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INDUCEMENTS HELD OUT TO FRANCE.

determined to follow a cautious and prudent course and wished to obtain concessions from the Americans in proportion to the benefits they bestowed. By this time Vergennes had obtained the consent of Spain to join her in a war against England, but just at this moment came news of the defeat on Long Island, and this unexpected announcement dashed the hopes of Vergennes and completely disarranged his plans.† Because of the discouragements consequent upon the failure of the campaign of 1776, Congress redoubled its efforts to secure aid from foreign nations, appointing a committee to prepare a plan for this purpose. When the plan proposed by this committee was taken under consideration, a heated debate followed. Some of the members wished to sacrifice almost everything to obtain the aid of France, and were willing to offer her almost the same monopoly of American commerce as Great Britain had enjoyed prior to the outbreak of the war. On December 30, 1776, a resolution was adopted in Congress to send commissioners to the courts of Vienna, Spain, and Prussia, and to the grand duke of Tuscany. These commissioners were instructed to assure these courts that the Americans would persist in the contest until independence had been attained. They were also to use their utmost endeavors to procure assist

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ance from the Emperor of Germany and the Kings of France, Spain, and Prussia in preventing the employment by England of German and other foreign troops in the conflict with America.

To induce France to lend her aid, the American commissioners were authorized to guarantee that all trade between the United States and the West India Islands should be carried on either in American or French vessels; they should assure the French king that, if by any means the British should be excluded from the American codfisheries by the reduction of Newfoundland and Cape Breton, ships of war should be furnished at the expense of the United States for the purpose of reducing Nova Scotia, and the cod-fishery would be equally enjoyed by France and America to the exclusion of other nations; and that one-half of Newfoundland should belong to France, while the other half, together with Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, should belong to the United States.* In the event of these offers being insufficient to obtain the coöperation of France, the commissioners were authorized to assure the French king that if any of the West Indies should be conquered during the course of the war, these islands would be given to him in absolute property, the United

*See John Bassett Moore, The Beginnings of American Diplomacy, in Harper's Magazine, vol. cviii., p. 500 et seq.

FRANCE UNWILLING TO AID COLONIES.

States engaging to furnish sufficient help in the way of armed vessels and supplies for this purpose. Offers of a similar nature were to be made to the king of Spain. Franklin was also appointed commissioner to Spain, but affairs in France consumed his entire time and Arthur Lee was afterward sent to that country in his place. Ralph Izard was appointed commissioner to the Duke of Tuscany, and William Lee to the courts of Berlin and Vienna.

The French court, however, could not be induced to depart from the line of policy it had adopted, for at the present time it was awaiting the outcome of the efforts of the Americans for independence, and was unwilling to lend aid until assurance was given by the conduct of the war that ultimate success would be attained.* Nevertheless, the American commissioners were allowed to fit out a number of privateers to capture British vessels, and the prizes captured by these vessels were openly carried to and sold in France. This aroused the resentment of the British minister, Lord Stormont, and he indignantly complained of the course adopted by the French ministry. His remonstrances, however, only produced assurances that similar occurrences would not happen again, which in reality meant little or nothing.†

For the attitude of the French court see Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, vol. i., pp. 60-89.

Bancroft, vol. v., p. 133; Tower, vol. i., p. 89
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Negotiations dragged on day after day and week after week with little or no result, the commissioners being chiefly occupied in denying and contradicting the false statements regarding affairs in America circulated in every direction by the English emissaries.*

The English ministry was supported in both houses of Parliament by large majorities, the great body of people seeming to favor the further continuance of the attempt to subjugate the Americans. There was a small minority, however, including several men of distinguished talents, who vigorously opposed the measures of the administration, because they feared for the liberty of England in general should the court succeed in establishing its claim against the colonies. But the failure of the Americans to maintain their ground during the campaign of 1776 completely discouraged the opposition, and on the other hand, highly elated the court party. Nevertheless, the difficulties surrounding the ministry soon began to multiply; the war with America had shut off a large portion of the commerce with the West Indies, which brought on a scarcity of the necessities of life in those islands. The British forces there had been reduced to augment the forces in America, and when the British West India fleet was

et seq.; Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., pp. 189-

199.

The reader will find this subject more fully treated by Pitkin, vol. i., pp. 384-395.

DIFFICULTIES BESETTING ENGLAND, ACTION OF PARLIAMENT.

ready to sail under convoy for England, it was discovered that, because of the weakness of the military forces in the islands, the negroes of Jamaica were planning an insurrection to overthrow the British power. Consequently, the ships of war were detained to suppress this insurrection, which gave the Americans time to equip their privateers. After the fleet had sailed, it was dispersed by stormy weather, and a large number of richly laden vessels fell into the hands of the American privateers, which, because of their sailing capacities, were able to dart in and seize the merchantmen and escape with the prize before the British men-of-war could intercept them. As already stated, these prizes were carried into the French and other continental ports and sold. The unfriendly attitude of the French was highly irritating to the British court, and finally a remonstrance was sent to the French ministry. The latter replied in high sounding terms, but did nothing to prevent the sailing of privateers from their ports; however, the traffic in British prizes was carried on somewhat more secretly. It was now plainly evident that France and Spain were making active preparations for a general war with England, and as the British ministry could not close their eyes to the actual facts in the case, about the middle of October, 1776, an additional fleet of sixteen ships was placed in commission.*

