on, his writings teftify; and what mifchiefs he has done the Proteftant cause in particular, this war will be a lafting memorial. When he entered Saxony, a Proteftant country, he found that religion no ways molefted in thofe places, where it had been established or tolerated by the treaty of Weft phalia. Even in the Popish dominions the perfecution began to lofe fomething of its edge, when he, under the name of its protector, brought upon it as great a calamity as its most determined enemies could have wifhed; by dividing the reformed states of the empire, and fetting Proteftants to cut the throats of Proteftants, whilst all the Popish powers have been forced into a ftrict confederacy.

Had we kept ourselves clear of this ruinous fyftem; and inftead of engaging France on her ftrong fide, attacked and vanquished her colonies one after the other, we might withoutexhaufting our ownftrength have gradually wafted away the principal refources of her trade, and whilft we continued this method, have as little reafon to grow tired of a war (the whole funds of which would be spent at home) as France has to grow weary in the prefent manner of carrying it on. If the powers on the continent were left without our interpofition to do their own business, they would probably better understand and better defend their own rights. At worst let France enter, let them conquer, let them poffefs Hanover; there is no mischief they can do that country greater than it fuffers by the prefent war; and we, not exhaufting ourselves by a fruitless defence, fhould in the end, by the entire poffeffion of the French colonies,

be able, befides the fecurity of our own juft claims, to rettore the Hanoverian dominions to their lawful fovereign, and even to procure fome indemnification for what they might have fuffered in our quarrel.

argu

This is pretty nearly the subftance of what was urged against the German fyftem; and the ment was conducted with great management and addrefs, and interfperfed with a number of topics well calculated to fpread difcontent, and to place in an odious light every ftep taken in those alliances and in that war. Many, however, ftrongly adhered to that method; and they answered, "that the best reafons on the other fide were more fpecious than folid; and that the chief writings against our German connexions were declamations rather than arguments. That the complaint of the expence of this war was in fome measure juft; but if the advantage was in any degree equivalent, the expence was incurred to good purpofe. That France, by engaging fo heartily as the has done in the German war, has drawn away fo much of her attention and her revenue from her navy, that it enabled us to give fuch a blow to her maritime ftrength, as poffibly the may never be able to recover. Her engagement in the German war has likewife drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered fome of the moft confiderable fhe poffeffed. It has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely deftroyed, whilit that of England has never in the profoundeft peace been in fo flourithing a condition. So that, by embarking in this German war, France has fuffered herself to be

undone, fo far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with England. But has fhe had in Germany fuch fucceffes as will counterbalance this lofs? Far from it. At this moment the is infinitely lefs advanced than fhe was the year the entered Germany, after having spent such immenfe fums of money, and loft by the fword, by difeafe, and by defertion, at leaft 100,000 of her people.

On the other hand, the account ftands thus with regard to England: deeply embarked as fhe has been in this German war, in her particular quarrel with France the has been carried along with an almoft uninterrupted tide of fuccefs. She has taken many of the French colonies; he has deftroyed their navy and their trade, and having infulted the enemies coafts, has ruined an harbour which might one day prove very obnoxious to us. Then how ftands the account in Germany? The French have been there frequently defeated; Hanover has been recovered and protected; the K. of Prussia has been preferved fo long at least from the rage of his enemies, and in general the liberty of Germany has been hitherto fecured. So that if we have incurred a great expence, we have done by it infinitely more than France has done at an expence much greater than ours. For the advocates who declaim against the king of Pruffia, feem to have forgot that the charge of the French army muft exceed ours, as the number of their troops to be paid, exceeds the difference between French and English pay. Thofe on the English eftablishment in Germany, have at no time exceeded 25,000, and the reft of the confederates ferve very nearly on the

fame terms with the French. Not to mention the fubfidies fo greatly fuperior to ours, which that power pays to ftates from whom the has not a fingle regiment to augment her armies. Thus although by our victories France is relieved from the charge of her navy, and that of the defence of fome of her moft confiderable colonies, the German war alone has brought her finances to a distress of which the whole world has been witness. And nothing lefs could have happened ; the expence. however contracted, was ftill enormous; and the refource of every war, trade, was almost wholly deftroyed. In England, the expence was alfo undoubtedly great: but then, the old trade still remained to fupply it, and new channels were opened. Had we lain by and tamely beheld Germany in part poffeffed, and the reft compelled to receive laws from France, the war there would foon have been brought to an end; and France, ftrengthened by victory, by conqueft, and alliance, would have the whole force and whole revenue of her mighty monarchy free to act against us alone.

