presumptuous, but calculated to burden the country with an enormous debt*-a bogey which haunted the minds of many for long years to come. Some members thought that the lands to be granted to the soldiers, concerning which we have already spoken, ought to be sufficient to satisfy any moderate man. Gouverneur Morris, however, undertook to push the measure through Congress, but he was fought tooth and nail by a large number of the delegates, including every delegate from New England, to their everlasting discredit be it said. The early leaders had done admirable service in exciting the patriots to make the struggle, but once the struggle began their function was ended, and thereafter they became more of a hindrance in the operations of the government and army than any good to the service. The New Englanders were as resolute as ever, but the scene of the war was transferred to a remote part of the country, and, without the spur of any immediate necessity, New England moved sluggishly. In their opposition the New England delegates were joined by those from South Carolina, while Morris received the support of the delegates from New York, Virginia and the other States, and he was ultimately successful.† In the spring of 1778, yielding to the insistent demands of those who had the

* See Elbridge Gerry's letter, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 66-68. Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 79-80. VOL. III-6

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interest of the country at heart, Congress agreed to allow the army officers half pay for life, reserving to the government, however, the power to commute it, if it became necessary or expedient, to six years' half pay. Shortly after, this resolution was reconsidered, and another adopted which allowed officers half pay for seven years only, dating from the end of the war.* While these measures were salutary, still they were adopted too late, and were not sufficiently spontaneous on the part of the members of Congress to create the good feeling which would have resulted had these measures been considered and adopted some time previously. Already more than 200 officers had resigned their commissions and the greater part of the others were fast becoming lukewarm.

It would seem as though Washington were already laboring under a sufficiently heavy burden without being called upon to suffer imputations against his character. As is generally the case with a man in his position, his appointment had created jealousy, and his conduct of the war could not possibly satisfy everyone. Up to this time his military exploits had been attended with very little success. He had been compelled to retreat continually before the enemy, but few took into consideration the fact that this enemy was more powerful numerically, better

* See Journals of Congress, vol. iv., pp. 228, 229, 243, 244, 288.

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equipped, better supplied, and in every way better fitted to drive the half starved Continental army before them. While the latter had compelled the British to evacuate Boston, they had lost the battle of Long Island, had been driven out of New York, compelled to retreat across Jersey, had lost Philadelphia and the fortifications on the Delaware, had been beaten at Brandywine; and, to offset these latter operations, had won one decisive victory at Trenton and the very indecisive action at Princeton. On the other hand, Gates, though undoubtedly much of the honor of winning the victory at Saratoga belongs to others, had been hailed as the victor of Saratoga. For a time his renown far outshone that of Washington, because it was the first great victory of the war-a victory which necessarily greatly affected the subsequent conduct of the war and the future prospects of the whole country. Therefore, not only the members of Congress, but the people throughout the colonies. began to make comparisons between the hero of Saratoga and the man who occupied the chief command over all the army. Jealousies also contributed their part to detract from Washington's fame, schemers endeavored by intrigue to question his integrity to further their own evil designs and selfish ends, but with little success. Hildreth says:

and

"Every biographer has been very anxious to

shield his special hero from the charge of participation in this affair [Conway's Cabal], indig nantly stigmatized, by most writers, as a base intrigue. Yet doubts, at that time, as to Washington's fitness for the chief command, though they might evince prejudice or lack of sound judgment, do not necessarily imply either selfish ends or a malicious disposition. The Washington of that day was not the Washington as we know him, tried and proved by twenty years of the most disinterested and most successful public service. As yet, he had been in command but little more than two years, during which he had suffered, with some slight exceptions, a continued series of losses and defeats. He had recovered Boston, to be sure, but had lost New York, Newport and Philadelphia. He had been completely successful at Trenton, and partially so at Princeton, but had been beaten, with heavy loss, on Long Island and at Fort Washington, and lately in two pitched battles on ground of his own choosing, at Brandywine and Germantown. What a contrast to the battle of Behmus's Heights, and the capture of Burgoyne's whole army! Want of success, and sectional and personal prejudices, had created a party in Congress against Schuyler and against Sullivan. Could Washington escape the common fate of those who lose?"

