the business for seven years, though he has not served an apprenticeship, he ought to be acquitted. 3 Bacon's Abridg. 552. But this is to be understood if the defendant hath followed the trade seven years as a master, without any prosecution against him with effect. Wullen v. Holton, Baller's Nisi Prius, 800. edit. 193. It seems agreed that the following a trade within this statute must be such whereby the party gets his livelihood; and that therefore the using of the trade of a brewer, baker, cook, taylor, and the like, in one's own house, or in the private family of another, without any reward, is not within the statute. 11 Co. 54. And it will not exempt the master if he be unqualified, for that the journeyman hath served seven years; for on a special verdict in Hobbs v. Young, the case appeared to be, that the defendant was a Turkey merchant, and exported woollen manufacture into Turkey; that he employed clothiers, who had served apprenticeships to work the cloth in his own house, at his own charge, and with his own materials ; AND the court held that the defendant was the trader in this case, because he employed the rest who were bat as servants; they held likewise that this was a trading within the statute; for whether the utterance be within the realm, or in Turkey, is not material. 2 Salkeld 610. So if a man keeps journeymen shoe-makers to make shoes for exportation, this is an exercising the trade of a shoe maker within this statute. Carthew, 164. Also if a coach maker keeps servants to make his wheels, and workmen to curry his own leather, this is against the statute, because it is he only who receives all the profits of the several trades, and the wheel-wright and the currier are but his servants. Curther 163. Shower 267. But one not qualified to exercise a trade himself by having served an apprenticeship, entering into co-partnership with a qualified person, and only sharing the profits, and standing the risques of the partnership without ever interfering in the trade personally, is not within the statute. 1 Burrow's Rep. 2. Noris a journeyman within the statute, for there is a great difference, between setting up a trade and working in it ; for a man may work it by doing a very trifting part: but the act meant to prevent persons from setting up the trade, being unqualified for it; or employing unqualified persons: and does not mean to give a penalty against both; a journeyman does not exercise the trade; the spirit of the act means to prevent the master only from setting up the trade, himself being unqualified; or en ploying unqualified persons; but it was not intended against th_journeyman himself. Per Ld. Mansfield in Beach v. Turner, 4 Gurrow's 2150, It seems formerly to have been an objection, that the But none but what were trades at the time of making the statute are within it; therefore it ought to be averred in the declara tion or indictment, that it was a trade at the time of making the t; and it is a good exception in arrest of judgment that it is not so averred, unless it be a trade within the very words of the act; and then no such averment is necessary. K. v. Monro, H.3 Geo. 2. Buller's Nisi Prius, 8vo. edit. 192. It hath been resolved, that there is no occasion for an actual What shall be binding, but that the following a trade for seven years is a suf- deemed service ficient qualification within the statute; therefore an indictment Sufficient. 1 as quashed because it only said, he had not served as an ap prentice within England or Wales; for it may be he did so beyond sea, and if it were any where it is sufficient. 1 Salkeld, 67, and 2 Salk. 613. So it hath been held, that serving five years to a trade out of England, and two in England, is suflicient to satisfy the statute; but that there must be a service of a full time either in England rout of England; and therefore serving five years in a country, where by the law of the country more is not required, will not qualify a man to use the trade in England. Cases L. & E. 70, and 3 Keble's Rep. 550. In an action qui tam for exercising a trade, the question rose, What should be a service? On which Holt, Ch. J. cited a tase between Hopkins and Young, in B. R. on a special verdict, where it was adjudged, that if a person serve seven years the exercise of his trade to any person exercising that trade, though that person have no right to use that trade, yet being Employed in it seven years that shall be a good service, though he were not an apprentice: and he said, that he had holden that a woman marry a tradesman, and be employed therein seven *Bat in corporations it does: See K. v. Seymour in n. p. 173 supra. VOL, I. N years, and then the husband die, she may use that trade after her husband's death; and also if she marry a second husband she may continue to exercise that trade; and if she die, her hus band may continue to exercise it, provided he were employed in the exercise of it seven years in his wife's lifetime: he said he had mentioned all these opinions of his to the rest of the judges who all concurred. Peaks and Johnson, 1 Ann. Salk. Mss. Buller's Nisi Prius, 8vo. edit. 139. And on an information against a person for exercising the trade of a baker, contrary to the statute, it appeared in evidenc that he had followed it twelve years, but never had been an ap prentice, nor served with any person as such. On a case re served, Baron Adams, before whom it was tried, consulted th eleven judges; who all joined with him in opinion, that exer cising a trade seven years without any prosecution with effec was a sufficient qualification. Wallen qui tam v. Holton. 1 Blac Rep. 233. See the same case mentioned in Buller's Nisi Pria 8vo. edit. 193. And it seems that such persons may exercise several trade where they have served as apprentices, or followed them f seven years or more*: for in the case of French v. Adums, action of debt was brought upon the statute against the defenda .for exercising the trade of a carpenter, he not having served apprenticeship to that trade. It appeared that the defenda had worked, or served as a servant for seven years in the tra of a glazier, and for some time afterwards exercised that tra as a master that afterwards he exercised the trade of a co penter for the space of nine years; and it was proved that well understood that trade. It was objected that the defend being originally bred up to the trade of a glazier, he could follow two trades, both glazier and carpenter; and whether 'could or not was the question reserved for the consideration the court.