Page images
PDF
EPUB

contract of employment, the wages of a laborer, not exceeding $100, are due and payable, he has the right to demand and receive them, notwithstanding his employer has been garnisheed. In a garnishment proceeding on a judgment against a laborer, it appeared that, when the writ was served, the garnishee, his employer, owed him $31, one month's wages; and that when the writ was returnable and the garnishee answered, three months afterwards, there was due him $121.10. Held, that the entire sum was exempt to such laborer, under this subdivision. (Supreme Court, 1895, Chapman et al. v. Berry, 18 Southern Reporter, 918.)

One who contracted to build a house for a fixed price, and who employed others to work under him, though he did part of the work himself, is not a laborer within this section, which exempts a certain sum from the wages of every laborer or person working for wages. (Supreme Court, 1895, Heard v. Crum, 18 Southern Reporter, 934.)

MISSOURI.

REVISED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 42, ARTICLE 2, SECTIONS 2627, 2627α, AND 2628.-Railroads-Blocking of frogs, switches, and guard rails. (a)

[The following decision related to sections 2627 and 2628 of the Revised Statutes of 1889, enacted by the legislature at the extra session of 1887; by act approved March 26, 1891, page 81, acts of 1891, the legislature enacted sections 2627 and 2627a on the same subject, which sections were not affected by the decision; the decision can not, therefore, apply to them, but only to section 2627 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 as it stood prior to the legislation of 1891, and to section 2628:]

Section 2628 is unconstitutional, the subject thereof not having been specially designated as one of the subjects to be acted on, in the governor's proclamation calling the extra session of 1887, in which said section was enacted, and it is not rendered valid by the mere fact of its insertion by the revision committee in the revision of 1889. The subsequent approval by the governor of the act enacting this section is not a valid substitute for his initiative required by the constitution. (Supreme Court, 1892, Wells v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 110 Mo. 287; 1893, Bowen v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 118 Mo., 541.)

REVISED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 115, ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 7058 TO 7060.— Payment of wages. (b)

[ocr errors]

Sections 7058 and 7060 are void, being class legislation, and violative of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law." (Supreme Court, 1893, State r. Loomis et al., 115 Mo., 307.)

REVISED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 115, ARTICLE 2, SECTIONS 7061 to 7077a.— Mine regulations and inspection. (c)

Under sections 7074 and 7076, giving to a person injured a right of action for damages caused by any willful failure of an "owner, agent, or operator" of any mine to keep a sufficient supply of timber, when required, to be used as props to protect the workmen in such mine, knowledge on the part of the owner that the props were necessary is essential to a recovery by the injured person.

The duty enjoined by section 7076 was intended to secure the health and safety of the persons employed in the mines, no matter by whom employed. The rela tion of master and servant is not, therefore, necessarily involved, nor the principles governing that relation. For the safety of the operatives the statute requires certain precautions to be observed by the "owner, agent, or operator," and liability is confined to such persons.

The actual owner of the property has the right to transfer to another the occu pancy and proprietorship of the mine by lease, or other contract and thus relieve himself from the duties imposed; he can not, however, be permitted to relieve himself of this statutory duty, and at the same time retain any joint occupancy or proprietorship of the mines. To relieve himself, he must part with all immediate proprietorship and occupancy of the mine and control of its operation. (Supreme Court, 1892, Leslie v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Company, 110 Mo., 31.)

A person employed as a cager in the bottom of the shaft of a coal mine is within the protection of sections 7066 and 7074, requiring the owner, agent, or operator

a See Law, page 579. b See Law, page 589.

c See Law, page 590.

of such mine to provide safe means of lowering and hoisting persons in a cage covered with boiler iron, and giving a right of action for injury to the person occasioned by any willful violation of the act or willful failure to comply with any of its provisions.

Mere knowledge by the plaintiff of the failure of the defendant to have the mine provided with the protections required by law will not defeat an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such failure. (Supreme Court, 1888. Durant v. Lexington Coal Mining Company, 97 Mo., 62.)