* 66

At this time a systematic attack was made upon Washington's reputation, known as Conway's Cabal, from the name of the one principally concerned in it, Thomas Conway, though Gates, Mifflin, Samuel Adams, and other members of Congress were equally as guilty for countenancing any such scheme.t Gates and Mifflin had never been well disposed toward Washington; Conway was angered and disappointed because he had not been appointed inspectorgeneral; while Adams and some of the New England members were never cordial to Washington from

* Hildreth, History of the United States, vol. iii., p. 233.

On the opposition of Samuel Adams, see Hosmer, Samuel Adams, p. 377 et seq.

the time of his appointment as commander-in-chief, principally because he was a Virginian. Now, therefore, when it was possible to make an unfavorable contrast between the operations under Gates and Washington, the discontented persons forming the Cabal began to assume a more openly defiant attitude. They widely distributed anonymous letters which insinuated that the continued failure attendant upon Washington's operations was due to incapacity and a vacillating policy. These missives were filled with insinuations against his character and conduct. While Washington had for some time been aware that there was strong opposition to him, not only in Congress but elsewhere, still he probably had no idea that this opposition would lead to a malicious circulation of false statements. As it was not until after the victory at Saratoga that these actions assumed definite shape, Washington, as was his custom, paid little attention to them. Trevelyan says: "The Commander-in-chief of the national armies was well aware that some of the cleverest, and all the least estimable, Congressman were plotting his downfall with adroitness and unscrupulous assiduity. They calumniated his motives. They disparaged his abilities. They deliberately withheld from him absolute necessaries, while demanding of him utter impossibilities.''* However,

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when the conspirators assumed such a bold attitude that he could not possibly overlook it, Washington was not slow to take the matter into consideration. When Wilkinson was on his way to Congress to notify that body of the victory of Saratoga, he divulged a part of a letter written by Conway to Gates and the statements he made at that time were communicated to Washington by Lord Stirling.* On the 9th of November, Washington wrote to Conway as follows:

"A letter which I received last night contained the following paragraph-'In a letter from General Conway to General Gates he says, "Heaven has determined to save your country, or a weak General and bad counsellors would have ruined it." I am, sir, your humble servant," etc.†

This curt note fell upon Conway with stunning effect and a long correspondence ensued which, on Washington's part, was conducted with great dignity. The result of the whole affair showed what a deep hold he had on the confidence, the love, and the veneration of his country.|| One of the anonymous letters written by the conspirators had been sent to Henry Laurens, at that time Presi

Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., p. 492; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 131-132; Johnson, General Washington, pp. 187-189.

Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., p. 215; Irv ing, Life of Washington, vol. iii., pp. 321-322.

See Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iv., p. 312 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iii., p. 362 et seq.

See also La Fayette's letter, in Tower, Marquis de La Fayette, vol. i., p. 260 et seq. See also John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 265.

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dent of Congress, and was intended to be read to that body, in the hope that some of the members might be influenced. Another letter was sent to Patrick Henry, governor of Virginia, but these men, being warm personal friends of Washington, sent the letters to him without allowing their contents to become known to others. * The letter to Henry was as follows:

YORKTOWN, 12 January, 1778.

"DEAR SIR,-The common danger of our country first brought you and me together. I recollect with pleasure the influence of your conversation and eloquence upon the opinions of this country in the beginning of the present controversy. You first taught us to shake off our idolatrous attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments upon our liberties, with our very lives. By these means you saved us from ruin. The independence of America is the offspring of that liberal spirit of thinking and acting, which followed the destruction of the sceptres of kings and the mighty power of Great Britain.

