1862. ROBERTS บ. RICHARDS. County Court for his wages, and when the defendant received the summons he sent by one Courtnay a letter to the plaintiff, which it was admitted was unsealed, and which Courtnay swore was read to him by the defendant, the effect of which was to repeat the accusation of robbery. And Courtnay further stated that the defendant repeated the same charge to him orally. These communications were the libel and slander complained of. For the plaintiff, he himself and his late fellow-servant, the discharged cook, were both called and examined, and described the pieces of bread as stale scraps to feed the dogs with. They were cross-examined a good deal, however, with a view to show that this was not really the case, that the dogs were fed with paunch and broken meat, and were, moreover, dainty dogs, which would not condescend to eat dry bread. For the defence, the defendant himself was called, and described the pieces as large slices of bread, two or three inches thick; and a loaf was sent for, from which he cut such slices as he described the pieces in question to be. In answer to the learned BARON, the defendant stated that he was not aware what was done with any waste bits of bread, or whether there had been any prohibition to the servants from using or disposing of such waste scraps. And in answer to a question from the learned Baron, whether he or his wife would not miss a loaf, or the larger portion of a loaf, from their daily consumption, the defendant said he supposed they would. The housemaid was called to confirm the defendant's evidence, but his wife was not called. The learned BARON, in summing up the case to the jury. If the plaintiff might reasonably have supposed that the pieces of bread were such as to be of no real value to his employer, or such as he would not be likely to object to his disposing of, you will probably be of opi nion that the charge of stealing cannot be sustained, and in that case you will find for the plaintiff with such damages as you think reasonable. The jury found for the plaintiff, damages, 501. Coram Martin, B. GORE v. HAWSEY. an THIS The defendant denied his liability. Shee, Serjt., and M'Donnell, for the plaintiff. 1862. ROBERTS V. RICHARDS. Surrey Summer Assizes. A woman who, at the request of her seducer, had taken lodgings and laid out money for her con in necessaries finement and the support of her child :Held, entitled to sue him for money paid; and her letters to him not, him. The parties were both in a humble position in society, answered, adthe plaintiff being a cook and the defendant the son of a dence against butcher. The case for the plaintiff was, that while she was in service she made the acquaintance of the defendant by his coming to the house of her mistress for orders, and the result of their intimacy was the matter which led to the present action. Her mistress allowed her to remain until she could get a lodging to be confined in. This the defendant desired her to do, and, knowing that she had saved some money to the amount of 301., desired her to expend it in furnishing a room and procuring necessaries, telling her he would repay her afterwards. She did as he desired. She took lodgings and furnished them, got all that was necessary, and in doing so spent all her money. The plaintiff was then called and examined as a witness. She said she first made the acquaintance of the defendant in April, 1860, and that he promised to marry her, and under such promise seduced her. She became pregnant, 1862. GORE บ. HAWSEY. and she sent to him certain letters; the first dated June 23, 1861; the next, July 23, 1861; the effect of which was, that her condition was apparent, and what was she to do, &c. After she left her place, as she said, the defendant desired her to take a lodging to be confined in, and to furnish it and procure all the necessaries, and that he would repay her. He knew, she said, that she had 307., which she had saved out of her earnings. She took the lodging and furnished it, and provided necessaries, and spent all her money in doing so. She sent him a letter, dated September 19, 1861, in which she wrote, "I have been and taking the Room. I will tell you all aboute it this evening when I see you." Shee, Serjt., proposed to put in the letters. Parry, Serjt., objected, as they had not been answered. MARTIN, B., ruled that they were clearly admissible. The action was founded on contract, and any letter from one of the parties to the other, whether answered or not answered, if proved to have been sent and received, was evidence (a). The evidence was confirmed by that of a respectable woman who had been taking care of the child, and who went to the defendant to ask what he