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Trinity Term. ACTION on a guarantee given by the defendant for On a plea of

the defendant's goods supplied to another person.

coverture, her

s marriage being Plea : that at the time of the contract the defendant was

regularly and still is the wife of one Shelton. Issue.

proved, evidence admitted

on the part of Murray for the plaintiff.

the plaintiff of

cohabitation of Bridge for the defendant.

the alleged husband be

fore the marThe guarantee was given by the defendant, in the name riage with of Shelton, for goods supplied to her father, an innkeeper.

ther woman,

reputed to be At that time she was neither living with him nor with her his wife, and

shown to have alleged husband; but, as the plaintiff alleged, described been living, herself as a widow. In point of fact, she had been a widow

widow fendant's mar(of one Oram) when she married Shelton. After the supply riage, with him. of the goods, her name was set up, as Elizabeth Oram, over her father's door. On the plaintiff inquiring as to her name, she stated that she had been, indeed, married to Shelton, but had afterwards heard that he was already married at the time he married her, and so she hesitated to assume his name.

For the defendant, an office copy-from Somerset House registry—of a certificate of the marriage of one “ Elizabeth Oram, widow," with one “ Shelton, bachelor," was put in, dated in 1856, before the time of the contract.

KEATING, J. (to the counsel for the defendant).—Do you not call the defendant, or any witness ? (a) No doubt the copy of the certificate is (under 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99) good evidence per se of a marriage (6); but do you go no further? (c)

(a) To prove the identity of the parties, and also to prove that Shelton was alive at the time of the contract.

(6) Between some parties of the

name stated; but as to identity of
parties, where it is disputed, there
must be some evidence.

(c) Vide supra (a); et ride R. v.
Wilson, ante, p. 122.




The defendant was called and proved that she was the person mentioned in the certificate, and that Shelton was alive at the time of the contract, but she had not seen him for above two years.

Cross-examined, she admitted that she had heard that he had been married, to a woman still living, at the time of her own marriage to him, and had heard that a woman, since her own marriage, claimed to be and called herself his wife, but she denied that she had any knowledge of a prior marriage, nor any reason, except from hearsay of the woman's statement, that any such marriage had taken place, and she also denied that she knew of any one except the woman herself calling her Shelton's wife.

Evidence on the part of the plaintiff was offered, that before the defendant's marriage with Shelton he had lived with the woman referred to as with his wife.

Bridge objected to the evidence (a), but

Keating, J., admitted the evidence (6), and left it to the jury whether they were satisfied that Shelton had been married to the woman referred to, as, if so, then no doubt his marriage with the defendant was invalid, and her plea was disproved. If, however, they were not satisfied of such previous marriage, then they ought to find for the defendant.

Verdict for the defendant.

(a) Such evidence is admissible against the reputed husband in an action against him as such husband (vide Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. Rep. 460; Pawle v. Goding, Vol. II., p. 585; sed vide Gomme v, Franklin, Vol. I., p. 465); and it is also admissible in furour of the second wife, as on an indict

ment against her for bigamy. Vide R. v. Wilson, ante, p. 122. It is perhaps doubtful whether it is admissible against the second wife, or against any third party, a stranger.

(6) But had the verdict been the other way would have reserved the point as to whether the evidence, even if admissible, was sufficient.

s were

1862. Coram Erle, C. J. BEHRENS AND OTHERS v. ALLEN.

Trinity Term. LIBEL. The action was by the plaintiffs, as traders, Even if a reagainst the proprietor of the Manchester Guardian, for portofino parte

O proceedings in two articles therein, imputing to them dishonest dealings. bankruptcy,

imputing to The articles purported to be comments on reports of cer- third parties tain proceedings in bankruptcy, at which it transpired that goods from the

od that purchases of the plaintiffs had for some time prior to and just before

traders under the bankruptcy purchased from the bankrupts, while they the market

price, and were insolvent, large quantities of goods under the market while he was

+ insolvent, is price; and the first article, the subject of the first count,

un, privileged ; imputed to the plaintiffs (in effect) that they must have comments on

such report, known that the vendors were insolvent, and were dispos- imputing that

these puring of the goods in fraud of their creditors, likening him to ch the Jew Fagan, &c. : innuendo, that the plaintiff had been made dis

honestly :guilty of dishonest dealings.

