13. * Perpetuity and importance of the Sabbath. A Sermon delivered at a Meeting of Citizens from most of the towns in the County of Cumberland, and from several in the Counties adjacent, held at Portland, Nov. 10, 1814, for the purpose taking measures to promote the due observance of the Lord's Day.

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14. Sermon delivered at Brunswick, April 13, 1815, appointed as a day of National Thanksgiving, by the President of the U. S. on account of the Peace, recently established between this Country and Great Britain.

15. An Address delivered at Boston, before the Mass. Society, for suppressing intemperance, May 31, 1816.

16. * A Sermon delivered at Freeport at the ordination of Rev. Enos Merrill.

17. A Sermon delivered at Northampton, Sept. 18, 1817, before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

18. A Sermon delivered at Portland, Nov. 19, 1818, at the formation of the Maine Branch of the American Education Society.

* Published in the present edition.

THEOLOGICAL LECTURES.

LECTURE I.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

THE existence and attributes of God may be considered, as lying at the foundation of all religion, whether natural or revealed. In regard to the existence of God, it shall be my endeavor to prove,

1. That something has existed from eternity.

2. That the Being who existed from eternity is intelligent. 1. Something existed from eternity.

We are conscious of our own existence, and are taught by our senses, the existence of a great variety of other objects. With respect to ourselves and most of the objects which fall within our notice, it is confessedly certain, that existence, far from being eternal, is of recent origin. The plants, which decorated the earth, the last summer, began their existence at the opening of spring. Of the forest trees many have grown up within our own remembrance; others give such undeniable proof either of present increase or decay, as to preclude from every rational mind all idea of their having existed from eternity. That our own existence is not without beginning is equally beyond question. What then produced the present generation of plants, trees, and animals? Did they create themselves? The doctrine is too ab

surd to find an advocate. It supposes a thing capable of acting before it had existence. But, in order to act, it must exist; it must, therefore, both exist and not exist, at the same moment. If any thing can render this absurdity still more glaring, it is the following consideration; viz. if a power of creating could precede existence, other beings might be subject to it, as well as that one to whom it is supposed to belong. If a plant or animal, while yet it was not, could have acted to produce existence to itself; it might, with the same facility, have produced existence to other beings. If it could thus act, one moment before its existence, it might a year or a thousand years. So that it is wholly uncertain, whether that being who has been busily acting, either in creating or varying the world, for several thousand years, has even to this day, ever chosen to exist, or not.

Now, if self-creation is impossible to one being, it is so to all. Every object, therefore, whose existence is not eternal, is the effect of some cause. You will reply, perhaps, that all the plants and animals were created by their predecessors, i. e. that the parent creates his children, and the acorn creates the oak,which proceeds from it. But has the acorn any design? Does it first determine to form a tree, then fix its magnitude, prescribe its shape, the texture of its bark, the number, direction, and length of its branches; the form, color, and multitude of its leaves? The seed of a plant is no more able to create that organized body, which springs from it, than to produce a temple. The acorn can no more create an oak, than build a navy.

But even were it possible, that present objects should have been created by those, who immediately preceded them, an insuperable difficulty would still remain. It is as necessary to find a creator for the generations which are past, as for that which is present. The person or the plant, who lived a thousand years ago, could no more create itself, than those which are now before our eyes. Follow up the succession, as far as you please, no satisfaction can be obtained, no resting place can be

found, until you arrive at a cause, which was not preceded by any other; but which existed without beginning.

There have not been wanting those, who attributed to chance the existence of the universe. With this opinion we have, at present, no concern, further, than as it militates with our first proposition, viz. that something existed from eternity. If the universe proceeded from chance, eternal existence cannot, I suppose, be predicated of any being. But if chance produced the universe, why does it produce nothing at present? If it produced the first man, why has it never produced any other? If it produced the first plant or tree, why has there been, since the memory of man, a precise method established, agreeably to which all vegetables have been propagated? If it produced the eye, why has it never produced a telescope; if it has produced the solar system, why not a planetarium; by what, may be exemplified the relation and motion of those bodies which compose it?

But to perceive, more fully, the merit or demerit of this opinion, which ascribes the universe to chance, it is necessary to investigate the term. What is chance? We apply the term not to events which exist without a cause; but to those the causes of which are unknown. When a cube is thrown up into the air, and returns, we say, it is by chance, that one particular side first strikes the ground rather than another. A person interested in a lottery, is said by chance to draw the highest prize. Two travellers taking different roads, are said by chance to arrive at the same place at the same time. But in no one of these cases is there any effect without an adequate cause, nor any uncertainty, but that which arises from human ignorance. Whether this or that side of a cube shall first strike the ground, depends on its position and direction, when its descending motion began. That position and duration depended on the impulse received from the hand, when throwing it up, and the uniformity or diversity of the medium, through which it passed. There is no effect without a cause, in the whole process. Why, then, you will ask, cannot the person, who sent the cube

into the air, tell, beforehand, the manner in which it will strike the ground. I answer, because of his inability to calculate the combining causes, which produce the effect;-the combined impulses by which its motions are regulated.

Equally mechanical is the drawing of a lottery; and, but for our ignorance of the various causes, concerned in it, the success of every adventurer would be clearly foreseen.

The remaining case is that of two persons, setting out from different places, and going in different routes; yet after having travelled a number of hours, arriving at a destined spot, precisely at the same moment. Such an event we should attribute to chance. Yet the cause is extremely obvious. Only suppose that the routes, though unknown to the travellers, were exactly of the same length; and that they, without being sure of it, proceeded with the same rapidity, and the issue could not have been different. Nor could it have been different, if the pace of the one exceeded that of the other, in proportion as his tour was longer.

It appears then, that when we attribute any event to chance, we mean nothing more, than that the manner of its production is unknown to us ;-we are unacquainted with the manner in which it was effected. Now, if they who speak of the universe as having been produced by chance, mean nothing more than this, if they mean only to say that the universe was created in a manner, which is to them unaccountable, the most devout believer would not, thus far, oppose them; for this is, in no degree, inconsistent with their opinion, who attribute all to a Supreme, Intelligent Being. But if, by chance, the atheist means something else, if he uses the term in a sense different from that in which it is used by others, he is bound to give a precise definition. Until this is done, his doctrine of chance can neither be refuted nor understood, nor does it deserve notice.

It may not be improper, under this head, to mention another opinion, embraced by some who are unwilling to acknowledge the existence of God. They suppose, that all things were produced by the laws of matter.