majority of the executives of the several states: that the executive, besides their general authority to execute the federal acts, ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military operations;- provided, that none of the persons composing the federal executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any

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9. Resolved, That a citizen of one state, committing an offence in another state of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had been committed by a citizen of the state in which the offence was committed.*

The debate upon the New Jersey

enterprise, as general, or in any other capacity.

5. Resolved, That a federal judiciary be estab

lished, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the executive, and to hold their offices during good behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine,

in the first instance, on all impeachments of federal officers, and, by way of appeal, in the dernier ressort, in all cases touching the rights of ambassadors; in all cases of captures from an enemy; in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be interested; in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal revenue: that none of the judiciary shall, during the time they remain in office, be capable of receiving or holding any office or appointment during their term of service, or for thereafter.

6. Resolved, That all acts of the United States in Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby, and by the Articles of Confederation vested in them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states or their citizens; and that the judiciary of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any state, or any body of men in any state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties.

7. Resolved, That provision be made for the admission of new states into the Union.

8. Resolved, That the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every state.

paring it with the Virginia plan and pointing out that the essential differences were that the Jersey plan proposed a single branch legislature which would derive its powers from the States and an executive of several persons, while the power of the legislature to act on national concerns was limited, though the executive had power to compel obedience by force.

Up to this time Hamilton

had hardly spoken, had hardly spoken, "partly from respect to others who superior abilities, age and experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments, as expressed by his colleagues, he could by no means accede." But on June 18 he arose and delivered an able speech in which he said he did not like either of the plans presented but thought the Jersey plan the best. It was merely the Articles of Confed

* Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution, App. xv. See also Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 370; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 139–142; Gilpin, Madison Papers, vol. ii., p. 862 et seq. † McMaster, vol. i., P. 444. For further details of the whole debate on the Jersey plan, see also Bancroft, vol. vi., pp. 231-238; McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 213 et seq.; Hunt, Madison's Journal, pp. 143–151. Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 152.

eration revised and extended.* He then presented the following eleven resolutions, which embodied some of his ideas regarding government:†

I. The supreme legislative power of the United States of America is to be vested in two distinct bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate; who together shall form the Legislature of the United States, with power to pass all laws whatsoever, subject to the negative hereafter mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people, to serve for three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good behaviour. Their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. In order to do this, the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal, or resignation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of the district from which he came.

IV. The supreme executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governor, to be elected to serve during good behaviour. His election to be made by electors chosen by the people, in the election districts aforesaid; or by electors chosen for that purpose by the respective Legislatures provided that if an election be not made within a limited time, the President of the Senate shall be the Governor. The Governor to have a negative upon all laws about to be passed and (to have) the execution of all laws passed-to be the Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces and of the militia of the United States to have the entire direction of war when authorized or begun to have, with the advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of making all treaties to have the appointment of the

Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 59 et seq.; Gilpin, Madison Papers, vol. ii., p. 828 et seq.; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 371 et seq.; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 152 et seq.; Thorpe, The Story of the Constitution, p. 125. Lodge says (pp. 62–63) that undoubtedly Hamilton knew that his plan had no chance of adoption but that his chief aim was "to brace the minds of his fellow members and to stimulate them to taking higher ground than the majority of their constituents demanded."

Lodge's ed. of Hamilton's Works, vol. i., pp. 347-369; Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., p. 197; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 162-164. See also Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution, App. xiv.

heads or chief officers of the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs-to have the nomination of all other officers (ambassadors to foreign nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate-to have the power of pardoning all offences but treason, which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.

V. On the death, resignation, or removal of the Governor, his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate (until a successor be appointed).

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war- the power of advising and approving all treaties - the power of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs of the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs.

VII. The Supreme judicial authority of the United States to be vested in twelve judges, to hold their offices during good behaviour, with adequate and permanent salaries. This court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellate jurisdiction (from the courts of the several States) in all causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the citizens of foreign nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute courts in each State for the determination of all causes of capture, and all matters relating to their revenues, or in which the citizens of foreign nations are concerned.

IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachments for mal and corrupt conduct, and upon conviction to be removed from office, and disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit.

All impeachments to be tried by a court, to consist of the judges of the Supreme Court, chief or senior judge of the Superior Court of law of each State-provided that such judge hold his place during good behaviour and have a permanent salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States

to be utterly void. And the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governor or President of each State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is Governor or President.

Madison then attacked the Jersey plan in probably the ablest speech against it.* Patterson in presenting the plan had laid great stress upon the Articles of Confederation and the duty of the States to obey them, but Madison refuted his argument by saying that these very articles declared that if one of the States committed an infraction of any one of them, the compact between the States was broken. He then instanced many cases when various States had overstepped their powers, asking what check the Jersey plan put upon these infractions. While it provided for compelling obedience by force and while it would be easy to bring the smaller States into submission, how about the larger States, could they be forced into submission? In case no plan could be agreed upon, how would the little States fare? Would not Delaware and New Jersey suffer at the hands of Pennsylvania and would Rhode Island be safe from Massachusetts? This speech practically settled the fate of the Jersey plan, which was declared inadmissible by a vote of seven States (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia) against three (New York, New Jersey and Delaware) with Maryland divided.†

*See Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., pp. 167

184.

† McMaster, vol. i., pp. 445-446; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., pp. 379-381; Elliot, Debates, vol. i., p. 180; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 185.

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On June 19 the modified Virginia plan, as adopted by the committee, was formally taken up for discussion by the house, each clause being debated anew. On the first resolution a debate immediately arose, Wilson declaring that a National government should not swallow up the States, while Hamilton said indefinite authority should be given the national government, for "if it were limited at all the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it."* King said that the States, properly speaking, had never been sovereign.

They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the organs or faculties of defence or offence for they could not of themselves raise troops or equip vessels, for war. On the other side, if the Union of the States comprises the idea of a confederation, it comprises that also of consolidation. A union of the States is a union of the men composing them from whence a national character results to the whole. ** *If the States, therefore, retained some portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in respects they formed a Nation in

some

others." †

small State men absolutely refused. to agree to anything less than an equal representation in the Senate. When a vote was taken on June 25 on the question to agree "that the members of the second branch be

chosen by the individual legisla-
tures," it stood nine States (Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Geor-
gia) to two (Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia). The larger States were un-
willing to allow this equality of rep-
resentation in the Senate, and for
some time the question hung in
doubt. On June 29 it was again
moved by Mr. Ellsworth" that in the
second branch, each State should have
an equal vote."
whole he was not

He said that on the
He said that on the

sorry that the Con

vention had decided in favor of unequal representation in the House, for that would allow the Convention to compromise by determining upon equal representation in the Senate, thus making the government partly national and partly federal.||

The

McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, pp. 227-229; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 400; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 269.

Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 236.

See the various speeches in ibid, vol. i., pp. 248-268.

Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 402; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 269.

465

small State men were determined that the States should have equal representation, but the large State men were equally determined. The debate was not long protracted, but was marked with an energy and warmth on both sides which revealed the nature of the perils then overhanging the unformed institutions whose existence now blesses the people of America. Ellsworth, Madison, Franklin, Baldwin, Wilson, and many others participated in the debate.* Wilson said he hoped the alarms exceeded their cause," and that the Convention was too wise to "abandon a country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place it could never happen on better ground.' Ellsworth said:

"The capital objection of Mr. Wilson that the minority will rule the majority' is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that a few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of so many gentlemen have united in applauding? * * No instance, of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to the

*See Pitkin, Political and Civil History of the United States, vol. ii., pp. 233-245; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 269 et seq.

† Hunt's ed. of Madison's Writings, vol. iii., p. 327; Hunt, Madison's Journal, vol. i., p. 273.