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jury might be asked of their own knowledge whether colonial brokers did not carry on their business by means of bills of exchange.

The jury at once intimated that it was so.

Bovill said he should then address the jury, urging that evidence was necessary of authority to accept bills. It was not every firm that had implied authority for all its members to accept bills in its name.

The learned JUDGE.-Not every firm, no doubt; but every mercantile or commercial firm. Not a firm of attorneys, for instance, but merchants and traders.

Bovill said he should contend that it required evidence in the case of colonial brokers. In the business of colonial brokers there was no necessity for bills of exchange being accepted, and therefore no general or implied authority on one member of the firm to bind the others. Nor was it the habit of this particular firm to use bills in their business. As brokers of colonial produce they had nothing to do with bills. There was no authority either in law or in fact to accept this bill. It was no part of the business of colonial brokers to accept bills, and though some did so this firm did not.

One of the defendants produced the deed of partner

determination of matters within the knowledge of the" country," as they were called, such matters as seisin or disseisin (which were supposed to be matters of notoriety in the "country"), usages, customs, commons, and matters of that nature, such as boundary. (Bro. Abr. "Trial," 17.) And hence it was, that the ancient doctrine of venue rested on the knowledge of the "vicinage," and the principle was, that the venue should be where the "country" had the most "knowledge" of the matter. (Lyskerrit's

case, Bulst. 48.) When juries came
to take cognizance of matters of a
private nature, which could only
be tried by evidence, they did not
lose their power of determining
matters of a more general or public
nature, upon their own knowledge.
And, upon this principle, in a
modern case, the verdict of a jury,
de vicineto, as to a question of
boundary, was allowed to be given
in evidence, although founded only
on the knowledge of the jury. (Re
Sutton, 8 Ad. & E. 516.)

This general knowledge of juries

1863.

SCHWEITZER

บ.

LONG and Others.

1863.

SCHWEITZER

V.

LONG

ship dated the 31st of December, 1861, with a clause that neither of the partners should, without the consent of the other, draw or accept bills. And he stated that to his and Others. knowledge none of the members of the firm did so. The signature to the bill was neither that of the witness nor of his co-partner (Long), nor had it anything to do with the business of the firm, nor did he know Seifert. They had beard of other similar matters respecting Wallace, and in October last "stopped his signature" at their bankers— i. e., directed that they should not honour it in any way. It was no part of the business of the firm to deal in or give bills of exchange, nor were colonial brokers in the habit of so doing, and he never knew of a colonial house doing so. The City regulations did not allow producebrokers to deal in bills.

The learned BARON observed that probably the jury would be aware that this was a regulation notoriously disgarded.

The jury said this was so.

The witness being pressed in cross-examination as to whether colonial brokers did not accept bills, said he had heard of some occasionally doing so. The business of colonial brokers was to buy and sell produce, not accept bills. It was not their business to give bills, nor usual to do so.

The other co-defendant, Long, gave similar evidence. He admitted, however, that some colonial brokers did give bills, and it had been, said the witness, their ruin. But

has been repeatedly appealed to of
late by judges, on matters agricul-
tural or mercantile. As, on a ques-
tion as to the authority of farm ser-
vants to sell horses at a price on cre-
dit, vide North v. Jackson, Vol. II.,
p. 199. So as to the duty of an
agent; Hayes v. Tindal, Ibid. 444.
So as to the duty of bankers;
Foster v. The Bank of London,

ante, p. 217; or broker, Bradley v. Goddard, ante, p. 638. The principle is of some importance, for there are many cases in which it happens that no express evidence is forthcoming, upon some matter of this nature, whether from its being so well known, or from its being supposed to be matter of law.

respectable brokers did not use bills, and it was unusual for them to give or take bills. Nor did Russia brokers, he believed, do so.

1863.

SCHWEITZER

V.

LONG

The witness said he knew of colonial brokers actually and Others. refusing business rather than take bills.

