another body who had taken poft near a wood, surrounded them in the fame manner; fummoned and réceived them all prifoners of war. A regiment of the enemy's huffars was entirely cut to pieces. Nothing was wanting to compleat his victory. Elliot's light horie, proud to be led on by the prince himself, and worthy of that honour, had the greatest share of the glory and fufferings of that day. So young a corps had never fo eminently diftinguished itself. No more than 79 of the allies were killed in this action, but of thefe 71 were of this fingle regiment. The numbers of the enemy killed is not known, but for a time the flaughter was terrible. General Glaubitz himself was made prifoner, together with the prince of Anhalt. There were befides 177 officers, and 2482 private men. A greater number of prifoners could fcarcely be expected from a victory in a general engagement. The trophies were nine pair of colours, and fix pieces of cannon. In all the Petite Guerre of this campaign (and the campaign between the French and the allies was almoft wholly made up of fuch) this was by far the most brilliant action; and alone might have eftablished the reputation of the hereditary prince, if any thing had been wanting to establish him the first man of his age in that fpecies of war, He returned to the camp of Saxenhaufen, without moletation, having fully revenged the affair of Corbach. Prince Ferdinand did not remain long after this action in his camp at Saxenhaufen. By fo advanced a pofition, the landgraviate, and even Hanover, lay too open to the enemy's incurfions. He therefore took his camp at a place called Kalle, in a fituation nearer to Caffel. On this M. Broglio formed a plan, which the greatness of his army in fome fort enabled him to execute. The chevalier de Muy, who commanded in the room of the count St. Germain, was ordered to crois the Dymel at Statbergen, with his referve, confifting of 35,000 men, in order to cut of the allies from their communication with Westphalia. Whilft the rest of the French, dividing themfelves into two bodies, moved, the main army under M. Broglio towards duke Ferdinand's camp at Kalle, the referve under prince Xavier of Saxony towards Caffel. Thefe important movements obliged prince Ferdinand to let himfelf alfo in motion; and as he was not in a condition to make detachments of fufficient ftrength, he croffed the Dymel with his grand army, in order to fight the chevalier de Muy. His ferene highnefs formed his main body on the heights of Corbach, and mov- 31 July. ed towards the enemy, who were advantageoufly pofted near Warbourg; in the mean time the hereditary prince, with two columns, wheeled round the enemy's left, and began a vigorous attack at once upon their flank, and upon their rear. The French commander poured reinforcements on that quarter. An hot engagement was there maintained with equal obstinacy for near four hours. Whilft this combat continued with uncertain fortune on the left, prince Fordinand caufed fome bodies to file, off towards the French bridges on the Dymel to their right, by which he propofed to attack alfo on that fide, and intercept them on their re £4 treat; treat; at the fame time the main of his army advanced with the utmost expedition to charge the enemy in front. The French now faw themselves in the most imminent danger of being furrounded. Already their left attacked in flank and rear by the hereditary prince began to give way; his fire became every moment fuperior; and the earliest retreat was the safeft. As foon as prince Ferdinand perceived the enemy to retire, he faw it was abfolutely in vain to think of bringing his infantry upon their front. The English cavalry alfo, upon which he chiefly confided, was too diftant to give almost any hope that they could be made to act. But the English cavalry outdid his expectations, and indeed all former examples. They confidered themselves as defrauded of their fhare of the glory of Minden : and they panted for an occafion of fignalizing their courage; and their commanders, lord Granby and gen. Moftyn, forwarded their ardour, knowing that great actions are commonly tranfgreffions of ordinary rules. They came up five miles on a full trot, (the Germans called it a gallop) without being blown, without the leaft confufion or diforder, and attacked the enemy's cavalry and infantry feveral times. The greated part of the enemy's horfe fell back and did not ftand the charge. The English artillery were brought up with the fame furprifing quicknefs, and employed with the fame powerful effect. Captain Phillips had done more with artillery than had been thought poffible at Minden; and he exceeded it at Warbourg. The English foot vied with the cavalry and artillery, and made fuch earnest efforts to come to action, that in ftraining their paffage thro'moraffy ground and in burning down on their march. But they weather, feveral foldiers dropped were too late to engage, and probably in their wafted coudition it was well that it fo happened. retreat towards Statberg; feveral The French made a