'cause thereof; and the said writing, so being made and enrol'led by the clerk of the peace, or town clerk, amongst the re esquires, justices of our said lord the king assigned to keep his peace in and for the and determine divers felonies, trespasses, WHEREAS A A, son of F A, of the parish of in the -aforesaid, gentleman, was by indenture tri county of partite, bearing date the said county of our lord day of in the year of in the bound an apprentice to M M, of tanner, for the term of years from the day of then last past, to learn the trade or mystery of a tanner; AND WHEREAS the said A A, the ap. prentice aforesaid, hath made complaint unto this court, that the said M M had misused and evil intreated him the said A A, being such apprentice as aforesaid, that is to say, that he the said M M had on divers days and times, during such apprenticeship, violently and cruelly beat and whipped him the said apprentice with certain sticks and. whips; and the said apprentice hath also informed us by the said complaint, that the said M M his said master on those days and times shut up, confined, and kept him the said apprentice in a certain room, parcel of the dwelling house of him the said master, situate at- aforesaid, for several hours together, without giving or affording to him the said apprentice, or permitting him to have sufficient meat, drink, and food for his nourishment and support during those times; and now upon the said master's and apprentice's personal appearance in open court, and on a full hearing of the said complaint, upon the oath of the said apprentice duly made here, and having duly examined into the circumstances thereof,and maturely considered the same in open sessions here; it appears to us, that the said complaint is true, and we do adjudge the same to be true. IT IS THEREFORE ordered by this court, and we the said justices now assembled in open court, do hereby order and declare, by virtue of the statute in such case made and provided, that the said A A shall be, and he is hereby discharged of and from the said apprenticeship; any thing contained in the said indenture to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding: and it further appearing unto us the said justices, that the said M M hath received the sum of-from the said F A, as a consideration for his teaching his said apprentice the said trade of--and for providing for him during the said term, meat, drink, washing, and lodging; WE DO THEREFORE FURTHER ORDER, that the said M M do pay back to the said 'cords that he keepeth, shall be a sufficient discharge for the said 6 apprentice against his master, his executors and administrators, the indenture of the said apprenticehood, or any law or custom to 6 the contrary notwithstanding; and if the default shall be found 6 to be in the apprentice, then the said justices, or the said mayor, or other head officer, with the assistance aforesaid, shaft 'cause such due * correction and punishment to be ministered unto him as by their wisdom and discretion shall be thought 'meet.' s. 35. And if any apprentice of husbandry, or of any occupation aforesaid, unlawfully depart into any other shire, the justices, mayors, or head officers, may grant writs of capias, directed to the sherius, or other head officers of the places whither he shali dee, to take his body, returnable before them, so that if he come by such process, he be put in prison till he find sure'ty to serve his master " 5 Eliz. c. 4. s. 47. And now the justices have, in all cases whatever where an offender escapes into another county, a more compendious and convenient mode of proceeding. For by 24 Geo. 2. c. 55, In case any person, against whom a warrant is issued, shall go into any other county, out of the jurisdiction of the justice granting such warrant, the constable, having the warrant indorsed by a justice in such other county, may apprehend him there, and carry him before the justice who 'indorsed the warrant, or any other justice of that county, who ' is to admit the offender to bail, if bailable ; and if he is not bailable, or doth not find bail, the constable is to carry him before a justice of the county where the oflence was committed.' Upon the construction of the statute of 5 Eliz. c. 4, the fol lowing points have been determined. 1. The justices of the peace may discharge an apprentice not only on the default of the master, but also on his owa default. 2 Keble 541. 2. But the master cannot compulsively, and of his own au * From a reasonable construction ofthese words, it seems that the justices may by their discretion commit the apprentice to the house of correction, there to se kept to hard labour, or corrected according to the circumstances of the case, FA the sum of being part of the said consideration money, as a compensation for the deficiency, as well of the instruction of the said apprentice, as of his maintenance for the residue of the said term. IN WITNESS Whereof, we the said justices (being all of the quorum) have in open sessions aforesaid hereunto set our hands and seals; the day and year first above written. What appren. tices may be discharged. thority discharge an apprentice: he must proceed regularly, under the several statutes in that behalf made. 3. It was formerly holden that the jurisdiction of the justices herein only extended to such apprentices as were bound to trades within the statute*, and were compelled by them to serve; for that in such case it was but reasonable that the contract which was made by their authority should be dissolved by the same power, but they could not discharge any voluntary agreements made between the parties. 3 Bacon's Abridg. 550. Thus where an order of sessions was made to discharge a surgeon's apprentice from his master for not instructing him in the art of surgery, it appearing that the master, being a mountebank, kept the apprentice for a tumbler on the stage, the order was quashed for want of jurisdiction in the justices, because, though it comes under the terms of arts and mysteries, yet, it is not one of the trades mentioned in 5 Eliz. c. 4; and here it was held, that the justices have power only over such apprentices who are bound to the trades therein named, and not over apprentices to other trades. Mic. 7 Will. 3. K. v. Gately. 2 Salkeld 471. Upon this case it is observable, that the court were first of opinion, that the clause of the statute relating to the discharge of apprentices was general, and extended to all manner of apprentices, even to those of merchants; but afterwards changed that opinion, and determined otherwise, as above stated. e; Afterwards, in Hil. 12 Ann. upon an order of sessions for the discharge of an apprentice to a glass-bottle maker, an exception was taken that it was not a trade within the statute: but by Sir Thomas Parker, Ch. J. If it was a new question, I should have thought it was confined to such apprentices only as were bound by the authority of the justices; but it has been extended farther, to any trade which at that time had been used then within some market town. And per Eyre, J. it has been extended farther than to trades which were exercised at that time. Q. v. Dalloe. 