A witness, who had been with Rothschilds twenty years, being asked if colonial brokers dealt at all in bills, he said he believed merchants objected to such bills, deeming that it was not the business of brokers to give bills. And although he had known of colonial brokers giving bills, he did not know that it was the usage among them to do so. But he said he was not a bill-broker, and was a foreign exchange broker, and such bills would not probably come to him.

A witness, who had been a colonial broker for thirty years, stated that it was not the practice of colonial brokers to accept bills.

The learned JUDGE.-But is it not one way in which they carry on business?

Witness.-It is.

Another broker stated it was not usual among colonial brokers to accept bills.

Bovill, upon this evidence, addressed the jury, urging that not only had it not been proved that colonial brokers carried on business by means of bills, but it had positively been disproved, and this did away with all implied authority to accept this bill; and, as the partnership deed negatived an actual authority, therefore the defendants were not bound by this bill. No doubt, it often happened that persons whose business did not require bills did give or take them for particular purposes or pressing reasons; but that was far from showing that it was usual or necessary to their business to do so, and a partner was only bound by partnership acceptances in the way of the partnership business.

Lush, in reply on the part of the plaintiff, ridiculed the

692

1863.

SCHWEITZER

v.

LONG and Others.

CASES ON THE HOME CIRCUIT.

idea that colonial brokers did not accept bills of exchange, and contended that his client, as a bonâ fide holder, was clearly entitled to recover.

The learned JUDGE, in summing up the case to the jury said the question was one of the liability of the co-partners, which depended on implied authority to accept bills of exchange (a). No doubt there were some businesses in which bills were not used, and in which they would probably be no such implied authority-as, for instance, stockbrokers; and some witnesses of the highest respectability had been called to prove that there was no such authority in the case of colonial brokers. The only doubt was, whether they were not in a sense too respectable, and whether they were not men of such high character as to be unaware of the practices to which smaller men were driven. If, however, the jury were satisfied that although it might not be the best way, still it was one way of carrying on the business of colonial brokers, then there would be the implied authority to accept the bill, and the defendants would be bound by the bill in the hands of a bonâ fide holder.

(a) It is an incident of a common trading co-partnership, that the acting partners have authority to borrow money and give bills. (Brown v. Kidger, 28 L. J., Exch. 66; not of others, Yates v. Dalton,

Verdict for the plaintiff.

Ibid. 69.) In the latter case, there was merely a partnership to get orders on commission, and divide the expenses; and that was held not a partnership to which the authority was incident.

1863.

Lewes, coram Cockburn, C.J.

REGINA v. RICHARDSON.

Sussex Spring
Assizes.

THE prisoner was indicted for administering a certain On an indict

poison, called corrosive sublimate, to Wm. H. Halsted and Martha Halsted, with intent to murder them, &c.

Roupell for the prosecution.

Barrow for the defence.

From the evidence for the prosecution, it appeared that

ment for administering poison with

intent to murder; the police having, in consequence of certain information, found the

bottle containing the poison

in a place used

soner: held,

bound to dis

the informa

the prisoner was the domestic servant of the prosecutor and his wife, and that there was no one else but herself by the priand them in the house at the time, and that, on the day in that they were question, she had drawn and brought up to table some close from beer for their dinner. In that beer was found a quantity whom they had of corrosive sublimate, while other beer which she had tion. drawn from the same cask for her own dinner was perfectly free from it: so that it was clear the poison must have been, either by accident or design, in the jug in which she had drawn the beer for her master and mistress. She was questioned as to the matter, and her answers at the time seemed satisfactory. About three weeks afterwards, however, some communication was made to the police, upon which they searched the servant's privy, used only by the prisoner, and in the soil was found a phial containing a small quantity of liquid, containing corrosive sublimate.

At the trial the policeman was asked from whom he received the information alluded to, when he replied, as he had previously done before the magistrates, and so stated in the depositions, that he and all the West Sussex police received printed instructions, amongst which was one forbidding them to name persons from whom any information was received, and he therefore refused to say who were

VOL. III.

3 B

F.F.

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