1862. REGINA บ. HORE. at the time when the secrétaire was taken, permanently to convert it to his own use. Now, the evidence of the prosecution on that question consisted chiefly of a recital of conversations which had taken place after the article was taken; but the witnesses for the defence gave evidence of the circumstances attending the taking itself, and if the jury believed that the prisoner took the article, as alleged on his behalf, merely for the purpose of taking care of it, then, though that might be an unauthorized act, it was not felonious, and it would be their duty to acquit him. The jury found the prisoner Not guilty. Sussex Summer Assizes. A bill of sale THIS not duly Lewes Civil Court, coram Martin, B. BELLAMY v. SAULL AND ANOTHER. was an interpleader issue, in which the question was, whether certain goods, seized by the sheriff of Sussex under a writ of execution, were the property of the judg ment debtor, having been claimed by the present plaintiff as assignee under a bill of sale. Philbrick (with him Hawkins, Q.C., and W. Williams) for the plaintiff, the claimant. Lush, Q.C., and Honyman for the defendants, the judgcould be really ment creditors. misled, over ruled. The bill of sale was given by the Rev. R. L. Browne, vicar of Westbourne, Sussex, in favour of the plaintiff, for 310., and on its being produced, and the office copy being put in, it turned out that the stamp was only 7s. 6d., and that in the affidavit Mr. Browne was described as of Westbourne Rectory, near Emsworth, in the county of Hants. Emsworth is in Hants, and evidence was given that Westbourne and Emsworth adjoined, a stream dividing the parishes and also the counties; but that Emsworth was the nearest post town, and that no one could be misled by the description in the affidavit. Lush objected that the stamp was insufficient, as it was 2s. 6d. too little. Philbrick thereupon elected to have it duly stamped, and paid the penalty. The money was thereupon paid. Lush then contended that the late Revenue Act, sect. 34 (a), which enacted, that all registered documents should be produced properly stamped at the time of registration, and that if they be not properly stamped they shall not be registered or valid, made it inadmissible in evidence; or that the document was void, on the ground that it could not be stamped after registration. Philbrick contended that as it had been registered the objection was too late-fieri non debet sed factum valet ; and The learned BARON SO ruled. Lush then objected that the description in the affidavit was insufficient. The defendants, he said, had searched a registry under the name of the county, and had been misled by the name of Hants. But of this there was no evidence. The learned JUDGE overruled this objection, but reserved the point, and directed the verdict for the plaintiff, the claimant under the bill of sale-with leave to the defend (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 91, s. 34. No copy of any bill of sale of personal chattels shall be filed in any Court, unless the original shall be produced to the proper officer, with whom the copy is to be filed, duly 1862. BELLAMY v. SAULL and Another. 1862. BELLAMY บ. SAULL and Another. ants, the judgment creditors, to move the Court on both Surrey Summer Assizes. A receipt for that it is to be money, stating repaid on a certain event, is an agreement, and requires a stamp as such. On a deposit of money by one person with another as security upon his becoming bail for the depositor, the money to be returned when the liability as bail has ceased; the question for the jury is, whether the proceedings have in effect terminated. And the rescis. sion of an order for the institution of proceedings, with the fact that none have in fact been since in THIS Guildford, coram Martin, B. BATSON v. TRANCE AND ANOTHER. was an action against two persons named Trance and Gibbs, to recover the sum of 1007. deposited with them by the plaintiff on their becoming bail for a friend of his at his request, as money received to his use. Plea: never indebted. M. Chambers, Inderwick and Biron for the plaintiff. Hawkins and Philbrick for the defendants. On the 11th of October, 1861, one Harrington was made a bankrupt, and on the 17th of December, 1861, Mr. Commissioner Hill made an order, that the creditors' assignee do institute and carry on a prosecution against him for perjury, and that the expenses be paid out of the estate, &c., and on that day he was charged before the magistrates and the case was remanded until the 21st of December, when he was again remanded in custody, requiring bail for his re-appearance, and the defendants consented to become bail for him. On the 22nd of December, 1861, the plaintiff deposited with the defendants the sum of 1007., taking from them the following receipt:-" Received from Mr. Batson 1007., stituted, to be repaid to him when our liability as bail for Harcoupled with lapse of time, rington has ceased; such bail to be given by us on his behalf to answer a charge of perjury preferred against him." The recognizances of bail ran thus:-"On condition that he shall personally appear whenever called upon to answer held, evidence that the proceedings had terminated. 1862. BATSON ย. TRANCE on a charge which may be preferred against him for perjury, as above mentioned, we receiving forty-eight hours' notice to produce him." There were no further proceedings taken against the bankrupt, and on the 3rd of June, 1862, and Another. the Commissioner rescinded his former order for his prosecution. Upon this the plaintiff required back the money, but the defendants' attornies demanded that they should be indemnified "against all claims which may possibly arise from their becoming bail;" their reason being that, notwithstanding the rescission of the order, any creditor might still institute a prosecution. Some remuneration for the trouble taken by the bail was also required, and it was intimated that if it was paid the indemnity would be waived. On putting in the memorandum given by the defendants on the deposit of the money it appeared to be unstamped. The learned BARON said it required a stamp. M. Chambers submitted that it did not, as it was a mere receipt; but The learned JUDGE said it was more than that; it was also an agreement as to the terms on which the money was to be retained and returned. Thereupon the stamp and the penalty were paid. Hawkins objected that there was no right of action, as it did not appear that the proceedings were terminated, or that no prosecution would be preferred. The learned BARON said he should leave it to the jury on the evidence (especially the answer on the part of the defendants to the application for the return of the money), whether the proceedings had been really put an end to. Hawkins thereupon proposed to except to his Lordship's ruling, on the ground that he had ruled that it was a 1862. BATSON บ. TRANCE and Another. question for the jury whether the liability was terminated, whereas it was a question for the Judge on the terms of the recognizances. The learned BARON said if the question was for him, he ruled that the liability was at an end. He then left the case to the jury, telling them that the proceeding was a very common one, and that common sense seemed to show that on the order for a prosecution being rescinded the liability was at end. However, if there were any question for the jury, it was whether the proceedings had not been really and substantially put an end to. If it was a question for him, then he was quite clear that the letter on behalf of the defendants showed that they were so, and that the retention of the money was a fraudulent attempt on their part, or their attornies, to extort money from the plaintiff. Hawkins then tendered a note of another bill of exceptions, on the ground that the learned Judge had left it to the jury whether the liability was put an end to; but The learned BARON said he had not so left it, but whether the proceedings had not been really put an end to. Hawkins again excepted, on the ground that there was no evidence that the proceedings had been terminated, and This was the only exception received by the learned Judge. The jury found for the plaintiff; and The learned JUDGE granted speedy execution. |