A laborer, discharged by his employer, for good cause, before the expiration of his term of service, is entitled to recover his wages up to the time of his discharge. Article 2748 pronounces no forfeiture against the party giving the other just cause of complaint. (Supreme Court, 1842, Nolan v. Darks, 1 Robinson, 332.)

Under article 2749, which is held to apply to all persons except menial servants, the right of action of a pilot, who has been discharged “without any serious ground of complaint," for his wages for the full term for which he was employed, accrues immediately upon his discharge, and the prescription of one year against his suit will commence when the right of action has accrued. (Supreme Court, 1857, Shoemaker v. H. & L. Bryan, 12 La. Annual, 697.)

Where one who has employed another for a limited time at a salary, discharges the employee before the expiration of the time, for a good cause, he is responsible to the employee for his services up to the time of his discharge. (Supreme Court, 1859, Kessee v. Mayfield & Cage, 14 La. Annual, 90.)

This article is in the nature of a penal statute, must be strictly construed, and can not be applied to the case of a contract for letting and hiring entirely unperformed in all its parts. In such case only the actual damages sustained by reason of the nonperformance of the contract can be recovered. (Supreme Court, 1861, Trefethen v. Locke, 16 La. Annual, 19; Word v. Winder, 16 La. Annual, 111.)

Where a person has hired his services for a fixed period, and he leaves his employer before the expiration of that period, he can not recover wages for the period which he has served, without showing that he had a just cause of complaint against his employer. (Supreme Court, 1866, Callehan v. Stafford, 18 La. Annual, 556.)

An overseer who has made a contract with the proprietor to manage his plantation for the term of one year, at a fixed price, on being discharged without any good and sufficient cause, before the expiration of the time, can recover the amount of the contract for the whole year. The custom of the neighborhood will not protect the planter against the legal consequences of the violation of his contract with the overseer. (Supreme Court, 1870, Jones v. Jackson, 22 La. Annual, 112.)

The obligations between employer and laborer on a plantation are reciprocal. If the employer discharge the laborer before the time of his engagement has expired, without any just cause, he at once incurs the liability of paying the laborer for the whole time of his engagement. On the contrary, if the laborer. leaves his employer before the time of his engagement has expired, without any just cause, he thereby forfeits all the wages that may be due him, and contracts the obligation to return all moneys that he may have received from his employer on account of such employment. Therefore, if the evidence shows that the laborer left his employer without any just cause before the time of his engagement had expired, he can not recover from the employer any wages for the time he has served. (Supreme Court, 1871, Bartell v. Lallande, 23 La. Annual, 317.)

A merchant who has engaged the services of a clerk to aid in carrying on his business is not liable to an action in damages by his clerk for simply taking a partner in the business, nor is he liable to such action because he has changed somewhat the character of his business from that of a wholesale notion store to that of a wholesale dry goods store. A clerk who has quit his employer under such circumstances without showing any good cause therefor can recover neither wages nor damages. (Supreme Court, 1872, Levy v. Friedlander, 24 La. Annual, 439.)

A clerk or bookkeeper employed in a store by the year who has been discharged before the term of his employment has expired, for good and sufficient cause, can only recover wages up to the time of his discharge. (Supreme Court, 1872, Griffin v. Haynes; 24 La. Annual, 480.)

Insubordination and disrespectful conduct of the employee toward his employer is a sufficient ground for his discharge and the rescission of the contract of employment. Where an agent, or other employee, has a term of service fixed by the contract of employment, he can not be discharged without just cause before the term has expired; and if so discharged without just cause, he can recover for the whole term. Where a member of a firm, by unjust provocation and insult, goads an employee of the firm into the use of disrespectful and contemptuous language toward himself, the firm can not make such language the just cause of a dismissal of the employee. (Supreme Court, 1882, Railey v. Lanahan & Son, 34 La. Annual, 427.)

Under these articles a discharge for good cause disentitles the party discharged for wages for a longer time than he served. Gross inattention to and nonperformance of duties, or conduct such as to endanger the control of the hands and drive them away, and thus entail irremediable loss, conjoined with sickness, which incapacitates him for service, will justify the discharge of an overseer. An overseer's wages can not be docked for sickness unless the same be stipulated expressly. Protracted sickness may be sufficient cause for discharging him, but so long as he remains in employment, he is entitled to his wages. (Supreme Court, 1884, Miller v. Gidiere & Marmande, 36 La. Annual, 202.)

