The laws of many of the States forbid its use. By a decision of Mr. Wells, the Dairy and Food Commissioner, the use of salicylic acid in foods is prohibited in Pennsylvania.

I wish to call attention here to another fact in connection with the use of salicylic acid, which is of extreme importance, viz.: the sale of preservalines, preservatives, etc., under various high sounding names, intended for use in private families. A number of these, claimed to be perfectly harmless, are on the market, but actually contain salicylic acid as the main ingredient. The conscientious and careful housekeeper should put an absolute veto upon the use of any such compound. There is rarely any need for them, since when pure fruits and vegetables are used, and the proper directions for sterilizing by heat, etc., are carried out, canned or preserved goods of all descriptions can be prepared that will remain in good condition for years without the aid of any preservative. Of the more common food-stuffs still to be considered, are:

VINEGAR, BEER AND WINE.

All three of these are extensively adulterated. With vinegar, the main form of adulteration is the addition of water and the consequent lessening of the acidity and of the total solids which a standard vinegar contains. In Pennsylvania the standard for cider vinegar is an acidity of 4 per cent. and 2 per cent. of solids. Besides this practice, the sale of spirit vinegar, colored with caramel, for pure cider vinegar, is very common, and in fact until the enforcement of our stringent law, there was very little pure cider vinegar on the market. White wine vinegar is likewise frequently a delusion. In its place there is sold the distilled vinegar obtained from grain. This grain or spirit vinegar, even when sold for what it is, is frequently adulterated by the addition of water. The vinegar law, as at present constituted, makes no standard for any vinegar other than cider vinegar, and hence it is impossible to define what constitutes a standard spirit vinegar. This feature of the law makes the entire statute very objectionable, and it is probable that at the present session of the Legislature a new law, drafted by Deputy Commissioner Moore, of the Food Department, will be introduced to remedy this evil.

Regarding wine and beer, but little can be said at present. In this State no standards have been set up as to what shall constitute the pure article. If beer and other malt beverages should consist solely of the product of malt and hops, then the addition of burnt

sugar, licorice, treacle, quassia, coriander and caraway seed, cayenne pepper, soda, salicylic acid, salt, grains other than barley malt, is certainly adulteration.

It is

Wine has been adulterated from the very earliest times. hardly necessary for me to say that the same condition of affairs exists to-day. Fortification with alcohol, the use of coloring principles, the addition of acids, and even worse forms of adulterationsuch as the addition of refuse matter that will ferment—are frequently resorted to. The entire subject of liquid food and nour ishment offers a very fertile field for investigation by the authorities, and must eventually end in the framing of a law which will define what shall constitute adulterations in these articles.

Before bringing this lecture to a close, I trust you will allow me a few minutes for a discussion of the Pure Food Law as it exists in Pennsylvania. Nineteen months have passed since the law was framed, and in that time it has met supporters and detractors without number. Reputable merchants, as a rule, have given it their support and have endeavored to conduct their business according to its requirements. Of all the blows which have been levelled at it, possibly the worst, so far as immediate results are concerned, is the recent decision of Judge Hemphill, of Chester County, declaring the law unconstitutional. In order to appreciate this decision. more thoroughly, permit me to quote a few passages of the act of June 26, 1895, entitled "An act to provide against the adulteration of food, and providing for the enforcement thereof." Section I of this act reads: "Be it enacted, etc., that no person shall, within this State, manufacture for sale, offer for sale or sell any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this act.”

Section 2 reads: "The term food, as used herein, shall include all articles used for food or drink by man, whether simple, mixed or compound-"

Section 3 reads: "An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act

"(a) In the case of food: (1) If any substance or substances have been mixed with it so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity. (2) If any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it. (3) If any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it. (4) If it is an imitation of or is sold under the name of another article. (5) If it consists wholly or in part or a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected.

tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not, or in the case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal. (6) If it is colored, coated, polished or powdered, whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is. (7) If it contains any added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health: Provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if each and every package sold or offered for sale be distinctly labelled as mixtures or compounds and are not injurious to health."

Judge Hemphill's decision of the unconstitutionality of the law rested on Clause 2 of Section 3, which refers to the substitution wholly or in part of any inferior or cheaper substance for the food in question. The learned Judge contended that substitution was not the same as adulteration, and since there is no mention of substitution in the title of the act, the act violated the organic law of the Commonwealth, which requires the particulars of any section of an act to be nominated in the title. Unfortunately for the Pure Food Law, there is hardly any question that Judge Hemphill is correct from the legal standpoint, and the case offers but another illustration to many that have gone before of slipshod methods of legislation notwithstanding the presence of considerable legal talent in our legislature. Unquestionably, this section of the act will require revision and amendment.