By section 7066, the owner, agent, or operator of every coal mine is required, under penalty, to provide a cage for lowering into and raising from the coal shaft the men engaged in digging the coal, provided with spring catches, to arrest the rapid descent of the car. By section 7063, it is declared that the term "owner" shall mean the immediate proprietor, lessee, or occupant of any coal mine, or any part thereof. Held, that the object of this section was to extend the ordinary meaning of the term "owner" so as to make it, for the purpose in view, apply to a party operating the mine under contract with the actual owner. But this will not acquit the actual owner who has engaged another to open his mine, reserving to himself the obligation and burden of furnishing the operating machinery, and to this extent the relation of master and servant exists between him and an employee of the person operating the mine under contract. As to that part of the machinery which the owner of the property is to furnish, the doctrine of respondeat superior must necessarily exist for the proper protection of the employee. (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1886, Fell v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Company, 23 Mo., Appellate Reports, 216.)

REVISED STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 163, SECTIONS 8569 TO 8576.-Trade-marks of trades unions, etc. (a)

This act prohibits the unauthorized use of a label adopted by a union of cigar makers and furnished to the various cigar manufacturers employing only members of the union in the manufacture of the cigars, to designate that the cigars were manufactured by members of the union. Said act does not violate section 53 of article 4 of the constitution, which prohibits the legislature from granting to any corporation or association any special right, privilege, or immunity. To warrant a conviction under this act proof of guilty knowledge on the part of defendant must be shown. (Supreme Court, 1895, State v. Bishop, 31 Southwestern Reporter, 9.)

ACTS OF 1893, PAGE 187.—Protection of employees as members of labor unions. (b)

This act, in making it unlawful for an employer to prohibit an employee from joining, or to require an employee to withdraw from, a trade or labor union or other lawful organization, violates the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and section 30 of article 2 of the constitution of the State, declaring that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and also section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting any State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is also unconstitutional as being special or class legislation. A citizen can not be deprived of a right secured by the constitution by a statute passed as a police regulation. (Supreme Court, Division No. 2, 1895, State v. Julow, 31 Southwestern Reporter, 781.)

ACTS OF 1895, PAGE 150.-Sunday labor-Barbers. (b)

This act, making it a misdemeanor to carry on the business of barbering on Sunday, violates section 53 of article 4 of the constitution of the State, prohibiting a special law where a general law can be made applicable. Barbering is laboring within section 3852 of the Revised Statutes. (Supreme Court, 1896, State v. Grauneman, 33 Southwestern Reporter, 784.)

[The three following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

A writer, signing himself chairman, sent the following notice to the various foremen of the chops of the Wabash Railway Company during a strike organized

a See Law, page 597.

b See Law, page 604,

to resist a reduction of wages, the railroad being at that time in the hands of a receiver appointed by the United States circuit court:

[ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

"You are requested to stay away from the shop until the present difficulty is settled. Your compliance with this will command the protection of the Wabash employees. But in no case are you to consider this an intimidation."

Held, that this was an unlawful interference with the management of the road by the receiver, and a contempt of court, for which the writer should be punished. (United States Circuit Court, Western District, 1885, In re Wabash Railway Company, 24 Federal Reporter, 217.)

The facts seem to be that certain persons while engaged in a strike against the Missouri Pacific Railroad interfered with the management and control of the engine and freight cars under the control of the receivers of the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway, and prevented the agents and employees of said receivers from operating portions of the property of said Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway in their custody, by spiking and blocking the tracks, drawing water from engines, inciting the agents and employees of said receivers to quit work, and threatening them with violence if they continued in the service of the receivers. The engine and cars of the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway, the operation of which was obstructed, were at the time in the yards of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, certain of whose employees were engaged in a strike. An order was issued on two prominent strikers to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt in interfering with property in the hands of the receivers of the court. As a result of the hearing they were found guilty of contempt and punished therefor. In its opinion the court held as follows: When the employees of a railroad company whose property is in the custody of the court, by concert of action quit work and take possession of and obstruct the movement of engines and cars on the tracks of said company, and while so doing also take possession of or obstruct the operation of engines or cars in the custody of receivers of the court, it is the right and duty of the court to punish such latter acts as contempt of its authority. If a party engaged in a lawful undertaking unintentionally interferes with or obstructs the officers of the court in the discharge of their duties, the court is not tenacious of its prerogative; but it is otherwise where parties, while engaged in an unlawful act, obstruct the officers of the court, although intending no contempt. The court is open to hear any just ground of complaint against its receivers. Employees of the receivers may present their grievances, and the court will instruct its officers in the premises. For this reason the court will be prompt to punish men who interfere with its receivers in the custody and control of property committed to them by law. A simple "request" to do or not to do a thing, made by one or more of a body of strikers under circumstances calculated to convey a threatening intimidation, with a design to hinder or obstruct employees in the performance of their duties, is not less obnoxious than the use of physical force for the same purpose. A "request" under such circumstances is a direct threat and an intimidation, and will be punished as such. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District, 1885, In re Doolittle et al., Strikers, 23 Federal Reporter, 544.)

