rier, unless he shows it was done by the king's enemies, or by such act as could not happen by the intervention of man; as storms, lightning, and tempests. If an armed force come to rob the carrier of the goods, he is liable *; and the true reason is, for fear it may give room for collusion, that the master may contrive to be robbed on purpose, and share the spoil; in this case it does not appear but that the fire arose from the act of some man or other; and it certainly did arise from some act of man, as it is expressly stated not to have happened through lightning; the carrier therefore in this case is liable, inasmuch as he is liable for inevitable accident. 1 Term Rep. 27. 33, 34.

But if a common carrier who is employed to carry goods to A, with directions to forward them from thence to another place by the first conveyance, accordingly carries them safe to 4, his responsibility as a carrier there ends; and if they are afterwards destroyed before another carrier arrives to take them in, by a fire happening in his warehouse, he shall not be answerable for the loss; for in keeping the goods in the warehouse, which is for the convenience of the owner, and not of himself, he is a mere warehouse-man, in which character he is not liable, unless guilty of lachess. Garside v. Trent Naviga tion, 4 Term Rep. 582.

But in another case of Hyde and another v. the Trent Navigation, Mic. 34 Geo. 3, where it appeared that the company, as common carriers from A to B, undertook not only to carry, but to deliver the goods at B, and charged a certain sum of mo. ney for the whole expense of carrying and delivering, including a charge for the cartage of the goods from a warehouse where they usually unloaded, at B, to the consignee's house in the same town-These goods having been destroyed in the warehouse by an accidental fire, it was held by the court that. the company were liable to answer for the goods so destroyed; although the warehouse did not belong to them, but to an. other person,who had the whole of the profits arising from the cartage; for it is like the case of an innkeeper, who agrees with his head ostler that the latter shall supply the customers with post-horses; in which case, if goods be lost, the innkeep er is liable, because he holds himself out to the public as the responsible person, and his engagement with his servant cannot vary the contract between him and the public. So in this case, the person nominated by the company, and intrusted with the delivery of the goods, must be considered as the servant of the company; and as such, the goods were still, in contemplation of law, in the custody of the company as carriers, at the time when the fire happened. 5 Term Rep. 389.

* Even though the force be ever so great; as if an irresistible molitude of people rob him (2 Ld. Rayməna 913.); and he instanced the riots in 1768.

common carrier to exempt himself by a special acceptance, from the responsibility cast upon him by the common law, for a rea sonable reward, to make good all losses, not arising from the act of God, or the king's enemies. Lyon v. Mills, 5 East's Rep. 428. 1 Smith's Rep. 478.

Therefore in an action against a carrier, where the goods were spoiled by water, the defendant proving, that when the goods were put on board, the ship was tight, and that the hole through which the water came had been made by a rat, eating out the oakum, this was holden to be no excuse. Buller's Nisi Prius 70.

And in the case of Forward v. Pitward, M. 26 Geo. 3, which was an action on the case against the defendant as a common carrier, for not safely carrying and delivering the plaintiff's goods, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on the following case; "The defendant was a common carrier from London to "Shaftesbury: on Thursday, 14th October, 1784, the plain"tiff delivered to him on Weyhill, twelve pockets of hops, to "be carried by him to Andover, and to be by him forwarded "to Shaftesbury by his public road-waggon, which travels. "from London through Andover to Shaftesbury: by the course "of travelling, such waggon was not to leave Andover till the Saturday evening following: and in the night of the follow"ing day, after the delivery of the hops, a fire broke out in a booth, at the distance of about 100 yards from the booth in "which the defendant had deposited the hops, which burnt for "some time with unextinguishable violence; and during that "time communicated itself to the said booth in which the des "fendant had deposited the hops, and entirely consumed them, "without any actual negligence in the defendant; the fire was "not occasioned by lightning :" THE QUESTION before the court was, WHETHER a carrier was liable for the loss of goods, oc casioned by fire, without any negligence in him, or his servants? And after an elaborate argument, Ld. Mansfield delivered the unanimous opinion of the court: after stating the case, he said, that it appears from all the cases for 100 years back, there are events for which the carrier is liable, independent of his contract. By the nature of his contract he is liable for all due care and diligence; and for any negligence he is suable on his contract: but that there is a further degree of responsibility by the custom of the realm, that is, by the common law, for a carrier is in the nature of an insurer; and it is laid down, that he is liable for every accident, except by the act of God, or the king's enemies. Now the act of God means something in opposition to the act of man: for every thing is the act of God that happens by his per mission; every thing by his knowledge. But to prevent litigation, collusion, and the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to be unravelled, the law presumes against the car

rier, unless he shows it was done by the king's enemies, or by such act as could not happen by the intervention of man; as storms, lightning, and tempests. If an armed force come to rob the carrier of the goods, he is liable *; and the true reason is, for fear it may give room for collusion, that the master may contrive to be robbed on purpose, and share the spoil; in this case it does not appear but that the fire arose from the act of some man or other; and it certainly did arise from some act of man, as it is expressly stated not to have happened through lightning; the carrier therefore in this case is liable, inasmuch as he is liable for inevitable accident. 1 Term Rep. 27. 33, 34.. But if a common carrier who is employed to carry goods to A, with directions to forward them from thence to another place by the first conveyance, accordingly carries them safe to A, his responsibility as a carrier there ends; and if they are afterwards destroyed before another carrier arrives to take them in, by a fire happening in his warehouse, he shall not be answerable for the loss; for in keeping the goods in the warehouse, which is for the convenience of the owner, and not of himself, he is a mere warehouse-man, in which character he is not liable, unless guilty of lachess. Garside v. Trent Navigation, 4 Term Rep. 582.

