posed, that there is a line extending a million of miles, and that for aught any one knows to the contrary, it is coextensive with space, or is infinite. How should the matter be determined? How should finite creatures know, whether it were infinite or not? Should they find an end, they would know it to be finite, but if they should not find an end, as they would not, if it were endless, they would never know whether it were finite or infinite. Consequently were an infinite effect necessary to prove infinite power in its cause, it would be absolutely certain, that such power could never be proved to the apprehension of finite creatures, even if these infinite effects really existed.

When we speak of God as omnipotent, or infinite in power, we do not mean, that he can communicate to matter or to creatures his own infinity, which is implied in his creating an infinite number of worlds. But we have defined the term, by saying that "there is no conceivable effect, which exceeds the power of God." If he has created one such system as ours, it cannot be conceived, that he should want the power to create a second, a third, a hundredth, or a thousandth. Fix on any number you please; it is in the power of God to double that number. Double that number, or multiply it, as you will; it is still in the power of God to produce more than are expressed by the product.

Again, God is able to destroy the universe. With perfect facility he could annihilate the earth, and every created object. This is demonstrable. What he created, he continually supports; and if his supporting hand were withdrawn, annihilation would of course ensue.

The proof of power hence arising is indeed not direct. Annihilation of the universe, should it take place to-morrow, would not directly prove the power of God, as it would imply no action in Deity, but rather rest, or withdrawment of action. But though the proof would be indirect, it would be cogent and undeniable. Because, if annihilation would be the consequence of God's withdrawing his sustaining energy, it follows, that the preservation of the universe is the result of that ener

gy; and surely that power by which the universe is sustained, must be inexpressibly great.

Further: it proves an agent to be powerful, if he can accomplish the same end, in a great variety of ways. That such power exists in the Deity, is evident from a consideration of objects less magnificent, than those, to which our attention has been directed. One of the designs in view of Deity is the support of animal life. What a vast variety there is in the structure of animal bodies; and yet all answer the purpose of supporting animal life. We see then, the ability of God to produce the same effect, in a great variety of ways. Another design in view of Deity is to support vegetable life; but the bodies of vegetables are not less various than those of animals. Here then is another proof of the power of God to accomplish, by a variety of means, the same general end. Proofs of this nature might easily be multiplied beyond the limits of this discourse.

Possibly there may still be in the minds of some, two considerations, which if they do not militate with the doctrine of divine omnipotence, may at least be thought inconsistent with our definition of it; which definition is, "that there is no conceivable effect, the production of which exceeds the divine power." It may appear to you, that God is not, in this sense, omnipotent, unless he can produce infinite effects; and 2. Unless he can cause a part to be greater than the whole, and cause a thing to be and not to be at the same time.

I answer, that neither of these effects is conceivable. They both imply absurdity. If there could be, at any time, an infinite effect, i. e. an effect, which nothing could exceed, it is evident, that no effects could be added to it; because, if any thing were added, the sum would exceed that which is infinite. But if nothing can be added to those effects already produced, then has Deity nothing to do:-nothing which he can do ; and if there is nothing which Deity can do, then hath he no power; which is at once, absurd and impious. But the existence of that which implies an absurdity, cannot be conceived. Therefore the production of any thing infinite is not among conceivaVol. I.

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ble effects. It follows then, that infinite power might be measured by a created object: but that which can be measured has limits.

The other suggestion was, that if God be omnipotent, then can he cause a thing to be and not to be, at the same time; or can cause a part to be greater than the whole.

I answer, that this is more obviously inconceivable than the other, and therefore inability to do this is not inconsistent with divine omnipotence. Any thing which implies absurdity is not an object of power. Make an effort to conceive that part should be more than the whole; that a figure should at the same time be a triangle and a square; that á temporary being should be an eternal being; that a thing should exist and not exist at the same time. The very moment you make an effort to conceive any of these things, absurdity appears. You perceive that no power, neither human nor divine, can cause two things to exist, when the existence of the one implies the non-existence of the other; and it is no more derogatory to the powers of Almighty God, to deny the possibility of his causing a part to be equal to the whole, than to deny the possibility that God himself should at the same time both exist and not exist.

Writers on the subject of divine power have usually remarked that omnipotence does not imply the power of doing wrong, and the Scriptures speak of Deity as a God who cannot lie. But this, I conceive, has no relation to power simply considered. The meaning is not, that Deity wants power to pronounce one sentence or another;-that he wants the power to make a declaration which corresponds with truth, or is inconsistent with it, but only that he has no disposition to do the latter. When we say of a parent, that he cannot permit his child to suffer, we say nothing of his physical strength, but of his natural affections. We do not mean that he has less physical power than if he were destitute of parental sensibility.

It has, we conceive, been proved, that God is all-powerful; that there is no conceivable effect, which he is unable to produce. What God has done, he is able to do. He has created

matter out of nothing, i. e. he has given existence to that which previously had no existence. He has created a vast, but as it respects us, an indefinite number of globes. He has, therefore, power to multiply these effects beyond any conceivable limits. He has a perfect command over all the globes, which he has created, moving and directing them with perfect ease and precision. Of course he could easily move, and precisely direct and restrain any other worlds, which he should be pleased to call into being; though they should be more numerous than particles of sand in the globe, or drops of water in the ocean.

Conformable to these ideas of omnipotence is the general language of Scripture: He shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble. He commandeth the sun and it riseth not; he sealeth up the stars. He alone spreadeth out the heavens and treadeth upon the waves of the sea. The Lord of hosts has purposed; and who shall disannul it? His hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back? Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance? Again: All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and he doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth.

I close with one reflection. Whatever part of the Universe we may occupy; in whatever period of a boundless futurity we may live, this Almighty Being will be our friend, or our enemy. His power will be employed in conferring reward, or inflicting punishment. Who then may abide the day of his coming? and who shall stand, when he appeareth?

LECTURE V.

DIVINE OMNISCIENCE.

OUR present object is to prove the omniscience of God. This is an attribute, different from that of intellect, or intelligence. The difference is nearly the same, which there is between the capacity of a vessel and its actual fulness. An intelligent being has a capacity for knowledge, and the greater his intelligence the greater is this capacity. Our having proved the intelligence of God does not, therefore, supersede the necessity of proving his omniscience or infinite knowledge.

1. The Divine Being must be conscious of his own intellectual exercises; and have a knowledge of his own attributes. Every man is acquainted with what passes within himself. He is conscious of being averse from some things, and inclined to others. He is conscious of viewing some designs with approbation, and of making efforts to execute those designs. Deity is, in like manner, conscious of being pleased with some objects, and displeased with others. He knows what objects they are, which meet his approbation, and what those are, which excite his disgust.

As man is acquainted with his own physical strength, so must God have a knowledge of that infinite power, which we have shown to be one of his attributes; and he must distinctly perceive the various ways, in which this power may be exerted.

Intelligent and prudent men do not engage in any enterprise without having formed some plan, agreeably to which they may proceed, and to the accomplishment of which all these future efforts may tend. All the actions of God are doubtless in agreement with some design. Of his own desigus he must be conscious. He is perfectly acquainted then with the whole