1772. SIEGE OF LEMNOS RAISED BY GAZI HASSAN. 327 his boyhood as a slave to a Turk of Rodosto; employed during his youth as a boatman; he had in after-life gone through a range of romantic adventures, by turns a chief at Algiers, a fugitive in Italy, and a prisoner at Constantinople.* Far from the loose tenets so common in political adventurers, Hassan through all his wanderings most straitly held the faith, and most scrupulously practised the rites, of a Mussulman. At, the naval battle off Scio he had commanded the Admiral-ship of the Turks which was attacked by that of the Russians. The Admirals on both sides, Cassim and Orlof, with equal prudence kept aloof. But Hassan towing close alongside his enemy, and locked fast to him by grappling-irons, continued to fight with the utmost fury, until from the Russian hand-grenades both vessels stood in flames. Both at length blew up with a terrific explosion, while Hassan, one of the last on deck, and one of the few survivors as it proved out of many hundreds, though severely wounded, swam safe to shore. Scarce yet recovered from his wounds he laid before the Grand Visier a scheme to raise the siege of Lemnos. He proposed to enlist four thousand volunteers from among the lower orders at Constantinople, to arm each man with a sabre and pistol only, and to transport them over to the island in rafts or small boats without artillery, trusting wholly to the force of courage and to the chances of surprise. This project seemed a mere chimera to all the best judges of the art of war; to none more than to Baron de Tott, a French engineer of great distinction in the Turkish service. De Tott felt it his duty to remonstrate on the subject with the Grand Visier. The Grand Visier heard him with attention, and then calmly replied: "I agree with you "that Hassan's scheme is absurd and hopeless; but at all "events it will rid us of four thousand rabble; and that For the character and early career of Hassan, see Rulhière Histoire de Pologne, vol. iii. p. 475-495, and vol. iv. p. 85-89. ed. 1807. This account closely agrees with the spirited sketch in Anastasius (vol. i. p. 29, &c.), which, as Mr. Thomas Hope assured me, was drawn in strict conformity to the information obtained by him in his Eastern travels. "riddance is almost as good as any victory!"* Under such auspices, such prognostications, did Hassan proceed upon his enterprise. It was crowned with triumphant success. Landing in Lemnos unperceived, he fell sword in hand. upon the enemy, who fled with precipitation and not without slaughter to the shore, where they re-embarked; the Russian fleet in a panic heaved anchor; and the Turkish fortress was saved. After an exploit so brilliant and so wholly unexpected the Sultan named Hassan Capitan Pacha or Lord High Admiral. From that time forward, partly through his vigilance, and partly through their own dissensions, the Russians could achieve no further conquest, and make no further progress by sea; and they finally sailed back with much disappointment to the Baltic. The King of England offered his mediation towards a peace, and conferences for that object were pursued with much activity through the summer of 1772. No such result, however, was at that time attained, and hostilities continued, though more languidly, till the summer of 1774, when they were terminated by the treaty of Cainardgi, the principal stipulation being that the Porte should relinquish its sovereignty over the Crimea. Not unconnected with the warfare in Turkey were the troubles in Poland. That ill-fated country, owing to its own elective Royalty and defective constitution, had for many years past lain open to the rapacity or dictation of its neighbours. There, as Russia had often tried, everything might be had for asking or rather for taking. There, as the Empress Catherine had once declared, one need only stoop down and gather up.** Since the election above all of Stanislas Poniatowsky for King in 1764 the Russian influence which had mainly wrought his elevation assumed Memoires du Baron de Tott, vol. ii. p. 81. ed. 1785. The difficulty of access to this island was long since remarked by Homer (Iliad, lib. xxiv. v. 573.) Ες Σαμον ες τ' Ιμβρον και Λημνον αμιχθαλόεσσαν. ** "Il semble, dit-elle en riant, qu'en Pologne il n'y a qu'à se baisser "et en prendre!" (Ferrand, Hist. des trois Demembremens, vol i. p. 142. ed. 1820.) 1772. TROUBLES IN POLAND. 329 to rule the kingdom in his place. The chief cause or pretext of internal strife was the condition of the DISSIDENTS, under which term in Poland were comprised all other forms of Christian faith beyond the Roman Catholic pale. Russia as adhering to the Greek Church warmly espoused the cause of the Dissidents, obtaining for them by main force a repeal of penal statutes and a participation in political rights. As warmly did the party opposed to Russia resist and resent such concessions. And thus unhappily in the annals of Poland at this period the cause of religious intolerance is closely blended with the cause of national freedom. A confederation in favour of the Dissidents was formed at Radom; another confederation against them was formed at Barr. The former was openly upheld by the Court of Petersburg, while the latter received in secret some succour from the Court of Versailles. It was also mainly with a view to assist the Confederates of Barr that France in 1768 had impelled the Porte to its rash and ill-considered declaration of war. In the desultory hostilities which ensued throughout Poland many districts were laid waste; and