SPANISH ANNOYANCES ON MISSISSIPPI. wiped out by the cost of carriage. The water route was therefore the only practical means by which they could transport their goods to market. They could send the products in barges down the Mississippi to Mississippi to New Orleans or the vicinity, there load them on sea-going vessels, and thus ship them by an all-water route to the Atlantic ports. In 1784 this method was employed almost exclusively, and naturally the free and unrestricted use of the Mississippi was of vital importance.* The fact that Spain held New Orleans had long been a source of much chagrin to the Westerners, and the acquisition of Florida in 1783 occasioned still greater alarm. Yet no real inconvenience was suffered until the dispute arose over the Florida boundary. Thereafter the Spanish held the trade upon the lower Mississippi entirely at their mercy. A custom house was established at New Orleans and the officials boarded every American boat that passed, and while the threat of confiscation was not generally put into effect, the traders were subjected to the payment of heavy tolls, and annoyed in innumerable ways. There was no way of escape, and as a result, before a year had elapsed after Florida came into Spanish possession, the trade of the Kentuckians and the Tennesseeans was completely ruined. The element of risk 373 was so great and the losses were so numerous by the Mississippi route, that the profits from the transactions were no greater than if the products had been shipped by the land route. Consequently, this enforced isolation placed the Southwest in a state of commercial stagnation.* Tobacco, which was worth $9.50 in Virginia, would bring but $2 in Kentucky, while the cost and difficulty of transportation rendered almost valueless such products as corn, fish, flour, and other food products which were abundant in the West and in great demand in the East. The people of the Southwest appealed to Congress to extricate them from this dilemma, urging that the whole force of the nation be directed to the task of bringing Spain to terms. But the East was deaf to the appeals of the West, for that section had its own interests to subserve, and was not much concerned with the prosperity or the tribulations of the West. Undoubtedly the great majority of the Eastern people felt that the Westerners should have the right to navigate the Mississippi, but they were not willing to sacrifice their own interests for those of Ken tucky and Tennessee, and did not consider it wise to risk a rupture with Spain, by insisting upon a matter which affected but a small portion Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. iii., p. 113 et seq. † Ibid, vol. iii., p. 98 et seg. 374 WASHINGTON'S LETTER; COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED. of the people.* Writing to Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, October 10, 1784, Washington very succinctly states the critical character of the situation as follows: "I need not remark to you, sir, that the flanks and rear of the United States are possessed by other powers, and formidable ones, too; nor how necessary it is to apply the cement of interest to bind all parts of the Union together by insoluble bonds, especially that part of it which lies immediately west of us, with the middle states. For what ties, let me ask, should we have upon those people? How entirely unconnected with them shall we be, and what troubles may we not apprehend, if the Spaniards on their right, and Great Britain on their left, instead of throwing stumbling-blocks in their way, as they now do, should hold out lures for their trade and alliance? What, when they get strength, which will be sooner than most people conceive (from the emigration of foreigners, who will have no particular predilection toward us, as well as from the removal of our own citizens), will be the consequence of their having formed close connections with both or either of those powers, in a commercial way? It needs not, in my opinion, the gift of prophecy to foretell. "The western states (I speak now from my own observation) stand as it were upon a pivot. The touch of a feather would turn them any way. They have looked down the Mississippi, until the Spaniards, very impolitically I think for themselves, threw difficulties in their way; and they looked that way for no other reason than because they could glide gently down the stream, without considering, perhaps, the difficulties of the voyage back again, and the time necessary to perform it in, and because they have no other means of coming to us but by long land transportations and unimproved roads. These causes have hitherto checked the industry of the present settlers; for, except the demand for provisions, occasioned by the increase of population, and a little flour which the necessities of the Spaniards compel them to buy, they have no incitements to labor. But smooth the road, and make easy the way for them, and then see what an influx of articles will be poured upon us; how amazingly our exports will be increased by them, and how amply Ogg, Opening of the Mississippi, pp. 418-419; Schuyler, American Diplomacy, pp. 270-271. we shall be compensated for any trouble and expense we may encounter to effect it."* Spain did not rest content with formal warnings; she was in earnest and determined not to relinquish her colonies even though they they were strangled in her grasp. Several methods were open to her. She could institute diplomatic negotiations and settle the matter by fair and square arbitration; she could intrigue with the Indians and incite them to make life so burdensome to the western pioneers that they would return east; she could bribe the western settlers into declaring themselves independent of the Confederation. Probably the last would have been the easier course, for the Westerners were eager for gold, whether Spanish or American, and as the States had none Spain was sure to win out on a question of money resources.