But in another case of Hyde and another v. the Trent Navigation, Mic. 34 Geo. 3, where it appeared that the company, as common carriers from A to B, undertook not only to carry, but to deliver the goods at B, and charged a certain sum of mo. ney for the whole expense of carrying and delivering, includ ing a charge for the cartage of the goods from a warehouse where they usually unloaded, at B, to the consignee's house in the same town-These goods having been destroyed in the warehouse by an accidental fire, it was held by the court that the company were liable to answer for the goods so destroyed; although the warehouse did not belong to them, but to an other person,who had the whole of the profits arising from the cartage; for it is like the case of an innkeeper, who agrees with his head ostler that the latter shall supply the customers with post-horses; in which case, if goods be lost, the innkeeper is liable, because he holds himself out to the public as the responsible person, and his engagement with his servant cannot vary the contract between him and the public. So in this case, the person nominated by the company, and intrusted with the delivery of the goods, must be considered as the servant of the company; and as such, the goods were still, in contemplation of law, in the custody of the company as carriers, at the time when the fire happened. 5 Term Rep. 389.

Even though the force be ever so great; as if an irresistible multitude of people rob him (2 Ld. Raym na 919.); and he instanced the riots in 1780.

Another question in the same case was, Whether a carrier, who undertakes to deliver goods generally, at such a place, is bound to deliver them to the individuals to whom they are di rected in such a place; or whether he does not satisfy his engagement merely by taking them to the inn or other place where he happens to put up ?--This however was not expressly decided, as the defendants had here actually undertaken to deliver the goods. But Ashhurst, Buller, and Grose, Judges, inclined to the opinion that a carrier is bound to deliver the goods to the person to whom they are directed; for it was said, that although the law which makes carriers answerable, is a hard law, yet it is founded on wisdom, and was established to prevent fraud; but that it would be of little importance to determine that carriers were liable as insurers, unless they were also bound to see that the goods were carried home to their place of destination; since as many frauds might be practised in the delivery as in the carriage of them: for in general the carrier appoints a porter, for the purpose of delivering the goods; but it would be open to an infinity of frauds if the carrier could discharge himself of his responsibility by delivering them to a common porter, a person of no substance, a beggar, of whose name the owner of the goods never heard, and against whom, in the event of the goods being lost, there could be no substantial remedy: the person who actually delivers the goods must be considered as the servant of the carrier; and although it may be the practice of many persons to send to the inn for their goods, yet that does not prove that the carrier is not bound to deliver them if they do not send; if the owner chooses to send for his goods that merely discharges the carrier from his liability in that case, it only dispenses with the general obligation thrown by the law upon the carrier; but it does not apply to other cases where that obligation is not dispensed with. 5 Term Rep. 396. 399.

Goods delivered to a carrier's porter, appointed to take in Delivery of goods, is a delivery to the carrier; and, if lost, an action lies goods to the against the master, and it must be brought against him, and carer's book keeper. not against his book-keeper; for he must answer for all the neglect of those under him, though he should expressly caution against it. Alleyn 93. 2 Mod. Rep. 309. 2 Barnard. K. B. 231. 1 Salk. 18.

If the carrier ask what is in the box, and is told silk, yet in Imposition on truth if there be money, he shall be answerable for it if lost, the carner, unless he made special acceptance+; but this intended cheat upon

Lord Kenyon, Ch. J. rather inclined to a contrary opinion,

As if the carrier had told the owner that it was a dangerous time, and if there was money in it he durst not take charge of it, and the owner had answered as before, this matter would have excused the carrier,

the carrier will be a good reason for the jury to give less da mages. Alleyn 93. Buller's Nisi Prius 70.

And it so as now settled, that without a special acceptance the carrier shall be liable, for in Titchburne v. White, King Ch. J. laid it down, that if a box is delivered generally to a carrier, and he accept it, he is answerable, though the party did not tell him there was money in it: but if the carrier asks, and the other says no, or if he accepts it conditionally, provided there is no money in it; in either of these cases the carrier is not liable. 1 Strange 145.

But if a bag sealed be delivered to a carrier, and said to contain 2007. and the carrier give a receipt for so much, when in fact it contains 400/. if the carrier be robbed, he shall be answerable only for 2001.: for his reward extends no farther, and it is that which makes him liable. Carthew 485.

And where the common carrier gives notice, that he will not be answerable for the loss of goods, above a certain value unless paid for accordingly, he shall not be liable for their loss, unless they are so paid for: for where an action was brought against the proprietors of a stage coach for not safely carrying 100%. delivered to their book-keeper in a bag, from B to L; on the trial it appeared, that the money was put into a bag, and carried by the plaintiff's servant to the defendant's house, and there delivered to their book-keeper, who asked no questions about the contents of the bag, but took it as a common parcel, and was paid for it as such by the servant, who gave him no information about it; the money was lost, and the defendants proved that an advertisement had been put into the county news-papers once every month, for two years together, concerning the carriage of parcels by this coach, with a notice that they would not be an. swerable for any money, plate, jewels, writings, or other va luable goods, unless they were entered as such, and paid for accordingly: the court held, that the defendants were not liable 'to answer for this money: for a carrier is only liable in respect of the reward which he receives and in the present case, there was a full proof of a special acceptance, and a deceit on the part of the plaintiffs: for it is not necessary that there should be a personal communication, in order to make a special acceptance; for if each party knows the other's mind, in any manner, that is sufficient. Gibbons v. Payton and another, Buller's Nisi Prius 71.

And where a carrier gives notice to his customers that he will not be accountable for any parcel of more than 5l. value unless entered as such and paid for accordingly, if a parcel be sent above that value, without being entered and paid for as such, and it be lost, the owner is not entitled to recover any thing, not even to the amount of the 5. Izet v. Mountain, 4 East's Rep. 371.