Held, not pri..

vileged, and on The second count was on an article on the 24th October, a plea that the in answer to a letter from the plaintiffs, complaining of soul

'80 substance true, the former one. In this article the defendant, in effect, held, that the

defendant must reiterated the original charges. They had, however, pub- prove the dis

honesty. lished the plaintiffs' letter, and offered to publish any other from them on the subject, but professed their belief in the truth of these charges, and challenged legal enquiry.

Pleas : 1. Not guilty.

2. That the alleged libels were true in substance and fact (a). Issue.

Shee, Serjt., E. James and Pope for the plaintiffs.
Bovill, Hawkins and J. A. Russell for the defendant.

The evidence for the defence was, that the bankrupts, calico printers, had for some months, between December, 1861, and March, 1862, sold to the plaintiffs 20,000 pieces of grey cloth (materials used in the bankrupt's business as


motorina ac libel was in

(a) Held good on demurrer, the charges being specific.


BEHRENS and Others


calico printers, and therefore not usually sold at all), worth
calico printe
about 12,0001., at prices greatly under the market price of
the day, and at a loss of about 1,3001. The sales were on
a promise by the plaintiffs not to re-sell them in the
Manchester market, and were not in the usual way in the
markets, but by private arrangements, and the last trans-
action being a few days before the bankruptcy; and all
this appeared in the report, which it was contended was
privileged. But there was no express evidence that the
plaintiff knew of the circumstances of the bankrupts at the
time or supposed them to be insolvent, nor did the evi-
dence, as in the report of the ex parte proceedings on the
examination of the bankrupts, impute that they had
known it; and, on the contrary, people generally supposed
them to be solvent. And the plaintiffs themselves had
been examined.

Erle, C. J., held, that even if the report of the proceedings in bankruptcy were privileged, (which was doubtful,) the comments were not so, as they went far beyond it, and he left the case to the jury on the plea of justification ; whether it was proved that the plaintiffs had bought the goods knowingly under such circumstances as that they were guilty of dishonest dealings, i. e., knowing that the sellers were insolvent or likely to be so (a).

Verdict for the plaintiff, damages 1,0001. (a) Unless they were so, the plaintiffs; and the plea put demere selling under the market price fendant to prove the sting of the would be no fraud in them, and the charge; Roberts v. Brown, 10 Bing. buying would be no fraud in the 519.

PEARCE v. TUCKER. (Trinity Term. A workman ACTION for fitting up a kitchen range in an improper being bound to do his work in and unworkmanlike manner. a workmanlike manner, it is no excuse for his doing it so as to be useless, that it was not possible to do it otherwise, unless he told his employer so.





Plea : inter alia, that the range was not put up in an improper manner.

Murphy for the plaintiff.
Mills and Hance for the defendant.

The case for the plaintiff was, that he had employed the defendant, as a workman in his trade, to put up a new kitchen range with an old boiler behind, and that hot water could never be got from the boiler, as there were, in fact, no flues to carry the heat from the fire to and about the boiler.

The defendant called witnesses to prove that Alues were made as large as the space allowed of, but that the space was not large enough to make them effective, and so he could not make a good job of it nor of the old boiler, which was badly constructed.

It was answered, that if the plaintiff had known that he would not have had the work done at all. And it did not appear that the defendant had told him.

Erle, C. J. (to the jury).—Was it not the duty of the defendant to tell the plaintiff that he could not do the work in a workmanlike manner, and that in fact it would be throwing away money to have it done at all, as it must have been obvious to any competent workman that it could not be properly done. If so, it is no excuse to the defendant that he could not do the work properly ; primâ facie, it must be taken that a workman undertakes to do his work in a work manlike manner (a). If the plaintiff had been told that it was impossible to do it, he might not

(a) Per Parke, B.- If a work- defendant might show under the man contract to supply Jabour, it general issue that the machine was must be taken to mean that the manufactured by the plaintiff for labour shall be of the quality which the defendant, and that it did not would be bestowed by a workman work and was useless; Grounsell v. of ordinary skill in his trade; Lamb, 1 M. & W. 352. As to acCousens v. Paddon, 2 C., M. & R. tion for doing work in an improper 547. So in an action for a machine way, vide Mondel v. Steele, 8 M. & sold and delivered : held, that the W.858.

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