precipitate were drowned in pafling the Dymel; battle, as many were made prifon1500 were left on the field of ers. taken; but they confoled themTen pieces of cannon were felves in having loft no colours. The lofs of the allied army in general has not been, that I can find, published. in killed, wounded, and mifling, That of the English chiefly on them, and the killed was 590; but then the battle lay included in that number were but about 130. clofe on the heels of the former, So brilliant a fuccefs following raised the reputation of the allied tage might have well been expected arms. As confiderable an advanfrom it; but according to the ufual play of fortune' in this war, the firft account that followed the defeat of fo large a part of the French army, was, that with a rapid and unrefifted tide of fuccefs they had reduced Caffel, Eimbach, and Ziegenhayn; by which they became mafters of the whole landgraviate of Heffe; that they had puthed into the king's territories, feized upon Gottingen and Munden, and threatened Hanover itself, In short, almoft the worft confequences which could have arifen from a defeat followed a victory; and whilft in England we gave a loofe to our joy on the fuccefs of our arms, the French were taking the mott important places of our allies. The The fact was, that prince Ferdihand must have been fenfible, that, in quitting his camp at Kalle, and taking poft to the northward of the Dymel, he in a great measure laid open Caffel and the whole territory of Heffe to the French; nay, that by this movement nothing was left to hinder their entering the Hanoverian dominions on the right of the Wefer. But, notwithstanding thefe risks, the ftep he took was prudent, and even neceffary. Had he fuffered the progrefs of the chevalier de Muy on the Dymel; had he permitted him to ftrengthen his pofts upon that river, his communication with Weftphalia had been inevitably cut off, and of courfe his fphere of fubfiftence greatly ftraitened. It would have had a worse effect. For he must have entirely loft the command of the Wefer, without which he could not have ftood his ground a moment; and he would on that lofs have found himfelf compelled to retire into the heart of Hanover, where he muft neceffarily be ftraitened in his winter cantonments, and where a blow of any confequence must be decifive against him. He therefore fought the battle of Warbourg, though he loft all Heffe by his victory; and he would not quit his pofts on the Dymel though he faw Gottingen and Munden in the hands of the French. He was not to be frighted from his fteady and well-chofen plan, by vain rumours or threatening appearances. He was by no means in a condition to make large detachments; it was therefore neceffary to facrifice fomething; and he made the fmalleft facrifice that cir- . cumftances would admit. For he forefaw that the French army, whilft he kept his poffeffion on the Dymel, could not poffibly take up their quarters in Hanover, or even act there in any confiderable body, and for any confiderable time, without fubjecting themselves to the fame or greater inconveniences, than thofe to which he would have been himself liable, had he in defending Heffe fuffered them to occupy thofe critical pofts on the Dymel. He knew farther, that it would prove extremely dangerous for them to hazard themselves beyond Gottingen; and that it would be more difficult for the French army to fupport themselves in that advanced poft, than for him to annoy them there. It is poffible that reafons fomewhat like the foregoing, together with others probably far more cogent, might have determined that great commander to this conduct. But whilft he fecured that middle communication, and acted upon the defenfive plan, the troops were not idle; his detachments acted in many parts with fpirit and effect. But we muft defer for a while the narrative of thefe actions, being called from this part of the theatre to the eastern parts of Germany, where about this time fcenes of greater eclat were opened. CHAP CHAP. VI. Laudobn blocks up Schweidnitz. Ruffians enter Silefia. March of the King of Pruffia from Saxony to Lignitz. Junction of the Auftrian armies in Silefia. The Ruffians pass the Oder. Plan of M. Daun. Laudobn defeated near Lignitz. Daun forms the blockade of Schweidnitz. Compelled to raise it. Action between General Hulfen and the army of the empire. Intercepted letter from the King of Pruffia to the Marquis d'Argens. FR ROM the time that the king of Pruffia found himself compelled to raise the fiege of Drefden, it was evident that he could have no hope of acting in Saxony to any good purpose. The bufy part of the campaign came on faft. Tho' prince Henry had obliged Laudohn to retire from Breslau, that general, able and lately victorious, was Rill formidable; he kept Neiffe and Schweidnitz blocked up; and waited to effect a junction with the Ruffians, by which he proposed to give the final blow to the king's power in Silefia. The Ruffians had now actually arrived in the frontier parts of that province, and wanted but a very