Page images
PDF
EPUB

Dodson maintained his right to plead the plea.

Watkin Williams contended, that it ought not to be allowed, and cited Gladstone v. Pearson (a), where he said, WILLES, J., at Chambers, had refused to allow any other plea to be pleaded along with such a plea, or to allow defendant to plead and demur.

WILLIAMS, J.-The plea would, no doubt, be just (b), if it were shown that the action was brought for the sole benefit of the releasor. But in this case, I think, he cannot justly deal with the interests of the co-plaintiffs (c). I will not, therefore, allow the plea to be pleaded with others.

(a) That case (not reported) would be no authority for the present, unless it appeared that the release there was not fraudulent, or that here it was. Now, in the case cited supra, Philips v. Clagett, it was held, that the release was not fraudulent if the plaintiff releasing had an interest. Here it must not, perhaps, be taken to have been considered that it was so, unless the other plaintiffs had not. No authority

Plea disallowed.

was cited for such a proposition;
and the learned Judge seems to
have supposed that the releasor had
no real interest. Hence this case
will only be an authority to this
extent, that fraud may be shown
on the application to allow the plea.

(b) That is not fraudulent.

(c) That is (or it must be taken according to Philips v. Clagett, supra), because he had no real interest.

1862.

LASCARIDI

and Others

v.

GURNEY

and Others.

Central Criminal Court-Judges' Chambers, coram

SUMMONS,

Keating, J.

REGINA v. COLUCCI.

1861.

ment in the Central Cri

on behalf of the prisoner, for leave to On an indictinspect letters in the possession of the prosecution. Indictment for obtaining money by false pretences.

minal Court, for obtaining money by a false pretence, that a parcel contained certain letters of the prosecutrix to the prisoner, which he had promised, for a valuable consideration, to give up, and which had been seized under a search warrant, a Judge on the rota for the session-after the session had opened-made an order in favour of the prisoner for an inspection of the letters.

1861.

REGINA

บ.

COLUCCI.

The pretence charged was, that a certain parcel delivered by the prisoner to the prosecutrix contained all letters written by him to her (and which, in pursuance of an agreement between them, were to be delivered up), whereas in truth the parcel only contained one of them. The letters had been seized under a search warrant, and were now, to the number of above sixty, in the possession of the prosecutrix.

The present application, on behalf of the prisoner, was for an order for leave to inspect and take copies of them, for the purposes of the defence.

KEATING, J., thought that he had no jurisdiction to make the order, because the indictment was in the Central Criminal Court; and although he was on the rota for the next Session, the Court was an intermittent Court, and the Session had not yet opened, so that the Court was not now sitting. If, however, the application were renewed after the Session had opened, it might be acceded to.

Accordingly, after the Session had opened, the application was renewed, and an order made, as prayed, for an inspection of the letters, but not for copies.

Keane for the defendant.

Giffard for the prosecution.

On an indictment for obtaining money by a false pre

tence, that a parcel contained all let

Coram Martin, B., and Keating, J.

REGINA v. COLUCCI.

FALSE pretences.

The first count stated, by way of inducement, that one

F. J. (the prosecutrix) had written and sent to the defendant divers letters, and that afterwards it was agreed by ters written by and between them, that, in consideration of 2,000l. to be the prosecutrix paid by her to the defendant, he should deliver to her the to the prisoner,

and which he

had promised, in consideration of the money, to give up to her :-Held, that the counsel for the prosecution were not bound to have the letters read, although the counsel for the prisoner might cross-examine as to the contents of any of them, and have any read for that purpose.

said letters, each and every of them. The indictment then charged that he knowingly did falsely pretend to her that a certain parcel, which he then produced and delivered to her, contained the said letters, and each and every of them.

Averment that the said parcel did not contain the said letters, but only one of them, as he then well knew. By means of which false pretences he then fraudulently obtained from her the sum of 1,9007.

Second count, charging the pretence to have been that the parcel contained all letters written and sent by prosecutrix to defendant.

Third count, charging that the defendant fraudulently produced to the prosecutrix certain papers and one letter written by her to him, and then fraudulently pretended that he had produced all letters written by him to her, &c. Chambers for the prosecution.

Keane and Giffard for the defendant.

