Japan’s Political Marketplace: With a New PrefaceMark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth construct a persuasive account of political relationships in Japan. In doing so, they demonstrate that political considerations and institutional arrangements reign in what, to most of the world, looks like an independently powerful bureaucratic state. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Electoral Rules and Party Strategy | 16 |
Demographics and Policy | 38 |
Copyright | |
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agency slack agents branch office budget Bureau bureaucrats cabinet campaign career cartels Committee competition constituents constrain court judge cracy delegate Diet majority economic Eisaku Satō election electoral rules electoral system faction leaders family court favors firms Hanrei jihō High Court implement incentive institutional Iwai Japan Japanese bureaucrats Japanese politics judicial independence judiciary Justice Kakuei Tanaka kōan LDP backbenchers LDP candidates LDP Dietmembers LDP leaders LDP legislators LDP members LDP politicians LDP's League members legislature Lower House McCubbins ministries MITI MOF bureaucrats monitor Nagara River Nihon Nihon keizai shimbun Ōhira organization PARC parliamentary system party leaders party leadership party members party's percent personal-vote policymaking positions Prime Minister programs regulations scholars Secretariat senkyo Socialist statutes Supreme Court Table Takeo Fukuda Tanaka tion Tokyo D.C. Tokyo District Court Tokyo High Court University of Tokyo Upper House voters ZSKS