few days eafy march to complete that fatal and long-dreaded junction. At the fame time another body of Ruffians had penetrated into Pomerania; laid all the defenceless parts under contribution, and threatened the fiege of Colberg. The Swedish army, faid to confift of 22,000 men, commenced alfo, tho' with lefs vigour, their operations. In all that country the king of Pruffia had not 5020 men to oppose them. In thefe circumftances a plan of mere defence would have proved altogether without effect. The king of Pruffia had but two armies; and it was neceffary that one of them, at least, should make the moft rapid and fudden movements to oppofe fo many combinations. On the fide of Silefia the danger feemed most preffing, and accordingly he marched to its relief; advanced near two hun-30th July. dred miles, and left marfhal Daun, who had confiderably the start, far behind him. This march would have been thought an aftonishing exploit in a partizan at the head of a fmall and difencumbered corps; but that a numerous army, clogged with its artillery, with above two thoufand waggons, fhould in that time traverse such a space, fhould pafs the Elbe, the Spree, the Neitle, the Quefs, and the Bober, five confiderable rivers; that they should effect all this, with one army of the enemy on one fide of its flanks, another behind, and with a third in its front (the actual pofition of the Auftrians in Lufatia) was an action referved for, and only to be expected from the king of Pruffia. The attempt itself could have been juftified only by neceflity; and the neceflity was urgent. The Ruffians approached, M. Daun followed, towards Silefia; and the king could hardly promife himself fuccefs but from a march of fuch rapidity as might enable him to try his fortune with general Laudohn, before the triple junction he apprehended had made his enemies irrefiftible. But notwithstanding the hopes conceived from this march, before the king could come to an action three bodies of Auftrians had joined, Laudohn's, Daun's, and Lacy's; and extending themselves along the Katibach, a river which falls into the Oder, occupied all the ground from Parchwitz to Coffendau, a space of little lefs than thirty English miles. But in this extent, their pofts were every where ftrong, and their communications eafy. The king's camp was at Lignitz. It was in vain that for feveral days he attempted, by various devices, to detach one body of the enemy from the reft, or to turn their flanks, and attack them at difadvantage. The nature of the ground or the kill of the oppofite generals always difappointed him. At length M. Daun took himself the offenfive party. The advantage of his fituation, and the fuperiority of his numbers, prevailed over his cautious nature to risk an attack. It was therefore refolved, after the fituation of Lignitz had been well reconnoitred, all circumftances maturely weighed, and the defign communicated to the other generals, to attempt the king of Pruffia in his camp, with the united strength of the three armies. To enfure fuccefs beyond a doubt, it was determined that this attempt fhould be made by furprife, and therefore in the night. M. Daun remembered the bad guard which had been kept by the Pruffians; and the advantage, which in the year 1758 he derived from a nightattack at the battle of Hochkirchen. In confequence of this plan the whole army, as foon as it should begin to grow dark, was to march from their feveral pofts to fuch fituations as were marked out for each corps; they were to ftrike. their tents, but yet to keep up the fires in their camps, and to have the drums beat the tattoo as ufual. Some time after marfhal Daun had began to move, to his aftonishment the patroles he had fent out returned with the account, that they had met no out-poft. As foon as day broke, and the army had advanced, their apprehenfions were confirmed. They were difappointed in their defign, there was no enemy in the camp; but when they caft their eyes from thence, they could perceive at a distance the rifing of a thick smoke, which left them no room to doubt that their fortune was then on the point of decifion, by a part of their forces only, and that the king and baron Laudohn were on that moment hotly engaged: Daun could only look on and wait the event. On the 13th of July the king was in his camp at Lignitz, when he received advice that the Ruffian army of 24,000 men, under count Czernichew, had thrown bridges over the Oder, at a place called Auras, and that they were to pafs the river on that very day. He fufpect ed alfo, that the enemy had formed the defign of a general attack. Troops which have been a long time opposed to each other, can reciprocally guefs at each other's defigns; the method ufed by the enemies generals grows familiar, and the leaft motion they make ditclofes their defigns. This is the account the Pruffians gave of the means by which they came to a knowledge of M. Daun's, projects. The Auftrians attributed this difcovery, not to the Pruflian fagacity, but to intelligence given. by deferters. What |