* On the situation in England at the end of

Upon the opening of Parliament October 21, 1776, the king in his speech from the throne regretted his inability to give a better account of the war in America and to say that the insurrection had been stopped and the people of the revolted colonies once again returned to their allegiance to the crown. But such was not the case for the colonists had openly abjured all connection and communication with the mother country and had refused to consider any proposal for reconciliation. He said that if the rebellion were not immediately stopped, much harm would come to British commerce, and if Parliament wished to end the rebellion at once, preparations should be promptly made for another campaign. He also expressed a hope that general conditions in Europe would remain tranquil, though he considered it wise to increase the defenses at home. The replies to this speech were drafted in the usual form, but amendments were suggested in both houses; in the Lords by the Marquis of Rockingham, and in the Commons by Lord John Cavendish. In the Commons the amendment was rejected by a vote of 242 against 87, and in the Lords, by a vote of 92 against 26. During this session of Parliament several attempts were made to secure the passage of conciliatory measures, but so great was the influence of the ministry that such

1776, see Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 148 et seq.

EFFECT OF VICTORY AT SARATOGA; AMERICAN MEMORIAL.

schemes were decisively defeated, and the ministerial plan was adopted without great opposition.*

The victory of Saratoga, however, greatly changed the sentiment of Europe. It was evident that the colonies were determined to achieve independence of England and were not to be discouraged by reverses no matter how many or how severe. The victory, therefore, placed them in a better position to enter into foreign alliances in accordance with the dignity and importance of a free people. As previously stated, France had only been awaiting the positive assurance that the Americans would be able to

continue the conflict before she openly became the ally of the new republic.† But even the victory of Saratoga did not give them this positive assurance, as the issue in America was still some

what uncertain. It was feared by the French court that the colonies might be induced to accept terms of reconciliation with the mother country, even if they could not be subdued by arms; hence, if France should join the Americans and England should once concede the point in dispute with the colonies, France alone would be engaged in a war with England, and, in addition, would have the colonies to reckon with. Besides, there would be no special object to be gained in

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such a struggle.* Consequently, France shaped her negotiations with the American commissioners so that the encouragement she held out was in proportion to the news of success or failure in America. While she protested her friendship to England, she secretly encouraged the Americans with aid and inflamed their ardor by continually promising future coöperation. Thus France was playing a double game being pledged to neither party but simply awaiting the course of events.†

The American commissioners, in every way possible, urged the court of France to come to some decision, but the French ministers, as usual, procrastinated, advancing a variety of excuses, and thereby keeping the Americans in constant uncertainty. Finally, about the middle of August, 1777, the commissioners drew up a that America might, after all, despairstrongly worded memorial suggesting ing of aid from France, abandon the conflict and yield to the demands of England, thus depriving France of those advantages which she would gain if England lost her rich and valuable colonies in America.‡ But this

Trevelyan, p. 414; John Adams, Works, vol. i.,

p. 310.

On European political conditions in general at this time see Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 226–243. On the French policy see also Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 113-115.

Writing to Vergennes, Adams says: "America is now known all over Europe to be such a magazine of raw materials for manufactures, such a nursery of seamen, and such a source of commerce and naval power, that it would be dangerous to all the maritime powers to suffer any one of

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CHATHAM INTRODUCES CONCILIATORY BILL.

memorial failed to produce the desired results, and England was again approached with a proposition to recognize the independence of the United States. It was represented that if the British ministry were capable of profiting by the occasion, it depended on them to stipulate an arrangement so conducive to the prosperity of Great Britain, that she would seek in vain to secure herself similar advantages by any other means. At this time, however, news of Burgoyne's first successes had just arrived in England, and being certain that Burgoyne would eventually conquer the American army opposing him, the British ministry rejected this proposition.

When news of the victory of Saratoga and the capture of Burgoyne's army reached Europe, a new aspect was given the American affairs.* The same express that carried to England the news of the surrender of Burgoynet bore dispatches which insinuated that the Americans were becoming discouraged at the procrastinations of the French and were indignant that they had not received from the French court greater

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succor in the midst of their various reverses. It was intimated that they were equally desirous of an accommodation with England and would conclude with her a treaty of commerce, if she in turn would acknowledge the independence of the colonies. It was suggested also that the colonies would be gratified at a reconciliation with the mother country, but if England should not see fit to yield to her demands, the colonies would enter into an alliance with the most inveterate and implacable enemies of EnglandFrance.

In November, 1777, Parliament prepared their addresses in answer to the royal speech. In the House of Lords, the Earl of Chatham introduced a resolution recommending that hostilities with America be stopped at once and a treaty of conciliation be drafted "to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries.” He very severely criticised the employment of savages as auxiliaries in the war, although it was true that their aid had not been disdained under his own administration,* but these proposals were rejected. On the other hand the ministerial measures were carried with large majorities. When Parliament received news of the victory of Saratoga, however, astonishment and dismay were everywhere plainly evident. The opposition at

# Bancroft, vol. v., p. 224; Green, William Pitt, p. 356 et seq.; Harrison, Chatham, pp. 231–232.

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