They argued further, that common faith obliged us to an adherence to our engagements both with Hanover and Pruffia; and that the pleaded incapacity to affift them, arifing from the greatnefs of the charge, could not excufe us; becaufe the incapacity was not real; and if the expence were inconvenient, we ought to have looked to that when we contracted our engagements. That it was not true, that we received no advantage from our alliance with the king of Pruf-* fia; for if it be once admitted, that we entered with any reafon into the German war, (which they fup

pofed

pofed proved), then the king of Prufia has been very materially ferviceable to us; because it was his victory at Rofbach, and the reinforcement from his troops, which has enabled us to do all that has fince been atchieved. In the like manner, if the fupport of the Proteftant religion be any part of our care, that religion must fuffer eminently by the ruin of the king of Pruffia; for though the writings attributed to his Pruffian majefty be fuch as, if really his, reflect on account of their impiety great dif

grace on his character as a man, yet as a king, in his public and political capacity, he is the natural pro- tector of the Proteftant religion in Germany; and it will always be his intereft to defend it."

We shall not prefume to determine, which party has the right fide of this queftion; it was once undoubtedly a queftion very fit to be difcuffed with great care; but having chofen our party, it is at prefent little more than a matter of political fpeculation.

B

Efore we refume the account of the war in America, it will be neceffary to take fome notice of the attempt of the celebrated Thurot. It happened much earlier in the year, than the events which we have juft related. But to avoid breaking the thread of the more important events in Germany, we have referved it for this place.

The reader will remember, that in the French scheme for invading these islands (which was described as it then appeared to us in the 4th chapter of the annals of 1759), a fmall fquadron was prepared at Dunkirk, under Monfieur Thurot, the deftination of which most people at that time imagined to have been for Scotland. But, it has fince appeared, that this little fquadron was intended to make a diverfion on the north coaft of Ireland, whilft the

grand fleet under Monfieur de Conflans made the principal defcent in fome of the fouthern parts of that kingdom. The manner in which the latter and principal part of this project failed, has already been related among the tranfactions of that year. It remains now to give fome account of the part in which Thurot was concerned.

His fquadron, confifting of five frigates, on board of which were 1270 land foldiers, failed from the port of Dunkirk on the 5th of October 1759. They had been blocked up until that time by an English fleet; but, under favour of an hazy night, they put out to fea, and arrived at Gottenburg in Sweden ten days after. From thence they made to Bergen in Norway. In thefe voyages, the men were reduced by ficknefs, and the veffels themselves

had fo fuffered by, ftorms, that they were obliged to fend one of the moft confiderable of them back to France. It was not until the 5th of December, that they were able to fail directly for their place of deftination. But their old ill fortune purfued them with fresh difappointments. For near three months they beat backward and forward amongst the western ifles of Scotland, having in vain attempted a convenient landing near Derry. In this tedious interval they fuffered every poffible hardship. Their men were thinned and disheartened. Another of their fhips was feparated from them, of which they never heard more. The new remaining three were extremely fhattered, and their crews fuffered extremely by famine. This obliged them to put into 16 Feb. the ifle of Ilay; where they refitted and took in fome cattle and provifions, which were liberally paid for by the generous adventurer who commanded, and who behaved in all refpects with his ufual courtesy and humanity.

Here they heard for the first time of the defeat of Conflans' fquadron. This was a circumftance of great difcouragement. But as Thurot could not be fure that this intelligence was not given to deceive him; he perfifted in his refolution to fail for Ireland. Indeed he had fcarcely any other choice; for he was fo poorly victualled, that he could not hope, without fome refreshment, to get back to France. And he was further urged on by his love of glory, no fmall fhare of which he was certain to add to his character, if he could strike a blow of never fo little importance on the coaft of Ireland; for by this he might make fome appearance of having revenged the

many infults which had been offered to the coaft of France.

