1862. HIRST v. GOODWIN. MARTIN, B., said he thought that was so; and there was a case in Bingham's Reports, Ward v. Weeks (a), where it was held that in such a case the action must be against the party who repeated the slander. There was a case on the Midland Circuit at the last assizes, before Mr. Justice Williams, in which the same law was laid down (b), and that case had been confirmed in the Exchequer last term (c). He must, therefore, reject the evidence. Similar evidence was tendered and refused as to the two other of the three persons in regard to whom special damage was claimed, not one of them having been present when the slander was spoken. Shee, Serjt., for the defendant, contended that, as the plaintiff had erroneously stated that the mare was spavined and unsound, the words really spoken by the defendant were mere words of fair and reasonable remonstrance and complaint, and so were privileged, and not actionable at all. The defendant was called, and gave evidence in support of this view of the case. He denied the words as to the plaintiff not knowing his business, and declared that he only complained of his saying the mare was spavined. Several witnesses confirmed this statement. proved that there was no spavin. It was The learned BARON, in summing up the case to the jury, told them that, as the action would not lie unless the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his business, they must find for the defendant, unless they were satisfied that the words were so spoken, i. e., as stated by the plaintiff. If the defendant's version of the words was the right oneviz., that he merely complained of the plaintiff for saying (a) 7 Bing. 211. (b) Parkins v. Scott, 2 Fost. & Fin. 799. (c) Parkins v. Scott, cited supra ; Dixon v. Smith, 29 L. J. R. 125. the mare had spavin-the action would not lie, and the defendant was entitled to the verdict. Even if the jury should think otherwise, and find for the plaintiff, they would have to say what damages they would give; and what injury was it likely that the plaintiff had sustained through words spoken in a mere public-house squabble? The jury gave a Verdict for the plaintiff; damages, ls. 1862. HIRST บ. GOODWIN. WALKER v. SHEERMAN. Herts Summer Assizes. has moved the THIS was an action by a gardener and seed-seller against A person who the owner of a railway omnibus for seizing a sack of seed, and wrongfully detaining it for some time, whereby the plaintiff alleged that he had lost several markets. The defendant pleaded payment into Court of the sum of 20s., which he said was sufficient to satisfy the claim. The plaintiff replied that it was not sufficient. Issue. Hawkins and J. C. Mathew for the plaintiff. Garth for the defendant. The plaintiff was a seed-grower at Biggleswade, and was in the habit of attending the markets at Aylesbury (Saturday), Luton (Monday), and Leighton (Tuesday), taking a bag of seeds of various kinds with him as specimens to sell. On Friday, the 4th of April last, he had gone to Tring by railway, with a view to his going to Aylesbury, and on reaching the station left his bag of seed there, to be taken by the defendant's omnibus into the town, where a carrier was to call for it, to take it on to Aylesbury, whither the plaintiff went by a friendly conveyance. Not having any change with him, the plaintiff told the omnibus driver he goods of another with out a lawful right to do so, even to put it out of the way: -Held liable only for the natural consequences of the removal. 1862. WALKER บ. SHEERMAN. would pay the 6d. charge for the carriage of the sack on his return. The defendant, finding the sack in the yard, had removed it into the house. The case for the plaintiff being that he did this to detain the sack as a distress for the 6d. ; but, According to the defendant's case it was merely to put it out of the way. The carrier, however, went away without it. When the plaintiff got to Aylesbury market next morning he found his sack had not arrived, and, going back to Tring, found that it had been detained. He then went to Luton for the Monday's market, hoping that the seed might be sent there. It did not come, however, and next day the plaintiff had a letter from the defendant, to the effect that he was sorry for what had occurred, but that, as the plaintiff was a stranger to him, and had left the place, and the sack was lying about, he had taken care of it, and that it should be sent to him at once. The plaintiff went home, and there found the seed, having thus lost the Tuesday Leighton market, as well as the Luton and the Aylesbury. The loss he reckoned that he had sustained was between 81. and 107. The defendant, as will have been seen, did not set up any legal right to seize the sack, but disputed the amount of damage, and that was the question in controversy between the parties. It turned out that the carrier had not room for the sack even if it had come into the town by the omnibus, and that he had told the plaintiff so. And the case for the defendant was that he had merely removed the sack into the inn in order to put it out of the way, as the carrier would not take it; but his counsel called no witnesses, and relied on the letter and the facts as they came out in the course of the case for the plaintiff. The learned JUDGE left the question of damage to the jury. The defendant might have moved the sack with a good intention, but as he had, strictly speaking, no right to do so, he was answerable for any loss, the natural result of the act of removal. The main question was, whether, if the defendant had not moved the sack, it would have gone to Aylesbury. If so, then the jury ought fairly to give such sum for damage as would cover the profit which reasonably might have been expected to be realized at that place. But as to the other two places, he did not think the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, as he did not appear to have gone to the defendant for his goods when at Tring on the Monday, and the defendant then had sent the sack home. The action was brought, however. Finding that he had done what was legally wrong, the defendant paid 20s. into Court, thinking that it was amply sufficient to cover any damage really sustained. If the jury thought so, they should find for the defendant. The jury at once so found, saying that they thought the sum paid into Court was sufficient. Verdict for the defendant. 1862. WALKER บ. SHEERMAN. THIS DODD v. GILL. Herts Summer on a note was an action on a promissory note for 1007., dated the 3rd of January, 1861, payable at the chambers of the defendant one month after demand," "to Miss Mary need not be a Dodd alone." The pleas denied the demand. Denman and F. H. Lewis for the plaintiff. Shee, Serjt., for the defendant. The point in dispute was whether there had been a "demand" according to the terms of the note. The plaintiff was called, and proved the note, and said mand, there presentment for demand. she had made the demand on the defendant before she placed it in the hands of her attornies, and authorized a demand by them. On the 12th of April, 1862, they demanded payment by letter: on the 13th of May, 1862, the note was presented to the defendant at his chambers by her attornies, Messrs. Lewis; and on the 22nd of May this action was brought. Shee, Serjt., submitted that there ought to have been presentment for demand one month before action. MARTIN, B., however, thought there was no necessity for a presentment of the note for a demand; it was enough that there was a demand a month before action. Verdict for the plaintiff. Herts Summer Assizes. HAWKINS v. HILL. In an action by THIS was an action on a bill of exchange, dated the a second or subsequent the holder to drawer or in 14th of January, 1861, payable twelve months after date, drawn by Walter Hill on and accepted by Robert Hill, indorsed to Alfred Hill, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff. The declaration alleged that the bill when drawn was presented and dishonoured, whereof the defendant had due notice, which was denied. Shee, Serjt., and L. Kelly for the plaintiff. Hawkins and Prentice for the defendant. The bill became due on the 17th of February, 1862, and was then in the hands of Spooner & Co., the London address of the agents for Duignan & Son, bankers, of Walsall, where the plaintiff lived. They (Duignans) received it on the 20th from Spooner's (a Sunday having intervened), and at once inquired of the plaintiff the address of Alfred Hill, the defendant; but the plaintiff could not give it. They then dorser. |