wherever the Russian troops were quartered they levied recruits or contributions as they might in a conquered province. This treatment of Poland so repugnant to every principle of generosity or justice was not long in attracting the serious consideration of the King of Prussia. Generosity or justice had indeed little or no weight with Frederick in his conduct of foreign affairs; they served him only as flourishes for the adornment of his writings. But although he was perfectly willing that Poland should still be plundered, he was not willing that Russia should monopolise the spoil. Why might not Prussia claim a share? Why might not each of the three neighbouring Powers seize and incorporate in its own dominions the provinces most contiguous and most desirable to itself, leaving only the poor remainder to King Stanislas and his successors? Negotiations on this basis were actively pursued both at Petersburg and at Vienna. The Empress Catherine, though with some difficulty, was brought to acknowledge that Poland ought not to be a prey for herself alone. Far different were the feelings of that virtuous and noble-minded woman the Empress Maria Theresa. She expressed to her Minister, Prince Kaunitz, the utmost aversion and horror of the scheme as a flagrant violation of the public right. But her age was now advanced, and her strength declining, while her son the Emperor Joseph the Second had become her colleague, or in truth more than her colleague, in the administration of the government. Thus at last she yielded, though not without a bitter pang. On the 5th of August 1772 were signed the definitive treaties of partition between the Three Powers; according to which the Prussians were to have Pomerelia, the Austrians Galicia, and the Russians great part of Lithuania. Poland, distracted and enfeebled, and standing alone against the Three, could offer no resistance, and obtain no succour to her cry; nay more, she was soon compelled to ratify the rapine which she could not hinder. The iniquity of this transaction stands little in need of comment. An usurpation more shameless, more destitute of any plausible plea, is scarce to be found in any page of history. When Louis the Fifteenth was first apprised of it he is said to have exclaimed, "This would not have hap"pened had Choiseul still been here!" The successors of Choiseul indeed were not men either to foresee the crisis or to deal with it when come. They might express displeasure and resentment; they might threaten to send one fleet of observation to the Archipelago, and another to the Baltic; they might even commence preparations with that view in the harbours of France and Spain; but all men felt that theirs were but illusory schemes or idle boasts; that they would shrink from the moment of action; that they were *In the Appendix to this volume will be found her confidential note to Prince Kaunitz, as translated from the German. The original is in Preuss (Lebens Geschichte, &c., vol. iv. p. 38.). In January 1772 Frederick the Second wrote to D'Alembert as follows: "J'entreprendrais plutot de mettre "toute l'histoire des Juifs en madrigaux, que d'inspirer les mêmes sen"timens à trois Souverains,-entre lesquels il faut compter deux femmes!" (Euvres Posthumes, vol. xi. p. 242. ed. 1789.) 1772. FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND. 331 neither to be feared as enemies nor trusted as allies. Under such circumstances the sole remaining Great Power, namely, the Court of St. James's, can scarcely, as it seems to me, be blamed in abstaining from hostile measures, and coldly acquiescing in the partition of Poland. To do otherwise England must have reversed her whole previous policy, and sought alliance with the Sovereigns of the Family Compact, Louis the Fifteenth and Charles the Third. She must have relied upon, and acted with, the abject Ministry of Madame Du Barry. She must have renounced the hope, on which at that time her ablest statesmen set the utmost value, of a close alliance with the Court of Russia. And if we could not take part in the conflict frankly and directly, still less could we do so indirectly; still less was it consistent with our dignity and honour, while ourselves remaining inactive, to fan the flames of war between Turkey and Russia, as our ambassador at Constantinople attempted at one moment contrary to his instructions.* Yet while acknowledging the justice of these views in vindication of the British Ministers, we may still regret that their language at that time was scarcely adequate to the magnitude of the occasion. The Secretaries of State, the Rochfords and Suffolks, of the day, so far as we can judge from their own despatches, do not seem to have comprehended the full bearings of the question before them; they say nothing of the danger of disturbing the balance of power; they do not dwell on the ill example from such a violation of the public law; they are silent as to motives of compassion for the injured Poles; they descant only on the possible interruption and disturbance of the British trade! It was right under all the circumstances to abstain from hostile measures, but it might have been neither impolitic nor unbecoming to have placed * See in the Appendix the prompt rebuke addressed to him by the Secretary of State, July 24. 1772. It may be observed in that despatch how much weight the Ministry placed on the hope of future alliance with Russia. Such was also the view of their antagonist Lord Chatham. He writes to Lord Shelburne, Cctober 20. 1773. "Your Lordship knows I am quite a "Russ." |