DEATH OF DE KALB; DEFEAT OF GATES. Webster turned his attention to the Continental troops under De Kalb, attacking them in front and flank. A severe contest ensued, the Americans fighting desperately to beat off the British attack; but finally Cornwallis hurled his whole force against De Kalb and the line gave way and began to retreat in some confusion. To save as many of his army as possible, De Kalb endeavored to cover the retreat by making a desperate charge at the head of a body of cavalry. The effort resulted in some benefit to the army as a whole, but this benefit was gained at the expense of De Kalb's life, who fell pierced with eleven wounds. His aide endeavored to shield the general, and in explaining to the attacking force De Kalb's rank and nationality, was severely wounded and taken prisoner with him. The British treated De Kalb with every kindness and attention, but medical assistance was of little avail, he expiring within a few hours. In recognition of his services, Congress afterward ordered the erection of a monument to his memory. * Horry and Weems, Life of Marion, pp. 124– 126; Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 232 et seq.; Smith, Memoir of Baron De Kalb; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 467-468; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 314-315; Fortesque, British Army, vol. iii., pp. 316-319; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 384389; Thacher, Military Journal, pp. 205–206; Fiske, American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 190–193; Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 104-109, 131-135; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 391, 429447; Stedman, American War, pp. 204-211; Greene, Life of Greene, vol. iii., pp. 15-31; Wheeler, History of North Carolina, vol. ii., p. 154. 201 The American loss amounted to 800 or 900 killed and wounded and about 1,200 prisoners, while the British loss was less than 100 killed and 250 wounded. In addition, all the baggage and artillery of the American army fell into the hands of the British.* The rout of the American army was complete, and the only force which was not dispersed was that under Sumter. The latter had overtaken a convoy on the Wateree and had made 200 prisoners, but when he heard of the disaster at Camden, he retreated with all possible speed. After retreating for many miles, he supposed that he was out of the danger zone and halted to rest his troops who were worn out with constant marching and loss of sleep. Hardly had he halted, when Tarleton pressed in upon him and so completely surprised the American detachment that he recovered the stores and prisoners and killed or captured between 300 and 400 of the Americans. Sumter, however, was well acquainted with the by-paths of the woods in the vicinity and was able to make his escape.† After the retreat Gates gathered Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 518; Tarleton's Campaigns, p. 133. McCrady, South Carolina in the Revolution, pp. 667-668, 681-683; Tarleton's Campaigns, pp. 112-116, 134, 148 et seq.; Lee, Memoirs of the War, pp. 187-189; Ramsay, Revolution, vol. ii., p. 153; Wheeler, History of North Carolina, p. 195; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 447 (ed. 1788); Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 454. 202 GREENE SUPERSEDES GATES; CORNWALLIS' INACTIVITY. together the scattered remnants of the army and finally made his way to Hillsborough, where he exerted every effort to recover from the terrible blow which had befallen him.* In November he advanced toward Salisbury, and soon after, to Charlotte. But in the meantime, on October 5, Congress had instituted an inquiry into his conduct of the campaign, and though this investigation was not pressed, Gates did not continue in command of the army much longer. Washington was requested to propose the name of Gates' successor, and he named General Greene, whose nomination was approved by Congress on October 30.+ Greene reached the headquarters of the army in the South on December 2. Gates thereupon left the army, never again to resume active service. He undoubtedly suffered keenly from the disgrace of defeat, and his fall was all the more humiliating because of the excellent reputation he had previously gained in the North. Shortly after leaving the army, his son died and he set out for the North, where he soon sank into oblivion and was forgotten by the majority of Ameri cans. Fortunately for the Americans, Cornwallis did not follow up the victory with his usual activity, for his * See his letter to Washington, in Sparks, Cerrespondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 66-67. F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 160, 166 et seq.; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol, vii., pp. 187, 257; Gordon, American Revolu tion, vol. iii., p. 469 (ed. 1788). army had been considerably reduced by sickness and by the sword. Nor had he brought with him sufficient supplies to maintain the army while conducting a pursuit, and he did not deem it expedient to leave South Carolina until he had completely extinguished every manifestation of resistance to British authority. In order to accomplish the subjugation of the State in the most thorough manner, he resorted to several harsh measures. He considered the State as a conquered province which was reduced to unconditional surrender and to allegiance to its former sovereign. According to his theory, the citizens were still British subjects, liable to all their privileges, duties and penalties in case of an infraction of the law. He seemed to forget that many of the citizens were prisoners of war on parole, that without their consent they had been discharged from their parole, and that it was only by proclamation that they had been declared British