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SULLIVAN'S CHAGRIN AT D'ESTAING'S DEPARTURE.

possibility of failure. On the other hand, it could not be abandoned at the present juncture without doing great injury to the American cause, for the volunteers under General Sullivan had undertaken the expedition in the expectation of receiving aid from the French fleet and had used every endeavor to furnish the army with supplies. To be abandoned by the French at so critical a moment, in conjunction with the ill success of the other American armies up to the present time, could not help but produce a high state of exasperation. The disaffected would also have good cause to deride

the Americans for their faith in the French and the expected aid from thom. They said that it would be very difficult for the fleet in its present condition to pass the shoals of Nantucket; that it could be repaired at Newport as well as at Boston; and finally that its present station offered advantages over Boston for distressing the enemy. On the other hand, if a superior fleet should appear, Boston harbor would be no safer than that at Newport. These arguments failed to change d'Estaing's determination, and, though a protest signed by all the leading officers except Lafayette was sent to the Count,* he adhered to his plan, and on August 22, 1778, sailed away from Newport, three days later arriving at Boston.+

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General Sullivan was so chagrined and disgusted at the movements of the French* that on the 24th in the general orders, he inserted the following paragraph:

"The General cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it; though he can by no means suppose the army, or any part of it, endangered by this movement. He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining."†

On the 26th he tried to smooth over

the reflection contained in this paragraph by declaring that he did not mean to insinuate that the departure of the French fleet was because of a fixed determination not to assist the

Americans, and that he would not wish to give to ungenerous and illiberal minds the slightest reason to make so unfair an interpretation. On the 26th, after his arrival at Boston, d'Estaing wrote a note to Congress in which he attempted to justify the departure of his fleet. He said that water and provisions were low; that he had been deceived with regard to these two articles, the need of which was growing more and more important; and that it was necessary for

475. See also Sullivan's, Lafayette's and Laurens' letters to Washington, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 178-188.

* See Greene's characterization of Sullivan's conduct in his letter to Washington, Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 188 et seq. See also Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., p. 478 et seq.

Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iii., p. 487. See also F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 112113.

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WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE COMMANDERS.

him to consider the condition of his fleet at the present time rather than to risk its total annihilation by being in no condition to withstand an attack. He said that when notice of the arrival of British reinforcements was received, his ships were in such a situation that had he returned to Newport, Howe would have had a great advantage if an attack should be made. Consequently, he felt justified in going to Boston, but he did not think that the American generals were justified in expressing their opinions in such strong language. Undoubtedly the Count himself cannot be held blameable for the departure of the fleet, for all his officers, men of long experience, insisted that the preservation of the fleet demanded it. Nevertheless, the American commander and the soldiers under him were sorely disappointed, because had the French commander returned to Newport, the British garrison would have been compelled to surrender long before Howe could have arrived with aid. Consequently, as the Americans said, "there never was a prospect so favorable, blasted by such a shameful desertion." So bitter was the disappointment and chagrin that a clamor arose against the whole French nation and letters were sent to Boston full of bitter invective intended to prejudice the inhabitants against d'Estaing and his officers. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the cooler and more judicious part of the community were able to preserve peace between

the French sailors and the inhabitants of the city.

Washington readily foresaw that a general and mutual irritation would be productive of still greater violence, and he therefore exerted every effort to calm the minds of both parties. In this he was aided by Lafayette, who was equally well beloved by the French and Americans.* Lafayette naturally owed his first duty to the king, but he was devoted to Washington, and put forth every effort to reconcile the French and American commanders. Washington wrote to General Heath in command at Boston and to Sullivan and Greene at Rhode Island. In his letter to Heath he stated his fears" that the departure of the French fleet from Rhode Island, at so critical a moment, would not only weaken the confidence of the people in their new allies, but produce such prejudice and resentment as might prevent their giving the fleet, in its present distress, such zealous and effectual assistance as was demanded by the exigence of affairs, and the true interests of America." He added that it would be sound policy to combat these effects, and to give the best construction of what had happened; and at the same time to nake strenuous exertions for putting the French fleet as soon as possible in a condition to defend itself, and be useful." He furthermore said:

* See Washington's letters to Lafayette, in Sparks, Life of Washington, pp. 280-281.