meant to do. Parry, Serjt., for the defence, submitted that there was no case. By the law of England, he said, a man was not compellable to support his bastard child save by a particular proceeding under a statute, and the woman herself was bound to do so (b). Now, the present claim, in substance, was for the support of the child, and, if so, it was for something to which he was not bound, and to which she was, so that there was no legal consideration for the promise. (a) Vide Gaskill v. Skene, 19 L. J., Q. B. 275, where so held. (b) Vide Smith v. Roche, 6 C. B., N. S. 232, and Crowhurst v. La verack, 8 Exch. 208, as to a special contract by the mother to support the child. The learned BARON, however, said that the action did not rest on legal obligation, but on special contract and stipulation. It was an undoubted legal principle that if a person laid out money at the request of another he could recover it, and here there was certainly no obligation on the plaintiff to take an unfurnished room and buy furniture and clothes, &c., and she had done so under a promise by the defendant to repay her. It was clear, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Parry, Serjt., said that, under the circumstances, he did not consider that he should do any good by calling the defendant as a witness. The learned BARON said he thought so too. No doubt, he could not deny or gainsay anything that the plaintiff' had stated; and, if the jury believed her story, she had expended 301. of her own money at the request of the defendant, and on his promise to repay her. If So, she was entitled to a verdict for that amount. The jury at once found a Verdict for the plaintiff for 301. 1862. GORE บ. HAWSEY. ROUPELL AND OTHERS v. WAITE. Surrey Summer Assizes. EJECTMENT for an estate at Kingston in Surrey, called In ejectment the Norbiton Park Estate. The plaintiffs were Richard by a person claiming as Roupell, who claimed as heir-at-law, and two persons, trus- heir-at-law of tees for him, under an alleged will of his father, the person to have died last seised in fee. The defendant claimed to hold as pur- under a devise, chaser, from a supposed grantee of the testator. a party proved seised, and also revoked by what purported to be a later will, forged; the defendant setting up such forged will and also claiming as purchaser from the forger under a forged deed of grant to himself, the deed of conveyance to the defendant not reciting the forged deed but falsely reciting that the pretended grantor, the forger, was seised, and the forged deed reciting the deeds of the testator's title :- Held, that all the deeds might properly be presumed to be in the possession of the defendant claiming to hold the purchaser, and that the plaintiff, on a notice to produce, was entitled to call for them, and that the defendant would, at his peril, decline to produce them. estate as 1862. ROUPELL and Others V. WAITE. Shee, Serjt., Lush, and J. Brown, for the plaintiffs. Denman, Raymond, Honyman, and Lefevre, watched the case for other parties interested in dispositions of other portions of the testator's property by the supposed grantee, Bovill, for the defendant, proposed to admit the title of the plaintiff Richard Roupell, as heir, and to begin as in the case of a devisee (a); but Shee, Serjt., stated that the defendant claimed under deed of grant from a supposed grantee of the testator, and would not admit that the testator died seised, so that he was not at all in the position of a devisee (b); and MARTIN, B., said, that though no doubt it had been held that a devisee, admitting the heirship, might begin, it had never, that he was aware, been held that a grantee or alienee was in the same position in that respect. The plaintiffs, therefore, must begin. Shee, Serjt., for the plaintiffs, accordingly began, and stated the case for them. Their case was, that the plaintiff, Richard Roupell, was the heir-at-law, as the only legitimate son of Richard Palmer Roupell, the person last seised. And also, that the other two plaintiffs were devisees in trust for him under a will of the testator, dated October, 1850, and a codicil thereto, dated 30th August, 1856, the testator dying on the 12th September, 1856. And he proposed to destroy a will dated the 2nd September, 1856, bequeathing the estate, inter alia, to the testator's widow, and a deed of July, 1855, conveying it to one William Roupell, the eldest but illegitimate son of the testator, under whom the defendant claimed, by showing that both the deed and the will were forgeries by William Roupell. (a) Martin v. Johnstone, Vol. I., plaintiffs, here, claimed as devisees, p. 122. while the other claimed as heir. (b) Added to which, two of the |