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man employs another to do work for a third party, for whose benefit, it is known, the work is to be, and such third party gives instructions about it; there is not even, prima facie, an implied contract in the first employer to pay; butthequestion is whether, on the whole, he led the person employed to understand that he, and not the third party, was to pay for the work.
Coram Byles, J.
CHIDLEY v. NORRIS.
-A.CTION by an attorney for costs.
Beasley for the plaintiff.
Keane for the defendant.
The business was done in taking the defendant's sons through the Court of Bankruptcy.
The case for the plaintiff was that the defendant came to his house late one evening and told him of his sons' difficulties, and asked him—or, as the plaintiff said, "instructed" him—to take them through the Court, and that he agreed to do so on this retainer.
Next morning the sons came to the office, and gave the necessary instructions.
And the case for the defendant was, that he had merely proposed to the plaintiff that he should undertake the business for his sons, and by way of introducing them to him. And the defendant swore that he asked the plaintiff to do the business for them.
Byles, J. (to the jury).—Prima facie when one man employs another to do work, the employer is liable for it. But there are cases where the employer does not prima facie create that liability: as where it is known that a third party is to receive the benefit of the work. When one man employs another for his own benefit, the rule of law may be applied, that a promise is implied, on his part, to
master. Was that so here? or was it not? In the one case, find for the plaintiff; in the other, for the defendant.
Verdict for the defendant.
COOKE v. HADDON.
JL ROVER, for four cases of champagne. Trinity Term!
Pleas: not guilty and not possessed, and also a plea of Acreditorwho
, loses or dis
lien. poses of a
Laxton and Eyre Lloyd for the plaintiff. his lien, and
Barnard for the defendant. can recover its
The action was in trover for the recovery of four cases of deducting the i • i lii debt due.
champagne, deposited with defendant, a money-lender, by
way of collateral security for a loan of money, for which, also, a bill of 25/. was given by the plaintiff. The sum actually received by the plaintiff was 18/. 19s., and in respect of the bill several payments were, from time to time, made for interest, renewal, and in liquidation of the principal sum; but eventually a judgment was obtained against the present plaintiff, and execution was put into his premises in Farringdon-street, where he kept a refreshment- . room, for the balance, under which 11/. 7s. was realized. Plaintiff then called on defendant and demanded the champagne, and was by him referred to a person named Staff, in whose possession the wine was alleged by the defendant to be. Upon application to Staff plaintiff was informed by that person that the return of the wine was impossible, as part of it had been drunk.
For the defence it was contended that the right of lien still subsisted, inasmuch as the full amount due upon the bill had not been realized under the execution, owing to a mistake of the defendant's attorney, by whom credit had been given in respect of a sum of 5/. twice over.
The learned Judge, in summing up, told the jury that when a deposit of goods was made by way of security for
1862. a debt, it was the undoubted duty of the pledgee neither to use nor in any way to dispose of the goods so deposited, and that by so doing he would forfeit his lien. Here, therefore, the wine having been drunk, the plaintiff, independent of any question as to the amounts paid on account of the bill, was entitled to recover the value of the pledge. The other question for their determination was, as to damage, whether the payments which had at different times been made (the account between the parties being somewhat complicated) sufficed to discharge the debt. The jury found a
Verdict upon both issues in favour of the plaintiff, assessing the value of the wine at 20/.
LondonSitlings. SWABY V. VALLEZ.
Trinity Term. „
When time lias J_ HIS was an undefended action.
been gained by
a false state- Horace Lloyd, who appeared for the plaintiff, stated, in
action which his opening, that the attorney for the defendant had gained
undefended b6 a month's time by alleging that he had instructed counsel
immediate t0 defend, but that it had been discovered that the learned
be granted and gentleman named by him knew nothing whatever of the censu'red?** matter, and that the assertion had been made for the purpose of delay.
The learned counsel having proved his case,
Byles, J., granted immediate execution, and remarked that he hoped that a similar proceeding would never again be brought under his notice, and that the conduct of the attorney for the defendant would not become a precedent.
BREMNER And Others V. DANDO And Another. v-^-^/
ACTION for demurrage. ^^
Plea: never indebted. action for de
murrage, on a
Karslake and Honyman for the plaintiffs. a°general° °B
cargo, the shipParry, Sent., and Barnard for the defendants. ou"ier having
liberty to load
On the 23rd May, the charter-party was entered into quantity of iron that the ship should load a cargo of general merchandize as de?d TMe'Bht>
'_ . an"tne defence
(the shipowner having liberty to ship 200 tons of iron in turned on the the ship, freight free, no other dead weight to be shipped), loading of the and therewith proceed to Table Bay and deliver the same, pTM^"* ^7" being paid a lump sum of 680Z. freight; the charterers to be <he Judge allowed thirty-five working days (if the ship should not be this had not sooner despatched) for loading;. to be discharged with all patedTythe
despatch, &C plaintiff, he
r adjourned the
On the 31st May the ship was ready for loading, and trial till the
the loading of the iron commenced. enable evi
On the 3rd June the shipowners gave notice to the adduce'dta
charterers that the lay days would commence next day. contradict the
On the 6th June, according to the case for the plaintiffs, the defence on the ship was ready to receive measurement goods. a P0"11,
On the 10th June, according to the case for the plaintiff's, the shipment of the iron was completed.
(On the 20th June, according to the case for the defendants.)
The iron was railway iron, for Kurrachee.
On the 5th July the defendants commenced loading their cargo.
On the 27th July they completed their loading.
And of course, reckoning the lay days from the 20th June, there would be no demurrage due; obviously the iron must go in first, both as being dead weight and as being destined for Kurrachee.
Byles, J., said the point was well worthy of consideration, and he should reserve it on condition that the case should not go further.
(To this condition both parties assented.) The iron was to be loaded by the shipowners, the plaintiffs. There was a great deal in the point.
The stevedore and other witnesses were called to prove that the loading of the iron was not complete until the 20th June; and that, before that day, the captain gave the stevedore directions not to begin loading the measurement cargo until the loading of the iron was complete (as it would be inconvenient), and that he told the defendants so, and, on the 20th, gave them notice that the loading of the iron was completed.
It was admitted that it was necessary that the iron should be loaded before the measurement articles.
On the 29th there was a claim by the plaintiffs for nine days' demurrage, at 41. a day—total, 36/.
The case for the plaintiffs had closed, without its appearing distinctly when the iron was loaded; and
Parry, Serjt, objected that there was no evidence as to that, and therefore no evidence that the delay in loading the other cargo was through the default of the defendants.
Byles, J., thought it sufficiently appeared at present that demurrage was due.
Parry, Serjt., then opened a defence founded on the fact, which he proposed to prove, that the shipment of the iron was not completed until the 20th June. He contended that, on the construction of the charter-party, coupled with the fact as to the destination and position in the ship of the iron, that the lay days did not begin until all the iron was loaded.
Karslake, for the plaintiff, applied for an adjournment, to enable them to adduce evidence in contradiction of this case, on the ground that it had come by surprise upon