Full of these ideas, he arrived before the town of Carrickfergus on the 28th of February; and landed his troops, now reduced to about 600 men, the day following. They were augmented by draughts from his feamen to near a thousand. These he formed on the beach, and moved to the attack of the town. Carrickfergus is furrounded by an old wall ruinous in many places. Colonel Jennings commanded about four companies in the town, moftly of new-raifed men, extremely ill provided with ammunition, and no way prepared for this attack, which they had not the smallest reason to expect. However, they shut the gates, fent off the French prifoners to Belfast, and took all the meafures their circumftances would admit. The enemy advanced and attacked the gates. There was no cannon; but the gates were defended with effect by musket (hot, until the ammuition was fpent. Then the garrifon retired into the caftle, which having a breach in the wall near 50 feet in extent, was no way tenable. They therefore furrendered prisoners of war, with terms of fafety for the town.

Thurot, as foon as he was mafter of Carrickfergus, iffued orders to Belfast to fend him a quantity of wine and provifion; he made the fame demand to the magiftrates of Carrickfergus, which they having imprudently refufed to comply with, the town was plundered. Thurot having victualled, and gained as much reputation by this action as could be expected from a fleet which was no more than a sort of wreck of the grand enterprise, set fail for France. But he had not left

the

the bay of Carrickfergus many hours, when near the coaft of the Isle of Man, he perceived three fail that bore down upon him. Thefe were three English frigates which happened to be in the harbour of Kinfale, when Thurot made his defcent; the duke of Bedford, lord lieutenant, dispatched orders to the commander of the frigates to go in queft of the French armament. The English frigates were one of 36 guns, commanded by capt. Elliot; and two of 32.

Such was their diligence and fuccefs, that they overtook Thurot's fquadron before they could get out of the Irish fea. They were exactly three frigates to three. The French fhips were much the larger, and their men much more numerous; but both fhips and men were in a bad condition. A fharp and clofe engagement begun. None of the French could poffibly efcape, and they must take or be taken. Thurot did all that could be expected from the intrepidity of his character; he fought his fhip until fhe had her hold almoft filled with water, and her decks covered with dead bodies. At length, he was killed. The crew of his fhip, and by her example thofe of the other two, difpirited by this blow, and preffed with uncommon alacrity by the fignal bravery of captain Elliot, and those who commanded under him, ftruck, and were carried into Ramfey Bay in the Ifle of Man. Even this inconfiderable action added to the glory of the English arms. None had been better conducted, or fought with greater refolution. This fole infult on our coafts was feverely punished; and not a veffel concerned in it efcaped. The public indeed lamented the death of the brave Thurot, who

*

even whilft he commanded a privateer, fought lefs for plunder than honour; whofe behaviour was on all occafions full of humanity and generofity; and whofe undaunted courage raifed him to rank, and merited diftinction. His death fecured the glory he always fought: he did not live to be brought a prifoner into Engiand; or to hear in France thofe malignant criticisms, which fo often attend unfortunate bravery. This was the fate of the laft remaining branch of that grand armament, which had fo long been the hope of France, the alarm of England, and the object of general attention to all Europe.

In America, the French had no greater reafon to boast of their fuccefs. The action of Sillery only gained them, by an immenfe effufion of their blood, a victory which was attended with no advantageous confequences. Vaudreuil, the governor of Canada, after Levi had been compelled to raise the fiege of Quebec, fixed his head-quarters at Montreal, to make, if poffible, a last stand in that place; for which purpose he called in all his pofts; and here he collected the whole regular force that remained in Canada. At the fame time he fought to keep up the fpirits of the people by various rumours and devices, by which he practifed on their credulity; one of thefe artifices is curiaus enough; the reader will find it among the ftate papers. But Monfieur Vaudreuil's greatest hope was not in his artifices, nor his force, but in the fituation of Canada, which is much harder to be entered, than, when the enemy has entered it, to be conquered. On the fide where the moft confiderable part of the British force was to act,

it