In a contract of employment for one year at a stipulated annual compensation, an express proviso reserving to the employer the right to discharge at any time, if dissatisfied with the manner in which the employee performs his duties, is a valid and legal agreement which the courts must enforce and takes the case out of article 2749 of the civil code. The employer has no right to discharge, prior to the end of the term, for any other cause than because he is dissatisfied; and if it appears that the discharge was for other cause, as for instance, because his services were no longer needed in the business, or because the employer wished to reduce the number of his employees, or the like, and that the alleged dissatisfaction was a mere pretext, the employer would be held responsible. But where, as in this case, the evidence satisfactorily shows that the dissatisfaction was the true cause of the discharge, the employer is exempted from responsibility. (Supreme Court, 1884, Hotchkiss v. Gretna Ginnery and Compress Company, 36 La. Annual, 517.)

A person employed, eo nomine, “as a sugar broker," but who stipulates and consents to receive an annual fixed salary in lieu of commissions, and agrees to effect sales of sugar and molasses that are to be consigned to his employer, and for no one else, and obliges himself to exert all his personal influence to promote the interest of his employer, and to write all letters concerning the sugar and molasses market for his employer, and to make out account sales for sugar and molasses in the transactions made by him, is a clerk, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. Such a person is properly classed as a laborer, within the meaning of this article, and if turned away by his employer without sufficient cause, he is entitled to make claim for the whole of the salaries he would have been entitled to receive, had the full term of his service arrived. (Supreme Court, 1893, Tete v. Lanaux, 45 La. Annual, 1343.)

ACTS OF 1890, ACT No. 138.-Enforcement of labor contracts. (a)

Section 1 of this act is null and void, being in conflict with article 29 of the constitution. The title of the act refers to labor contracts. The body of the act refers to any contract. (Supreme Court, 1892, State ex rel. Lewis v. Pierson, Judge, 44 La., 90.)

ACTS OF 1894, ACT No. 139.-Board of arbitration and conciliation. (b) The distinguishing features of this statute are that an investigation may be held without the consent of all parties (1) on application of employers or employees or the latter's duly authorized agent; (2) on notification from the mayor or a district judge in the parishes that a lockout or strike is seriously threatened. It devolves upon the board, in the first instance, to pass upon questions of regularity and compliance with the statute vel non, in those steps taken to bring labor troubles to its notice. The board is authorized to hear the parties, make inquiry into the causes of trouble, advise the parties, and keep a record of their decision regarding the causes of dispute. They are not bound in all things to decide according to technical rules of law that would possibly determine issues in a court of justice, but they are subject to the terms of the statute under which the board was organized, and they are bound to observe those broad rules of law and equity without which no board of arbitration and conciliation can make a just decision. Objections upon grounds of irregularity must be urged before the board, and heard contradictorily with parties concerned, or their duly authorized representatives, prior to application to the courts to correct alleged errors. Apprehension that the conclusion and decision of the board will be erroneous is not ground for an injunction. Injunction will not issue for the purpose of controlling the action of public agents, acting under legislative authority, unless irreparable injury is evident. (Supreme Court, 1895, New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Company v. State Board of Arbitration, 17 Southern Reporter, 418.)

a See Law, page 383.

b See Law, page 386.

MAINE.

REVISED STATUTES OF 1883, CHAPTER 82, SECTION 43.-Hours of labor. (a,

Ten hours constitute a legal day's work in a grist mill where the labor is hired at a per diem compensation, payable weekly, this not being an agricultural employment, nor a monthly hiring.

For work done at the request of his employer, by a laborer so hired in a grist mill, after the completion of his day's labor the law implies a promise of payment, which may be enforced by suit after the stipulated compensation for the day labor has been paid and accepted. (Supreme Court, 1872, Bachelder v. Bickford, 62 Me., 526.)

ACTS OF 1887, CHAPTER 139.-Employment, hours of labor, etc., of women and children. (b)

The refusal and neglect of the employer of labor in a manufacturing or mechanical establishment to produce certificates of the ages and places of birth of children under 16 years of age, employed in such establishment, for the inspection of the deputy commissioner of labor, is not an interference with his duties within the meaning of this chapter. The term interfere as therein used relates to some action directed to the person, or some active personal obstruction or interference in the performance of his duties, and not mere nonaction. (Supreme Court, 1891, State v. Donaldson, 84 Me., 55.)

MARYLAND.