† In order to settle the dispute, Congress appointed Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to go to Spain. But before he departed Don Diego de Gardoqui (or Guardoqui) came to Philadelphia as first Spanish Minister, and on July 2, 1785, presented his credentials authorizing him to treat with the United States concerning boundaries and to settle all diffi * Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. ix., pp. 62-63. See also Old South Leaflets, no. xvi.; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. x., p. 488; Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. i., p. 136 et seq. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, pp. 93–94. NEGOTIATIONS WITH GARDOQUI; JAY'S SOLUTION. 375 culties on that score.* On July 21, 1785, Jay had been given full discretionary powers to treat on all subjects of interest to the two nations in any way that might seem to him advisable,† but on August 25 he was more especially instructed to insist upon the recognition of the 31st parallel and the free navigation of the Mississippi, from its source to its mouth, as guaranteed in the treaty with Great Britain. A long negotiation ensued, but Gardoqui was resolute in refusing to concede the free navigation of the Mississippi, and flatly informed Jay that the king refused to recognize the treaty of 1783 as binding. On the other hand, he offered very favorable terms for a commercial treaty with Spain.§ Finally the negotiations became so disagreeable that in desperation Jay asked Congress to appoint a committee to advise and instruct him in secret, and Rufus King, Pettit and Monroe were appointed for that purpose. Thereupon Jay set about preparing a letter on the subject to Gardoqui. On August 3, 1786, Jay fir.ished the statement of the difficulties he was experiencing in his negotiations with 570. Secret Journals of Congress, vol. iii., pp. 563 † Secret Journals of Congress, vol. iii., p. 571. Secret Journals of Congress, August 25, 1785, vol. iii., pp. 585-586. See also Schuyler, American Diplomacy, p. 269; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 232 233. || See Ogg, Opening of the Mississippi, pp. 422 424. § Pitkin, Political and Civil History of the United States, vol. ii., p. 202 et seq. come. the Spanish minister and laid it before Congress, suggesting a way by which the difficulties could be overThere were many reasons in favor of making such an arrangement as would open the ports of Spain to American ships, and it was felt that if Spain persisted in her stand regarding the Mississippi, it would be necessary to choose between the two alternatives - yielding or going to war. Jay made it clear that he did not consider this an ideal solution of the matter, but merely as the only one that was at all practicable. He said: "My letters written from Spain when our affairs were the least promising, evince my opinion respecting the Mississippi, and oppose every idea of our relinquishing our right to navigate it. I entertain the same sentiments of that right and of the importance of retaining it, which I then did. Mr. Gardoqui strongly insists on our re linquishing it. We have had many conferences and much reasoning on the subject, not necessary now to detail. His concluding answer to all my arguments has steadily been, that the king will never yield that point, nor consent to any compromise about it; for that it always has been and continues to be one of their maxims of policy to exclude all mankind from their American shores. I have often reminded him that the adjacent country was filling fast with people, and that the time must and would come when they would not submit to seeing a fine river flow before their doors without using it as a highway to the sea for the transportation of their productions; that it would therefore be wise to look forward to that event, and take care not to sow in the treaty any seeds of future discord. He said that the time alluded to was far distant, and that the treaties were not to provide for contingencies so remote and future. For his part he considered the rapid settlement of that country as injurious to the states, and that they would find it necessary to check it." Jay therefore considered it "expedient to agree that the treaty 376 JAY'S REASONS FOR CLOSING MISSISSIPPI. 66 should be limited to twenty-five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean." He thought the experiment worth trying, first because no treaty with Spain could be concluded unless the Mississippi question were settled in some way. In the second place he said, "as that navigation is not at present important, nor will probably become much so in less than twenty-five or thirty years, a forbearance to use it while we do not want it, is no great sacrifice." Thirdly he said: Spain now excludes us from that navigation, and with a strong hand holds it against us. She will not yield it peaceably, and therefore we can only acquire it by war. Now as we are not prepared for a war with any power; as many of the States would be little inclined to a war with Spain for that object at this day; and as such a war would for those and a variety of obvious reasons be inexpedient-it follows that Spain will, for a long space of time yet to come, exclude us from that navigation. Why, therefore, should we not (for a valuable consideration, too) consent to forbear to use what we know is not in our power to use?" Lastly he said, if the matter were not settled now and the United States and Spain should come to a parting of the ways, what were the former to do? Spain might be driven into a permanently hostile position, but the United States could not enforce her demands by going to war, as they were not capable of conducting a war, and consequently all manner of ill treatment would be heaped