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But, sir, we have only passed the Red Sea. A dreary wilderness is still before us, and unless a Moses of a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, we must perish before we reach the promised land. We have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way. General Howe it is true has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed his prison. His dominions are bounded on all sides by his out-sentries. America can only be undone by herself. She looks up to her councils and arms for protection; but alas! what are they? Her representation in Congress dwindled to only twenty-one members; her Adams, her Wilson, her Henry, are no more among them. Her councils weak, and partial remedies applied constantly for universal diseases. Her army, what is it? A major-general belonging to it called it a few days ago in my hearing, a mob. Discipline unknown or wholly neglected. The quarter-master's and commissary's departments filled with idleness, ig

In his letter of March 28, 1778, Washington says that the letter was written by Dr. Rush, so far as I can judge from a similitude of hands."— Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., pp. 495-497, 512-515. See also Tyler, Life of Patrick Henry, pp. 222–223.

norance and peculation; our hospitals crowded with six thousand sick, but half provided with necessaries or accommodations, and more dying in them in one month than perished in the field during the whole of the last campaign. The money depreciating without any effectual measures being taken to raise it; the country distracted with the Don Quixote attempts to regulate the price of provisions, an artificial famine created by it, and a real one dreaded from it; the spirit of the people failing through a more intimate acquaintance with the causes of our misfortunes; many submitting daily to General Howe; and more wishing to do it, only to avoid the calamities which threaten our country. But is our case desperate? By no means. We have wisdom, virtue and strength enough to save us, if they could be called into action. The northern army has shown us what Americans are capable of doing with a general at their head. The spirit of the southern army is no way inferior to the spirit of the northern. A Gates, a Lee, or a Conway, would in a few weeks render them an irresistible body of men. The last of the above officers has accepted the new office of inspector-general of our army, in order to reform abuses; but the remedy is only a palliative one. In one of his letters to a friend, he says 'A great and good God hath decreed America to be free, or the [General] and weak counsellors would have ruined her long ago.' You may rest assured of each of the facts related in this letter. The author of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by the handwriting, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Even the letter must be thrown in the fire. But some of its contents ought to be made public, in order to awaken, enlighten, and alarm our country. I rely upon your prudence, and am, dear Sir, with my usual attachment to you, and to our beloved independence, "Yours, sincerely," *

had been for some time forming to my prejudice; which, conscious as I am of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trust reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account. But my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause.

"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct, that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed to you, exhibits many serious charges, and it is my wish that it should be submitted to Congress. This I am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may possibly involve you in embarrassments hereafter, since it is uncertain how many, or who, may be privy to the contents.

"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defence I might otherwise make against their insidious at tacks. They know I cannot combat their insinuations, however, injurious, without disclosing secrets, which it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be exempt from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station? Merit and talents, with which I can have no pretensions of rivalship, have ever been subject to it. My heart tells me, that it has been my unremitted aim to do the best that circumstances would permit; yet I may have been very often mistaken in the judgment of the means, and may in many instances deserve the imputation of error."

Thus it was evident, not only from the operations of the Cabal, but also from the proceedings of Congress for some time prior to this, that a large number of the members of that body had in some way loaned their influence to the disgraceful conspiracy against Washington's name. Furthermore, the appointment of a

*

new

Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 233. See also Washington's reply to Patrick Henry, who also sent him a copy of this letter. Henry, Life of Patrick Henry, vol. i., pp. 549–551.

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Board of War, of which Gates and Mifflin were members, was not calculated to allay Washington's distrust as to the sentiments of Congress; for, as we have said before, Washington knew that both of these officers were his enemies, and that if they possessed supreme power over the Continental armies he was likely to be removed. One of the first steps in their plan thoroughly to disgust Washington was to make preparations for future operations without consulting the commander-in-chief. They proposed also an expedition to subjugate Canada, probably more to separate Lafayette and Washington than for any other purpose, because while Lafayette was near the commander-in-chief, there was little hope that any of their bold designs could be successfully consummated without his knowledge. In order to separate the two, therefore, Lafayette was placed in command of this expedition upon rosy promises of large reinforcements. After a long and earnest consultation with Washington, Lafayette accepted the commission, but much to his disgust he found the army in a wretched condition, while the aid promised by Congress failed to materialize. The expedition was therefore abandoned and after several months of comparative idleness, Lafayette returned to headquarters at Valley Forge in April, 1778.* The

* For details, see Tower, Marquis de La Fayette, vol. i., pp. 271-291. See also Lossing, FieldBook of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 133 et seq.;