CODE OF PUBLIC GENERAL LAWS, 1888, ARTICLE 23, SECTIONS 14, 15, 37, AND 38.Incorporation of cooperative associations, trades unions, etc. (c)

Section 37 of this article, authorizing the formation of trades unions, etc., does not sanction the making of war on the nonunion laboring man, or the illegal interference with his rights and privileges. A labor organization which refuses to admit a nonunion man to membership, and informs his employers that in case he is any longer retained it will be compelled to notify all labor organizations of the city that their house is a nonunion one, and thereby compels his discharge, is guilty of a wrongful act; and an action will lie against it by the nonunion man for the damages he has suffered in consequence of such discharge. Where the work of the nonunion man was entirely satisfactory to his employers, who intended to retain him permanently, and he was discharged solely because of the notice received from the labor organization, the fact that his employer reserved the right to discharge him at the end of any week will not prevent him from recovering damages from the organization for maliciously and wantonly procuring his discharge. (Supreme Court, 1893, Lucke v. Clothing Cutters and Trimmers' Assembly, No. 7507, Knights of Labor, of Baltimore, 77 Md., 396.)

CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS, 1888, ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 185 TO 189.--Payment of wages. (d)

These sections are a valid exercise of power by the legislature and do not conflict with article 9 of the Code of Public General Laws relating to the assignment of choses in action. These sections were not intended to restrict nor do they restrict the powers of the employees of a corporation engaged in mining and manufacturing in Allegany County and employing more than ten hands, so as to prevent their assigning what was due them from the corporation by orders drawn on the corporation in favor of merchants who had sold them goods, said orders speci fying that the amounts due the merchants should be deducted from moneys due the employees by the corporation for wages, and be paid to the merchants for their account, and authorizing the merchants to receipt in the employees' names for the amounts so paid, and which orders were accepted by the corporation. This law being penal, and intended to be in the interest of the employee, is not restrictive of the employee's rights, except in so far as it prevents him or the holder of his assignment of wage from colluding with the employer to do what the law has forbidden any corporation as is therein described from doing. (Court of Appeals, 1880, Shaffer v. Union Mining Company, 55 Md., 74.)

a See Law, page 392.
b See Law, page 398.

c See Law, page 406.

d See Law, page 417.

CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS, 1888, ARTICLE 4, SECTIONS 402 TO 405.-State board of commissioners of practical plumbing. (a)

A person who has not been examined, and registered as a practical plumber in the books of the State board, under the provisions of these sections, may engage in the plumbing business, make contracts for furnishing all the necessary materials and doing all the necessary work in plumbing, provided he does not personally perform any of the manual work of plumbing, but employs other persons to do it, who are duly examined and registered plumbers, holding the certificates of competency required by these sections. (Court of Appeals, 1893, Davidson v. State, 77 Md., 388.)

MASSACHUSETTS.

PUBLIC STATUTES OF 1882, CHAPTER 112, SECTIONS 143, 145, AND 147.-Suits for Wages-Railroad employees, (b)

These sections, as applied to future contracts, are constitutional. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1877, Hart v. Boston, Revere Beach and Lynn Railway Company, 121 Mass., 510.)

Where a person worked on a railroad in the employ of two different contractors, it was held that he could not secure a right of action under these sections against the owner of the railroad for labor performed by him for both contractors, by a statement thereof filed within thirty days after he had ceased to labor for one contractor, but more than thirty days after he had ceased to labor for the other. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1879, Lyon v. New York and New England Railway Company, 127 Mass., 101.)

PUBLIC STATUTES OF 1882, CHAPTER 112, SECTION 212.-Railroad companies— When liable for death of employees. (c)

The transfer from a vessel, to cars, of freight to be forwarded, is a railroad operation, within the meaning of this statute as amended by chapter 243, acts of 1883, providing that a "corporation operating a railroad" shall be liable for negligence resulting in the death of an employee. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1888, Daley v. Boston and Albany Railroad Company, 147 Mass., 101.)

In an action under this section, against a railroad company for causing the death of an employee through the negligent employment of an incompetent locomotive engineer, there was no evidence of the engineer's incompetency aside from the single act of negligence of his causing the death, and it did not appear that his conduct and appearance as a witness before the jury were such as to justify such inference. Held, that the company could not be said to have been negligent in employing the engineer in that capacity, and that a verdict was properly directed for the defendant. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1890, Peaslee v. Fitchburg Railway Company, 152 Mass., 155.)