upon the young nation. "The Mississippi would continue shut; France would tell us our claim to it was ill founded; the Spanish posts on its banks and even those out of Florida in our country, would be strengthened; and that nation would there bid us defiance with impunity, at least until the American nation shall become more really and truly a nation than it at present is. For unblessed with an efficient government, destitute of funds and without publick credit, either at home or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in patience for better days, or plunge into an unpopular and dangerous war with very little prospect of terminating it by a peace, either advantageous or glorious." He said also that, "even if our right to that navigation, or to anything else, was expressly declared in holy writ, we should be able to provide for the enjoyment of it no otherwise than by being in capacity to repel force by force."* Washington and a number of the other statesmen did not deem this point of prime importance at that date, and were disposed to waive the *See Jay's various reasons, in Secret Journals of Congress, vol. iv., pp. 45, 53–54; Pellew, John Jay, pp. 233-234. Writing on May 26, 1788, to John Brown, Jefferson said: "The navigation of the Mississippi was perhaps the strongest trial to which the justice of the federal government could be LETTERS OF LEE AND WASHINGTON. right for twenty-five or thirty years, and conclude a commercial treaty at once. Writing to Washington, Henry Lee, then in Congress, said: "We are very solicitous to form a treaty with Spain for commercial purposes. Indeed, no nation in Europe can give us conditions so advan⚫ geous to our trade as that kingdom. The carrying business they are like ourselves in, and this common source of difficulty in adjusting commercial treaties between other nations does not apply to America and Spain. But, my dear General, I do not think you go far enough. Rather than defer longer a free and liberal system of trade with Spain, why not agree to the exclusion of the Mississippi? This exclusion will not, cannot, exist longer than the infancy of the western emigrants. Therefore, to these people, what is now done cannot be important. To the Atlantic States it is highly important; for we have no prospect of bringing to a conclusion our negotiations with the court of Madrid, but by yielding the navigation of the Mississippi. The minister here is under positive instructions on that point. In all other arrangements the Spanish monarch will give to the states testimonies of his regard and friendship. And I verily believe that, if the above difficulty should be removed, we should soon experience the advantages which would flow from a connection with Spain." In reply to Lee, Washington said: "The advantages with which the inland navigation of the rivers Potomac and James is pregnant must strike every mind that reasons upon the subject; but there is, I perceive, a diversity of sentiment respecting the benefits and consequences which may flow from the free and put. If ever they thought wrong about it, I trust they have got to rights. I should think it proper for the Western country to defer pushing their right to that navigation to extremity as long as they can do without it tolerably; but that the moment it becomes absolutely necessary for them, it will become the duty of the maritime states to push it to every extremity to which they would their own right of navigating the Chesapeake, the Delaware, the Hudson, or any other water."- Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. V., p. 17. 377 immediate use of the Mississippi. My opinion of this matter has been uniformly the same; and no light in which I have been able to consider the subject is likely to change it. It is, neither to relinquish nor to push our claim to this navigation, but in the meanwhile to open all the coinmunications which nature has afforded between the Atlantic States and the Western territory and to encourage the use of them to the utmost. In my judgment, it is a matter of very serious concern to the well-being of the former to make it the interest of the latter to trade with them; without which, the ties of consanguinity, which are weakening every day, will soon be no bond, and we shall be no more, a few years hence, to the inhabitants of that country, than the British and Spaniards are at this day; not so much, indeed, because commercial connections, it is well known, lead to others, and, united, are difficult to be broken. These must take place with the Spaniards if the navigation of the Mississippi is open. Clear I am that it would be for the interest of the western settlers, as low down the Ohio as the Big Kenhawa, and back to the Lakes, to bring their produce through one of the channels I have named; but the way must be cleared, and made easy and obvious to them, or else the ease with which people glide down stream will give a different bias to their thinking and acting. Whenever the new states become so populous and so extended to the westward as really to need it, there will be no power which can deprive them of the use of the Mississippi. Why, then, should we prematurely urge a matter which is displeasing and may produce disagreeable consequences, if it is our interest to let it sleep? It may require some management to quiet the restless and impetuous spirits of Kentucky, of whose conduct I am more apprehensive in this business than I am of all the opposition that will be given by the Spaniards." The New England States clamored for the conclusion of the treaty, as much of the western trade would then come through her ports, but the South. would not throw away the affections of her Western colonies by thus abandoning them, while the Middle States *Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. ix., pp. 172-173. For similar expressions, see also pp. 180, 205, 261. |