if the age of the world, were twice as great; i. e. if creation had begun 6,000 years before it actually did begin.

If we suppose a thousand worlds instead of one, or if we suppose the world to have existed a million years, instead of six thousand, the difficulty will remain,-the greatest possible number of happy beings is not created; of course, the greatest possible sum of happiness does not exist, because, however great the number of happy beings, Deity could create more. Should the argument in favor of optimism be repeated, viz. that as God is infinitely benevolent, if he could produce more happiness, he certainly would do it, it might be replied, that the seeming force of this argument arises from our not considering the difference between a finite and infinite being; and from not noticing that effects, which must of necessity be finite, can never be equal to a cause, which is infinite; and further, that to speak of any conceivable effect, which has existed, does now, or ever will exist, as equalling the powers of Him who is unlimited and infinite, is either without meaning, or untrue.

This is a brief statement of the leading arguments used by those, who contend on this abstruse and difficult point. They who desire to see the subject treated at large, and with great ability, may be gratified by perusing the papers, which in the former part of the last century, passed between Dr. Samuel Clarke and the celebrated German philosopher Leibnitz; whose controversy relates to this subject among several others.-The question, I repeat it, is not whether our Creator is benevolent; for that is equally conceded on both sides; but whether this benevolence requires the greatest possible effort of his power, and whether the best possible is a suitable phrase in reference to power, that is confessed to be infinite.

I shall close this lecture with a few remarks, intended to prove the divine immutability. This results from the knowledge, power, and goodness of God.

The changes which occur in human conduct are the result of human imperfection. A perfect being cannot change for the better, and will not change for the worse. Why does a man

alter his purpose? Perhaps he did not sufficiently consider all, which would be necessary to its execution;-he did not consider all the bearings and relations which might have been foreseen; or perhaps circumstances arise in the execution of a plan, which at the commencement of it could not have been foreseen.

In regard to Deity, none of these things can be rationally supposed. Those effects, which occur in the natural world, are the result of his agency. A knowledge of them is therefore implied in the knowledge of his own will or determinations. His knowledge of the future volitions of moral agents is equally certain. Nothing therefore can arise in the execution of a scheme, which was not foreseen at the commencement of it. The same good reasons, which led to its adoption, must lead to its execution. All its bearings, all its relations must be distinctly in the view of God. He always accomplishes precisely as much as he expected to accomplish. He is therefore never disappointed. Consequently, when men speak of the Deity, as expecting from his creatures any thing different from what they perform, they must be understood to mean nothing more, than that he requires it. He requires service from every rational creature, he has a right to require it, and, with perfect justice, punishes the delinquent; yet is there no act either of rebellion or obedience, which he had not, from eternity, fore

seen.

It is sometimes suggested that the divine immutability renders prayer either useless, or improper. If the argument has any weight in regard to prayer, it will prove the inutility of means in general. For, if it be said, that our prayers cannot change an immutable God; it may be added, neither can our industry or application change an immutable God. There may be, notwithstanding the divine immutability, as sure a connexion between prayer and the obtainment of the favors sought, as between agricultural labor and the full grown harvest. The fact is, that in determining any event, all circumstances relating

to it are taken into view, and have their just influence on the result. Nor is their influence less, because they are foreseen and weighed beforehand, than if they were appreciated for the first time, when the events themselves occur.

LECTURE VIII.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

THE subject of the present lecture is a divine providence ;a government or superintendence of the world maintained by Deity. I shall proceed in the following order:

1. Consider, whether the Supreme Being does at all interest himself in the condition of his creatures;

2. Shall inquire, whether if he maintains any government, it is general or particular; whether it relates to all occurrences, or to some great events only;

3. Whether the changes occurring in the material universe result from properties, which were originally communicated to matter; or are produced by the immediate agency of God.

4. Whether a divine providence extends to the moral world. 1. We are to inquire whether the Supreme Being does at all concern himself in the condition of his creatures.

On this subject there has been in all ages a general, though not universal agreement. Though men have entertained various and discordant opinions as to the number and character of superior Beings; some supposing, that there are many gods, and others believing in one only; some attributing to the object of their worship every moral perfection, and others, a character not superior to their own; in these there has been very extensive union, viz. that the affairs of the world, and of men, are objects of divine attention and government.

As wisdom and design are manifest in the works of God, he must have had some purpose to be accomplished by creation. If so, he cannot be indifferent, whether this purpose is answered VOL. I.

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or not. It would be absurd, for an artificer to construct a machine for a particular purpose, and thenceforward be indifferent, whether it operated at all, or whether its operations produced the effect designed. The philosophy of Epicurus, if it has been rightly understood, represented the superintendence of human affairs as inconsistent with the majesty and bliss of the gods. This opinion Horace avows, as his own, and congratulates himself not a little, in being free from the vulgar belief, that divine interpositions were frequent in human concerns.* Deos didici securum agere aevum ; Nec, si quid miri faciat natura, Deos id Tristes exalto coeli demittere tecto.

(Sat. Lib. 1. 5. 101.)

Some persons of our own time would be thought to do honor to the Deity, and, at the same time, to their own intellectual penetration, by saying, that to suppose the great God concerned in superintending objects so inconsiderable as human beings and human events would be highly derogatory to his infinite majesty. It would be pertinent to ask these people for what purpose the world was made, if it were not worth the governing. God did not leave the smallest objects, which we behold, to create themselves. There is nothing of chance in the structure of a leaf or a flower. Every portion of these is impressed with marks of eternal wisdom. Is it less consistent with the majesty of God to preserve and govern, than to create? Is it, indeed, honorable to God, to say of him, that he has brought into existence creatures, whose preservation would derogate from his character? As to the securum aevum, the tranquil life, which the poet had learned to ascribe to the gods, if creation did not disturb it; neither would a perpetual providence.

But is it, in fact, true, that indolence is more consistent with majesty than action? Of those men, who have been deservedly held in high estimation, do you find any, whose days were consumed in sloth? Or who thought themselves degraded by efforts to advance the welfare of others? Would it be evidence

* Plutarch as quoted by Dr. Leland, was of the same opinion. Lel. 1. 392.