SKIRMISH AT PETERSBURG; LAFAYETTE ARRIVES. gether with all the ships then lying in the river.* In opposition to the force under Phillips, Baron Steuben had but a few ill-equipped troops and consequently was unable to make any effectual resistance to this ruthless work of devastation. The regular State troops had been sent to reinforce General Greene, and the militia did not exceed 2,000 men, and could scarcely be relied upon to face regular troops. To have hazarded a battle against the trained British soldiers would have been to court defeat, the loss of all arms and accoutrements, and the subsequent discouragement of the whole country. Steuben, therefore, could only sit idly by and see the country devastated without being able to prevent it or to inflict any counter damage. After some slight skirmishing, therefore, he retreated toward Richmond. † Arnold was now sent to Osborne, a small village on the south side of the James River, a few miles below Richmond; and on April 27 Phillips marched to Chesterfield Court House, which had been appointed a place of rendezvous for the new Virginia levies. At this place he destroyed the barracks and such of the public stores as had not been removed. In addition, he destroyed a number of small * See Arnold's report to Clinton quoted in full in Arnold, Life of Arnold, pp. 344–345. See also Muhlenberg, Life of Major-General Peter Muhlenberg, p. 248; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., pp. 291-292; Lossing, FieldBook of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 337-339. † Kapp, Life of Steuben, p. 426. 241 armed vessels lying in the river half way between Osborne and Richmond These were scuttled and set afire, after which the crews escaped and joined the State militia.* On April 30 Arnold and Phillips marched to Manchester, opposite Richmond, on the south side of the James River, and here also destroyed much property.† At about this time Lafayette arrived from the North to take com. mand of the troops in the State. He had been appointed to command the troops which Washington intended to send against Arnold, but when the naval expedition was abandoned by the French he returned to the head of the Elk where once again he was ordered by Washington to take command of the troops in Virginia.‡ The troops under Lafayette's command had been drawn chiefly from the Northern States, and as it was supposed the campaign would be of short duration, they were ill-equipped for hard fighting, or in fact, any kind of fighting in the southern climate. Furthermore, when the troops learned that the service might be permanent, some deserted; but the great majority, inspired by the example of * Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 339. See Arnold's report in Arnold, Life of Arnold, pp. 345-346; Lossing, p. 340; Jefferson's letter of May 9, 1781, in Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. iii., pp. 32-34. See the two letters dated April 8 and 18 in Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. viii., pp. 512-513. See also Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., p. 247 et seq. 242 LAFAYETTE'S OPERATIONS; GREENE IN COMMAND. Lafayette, remained with the army and resolved to brave every danger.* Knowing their condition and realizing the hardships of a campaign in the South, Lafayette sought to encourage the soldiers by purchasing shoes, linen, and other necessaries, using his personal credit to secure the money with which to pay for these supplies. His ardor for the American cause stimulated all to further exertions, and the ladies at Baltimore organized a society for making clothes suitable for summer wear in the South.† Lafayette and his troops arrived at Richmond the night before Phillips entered Manchester, but instead of attempting to pass the river in spite of Lafayette, the British general marched back to Bermuda Hundred, destroying valuable property on the way. He then embarked his army and sailed down the river as far as Hog's Island, where the van of his fleet arrived on May 5.|| Immediately upon his arrival, and after he had discovered the retreat of the British, Lafayette sent out small parties to harass them and to watch their movements, while he him 586. * Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. † Bancroft, vol. v., p. 506; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., p. 260 et seq. Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 340. See Jefferson's letter of May 9, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 307-309; Arnold's report in Arnold Life of Arnold, p. 346; Simcoe's Military Journal, p. 199 et seq.; LaFayette's reports to Greene, etc., quoted in Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., pp. 293296. self established headquarters behind the Chickahominy, some distance from Richmond. On May 7 General Phillips received instructions from Cornwallis to march toward Petersburg for the purpose of forming a junction with the British troops in that province.* Accordingly, he immediately returned up the river, landed one division at Brandon, and another at City Point, and on May 9 the two divisions met at Petersburg. So sudden and unexpected was their arrival that some of Lafayette's officers, who had been sent to Petersburg to collect boats for conveying Lafayette's troops across the river, were taken prisoners.† In the meantime General Phillips had been taken sick, and on reaching Petersburg was in no condition to command the troops. He rapidly declined, and on May 13 died, the command of the troops then devolving on Arnold until the arrival of a superior British officer.|| Meanwhile, in December, 1780, General Greene had taken command of the southern army, which at that time consisted of about 2,300 effective men, il trained, without arms, ammunition, and other necessaries, and totally unfit to successfully oppose Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., pp. 305-306. Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 591; Arnold's report in Arnold, Life of Arnold, p. 346; Simcoe's Military Journal, p. 204. Arnold, p. 347. Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 340-341. GREENE DIVIDES ARMY; TORIES DEFEATED. the march of the superior force under Cornwallis.* Greene fully realized the responsibility of his position and how much was expected of him. Though he knew the danger of his situation at the present time, he nevertheless took the risk of dividing his forces, placing one division under General Morgan, and the other under General Huger, with the whole subordinate to himself. In this way he could more closely watch the movements of the enemy, and more effectively harrass him at every turn; while on the other hand, if he kept his forces intact, he could no more. effectually oppose Cornwallis. † Under Morgan's general supervision, therefore, Greene placed 320 infantry under Colonel John Eager Howard, about 200 riflemen under Major Triplett, and about 80 light dragoons under Colonel William Washington. Morgan was then dispatched to the south of the Catawba to watch and annoy the enemy at Wynnsborough and Camden, though he was cautioned to use every precaution against surprise. On December 25, 1780, Morgan took a position toward the western frontier of South Carolina, about fifty miles northwest of Wynns See his letter to Washington in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 165–168; also F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, p. 174 et seq. † See G. W. Greene, Life of General Greene, pp. 108-116; Graham, Life of General Morgan, pp. 258-259. Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 532; F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 183-184 243 borough and not far from the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers.* On December 20 Greene left Charlotte with the other division of the army, arriving at Hick's Corner, on the east side of the Peedee, opposite the Cheraw Hills, about seventy miles northeast of Wynnsborough, on December 29. He had marched to that place with the hope that the troops would find more plentiful subsistence; but after remaining there for some time he found that his burdens in this respect were not much lightened, as the destructive warfare carried on between the Whigs and Tories of that section had completely laid waste the whole country. While in this position, however, he did not remain inactive. On December 27 he detached Colonel Washington with his cavalry and about 200 militia, who after marching 40 miles, surprised a body of Tories near Ninety-Six. Exasperated by the recent outrages on the part of the British, the Continentals fell on the Tories with uncontrollable fury and slaughtered the entire party without losing a single man. As a result of this expedition, Cornwallis was unable at any subsequent time to persuade a large body * Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 431. † See Greene's letter to Washington in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 189-192. Graham, Life of Morgan, p. 262; G. W. Greene, Life of Greene, vol. iii., p. 135; Carring ton, Battles of the Revolution, p. 541. 244 TARLETON AND CORNWALLIS PURSUE MORGAN. of Tories to take the field against the Americans. At about this time, Colonel Andrew Pickens and Major McCall, with 260 mounted troops, arrived in camp from the Carolinas. Cornwallis had determined to await reinforcements under General Leslie before he began offensive operations, but the manoeuvers of Morgan in the vicinity of Ninety-Six had alarmed him. On January 1, without awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, he sent Tarleton in command of 1,000 men to annihilate Morgan's force, no doubt being entertained of his ability to accomplish this.* When Tarleton arrived at Ninety-Six he found everything quiet, as the Americans had retired after some slight skirmishing. He then determined to march against Morgan in the hope of surprising him or at least of driving him beyond the Broad River. Cornwallis approved of the design and resolved to aid Tarleton by ascending the left bank of the Broad River, thus menacing Morgan's rear. At first everything prospered with the British. Having passed the Ennoree and the Tiger, Tarleton pushed along the banks of the Pacolet. Morgan retreated before Tarleton, and the pursuit was pressed with unabated vigor. Realizing that it would be extremely dangerous to ford the river with an enterprising enemy hanging upon his rear, and believing that his men * F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, p. 185 et seq. would stand against the British, Morgan determined to face about and engage Tarleton in battle. In order to make his men fight more desperately, he placed them so that their retreat was cut off, thus forcing them to fight for their lives. As Morgan said: "When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly."* Morgan took a position at Cowpens, about 6 miles from the Broad River, feeling certain that the 1,000 men under him would defeat the forces under Tarleton. On the morning of January 17, Morgan formed his troops in two divisions; the first, composed of militia under Colonel Pickens, was placed in front of a wood and in view of the enemy; while the second, composed of marksmen and old Continental troops under command of Colonel Howard, was concealed in the wood itself. Beyond the second division, and acting as a reserve, was the cavalry under Colonel Washington.† Tarleton's army was formed in two divisions, the infantry composing the centre of each while the cavalry, which was much superior to the Americans, was on the flanks. Though Tarleton's troops were fatigued by their long march in See Morgan's letter quoted in Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 543; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 384. † Fiske, American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 253254; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 433-434. |