-BY THE COURT: All the judges of England, a meeting lately resolved, that if any man as a master had ex cised and followed any trade as a master, without interruptio or impediment for the term of seven years, he was not liable be sued or prosecuted on the statute of 5 Eliz. Also if a r hath followed two or more different trades for the term of se years or more he shall not be liable to be prosecuted on statute for there is no law at this day against one man's foll ing several trades: and without the least doubt, a man may low twenty trades, if he has worked at, or followed each t seven years. 2 Wilson 168. *Therefore all petty chrapmen in little towns and villages are inde fied, because their masters kept the same mixed trades there before. con's Abridgm. 553. The court clearly alluded to the above case of Wellen qui tam v. H which was first reported by Buller, Jus, in his Nisi Prius, AN APPROVER. N approver is an offender, who confesses himself to be guilty of a crime, and appeals or accuses others, his accom. plices, of the same crime; and he is so called, because he must at his peril prove his appeal in every point, for doing which he is pardoned of course. 2 Hawk. c. 24. s. 1. And a man is an approver when being indicted of treason or felony, before competent judges *, and in prison for the same, and capable of being an approver, he confesses the indictment, and is sworn to reveal all the treasons and felonies he knows, and then before a coroner enters his appeal against all that were partners with him in the crime in the indictment, being at the time of the appeal within the realm. 2 Hawk. c. 24. 8. 2. And any one indicted of treason or felony may be an approver, but unless the crime with which a person is charged amount either to felony or treason, he cannot be an apprøver. 2 Hawk. e. 24. s. 10. Nor can he be an approver unless he be actually indicted for it, because his confession amounts not to a conviction until he be indicted, and consequently puts it not in the power of the court to give judgment against him, when his appeal shall be rejected or falsified, as every approvement ought to do.2 Hawk. t. 24. s. 11. And if a person be appealed only and not indicted, he cannot be an approver. 2 Hawk. c. 24. s. 12. Also it is purely in the discretion of the court (whether they will assign him a coroner +, and) admit him to be an approver to appeal or not, or give him any respite from judgment or exe cution upon his confession and approvement, for otherwise it would be in the power of any party arraigned for felony, by becoming an approver, to delay judgment, where, it may be, his appeal is but feigned; for the admission of his appeal or respite of judgment is but a matter of grace and discretion. 2 Hale's Hist. 226. And if on his confession it appears that he is a principal, and tempted the others, the court may refuse and reject him as an approver. Per Ld. Mansfield in Mrs. Rudd's case, Cowper's Rep. 335. Also when he is admitted as such, it must appear that what *The justices of the King's Bench, and justices of goal delivery, and justices in eyre, might admit a man to be an approver, because such justices could assign a coroner; but justices of the peace, or of oyer and terminer, could not *ke cognizance hereof, because they have no authority by their commison to assign a coroner. 3 Inst. 130, and 2 Hale's His. 229. + Per Ld. Mansfield in Mrs. Rudd's case. Accomplices he has discovered is true, and that he has discovered the whole truth. For this purpose the coroner puts his appeal into form ; and when the prisoner returns into court he must repeat his appeal, without any help from the court or from any bystander. And the law is so nice, that if he vary in a single circumstance the whole falls to the ground, and he is condemned to be hanged; if he fail in the colour of a horse, or in circumstances of time, so rigorous is the law, that he is condemned to be hanged; much more if he fails in essentials; the same consequences follow if he does not discover the whole truth: and in all these cases the approver is convicted on his own confession. A further rigorous circumstance is, that it is necessary to the approver's own safety that the jury should believe him; for if the partners in his crime are not convicted the approver himself is executed. Per Ld. Mansfield in Mrs. Rudd's case. Cowper's Rep. 335. For the condition of his pardon has failed, viz. the convicting of some other person, and therefore his conviction remains absolute. 5 Black. Com. 330. The approvement is also, as it were, equivalent to an indictment, since the appellee is equally called upon to answer it, and if he hath no reasonable and legal exceptions to make to the person of the approver, which are very numerous, he must put himself upon his trial, either by battle, or by the country; and if vanquished, or found guilty, must suffer the law, and the ap prover shall have his pardon ex debito justitiæ. 4 Black. Com. 330. But great inconvenience arose out of this practice of approvement: more mischief happening to good men, by these kind of approvements, by false accusations of desperate villains, than benefit to the public by the discovery and convicting of real offenders, wherefore the course of admitting of approvers hath long since been wholly disused, and the doctrine on this subject is become a matter more of curiosity than use. 2 Hale's Hist. 226. However, notwithstanding the disuse of the practice of aphow entitled of provement, all the good that ever could be expected to result right to a par- therefrom may still be obtained; for accomplices may, at this day, be received to give evidence, and thereby be entitled to a pardon. FIRST, if they come in under the express provisions of certain acts of parliament; and convict other offenders. don. SECONDLY, if they surrender themselves, and comply with the terms of any special proclamation by the king, promising a par don. THIRDLY, in analogy to the ancient law of approvement, a practice has been introduced, whereby an accomplice will be entitled to a recommendation to the king's mercy, but not to a pardon as of legal right; namely, where an accomplice, having nade a full and fair disclosure of the truth is in consequence |