A court of equity may interfere by injunction to prevent persons from attempting by intimidation, threats of personal violence, and other unlawful means, to force employees to quit work and join in a “strike."

While equity will never interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, it may enjoin an act which threatens irreparable injury to the property of an individual, though such act may also be a violation of a criminal law. (Supreme Court, 1895, Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company v. Saxey et al., 32 Southwestern Reporter, 1106.)

MONTANA.

CODES AND STATUTES, SANDERS' EDITION, 1895, CIVIL CODE, DIVISION I, SECTION 905.-Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (a)

Under this section, a railroad company is liable for an injury inflicted in Montana, to a fireman in its employment on one train, caused by the negligence of a conductor in its employment on another train in leaving a switch open, although it would not have been so liable under the general [common] law. (United States

a See Law, page 623,

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1894, Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Mase, 63 Federal Reporter, 114.)

In an action against a railroad company for injuries received by a fireman on a locomotive in a collision with another train, it is no defense that the negligence of the conductor of the latter train, in passing a station without stopping for orders, caused the collision, since he is the representative of the railroad in charge of the train, and not a fellow-servant of the employees on either train. Nor is the engineer in charge of the engine on which plaintiff was fireman a fellow-servant of plaintiff, and that his negligence caused the collision is no defense to the action. The conductor is the superior of the fireman on the other train within the meaning of the above section. (United States Circuit Court, District of Minnesota, 1889, Ragsdale v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 42 Federal Reporter, 383.) Under this statute, both the conductor and engineer of a railroad train are the superiors of a brakeman on the same train, so as to render the railroad company liable for injuries to the brakeman caused by the negligence of the conductor or engineer. (Supreme Court, 1895, Crisswell v. Montana Central Railway Company, 42 Pacific Reporter, 767.)

[The following decision was not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, is here included:]

Upon a petition to the supreme court of Montana to issue a writ of mandamus to compel an interstate railroad company, the employees of which had gone out on a general strike, to operate its line within the State, the petition alleging that "sufficient competent, skillful, and experienced men are available, ready, and willing to serve said company in the operation of said road for reasonable compensation," the court refused to issue the writ, the decision being as follows:

"It is therefore proposed that this court shall inquire and determine what would be a schedule of reasonable wages for a corps of skilled and unskilled employees necessary to operate said railway, and then ascertain whether the requisite number of employees can be procured at the wages determined, and, if that fact is found to be true, as alleged, then command the operation of said railway under the penalties attached to disobedience of the writ of mandamus.

Those questions mentioned must be determined by the court upon the proper inquiry whether the respondent should answer and traverse the allegations of the petition or no, because the court, before sending forth this extraordinary writ, will, by careful inquiry, become satisfied of its own jurisdiction, and that the conditions are such that the act commanded is feasible of performance.

"If the proposed scheme is feasible, and the court has jurisdiction to carry it out, it evidently affords a remedy going far toward the solution of a problem of great moment to all parties concerned. But, aside from the relations of this property to interstate jurisdiction, as shown by the averments of the petition, already asserted by the United States courts to some extent, the difficulty is that this court does not at present possess jurisdiction for the arbitrament of the question involved, as aforesaid, and, having ascertained what is just in the premises, to enforce the same upon contending parties.

The time may come when the State-that is, the National Government-by reason of its interstate jurisdiction, may, by proper provisions of law, come into the attitude of permanent trustee of such property so vitally related to the welfare of the whole people, instead of the occasional exercise of trusteeship by receivers, when the property has become financially swamped; and then the proper courts will be empowered to interpose an equitable authority in a threefold direction for the orderly correction of abuses existing towards employees and investors (minority as well as majority stockholders) of the vast capital involved in such property, and also toward the public as patrons thereof. For the reasons suggested, we must deny this application. The cases called to our attention lead to this conclusion also." (Supreme Court, 1894, State ex rel. Haskill v. Great Northern Railway Company, 14 Mont., 381.)

