1862. London Sitlings. third party, for tions about it; there is not even, primâ facie, an implied contract Coram Byles, J. CHIDLEY v. NORRIS. ACTION by an attorney for costs. Plea: never indebted. Beasley for the plaintiff. Keane for the defendant. The business was done in taking the defendant's sons through the Court of Bankruptcy. The case for the plaintiff was that the defendant came to his house late one evening and told him of his sons' difficulties, and asked him-or, as the plaintiff said, "inployer to to pay; structed" him-to take them through the Court, and that but the question he agreed to do so on this retainer. in the first em is whether, on the whole, he led the person employed to understand that he, and not the third party, was to pay for the work. Next morning the sons came to the office, and gave the necessary instructions. And the case for the defendant was, that he had merely proposed to the plaintiff that he should undertake the business for his sons, and by way of introducing them to him. And the defendant swore that he asked the plaintiff to do the business for them. BYLES, J. (to the jury).—Primâ facie when one man employs another to do work, the employer is liable for it. But there are cases where the employer does not primá facie create that liability: as where it is known that a third party is to receive the benefit of the work. When one man employs another for his own benefit, the rule of law may be applied, that a promise is implied, on his part, to pay. But where one person employs another, or proposes that another shall be employed, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of third parties, then, to raise an implied promise on his part to pay, he must have led the other to understand, by words or conduct, that he was to be the pay master. Was that so here? or was it not? In the one case, find for the plaintiff; in the other, for the defendant. Verdict for the defendant. 1862. CHIDLEY ย. NORRIS. COOKE v. HADDON. TROVER, for four cases of champagne. London Sittings. Trinity Term. Pleas not guilty and not possessed, and also a plea of A creditor who lien. Laxton and Eyre Lloyd for the plaintiff. Barnard for the defendant. loses or disposes of a pledge loses his lien, and the pledgor can recover its value without debt due. The action was in trover for the recovery of four cases of deducting the champagne, deposited with defendant, a money-lender, by way of collateral security for a loan of money, for which, also, a bill of 251. was given by the plaintiff. The sum actually received by the plaintiff was 187. 19s., and in respect of the bill several payments were, from time to time, made for interest, renewal, and in liquidation of the principal sum; but eventually a judgment was obtained against the present plaintiff, and execution was put into his premises in Farringdon-street, where he kept a refreshment-. room, for the balance, under which 117. 7s. was realized. Plaintiff then called on defendant and demanded the champagne, and was by him referred to a person named Staff, in whose possession the wine was alleged by the defendant to be. Upon application to Staff plaintiff was informed by that person that the return of the wine was impossible, as part of it had been drunk. For the defence it was contended that the right of lien still subsisted, inasmuch as the full amount due upon the bill had not been realized under the execution, owing to a mistake of the defendant's attorney, by whom credit had been given in respect of a sum of 5l, twice over. The learned JUDGE, in summing up, told the jury that when a deposit of goods was made by way of security for a debt, it was the undoubted duty of the pledgee neither Verdict upon both issues in favour of London Sittings. Trinity Term. SWABY v. VALLEZ. When time has THIS was an undefended action. been gained by a false statement in an action which turns out to be undefended, immediate Horace Lloyd, who appeared for the plaintiff, stated, in his opening, that the attorney for the defendant had gained a month's time by alleging that he had instructed counsel to defend, but that it had been discovered that the learned be granted and gentleman named by him knew nothing whatever of the matter, and that the assertion had been made for the purpose of delay. execution will the attorney censured. The learned counsel having proved his case, BYLES, J., granted immediate execution, and remarked that he hoped that a similar proceeding would never again be brought under his notice, and that the conduct of the attorney for the defendant would not become a precedent. BREMNER AND OTHERS v. DANDO AND ANOTHER. ACTION for demurrage. Plea: never indebted. Karslake and Honyman for the plaintiffs. Parry, Serjt., and Barnard for the defendants. On the 23rd May, the charter-party was entered into that the ship should load a cargo of general merchandize (the shipowner having liberty to ship 200 tons of iron in the ship, freight free, no other dead weight to be shipped), and therewith proceed to Table Bay and deliver the same, being paid a lump sum of 6801. freight; the charterers to be allowed thirty-five working days (if the ship should not be sooner despatched) for loading; to be discharged with all despatch, &c. pleted, and the Judge thought that this had not iron was com been antici pated by the plaintiff, he adjourned the On the 31st May the ship was ready for loading, and trial till the the loading of the iron commenced. morrow, to enable evi adduced to contradict the evidence for On the 3rd June the shipowners gave notice to the dence to be charterers that the lay days would commence next day. On the 6th June, according to the case for the plaintiffs, the ship was ready to receive measurement goods. On the 10th June, according to the case for the plaintiffs, the shipment of the iron was completed. (On the 20th June, according to the case for the defendants.) The iron was railway iron, for Kurrachee. On the 5th July the defendants commenced loading their cargo. On the 27th July they completed their loading. And of course, reckoning the lay days from the 20th June, there would be no demurrage due; obviously the iron must go in first, both as being dead weight and as being destined for Kurrachee. the defence on that point. 1862. BREMNER and Others ບ. DANDO BYLES, J., said the point was well worthy of consideration, and he should reserve it on condition that the case should not go further. (To this condition both parties assented.) The iron was and Another. to be loaded by the shipowners, the plaintiffs. There was a great deal in the point. The stevedore and other witnesses were called to prove that the loading of the iron was not complete until the 20th June; and that, before that day, the captain gave the stevedore directions not to begin loading the measurement cargo until the loading of the iron was complete (as it would be inconvenient), and that he told the defendants so, and, on the 20th, gave them notice that the loading of the iron was completed. It was admitted that it was necessary that the iron should be loaded before the measurement articles. On the 29th there was a claim by the plaintiffs for nine days' demurrage, at 47. a day-total, 36l. The case for the plaintiffs had closed, without its appearing distinctly when the iron was loaded; and Parry, Serjt., objected that there was no evidence as to that, and therefore no evidence that the delay in loading the other cargo was through the default of the defendants. BYLES, J., thought it sufficiently appeared at present that demurrage was due. Parry, Serjt., then opened a defence founded on the fact, which he proposed to prove, that the shipment of the iron was not completed until the 20th June. He contended that, on the construction of the charter-party, coupled with the fact as to the destination and position in the ship of the iron, that the lay days did not begin until all the iron was loaded. Karslake, for the plaintiff, applied for an adjournment, to enable them to adduce evidence in contradiction of this case, on the ground that it had come by surprise upon |