WASHINGTON'S LETTERS AND THEIR EFFECT.

"The departure of the fleet from Rhode Island is not yet publicly announced here; but when it is, I intend to ascribe it to necessity produced by the damage received in the late storm. This, it appears to me, is the idea which ought to be generally propagated. As I doubt not the force of these reasons will strike you equally with myself, I would recommend to you to use your utmost influence to palliate and soften matters, and to induce those whose business it is to provide succors of every kind for the fleet, to employ their utmost zeal and activity in doing it. It is our duty to make the best of our misfortunes, and not suffer passion to interfere with out interest and the public good."

On September 1 he wrote to General Sullivan as follows:*

"The disagreement between the army under your command and the fleet has given me very singular uneasiness. The continent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept up by all possible means consistent with our honor and policy. First impressions, you know, are generally longest remembered, and will serve to fix in a general degree our national character among the French. In our conduct towards them we should remember, that they are a people old in war, very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire where others seem scarcely warmed. Permit me to recommend in the most particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endeavors to destroy that illhumor which may have got into the officers. It is of the utmost importance, also, that the soldiers and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding; or, if it has reached them, that

ways may be used to stop its progress, and pre

vent its effect." †

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tions of success, and, which I deem a still worse consequence, I fear it will sow the seeds of dissension and distrust between us and our new allies, unless the most prudent measures be taken to suppress the feuds and jealousies that have already arisen. I depend much on your temper and influence to conciliate that animosity which subsists between the American and French officers in our service. I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered into by the general officers from being made public. Congress, sensible of the ill consequences that will flow from our differences being known to the world, have passed a resolve to that purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, you can conceive my meaning better than I can express it; and I therefore fully depend on your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities between our principal officers and the French, and to prevent all illiberal expressions and reflections that may fall from the army at large."

Greene therefore employed every means to conciliate the French officers. * Washington exerted all his diplomacy to heal the breach with the French commander, and in writing to Count d'Estaing took no notice of the disagreements which had occurred. He composed his letter so that it would soothe every unpleasant sensation which might have disturbed his mind.

As a result of these combined efforts, good understanding and cordiality returned, although there were several manifestations of ill-will

To General Greene, Washington toward the French sailors, such as

wrote:

"I have not now time to take notice of the several arguments which were made use of, for and against the Count's quitting the harbor of Newport, and sailing for Boston. Right or wrong, it will probably disappoint our sanguine expecta

*Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vi., p. 44.

See also Sullivan's reply, in which he states that he has done everything to satisfy d'Estaing and to restore perfect harmony.- Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 204–205; Amory, Life of Sullivan, p. 79.

street brawls, etc ‡

*F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 113–114, 122–

123.

†See Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iii., p. 494; also Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. i., pp. 108-125; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vii., pp. 160–164, 166, 168–175, 180, 182; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 165–169, 197-198, 200; Stedman, American War, vol. ii., pp. 38, 46-47.

See Greene's letter to Washington, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 206-207.

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SULLIVAN RETREATS; REPULSES BRITISH ATTACK.

Meanwhile the volunteers were leaving the American army in Rhode Island; in the course of twenty-four hours from 200 to 300 deserted, so that inside of three days Sullivan's force was not much larger than that of the British.* Therefore Sullivan determined to raise the siege and to retire to the northern end of the island, preparatory to an entire abandonment of the expedition. On the 29th of August the army began the march, and though they were warmly pursued by the Hessians and British, the retreat was conducted without serious loss. When the American army arrived at Quaker Hill, however, a large force of the British attacked it and in the ensuing engagement the loss was severe on both sides. Finally the Americans under Greene succeeded in repulsing the British, and during the night of the 30th the whole army under Sullivan reached the mainland by the passages of Bristol and Howland's Ferry.‡ Sullivan made his retreat just in time, for the next day Clinton arrived with a light squadron containing about 4,000 men. Had Sullivan been less prompt in his

* Greene, Life of Greene, vol. ii., pp. 125-141; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. i., pp. 650-651.

Heath's Memoirs, p. 177 (Abbatt's ed.).