*

Possibly other sections may require similar treatment. For example, Section 2 states that "the term food as used herein shall include all articles used for food or drink by man." * * This section is a counterpart of the English law on the subject, and yet in England it has been decided that under this clause baking powders could not be included. Judge Hawkins, in rendering his decision, stated that "the mere sale of an article, not in itself an article of food, even though it be sold in the knowledge of the vender, that it is the buyer's intention to mix with it the ingredients of which an article of food, e. g., bread, is to be composed, is no offence under Section 3, and it makes no difference, in a legal point of view, that when sold it is mixed with other ingredients not in themselves hurtful, some or one of which might in an unmixed state be used as articles or an article of food, if the injurious and harmful articles are so inseparably mixed and in such quantities as that the mixture as a whole forms an injurious compound which

no one would dream of using as a food." Referring to the baking powder in dispute, Judge Hawkins said: "Who would venture to describe such a mixture (sodium bicarbonate, 20 per cent.; alum, 40 per cent.; ground rice, 40 per cent.), as the food of man? With equal truth might not powder composed of poison mixed with flour be called food for man because pure flour is used? Possibly it may be said that the injurious ingredients, when mixed with other materials of which an article of food is composed, becomes a part and parcel of such article, but that is no argument against the vender of such injurious ingredient, unless such injurious ingredient can be treated as an article of food at the time of the sale. That is the moment when the test of its character is to be applied, and if it is not then an article of food, no offence is committed by the vender of it, though the purchaser or any one who afterwards mixes it with an article of food intended for sale, would be guilty of an offence."

This is but one illustration, but it suffices to show that astute legal minds could possibly detect other flaws in our present law. For this reason, it is well that decisions such as Judge Hemphill's should see the light of day; for, while their immediate effect is baneful, their ultimate outcome will mean the revision of the law in such a form that it will be impregnable.

Aside from the possible flaws, the law as it stands has received opposition from other sources. The manufacturer, the dealer and the retailer has each, in his turn, found some clause that was obnoxious, some section that interfered with his business interests. Without going too minutely into details, it is conceded even by those who recognize the beneficial value of a pure food law for the honest tradesman, and notwithstanding the liberal policy that has been the invariable rule of the Dairy and Food Commissioner, that it is an impossibility to comply with the letter of the law in its present form. If it were the retailer only who complained, or the dealer, or the manufacturer, or any two of these, it might be supposed that any existing fault in the law would be special in its nature. The fact that the complaint is general, leads to the inference that the fault is organic.

To my mind, the inherent error of the law lies in the absence of a thought which should always be present in legislation of this kind, the underlying idea that a distinction must be made between adulteration that is the result of fraud or negligence and that which arises notwithstanding the fact that every possible precaution to

prevent it has been exercised; in other words, the distinction between adulteration wilfully and deliberately planned, and adulteration the result of an accident beyond the power of man to prevent. Countries older in food legislation than we are have recognized this distinction, and have incorporated it in their laws and even in the punishment imposed for their infraction. In Germany, for example, where every detail of food adulteration has been worked out to a nicety, and where the punishment imposed for the violation of the statutes is severe, the law distinguishes between adulteration prejudicial to health and that which is not. In the latter case, it is first necessary to establish guilty knowledge on the part of the vender before punishment can be imposed. Where substances injurious to health are used, punishment is imposed; and should death result from the use of such substances, the imprisonment may be for a term of five years. In the case, however, where the toxic nature of the substance was known to the vender, the punishment is imprisonment for ten years, and in case of the death of the user, the seller may be imprisoned for life.

After what has been mentioned, it will hardly be profitable to discuss more thoroughly our food law or its administration. The authorities, as must be plainly seen, have no volition in the matter, but are compelled to enforce the law and to prosecute adulterations under the law, as defined in the act which regulates the duties of the Commissioner. Possibly no better proof of the inadequacy of the law could be given than the fact that, notwithstanding the exceptionally humane policy of the Commissioner, and his desire to be not only just but merciful in his decisions, the law has in several cases been a positive source of injury to unintentional offenders, who desired nothing more than to be honest and conscientious in their dealings.

But little more remains to be said. As to what shall constitute the responsibility of the State and the duty of the individual must be left for a more explicit law to decide. In general, it may be stated that the State must eventually recognize that its responsibility does not end with a mere police surveillance and the means necessary to accomplish this one function. It will finally be seen that it is within the province of the State to branch out on the broader lines of educating the community up to the standard which it imposes in its laws. That this will entail expense is without question, but this is a problem that will not admit of the consideration of cost. For the proper development of a food law