NEBRASKA.

COMPILED STATUTES OF 1881, SEVENTH EDITION, 1895, PART I, CHAPTER 86, SECTIONS 5163, 5191, AND 5196 To 5202.-Convict labor-State penitentiary. (a) Section 5 of chapter 66, acts of 1895 [section 5202], providing for the leasing of the convict labor until the last day of the next session of the legislature, is not

a See Law, page 643,

within the title of said act, to wit: "An act to annul a contract between the State of Nebraska and W. H. Dorgan, alleged assignee of C. W. Mosher, for leasing the penitentiary, penitentiary grounds and convict labor of the State of Nebraska, and to appropriate the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars or so much thereof as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this act, and to repeal all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act," and is therefore in conflict with the provision of section 11 of article 3 of the State constitution, requiring the subjects of acts to be clearly expressed in their titles. It is apparent from the whole of said act, including the title and preamble, that the words, "for leasing the penitentiary, penitentiary grounds and convict labor," as employed in the title thereof, are descriptive merely of the contract referred to, and do not embrace a separate and distinct subject of legislation. (Supreme Court, 1896, State ex rel. Leigigh v. Holcomb, 65 Northwestern Reporter, 873.)

COMPILED STATUTES OF 1881, SEVENTH EDITION, 1895, PART I, CHAPTER 90— CHAPTER 54, ACTS OF 1891.-Hours of labor. (a)

Sections 1 and 3 of this act are unconstitutional, first, because the discrimination against farm and domestic laborers is special legislation; second, because by the act, the constitutional right of parties to contract with reference to compensation is denied. It being apparent, from an inspection of the entire act, that sections 1 and 3 thereof formed an inducement to its passage, no part of said act can be sustained as constitutional. (Supreme Court, 1894, Low v. Rees Printing Company, 41 Nebr., 127.)

COMPILED STATUTES OF 1881, SEVENTH EDITION, 1895, PART II, CODE of Civil PROCEDURE, TITLE 14, SECTIONS 6120 TO 6123.-Assignment, etc., of claims to avoid effect of exemption laws as regards wages, unlawful. (b)

This act is not in conflict with the constitution of Nebraska, either as being broader than its title or as being prohibited class legislation; neither is it in conflict with section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, requiring that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. (Supreme Court, 1894, Singer Manufacturing Company v. Fleming, 39 Nebr., 679.)

Where there were due a resident of Nebraska, from a railroad company operating a line of railroad through Iowa and Nebraska, wages, which, in Nebraska, were exempt from execution and attachment process, but which, nevertheless, by means of an assignment of the claim against the party entitled to such exemption, to a resident of Iowa, were procured, by the garnishment of said railroad company in Iowa, to be applied to the payment of said claim, the assignor of such claim is liable to such debtor for the amount so appropriated without his consent.

As between said assignor and the party entitled to the benefits of such exemp tion in Nebraska, the proceedings in Iowa were in no sense res adjudicata. (Supreme Court, 1893, O'Connor v. Walter, 37 Nebr., 267.)

[The two following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

The defendants, to the number of eighteen, were engaged by the plaintiff as journeymen tailors to do tailoring work for the plaintiff by the piece. They conspired together to stop work simultaneously, and return all work in an unfinished condition. On the 31st of March, 1876, they did stop work, and returned to the plaintiff various and numerous pieces or jobs of work (garments) in an unfinished state, which were entirely worthless in such an unfinished condition. Plaintiff could not get any workmen to finish said jobs, to plaintiff's damage, etc. Held, that the above facts were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for conspiracy and damages. (Supreme Court, 1879, Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Nebr., 390.)

A contract was signed by an employee of a railroad company, upon becoming a member of a relief department, organized and conducted by said railroad company, to the effect that, if he should be injured and receive moneys from the relief fund of said relief department on account thereof, the acceptance of such relief funds should operate as a release of said employee's claim against said railroad company for damages because of such injury. Held, that such contract of an employee did not lack consideration to support it; that the promise made by the employee to the relief department for the benefit of the railroad company was available to b See Law, page 646.

a See Law, page 645,

« PreviousContinue »