1 Sess. Cases. 52. p. 54. And in Mic. 12 Geo. 1. an exception having been taken to an order of sessions, that the justices could not discharge the apprentice, because the trade to which he was bound, viz. a glazier, was not within the statute, it was not allowed; and the court said, that though formerly it was held, the trade ought to be a trade within the statute, yet the later resolutions have * 5 Elix. c. 4. According to the rule: Nihil tam conveniens naturali æquitati, unumquodque dissolvi eo ligamine quo ligutum est. In Hilary v. Hawkesworth, Hil. 21 and 22 Car. 2, The court said the statute includes all apprentices. 2 Keble 592, and in Watkins v. Edwards, Mic 23 Car. 2, Twisden, Jus. said that the clause extended to all ap prentices. Hale, Ch. J. doubting, 2 Keble, 822. been otherwise; and K. v. Taunton, 6 Geo. 1, was cited, where it was held, the trade need not be a trade within the statute, in the case of How, an apprentice. K. v. Collingbourn, 2 Lord Raymond 1410. Strange 663. 1 Sess. Cases, Ca. 223. p. 285. From hence, therefore, it seems to be now settled by an equitable construction of the statute, that it does extend to other trades, besides those which are specifically mentioned therein. 4. Illness is not a sufficient ground for the discharge of an ap. For what the prentice; for on an order of sessions, discharging an appren. apprentice mv be discharged. tice on account of his being lame, and having the king's evil, incurable in the opinion of surgeons, it was moved to confirm the order, because the master cannot now have the end of the binding, which was the service of his apprentice: to which it was insisted, that the statute only empowers the justices to discharge for misbehaviour, and not for sickness. THE COURT quashed the order upon this ground, for the master takes the apprentice for better and worse, and is to provide for him in sickness and in health. K. v. Halesowen. i Strange 99. 5. An order of sessions for discharging an apprentice was quashed, the only reason given for the discharge being, that the master declared in open court he would not take him again. K. v. Davie, 1 Strange 704. 6. The sessions discharged an apprentice, the master having used him unkindly, and refusing to provide for and entertain him: it was moved to quash this order, because the justices did not exercise their jurisdiction in this case rightly; for the rea son they give, is for unkind usage from the master; whereas the act gives them jurisdiction, if the master misuses the apprentice, or evil entreats him, and the alleging unkind usage comes not up to that; and though the order says further, that the master refuses to continue him in his service, or to entertain him according to the indentures, that will not make it better; and the above case of K. v. Davie was cited. By lord Hardwicke; In general, it is not necessary for justices to set out the reasons of their judgment; but here they are bound to do so, the act requires it, and it is rightly said, that using unkindly is not such misusing as is intended by the act; and if the following reason, namely, his refusing to continue the lad in his service, is to be understood as an absolute refusal to let him continue with him, and not only as a refusal to enter. tain, according to his articles, that neither will be a ground for this order, because the justices have a power to compel the master to take him again, as was done in the case of the King, v. Davie; but the order was quashed on another objection. Cases, Temp. Ld. Hardwic'ke; 101. 2 Strange 1013. 7. It was formerly a question whether the sessions could proceed to discharge an apprentice, originally and without any VOL. 1. M How discharg cd. previous application to a justice; but it is now fully settled by the following cases that they have such power, and that the previous application to one justice is only discretionary. On an exception to an order of sessions for discharging an apprentice from his master, because the first proceeding was a the quarter sessions, whereas it ought to have begun by com. plaint to a justice of peace, Holt was then strongly against the order, because they ought to have followed the method pre scribed by the statute, the statute directing that the endea vours of a justice of peace should be first used; and if the party of whom complaint was made had not complied with the jus tice's proposal, then that he should give bond to appear a sessions, and that, as it were by appeal; but if the party ha promised to obey the justice of peace's orders, but afterward would not stand to them, the only way was to complain anew and the justice to attach him, and bind him to sessions. K. Ilays. 12 Mod. Rep. 349. But afterwards in K. v. Johnson, where a like exception wa taken to an order of sessions, because the complaint was mad originally at sessions, without any previous application to single justice out of sessions, Holt, Ch. J. held the order to b good; and said, if it had been a new question he should ha held a prior application to some justice out of sessions nece sary; but after so many orders affirmed in this court, witho any application to a justice, it is too late to unsettle that poin 1 Salkeld 68. And he said, he was brought to that resolution rather fro the necessity of the thing, the practice being universally s than any reason he saw for it. 12 Mod. Rep. 349. Again, in the cases of Rex v. Gill, and Rer v. Davie, t court said that it had been often determined, and is not now to disputed, that the sessions have an original jurisdiction to di charge apprentices; they therefore would not suffer it to made a question, though it might be doubted on the statute self. 1 Strange 143. Strange 704. Also in Arglis v. Heaseman, per Ld. Hardwicke: The lat cases have been, that the sessions have an original jurisdi tion; and this determination is right*; for the applicati which the act directs to be made to a private justice seems mean only to arbitrate and accommodate the matter in disput the statute says, if he cannot compound the matter he is take bond for the party's appearance at the sessions, so th they are not to take it by appeal. Cases Temp. Ld. Hardwic 101. 8. Upon a special order of sessions in Middlesex, remov *Though it might be wished parties would go before one justice first. Per Hardwicke, in the same case, as reported in 2 Seas. Cases, p. 154 |