 29th of June, about the time, 1861, the defendant having applied to him for a loan of only evidence for the jury, who 20., he (the plaintiff) sent, through one Hebden, a cheque, must judge of the grounds on which Hebden cashed, and then handed the money to the which it was defendant, bringing back to the plaintiff the I O U. in order to sustain his case he had to show some personal communication with the defendant, as it was not set up that Hebden was his general agent. And The case for the defendant was, that the money was not formed. plaintiff himself, according to his own evidence, was in personal communication with the defendant at the Where the time, that, in itself, is some evidence that the plaintiff knew of the insanity, supposing the jury find the fact of insanity established. 1862. LOVATT V. TRIBE. really lent to or borrowed by him at all, but obtained by Hebden for his own purposes; and that his signature to the IO U was obtained from him while he was in a state of mental incapacity. The defendant was about seventy years of age, and, having lost his wife, had married again in his old age, and had not lived happily with his second wife, who was called on behalf of the plaintiff, and described his conduct towards her as violent, on account of which, she said, she had since left him. Before this, however, on the 24th of June, 1861 (five days before the I O U was given), two medical men signed certificates that he was of unsound mind. The certificate of one of the medical men stated as the grounds, derived from personal observation, that the party used violent language, and fancied himself to be very wealthy, &c.; and secondly, under the head of facts communicated by others, this certificate stated that the writer was told that a few days before the party had threatened to destroy himself. The certificate of the other medical man stated as the grounds of belief, founded on personal observation, "violent conduct, incoherent language and attempting injury to unmolesting persons ;" and, secondly, stated, under the head of facts derived from others, that the wife had said that he had left home without reasonable cause, wantonly spent large sums of money and taken home with him a woman, &c. The medical men were called on the part of the defendant, and gave evidence in accordance with their certificates, and were cross-examined as to the grounds of their belief. The medical witnesses described the defendant's derangement, moreover, merely as "mania resulting from delirium tremens." And the defendant, after having been for some few days placed, upon these certificates, under the care of a physician in an asylum, was liberated and restored to his own house, where, on the 29th of June, he gave the IO U in question. On the 25th of June a medical man examined the defendant, and said he thought him sane and of sound mind, and it was suggested on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant only suffered for a short time from the influence of drink. ERLE, C. J., in summing up the case, said, the question for the jury lay in the smallest compass, being simply this-whether, when the IO U was given, the defendant was sane. The jury would do well, however, in deciding the question, to form their own judgment upon it, not disregarding, but not relying upon, the opinions of the medical men (a). The evidence showed some temporary derangement caused by drink; but the question was, whether the defendant was not of sound mind on the day when the IO U was given. The jury consulted together some time, and then returned a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that he was of unsound mind on the day in question. (a) In an action of trespass by the alleged lunatic, the certificate, &c. would be conclusive evidence of the insanity (if bond fide); Norris v. Seed, 3 Exch. Rep. 782; but this is because of the statutable effect of the proceeding as a justification for the confinement, in analogy to a summary conviction. But at common law, even an inquisition of lunacy is traversable. And, as between the alleged lunatic and a person suing him on a contract, the effect of a proceeding between the lunatic and third parties, to which the plaintiff was no party, is not conclusive, any more than, on an interpleader issue, an admission by the debtor behind the back of his creditors; Crole v. Braham, 3 Exch. 183; there being nothing like an adjudication by a court of law, in the nature of a sentence in rem. If, indeed, the plaintiff had been a promoter of the 1862. LOVATT v. TRIBE. ERLE, C. J., asked whether they found that the plaintiff knew of it (a). The jury said they had not considered that question. ERLE, C. J., said it was necessary to have their verdict on it, and sent them back to consider it. The jury again retired, and eventually returned with a verdict for the defendant on that point also, which amounted to a Verdict for the defendant. (a) Beavan v. M'Donald, 23 L. J., Ex. 326, C. P. 474. Spring Assizes. When, on letters, it is doubtful whether there has been a complete contract within the Statute of Frauds, by reason of the absence of an answer in writing to a written offer by the defendant, it is enough that there has been a subse quent verbal assent by the plaintiff, there being a 66 note or memoran dum signed by the party to be charged," i. e. the party sued. THIS Coram Wightman, J. WATTS v. AINSWORTH AND OTHERS. was an action on an alleged contract of sale, for not accepting three acres of white globe turnip seed. The defendants denied the contract. Hawkins and Addison were for the plaintiff. Lush and Prentice for the defendants. The plaintiff was a seed merchant at Hythe, who contracted with the farmers and turnip-growers to buy the seed at so much per acre, taking the chance of the crops as they stood, and resold to seedsmen. The plaintiff in March, 1861, wrote to the defendants offering them five acres of white globe turnip seed at 18s. 6d. per bushel. The defendants wrote that they could perhaps take two or three acres at 16s. 6d. The plaintiff replied to this that he could not take their offer, and saw no reason to take less than 18s. To this the defendants wrote an answer, which Let us know Waiting your no reply in |