The letters had been taken under a warrant, and in the course of the case for the prosecution,

Keane, for the defendant, desired that they be then put in and read, as it was very necessary that the jury should be able to judge from their tenor whether it was probable that the prosecutrix should have promised or paid her money in consideration of their being given up (a), but

MARTIN, B., said the Court did not consider it necessary that the letters should then be put in and read on behalf of the prosecution, and that it would be enough that they were put in, and that any of them which might be deemed material for the purposes of the defence might be read and made use of by the counsel for the prisoner, for the purpose of cross-examining or contradicting the prosecutrix.

(a) Vide previous report of the same case at Chambers as to inspection of the letters.

1861.

REGINA

v.

COLUCCI.

1861.

REGINA

v.

COLUCCI.

On cross-examination, it appeared that the prosecutrix had destroyed some of the letters.

At the close of the case for the prosecution,

Keane, for the defence, objected that the indictment, which alleged the pretence to be that the parcel contained all the letters written, was not supported; but

The Court held the allegation distributive, and overruled the objection, and ultimately,

Verdict, guilty.

1862.

Easter Sessions.

A meat sales

man can be in

victed at com

mon law, for knowingly

Coram Willes, J.

THE QUEEN v. STEVENSON.

INDICTMENT, for that at a public market for the purdicted and con- pose of buying and selling flesh meat for human food, the defendant unlawfully, wilfully and deceitfully did cause to be publicly exposed for sale a quantity of flesh meat as and for sound and wholesome flesh meat fit for human food, whereas in truth and in fact, as he well knew (a), it was not so.

sending or ex-
posing meat for
sale in a public

market as fit
for human
food, which, in
fact, was not

[ocr errors]

A second count charged that the defendant himself knowingly exposed the meat for sale, with the same averments of scienter. The second count charged the sending the meat to the market, with the intent that it should be sold for human food, with similar averments.

Two other counts charged the attempt to cause it to be exposed, or to expose it for sale.

(a) Victuallers, brewers and other common dealers in victuals, who, in the course of their trade, sell provisions unfit for the food of man, are criminally responsible under the stat. 51 Hen. 3, " Pillor' et Tumbrel' &c.," and the stat. of Edw. 1, "De Pistoribus et Brassiatoribus et aliis Vitellariis," if they do so knowingly, and probably

if they even do not, and are liable civilly to the vendee without any fraud on their part or warranty of the soundness of the thing sold: but a private person not following any of these trades, who sells an unwholesome article for food (not knowing it to be such), is not liable under such circumstances; Burnby v. Bollitt, 11 Jur., Exch. 827.

All the counts charged the scienter (a).

None of the counts concluded, contra formam statuti.
Sleigh for the prosecution.

The prisoner was undefended.

The defendant, it appeared, was a jobbing butcher at Leicester, and on the 27th of March he sent up to Newgate Market the carcase of a calf which was in a diseased state, and quite unfit for human food. When he was questioned upon the subject, he said that he had purchased the carcase of a farmer residing near Leicester, that he did not kill it, and that he did not think it was so bad as it turned out to be; but it appeared that the animal had been very ill, and that it was killed on account of there being no chance of its recovery; and when the prisoner went to purchase it he saw it, and was told that it was worth 6s. for the dogs, and he replied that if it was sent to London it might "make a sovereign."

There was evidence that the appearances were such as that a butcher must have known that the carcase was diseased, and unfit for human food.

WILLES, J. (to the jury).-Did the defendant know when he sent up the meat, that it was unfit for human food? And did he send it up to be sold for human food?

(a) This is noticed, because in Everton v. Mathews, 10 W. R. 346, the question was raised, whether either at common law or under the ancient statutes, or under the Newgate Meat Market Act, a salesman was liable, even civiliter, for selling bad meat, which he did not himself kill and which he did not know to be unfit for human food, and the Court decided that he was not, and that the Market Act only

Verdict, guilty. Sentence, six
months' imprisonment (6).

gave powers of seizure and did not
otherwise affect the law as to
scienter.

(b) WILLES, J., observed, that
the offence was one of great gravity;
and he regretted that there was
no power to punish it more se-
verely, as by hard labour as well
as imprisonment. It seems, at
present, to be a mere misdemeanor,
not, properly speaking, a crime.
See the next case.

1862.

THE QUEEN

v.

STEVENSON.

« PreviousContinue »