subjects. Supposing that the whole province was now prostrate at his feet, Cornwallis sent the following message to the British commander at Ninety Six, and similar messages to the commanders of other posts: "I have given orders that all the inhabitants of this province who have subscribed, and have taken part in the revolt should be punished with the utmost rigour; and also those who will not turn out that they may be imprisoned, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed. I have likewise ordered that compensation should be made out of their estates to the persons who have been injured or oppressed by them. I have or BRITISH BRUTALITY; FERGUSON'S MARCH. The officers and soldiers to whom the execution of these orders was committed possessed little humanity and little prudence, and the consequences were calamitous. The orders were executed exactly in the spirit in which they were given; numbers of people were put to death, many others were imprisoned and thousands of dollars worth of property destroyed or confiscated.† As a result of these operations, the people were thoroughly aroused and longed for revenge. Cornwallis' conduct toward the principal citizens of Charleston was extremely disgraceful. Without cause or excuse, they were seized during the night, placed on board a guard ship, and soon after sent to St. Augustine, despite their earnest remonstrances that such action was contrary to all the rules of war and entirely unnecessary in the present circumstances.‡ Cornwallis left Camden September 8, and arrived at Charleston, North 203 Carolina, toward the end of the month taking possession of the latter place after a slight resistance on the part of some volunteer cavalry under command of Colonel William R. Davie.* He then advanced toward Salisbury and ordered the militia to cross the Yadkin, but his victorious career was suddenly arrested by an unexpected disaster. Cornwallis had endeavored to form a British militia out of the well-affected inhabitants of the country, and for this purpose had dispatched Major Patrick Ferguson of the Seventy-first regiment with a small detachment toward Ninety-Six. Ferguson was to train the Loyalists who joined the British army and to induce others to join. Cornwallis expected much from Ferguson's operations, for he was well known as an officer of much merit and as one who executed his assignments with zeal and energy. The first part of the program was carried out with complete success; Ferguson collected a large number of Loyalists and had created great havoc among the backwoods settlements, which were as a rule friendly to the American cause. At this time Colonel Elijah Clarke was retreating from the vicinity of Augusta, Ga.,† and, McCrady, South Carolina in the Revolution, p. 714 et seq. See also the letters of Nash and Rutledge, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 179–181, 187–189. 204 FRONTIERSMEN GATHER TO OPPOSE FERGUSON. thinking that he might cut off and destroy this detachment, Ferguson determined to stay in the vicinity of the western mountains longer than he would have tarried under other circumstances. This delay was his undoing; the mountaineers of the Wateree and Holston settlements had learned of Ferguson's approach and his work of devastation and determined upon reprisal. From all parts they came together under various leaders, including Isaac Shelby and John Sevier, and set out in quest of the enemy. They were all mounted, and as each man had only a blanket, knapsack and rifle, there was no encumbrance such as baggage to hinder their march. Consequently, they were able to hunt down the British detachment by the same methods they would have used in hunting the wild beasts of the forest or the savages of the border.* Their numbers rendered them formidable, and so rapid was their march that Ferguson would probably have been unable to escape even if he had received warning of their intentions. Early in October the mountaineers reached Gilberttown their forces numbering near proach of this force and attempted to escape, but the mountaineers, selecting about 1,400 of their best riflemen, set out in pursuit on their swiftest horses and finally compelled Ferguson to halt. Sensible that he would ultimately be overtaken, Ferguson deemed it best to select his battle ground with the greatest possible care before the American force could come up. He therefore chose King's Mountain on the border line between North and South Carolina as the place where he should make his stand, challenging "all the rebels outside of hell" to dislodge him,* and declaring that "God Almighty could not drive him from it." The American forces arrived on the scene of action October 7. By this time, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, the Americans had dwindled to a little over 900 men; in nominal command was Colonel William Campbell, but there was little subordination or order in the attack, each man being instructed to shift for himself and to fight as only the frontiersmen knew how. Upon arriving at King's Mountain, the American troops were divided so as to attack Ferguson from several different quarters, separate divisions ly 3,000 men.† Ferguson had heard of the ap- being led by Benjamin Cleveland, * Draper, King's Mountain and Its Heroes, pp. 174-175, 530, 563-564. For the details of the organization of this force see McCrady, South Carolina in the Revolution, pp. 755-764 and authorities cited; Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. ii., chap. ix., pp. 241-294; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., p. 343 et seq. James Williams, Charles McDowell, Shelby and Sevier. Before the attack was begun, Cleveland addressed *Van Tyne, American Revolution, p. 302; Fiske, American Revolution, vol. ii., p. 246. 782. McCrady, South Carolina in the Revolution, p. |