indeed, desired, but declined to go, and she was not in the room into which he desired to break. There certainly, therefore, would have been justification for removing him by force from the house, but the question is, whether there was a justification for giving him into custody? If you find that he was not only in the house against the will of the landlady making a disturbance, but that he had assaulted her and went up stairs against her will, and was on the landing against her will and the will of the defendant, and close to the defendant's rooms making a disturbance and trying to force his way in (a) and intending to strike Boucicault when he should get at him; then the plea is substantially proved, and you are bound to find it so and return a verdict for the defendant, otherwise the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. The jury found that the plaintiff was unlawfully in the house but had committed no assault. Verdict for the plaintiff, 251. (b). liberty for an indefinite time, using no hardship or unnecessary restraint. Id. Semble, such restraint would amount to imprisonment, and be illegal, and this Court would afford redress, unless the wife make an undue use of her liberty, by going into lewd company, or squandering her husband's estate. Ib. And a habeas corpus is refused against the wife to force her return. In re Price, 2 F. & F. 263. (a) Vide ante, p. 610. (b) The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE at once stayed the execution, and Karslake moved as against evi-. dence, but took nothing, except a rule to reduce the damages. 1863. JORDAN V. GIBBON. le a good thing of it. If it was deemed be no doubt that he could be satisfactorily tion as a naval officer, excepting in the I afloat since 1815. "ANTI-HUMBUG." sequent letter, in which there was obviously, in answer to some in nd Confidential.) e my name mixed up with one of this "Yours, &c., "E. BELCHER." guilty, and also that the 1 E. Besley, for the plain r the defendant. e for the plaintiff, laid it, and persons libel, as to which, vide 1863. MORRISON V. BELCHER. 1863. Sittings after Trinity Term. In an action for a libel in a newspaper, imputing to the plaintiff, the proprietor and editor of Zadkiel's Almanack, that not only was he connected with that foolish publication, but that he "gulled" the public by means of a magic ball of crystal, by which he pretended to tell what was going on in the other world, and that he took money for those profane acts, and made a good thing of it: pleas, not guilty, and a justification that the libels were true in Court of Queen's Bench, Guildhall, coram Cockburn, C.J. LIBEL. The action was by the proprietor and editor "Sir, In your impression of this day you ask, Who is this Zadkiel?' and 'Are there no means of ferreting him out and handing him up to Bow-street under the statute as a rogue and vagabond?' I will aid you on the scent by first informing you he stands as a lieutenant on the Navy List, seniority 1815; next, that he has his admirers about Greenwich Hospital, who fancy him a prophet A 1; and that his mischievous propensities are not solely involved in that foolish publication, Zadkiel's Almanack. More; I think he gave his name not long since as president of some peculiar society connected with astrology (R. I. Morrison). A friend reminds me that the author of Zadkiel is the celebrated crystal globe seer, who gulled many of our nobility about the year 1852.' Making use of a boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve, he pretended, by their looking into the crystal globe, to hold converse with the spirits of the Apostles-even our Saviour, with all the angels of light as well as darkness, and to tell what was going on in any part of the world. Drawings were made of the a public writer objects seen in these visions. One noble lady gave one of these boys 51. to give her intelligence respecting her boy, who was in the Mediterranean. That boy 'peached '—let the cat out of the bag (a). Of course the information was false. He took money, if he be really the same, for substance and fact. Held, 1. That within the scope of fair discussion is not liable unless he writes (a) That is, for these, or some of them for such acts; that is, for posture. But taking the whole together, probably it meant that he took money for the fraudulent use of the crystal ball, and gulled the public thereby. such acts as described; that is, acts cussion of the of pretence, and " gulling," and impublished writings on public or undoubted acts of the plaintiff, and does not extend to the gratuitous assertion of matters of fact for which there is no foundation. 3. That the privilege had extended to a denunciation of the Almanack and the use of the ball as an imposture, but that if the libel meant that the plaintiff had made money by a conscious and fraudulent imposture by use of the magic ball, that was beyond the right of fair discussion and required a justification. 4. That the justification required proof that the plaintiff took money for the use of the crystal ball, and used it knowing that it was an imposture. these profane acts, and made a good thing of it. If it was deemed sufficiently important there can be no doubt that he could be satisfactorily ferreted out. As to his position as a naval officer, excepting in the Coast-Guard, he has not served afloat since 1815. "ANTI-HUMBUG." There was another subsequent letter, in which there was a second count. It was, obviously, in answer to some inquiry from the editor: "(Private and Confidential.) "Sir, I am unwilling to have my name mixed up with one of this stamp, but I had reason to be much disgusted with this personage at the period to which I allude. The boy's mother confessed to me the trick he had played. "Union Club, January 31, 1862." "Yours, &c., "E. BELCHER." The defendant pleaded not guilty, and also that the alleged libels were true in substance and fact (a). Shee, Serjt., J. O. Griffits and E. Besley, for the plaintiff. Ballantine, Serjt., and Field, for the defendant. Shee, Serjt., in opening the case for the plaintiff, laid stress chiefly on the imputation as to the use of the magic ball of crystal, which he contended amounted to an imputation of conscious and corrupt imposture. This, he said, he should disprove in point of fact, that is, the conscious imposture, and he insisted that it would not be enough that the jury should be satisfied it was a delusion; alluded to Aubrey's Miscellanies, 1784, page 217, where mention was made of a "consecrated beryl," a kind of crystal, which he said he saw. The learned serjeant also alluded to a work of a Dr. Gregory, who stated that in these crystal balls persons saw scenes which were distant, and persons who were absent. The learned serjeant said that the substance of his client's complaint was that he was called in (a) The effect of this plea would of course depend upon the sense given to the libel, as to which, vide 1863. MORRISON v. BELCHER. |