112 CLINTON SUCCEEDS HOWE. Two nies submitted, the troops comprising this expedition murdered some 50 or 60 of the militia and returned to Philadelphia with little loss.* months later, on May 4, a detachment of British encountered a small body of militia at Crooked Billet, seventeen miles from Philadelphia, but the Americans succeeded in escaping with only the loss of their baggage. On May 7 the British sent an expedition against the galleys and other ships which had escaped up the Delaware at the time of the capture of Mud Island, and a large number of vessels were destroyed, and some stores and provisions captured.† Because of their superiority in numbers and equipment, the British were able to undertake these expeditions and to send out numerous detachments to various points without fear of capture, while on the other hand, the movements of the militia were often tardy and inefficient. Because of their small numbers, the American army could not properly guard the roads, and the British were able to conduct their foraging expeditions and return to Philadelphia before an adequate force of Americans could be assembled to attack them. In October, 1777, Howe had sent his resignation to the British ministry, but not until the spring of 1778 was it accepted, when Sir Henry Clinton Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 138-140. † Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 13. was appointed to succeed him. Upon his departure from Philadelphia, Howe was given a magnificent farewell entertainment.* Soon afterward, being quite certain that the British were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia, Washington ordered Lafayette to cross the Schuylkill with 2,200 troops and take post at Barren Hill, about twelve miles in front of the army at Valley Forge.t Lafayette picketed all the roads by which it was probable that the enemy would approach. About two miles to the left of his headquarters was Whitemarsh, where a number of roads formed a junction, and to guard these roads the Marquis had dispatched some militia, who, however, never went. Having placed his guards, Lafayette directed a Quaker in the vicinity to provide him lodgings for the night. Inferring that Lafayette intended to stay there, the Quaker sent information of Lafayette's situation to the British. The latter thereupon determined to surprise Lafayette, and on May 19 General Grant, with about 5,000 men and a number of cannon, set out from Philadelphia. Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 122, 139-143; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iv., p. 282 et seq.; Jones, New York in the Revolution, vol. i., pp. 242-252, 716. See also André's description of the Mischianza, in Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 97 et seq. On the subsequent investigation of his conduct of the war, see Fisher, pp. 149-157. See his instructions to Lafayette in Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., p. 368, and in Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 326328. Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., p. 329. LAFAYETTE AT BARREN HILL. Taking the Frankford road and crossing the country through the old York road and Whitemarsh, Grant, the next morning, entered the road on which the Marquis had stationed his camp, about two miles in his rear, at Plymouth meeting-house. The only ford by which Lafayette could retreat was Matson's Ford on the Schuylkill, about a mile and a quarter distant, and about two miles from Barren Hill church. Detaching some troops to take the Marquis in front, Grant, instead of securing this ford and then cutting off Lafayette's retreat, marched down the main road. Lafayette thereupon retreated by the road leading from Barren Hill church to Matson's Ford, and had nearly effected his retreat before the enemy were aware of the error they had committed. Doubling their pace, the British attempted to overtake Lafayette's troops, but before they came up with his rear, all the Americans had crossed and formed in battle order on the other side. Lafayette's loss was not more than nine men. Of Lafayette's danger the American army had received early information and adopted several expedients to distract the attacking forces. Some of the heaviest artillery was fired in the hope that the sound of it would be carried to the British, who might think that the whole American army was approaching. Evidently this was the case, for Grant hastily beat his way back to Philadelphia, seemingly under the apprehension that his small 113 *Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 330338; Bancroft, vol. v., p. 270; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 405-407; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 144-148; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 121-123. See also Wayne's account of this in Stillé, Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line, pp. 139-141; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., p. 377. 114 PHILADELPHIA EVACUATED; OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS. evacuate Clinton was ordered to Philadelphia as soon as possible and to send a portion of his forces to aid in making a descent upon the French possessions in the West Indies. The remainder of his troops were to be stationed at New York.* Shipping part of his troops, Clinton began the march through New Jersey with the main body of the army, starting from Philadelphia on June 18, 1778.+ Hardly had he evacuated the city when Arnold with a small detachment entered to take possession. A few days afterward Congress also returned to the city.‡ At this time the British army in Philadelphia, New York, and Rhode Island numbered approximately 33,000 men,|| while the American force did not exceed 15,000, nor was it probable that it could have been raised to more than 20,000 effective men. The Council of War supposed that Howe's force numbered but 10,000 men; nevertheless they were reluctant to enter upon offensive operations, and with the exception of Washington and possibly two or three others, all the generals were opposed to attacking the British with * Bancroft, vol. v., p. 272. Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. the object of bringing on a general engagement. Lee even declared it to be "criminal" to risk a battle with an enemy so superior in discipline and strength.* Most of the foreign officers concurred in this opinion, and Washington felt obliged to yield to the opinion of the majority of his council in a matter of so great importance.t Some time previously, with the object of impeding the march of the British as much as possible, Washington had detached General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, across the Delaware to coöperate with General Philemon Dickinson with the Jersey militia in destroying bridges, felling trees across the roads, etc., as had been done at Saratoga, but Dickinson was ordered to guard against a sudden attack.‡ There were two roads leading from Philadelphia to New York; one running along the western bank of the Delaware to the ferry at Trenton, while the other followed the eastern bank to the same point. Unmolested by the American army, the British crossed the Delaware at Gloucester Point, and had taken the road leading along the eastern bank. Clinton carried with him a large quantity of baggage and pro * Bancroft, vol. v., p. 274; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 347-348. Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. 373-374; F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, p. 100; Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 159. ‡ Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., p. 348; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 147; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 445. BRITISH RETREAT TOWARD NEW YORK. visions, so that the progress of the army, thus heavily encumbered, was exceedingly slow, and it did not reach .Crosswicks and Allentown until June 24, having marched less than 40 miles in seven days.* It seemed to the Americans that Clinton's slow progress was intentional, with the purpose of drawing the Americans into a general engagement. On Clinton's approach, General Maxwell, who was posted at Mount Holly, retired, and neither he nor Dickinson was able to give the British much trouble. Thus far the British army had marched up the Delaware at only a short distance from the river, and Washington, who had left Valley Forge on the day that Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, found it necessary to take a circuitous route, and pass the river higher up at Coryell's Ferry. Crossing this on June 22, Washington stationed himself at Hopewell, where he remained throughout the 23d. From Allentown to New York were two roads; the left of which passed through South Amboy to the Hudson, while the right led to Monmouth and Sandy Hook. The first of these two roads was the shorter, but it was crossed by the Raritan, and as it would be difficult and dangerous to pass this river if Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 413. Lowell says that on the 25th of June nearly a third of the Hessians were overcome by the heat and that there were many desertions - Hessians in the Revolution, p. 213. See also Knox's letters of June 25 and 29 in Brooks, Life of Knox, pp. 119, 121. 115 opposed by the enemy, Clinton determined to take the longer road.* At Hopewell, Wasington once more asked the advice of the Council of War. Lee again expressed the same opinion regarding the attack on the British and his opinion carried great weight in the Council. But Washington decided not to follow the advice of the Council and to act on his own initiative, deeming the reputation of the army in a measure involved, and knowing that the country expected that he would make an attack of some kind upon the British.f Washington could not be persuaded that the chances were so much against him as had been suggested by Lee and others. On receiving word that Sir Henry Clinton was proceeding by the right road to Monmouth CourtHouse, Washington sent forward 1,000 men under General Wayne, and directed General Lafayette to take command of the left flank, ordering him to attack the enemy's rear upon the first favorable opportunity.‡ Lee had been offered command of this corps, but had declined it. The whole Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 147-148. † Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 179–181; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., p. 350; Stillé, Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line, p. 141 et seq.; F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, p. 101; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 148; Sparks, Life of Washington, pp. 271-273. Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 414; Stillé, Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line, p. 144; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 352–353. His instructions to Lafayette are in Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., p. 417. 116 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. army followed at a short distance behind the advance corps and reached Cranberry the next morning. Upon learning of the approach of the Americans, Clinton sent his baggage to the front and placed his grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs in the rear. Washington then sent Washington then sent forward two more brigades to the advance corps and dispatched General Lee, who for some reason now desired to have the command, to take charge of the whole advance corps.* On the morning of June 28 Lee was ordered to move on and attack, " unless there should be very powerful reasons to the contrary." Washington followed with the main army to support the advance corps. When he had marched about five miles, he found the whole of the advance corps in full retreat, by Lee's orders, without having made any appreciable attempt to defeat the British.‡ Wash Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., p. 356 et seq.; Fiske, American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 59-61; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. vii., pp. 73-75. For an exposition of the reasons for Lee's change of heart, see Johnson, General Washington, pp. 198-199. See the extracts from testimony regarding orders given prior to the battle citetd in Carrington, pp. 422-432. See also New York Historical Society Collections, 1873, vol. ii., p. 443, vol. iii., pp. 7-8; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 366-369; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 274 et seq. On the various skirmishes see Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 369-381; Carrington, pp. 433-438; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 148-152. Fisher seems to think that Lee was not at fault in the measures he took.— Struggle for American Independence, vol. ii., pp. 183-185. See also the report of Wayne and Scott, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. ington was astounded at the sudden change and asked Lee to explain. Lee replied with warmth and in very unsuitable language, and in turn was reproved in much stronger language than it was generally supposed Washington could use.* The regiments of Colonel Walter Stewart, William Irvine and Thomas Craig, together with the Virginia and Maryland regiments, were ordered to form on a piece of ground deemed suitable for checking the advance of the enemy.t Washington then asked Lee if he would take command on that ground, and he promptly consented. He was ordered to use the utmost diligence in checking the advance of the enemy, to which he replied, "Your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field." Washington next rode to the main army, which was ii., pp. 150-152; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. 376-378. *See Irving's Life of Washington, vol. iii., pp. 454-455; Fiske, vol. ii., pp. 62-64; New York Historical Society Collections, 1873, vol. iii., pp. 81, 112, 147, 156, 191; Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., p. 230; Pennsylvania Magazine of History, vol. ii., p. 141; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. i., pp. 382-384. Tower, however (p. 389) says there is no evidence that Washington expressed violent feeling toward Lee or that he reproached him with angry words. However, had Washington known that the British commander was at this very moment acting on the plan that Lee himself had drawn up to destroy Washington, he probably would have expressed his feelings in much harsher language than he is reported to have used. Stillé, Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line, pp. 146-147. Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 441; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 154; Johnson, General Washington, pp. 201-202. |