very severe censure on Mr. Seymour, but the writer of the article added nothing to the facts upon which the benchers proceeded. If the defendant had given to the world that which the benchers intended to keep secret, the case would be different. But, unfortunately, Mr. Seymour went down to his constituents at Southampton, and finding that placards were circulated referring to what had passed in the Parliament Chamber of the Middle Temple, and acting under the impulse of the moment, himself gave publicity to the whole matter. Mr. Seymour made a long and violent speech at Southampton. Mr. Seymour returned and wrote a letter to the Times. He wrote a protest to the benchers, and he sent the whole to the public press. The writer of the article was not the first to give publicity to the charges made against Mr. Seymour and the censure pronounced, but he gave the judgment of the benchers and commented upon it in severe terms. It would be for the jury to say whether the severity of the comment was not borne out by the severity of the censure. The writer inserted all the documents, and said that his readers might judge for themselves. If the jury arrived at the conclusion that such a matter might be fairly brought before the public, it was difficult to see how it could be brought before the public in a fairer spirit,-when they found that every document which had been published by Mr. Seymour was included in the article. The jury would have to form an opinion whether the comments were fair, and to do so they must see what were the charges and what were the terms of the censure. Unfortunately, the charges against Mr. Seymour were not before them in an intelligible form, but according to the terms of the sentence of the benchers, there was grave matter of censure applied to the conduct of Mr. Seymour. The jury ought, in order to see whether the writer was imbued with hostility, bitterness and malice towards Mr. Seymour, to consider the position 1862. SEYMOUR v. BUTTER- in which Mr. Seymour stood. Mr. Seymour might have been wounded and pained, but they must see whether the writer did not take the sentence pronounced as the basis upon which he founded the observations which he made? It was impossible to read that sentence and not to feel that it contained condemnation and censure of a very serious character; and the jury had to judge of the comments made upon it. The writer added no facts of his own, and was not responsible for the facts. A tribunal of competent authority, the writer said, had made public a sentence reflecting upon a public man, and that man, upon whom censure was passed, had taken no step, either by publishing the evidence or by appeal to a superior jurisdiction, effectually to vindicate himself from the sentence. Surely it was a fit subject for public animadversion, whether the person censured was fit to occupy the position of barrister, judge and member of parliament. There was no attempt to add any facts, and the writer proceeding to make comments said, true it was that Mr. Seymour protested, true it was that Mr. Seymour denied the propriety of the censure which had been pronounced upon him; but until Mr. Seymour took the course which was open to him, of bringing before the public the whole of the evidence which had been taken, and of which he was in possession, so long there would be nothing but his assertion to meet the sentence, and so long the writer would take the liberty to say the sentence was well founded, and the facts upon which it proceeded incontestable. It was said that the defendant had not put on the record that all the matters referred to in the sentence were true. Upon that point there was great force in the observations of the defendant's counsel. Let them take the case of a man occupying a high position, charged with an offence, brought before a jury, and a verdict passed against him. Let them take the case of a man, whose conduct was alleged in a civil suit to be unbecoming, not only a public man but a private individual. Sentence was passed or a verdict was given against him, and a public writer, assuming the sentence to be well founded or the verdict to be right, commented upon that which was a matter of public interest and public observation. The writer commented upon that which must be taken to be an admitted and ascertained fact. The person affected might have the sentence revoked or he might have the verdict set aside, but the decision pronounced by competent authority must be taken to be the fact until the contrary appeared; and a public writer, who commented upon what was public property, ought not to be held responsible in an action, and bound to take upon himself the burthen of proof as to the whole of the matters upon which the decision rested, involving, as it probably would, an inquiry of great magnitude and great expense. Now, as to this, the question was, not whether the sentence was properly pronounced by the benchers, but whether the writer had gone beyond the limits of fair comment (a). Certainly some of the language was very strong, but the writer did not proceed to attack Mr. Seymour until Mr. Seymour had attacked the Northern Circuit. When a man sought to hold another responsible for a hostile attack on himself, he should not be the man who had unnecessarily and wantonly lavished abuse upon the other (b). Mr. Seymour went down to Southampton and there he made attacks upon the bar and upon the benchers of his Inn, which no doubt were present to the mind of the writer, and provoked a certain amount of indignation against Mr. Seymour, because, the jury might pretty well guess, the writer was himself a member of the bar. If the jury thought that the (a) Vide Campbell v. Spotlis woode, post. VOL. III. EE (b) See a similar observation in Kanig v. Ritchie, post. F.F. 1862. SEYMOUR v. BUTTER WORTH. 1862. SEYMOUR V. BUTTER WORTH. language of the writer passed the proper limits of fair criticism, they would consider how far that language was provoked by Mr. Seymour sowing broadcast aspersions upon men of the highest character and honour in the profession. The language of the writer was certainly very strong, and especially in the passage beginning "There are two kinds of Irishmen," &c., &c. What was the meaning of that passage it was for the jury to determine; and then they would have to say, whether the plaintiff was entitled to their verdict, on the ground that the writer had transgressed the bounds within which comments upon the character of public men ought to be confined (a). What was the meaning of that passage it was for the jury to determine. If a gentleman, who had had to submit to the ordeal of an inquiry by the benchers of his Inn, and had been the subject of severe animadversion and censure, was not satisfied with the decision, but took the opportunity to challenge public attention to his sentence-if he neither appealed nor submitted in a contrite spirit with the intention to wipe out the stain in the time to come, but, if instead he denounced his benchers as unjust judges, actuated by sinister and unworthy motives, and ascribed the charges made against him to the jealousy or hostility of his Circuit, which, as he alleged, had persecuted him with a bitter malignity and cruelty because he was an Irishman, there was some provocation for the strong language which the writer had used. If the jury thought that the writer meant more than that Mr. Seymour was justly blameable and that his character as a public man was tarnished-if they thought that the writer took upon himself, without warrant and without authority, to apply to Mr. Seymour the general observations on the worse sort of Irishmen, who was said to be "fertile in fraud and the most unblushing of swindlers," then they would con(a) Vide Campbell v. Spottiswoode, post. sider that, under those circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to their verdict, upon the ground that the writer had transgressed the bounds within which one who was canvassing the character of a public man, ought still to be confined. And so, if the writer had taken the opportunity of gratifying a bitter and malignant spirit against Mr. Seymour, the defendant must be held liable. If the jury thought that, instead of a fair, reasonable, honest, comment upon the circumstances, this was made. an opportunity for gratifying personal vindictiveness and hostility, they would have to assess the damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The jury found a Verdict for the plaintiff, damages 40s. 1862. SEYMOUR v. BUTTER- Court of Common Pleas, coram Byles, J. ELLIOT v. HUGHES. DECLARATION, that the defendant had contracted with the plaintiff to sell and deliver him seven pockets of hops, at a certain price, which was paid. Breach: non-delivery. Plea: the general issue. Shee, Serjt., and J. Brown for the plaintiff. Digby Seymour and M'Mahon for the defendant. The sole question was as to damages. The plaintiff was a hop merchant at Cirencester, and the defendant a hop broker in Southwark. On the 5th May, 1862, the plaintiff bought of the defendant seven pockets of hops at the price of 57. 10s. per cwt., to be delivered forthwith, and paid for them by accepting a bill for the amount at four months. On the 14th May the plaintiff demanded the hops, which 1863. Middlesex Sittings. Hilary Term. The measure of damages for the non-delivery of goods, paid for at the time of purchase, is, the difference between that price and the highest price the goods have attained up to the time of trial. . |