‡ Bancroft, vol. v., p. 286; Richman, Rhode Island, pp. 231–232; F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 114-115; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 488-489; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 454; Greene's letter to Washington, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 192 et seq.; Lossing. Field-Book of the Revolu tion, vol. i., pp. 651-652.

movements, or had the winds favored Clinton more than they did, Sullivan would probably have been in a most desperate position, for the British fleet would have intercepted his passage to the mainland while a superior British force would have attacked him by land. As it was, however, he extricated the army from a perilous position in the nick of time, for which he was thanked by Congress.*

Finding upon his arrival that Sullivan had retreated, Clinton immediately set out on his return to New York; but, desiring that the expedition should not return to the city without having accomplished something noteworthy, he placed the troops aboard the transports under command of General Grey, giving the latter officer orders to make an expedition to Buzzard's Bay. Grey sailed to Acushnet River, where he landed September 5, 1778, and destroyed all the shipping in the vicinity, amount

*Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. i., p. 652, note; Journals of Congress, vol. iv., p. 378. For other works on the Sullivan expedition see Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, vol. vi., pp. 592-603; T. C. Amory, Life of Major-General John Sullivan; T. Balch, The French in America, 1777–83; G. W. Cullum, Fortification Defences of Narragansett Bay; W. Heath, Correspondence, in Massachusetts Historical Collections, series vii., vol. iv.; A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History; G. C. Mason, The British Fleet in Rhode Island, in Rhode Island Historical Collections, vol. vii.; S. S. Rider, The Battle of Rhode Island, in Rider's Historical Tracts, no. 6; S. S. Rider, The Rhode Island Black Regiment, in Historical Tracts, no. 10; J. G. Rosengarten, The German Soldiers in Newport, 1776-79, in Rhode Island Historical Magazine, vol. vii.; E. M. Stone, Our French Allies, 1778-1782; James B. Perkins, France in the American Revolution (1911).

PREDATORY EXPEDITIONS; BRITISH DEPART FOR SOUTH. 129

ing to more than 70 sail. He then went to New Bedford and Fairhaven, the greater part of which towns he laid in ashes, and where he also destroyed a large quantity of military and naval stores, provisions, etc. He had landed at 6 o'clock in the evening, and so rapid were his movements that before noon of the next day the whole work of destruction had been accomplished and the troops reimbarked. Grey next proceeded to Martha's Vineyard, where he burned several vessels, destroyed much property, compelled the inhabitants to surrender their arms, and forced them to supply him with a large number of sheep and oxen, which proved a seasonable relief to the British in New York.*

About the middle of September, 1778, Admiral Byron, the successor to Lord Howe in command of the British fleet, arrived at New York. As his fleet was in a much shattered condition because of stormy weather, he was unable to put to sea again until October 18, on which day he set sail for Boston in quest of d'Estaing. Again ill success attended him, for on November 1, when he reached Boston Bay, a storm arose which so damaged his ships that he was compelled to hasten to Rhode Island for repairs.† Having completed the repairs to his ships, d'Estaing seized this oppor

Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 169 (ed. 1788); Stedman, American War, vol. ii., pp. 32, 39, 44. pp. 46-47.

Stedman, American War, vol. ii.,

.

tunity to put to sea, and on November 3 sailed for the West Indies. On the same day General Grant in command of a detachment of 6,000 men from the British army, convoyed by a fleet under Commodore Hotham, set sail for the same quarter. Toward the end of the same month another detachment of more than 2,000 British troops under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, embarked from New York for the purpose of invading the Southern States. This latter body of troops was escorted by Commodore Hyde Parker. Thus the British at New York were left only a sufficient force to defend the city against attack.*

As the campaign in the Northern and Middle States was now closed, Washington put his army into winter quarters, stationing the main body on both sides of the Hudson near Middlebrook, West Point and Danbury, while the artillery was sent to Pluckemin. Thus the army was stationed in various cantonments from Long Island Sound to the Delaware, and so arranged that in case of necessity all the other bodies could quickly reinforce any detachment that was suddenly attacked. In command of the troops at Danbury was General Putnam; McDougall commanded in the Highlands; and General Lincoln was sent to take command of the

See Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vii., passim.

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