Chapter 270 of the acts of 1887 can not be invoked to relieve a case brought under this section, from the defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant. Section 2 of said chapter 270, which gives a remedy to the widow or next of kin, instead of to the administrator, where death results without conscious suffering, must be held to be exclusive as to cases of death where the aid of the statute is invoked. Under this section [212] an action can not be maintained for the death of an employee caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1891, Dacey v. Old Colony Railway Company, 153 Mass., 112.)

[See case of Lynch v. Boston and Albany Railroad Company, on page 1290, post.] ACTS OF 1884, CHAPTER 313.-Conditional sale of personal property. (d) This chapter, providing that all contracts for conditional sales of "furniture or other household effects" shall be in writing, and that a copy of the contract shall be furnished to the vendee, applies to the sale of a piano. This chapter, providing that where, for the breach of a contract of conditional sale, the vendor takes the

a See Law, page 420.
b See Law, page 430.

c See Law, page 431.

d See Law, page 438.

goods, he shall furnish to the vendee a statement of the amount due thereon, and that the vendee may redeem the goods within fifteen days after such statement is furnished, is not waived by an express power in the contract permitting the vendor to retake the goods. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1896, Lee v. Gorham et al., 42 Northeastern Reporter, 556.)

ACTS OF 1886, CHAPTER 120.—Railroads-Blocking of frogs, switches, and guard rails. (a)

If an employee of a railroad corporation is injured by having his foot caught in a frog in the track of another railroad corporation, while engaged in delivering a car to the latter upon its tracks in the regular course of business between the two corporations, it is a question for the jury, in an action against the last-named corporation for the injury, whether the defendant was negligent in leaving the frog unblocked, there being evidence that the defendant had assumed the duty of blocking all the frogs, and keeping them blocked, for the safety of its own employees, as required by this statute. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1893, Turner v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 158 Mass., 261.)

ACTS OF 1887, CHAPTER 270.-Liability of employer for injuries of employees. (b)

Section 1, clause 1, of this chapter does not give a right of action against an employer by an employee for injuries sustained through the negligence of a fellowservant in handling or using a machine, tool, or appliance, which is in itself in proper condition.

A declaration, in an action to recover for such an injury, alleged that the plaintiff and K., both journeymen painters, and employed by the defendant in painting a house, were furnished by him with a hanging stage, each being intrusted with the duty of caring for and fastening to the house his particular end of the stage; that when it became necessary to lower the stage, according to the usual method of managing such stages, K. had charge of lowering one end, and the plaintiff the other; and that, after so doing, K. neglected to fasten his end securely, so that the plaintiff, who was in the exercise of due care, fell and was injured. Held, that the negligence alleged was the negligence of a fellow-servant in handling or using a proper stage, and that the action was not maintainable under the statute. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1888, Ashley v. Hart, 147 Mass., 573.)

The notice, required by section 3 of this statute, so far as applicable to a cause of action under section 1, clause 1, applies only to cases, if any, within that clause, in which there is no common-law right of action, unless a plaintiff with a remedy at common law should insist upon relying upon the statute alone. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1889, Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass., 190.)

This chapter is not a bar to an action at common law, in those cases within its terms, in which an employee might have maintained such an action before its passage. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1889, Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass., 190, and Coughlin v. Boston Tow Boat Company, 151 Mass., 190; Supreme Judicial Court, 1890, Clark v. Merchants and Miners' Transportation Company, 151 Mass., 352.)

-A servant who, of his own motion, and outside the line of his regular duty, attempts to repair machinery, the dangers from which are obvious, and is injured, can not invoke this chapter in support of an action against his master, although he was in the exercise of due care. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1890, Mellor v. Merchants' Manufacturing Company, 150 Mass., 362.)

A freight brakeman upon a railroad, being orderd generally by the conductor of a train to do the coupling as it was being made up about noon on a clear day, attempted to couple from the north side of the track two flat cars loaded with sticks of timber, which on that side dangerously projected toward each other beyond the ends of the cars, and, his head being caught between the ends of two of the timbers as the cars came together, he was instantly killed. He might have coupled them in safety either from the south side of the track, where the timbers did not project, or by stooping down below the projecting timbers. Held, in an action against the railroad under section 2 of this chapter, for causing his death, that he was not in the exercise of due care within the meaning of section 1, and that the action could not be maintained. (Supreme Judicial Court, 1890, Lothrop v. Fitchburg Railway Company, 150 Mass., 423.)

a See Law, page 441.

b See Law, page 445.