SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND LESSONS

II

THE present hostilities in South Africa recall to mind the predictions and warnings of the late Sir Bartle Frere, one of the ablest, strongest and noblest of those great Proconsuls who have done so much to make the British Empire what it is to-day. His high reputation rests chiefly on his achievements as an Indian statesman. He went to South Africa comparatively late in life, and his knowledge of that country was necessarily limited. It may be doubted whether he ever fully understood either the Boers or the natives; but nevertheless his varied attainments, his wide experience and the philosophic bent of his mind must always command respect even from those who are unable to endorse all his conclusions. He rapidly formed decided views on every subject ;' he always knew his own mind, and in everything he judged and acted on fixed principles according to the highest standard of abstract right known to him. If he erred, it was only through lack of local knowledge or because he was deceived by others. That in South Africa he should sometimes have misjudged men and even made mistakes in policy was perhaps, under the circumstances, inevitable. Whether his successive native wars, so popular with the Dutch, were in every case equally politic and necessary may be open to question. Of the ultimate effects of the Zulu war as regarded his own official position and the growth of Boer power there can be no doubt. For the annexation of the Transvaal he was not personally responsible. To its retrocession he was firmly opposed. Whatever mistakes he may have made, however little he may have realised the vaulting ambition of the South African Dutch, however hopeless at that time the task of federation imposed upon him by the late Lord Carnarvon, there cannot be two opinions as to the purity of his motives, the fervour of his patriotism or the ingratitude with which he was treated.

In 1881 Sir Bartle Frere published in the February number of this Review an article on the Transvaal which well deserves careful reperusal at the present time. I am unable to concur unreservedly 30

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with him in all he says. Thus, for instance, I am rather inclined to agree with the view of the Natal officials that the Zulus would never have resorted to hostilities against the British in that colony, their quarrel being only with the Boers of the Transvaal. Sir Bartle Frere thought otherwise, and acted on his belief. Be this as it may, his views as to the Imperial destinies and duties of England were perfectly sound and his remarks as to the bad policy and even the positive wrong, injustice and cruelty of rescinding the annexation of the Transvaal are as true now as when they were written, and merit special consideration at the present time. He says:-'Let not the English nation suppose that by throwing off all responsibility for the fortunes of the Transvaal we shall either insure the good government of the Transvaal or make our responsibilities in the other colonies of South Africa less.' How true was this forecast is known

to every one who has since lived in South Africa, and may be realised by any one who will read Mr. J. P. FitzPatrick's carefully compiled and thoroughly reliable book, The Transvaal from Within. Sir Bartle Frere's words are especially noteworthy now, on account of the warning they convey against a patched-up peace or any halfhearted or unsatisfactory settlement of the momentous questions now at issue. Happily no such warning is needed by Her Majesty's present advisers, the soundness of whose views on the South African question admits of no doubt. The idea that Her Majesty's present Government would tolerate the establishment of independent Boer Republics on the conclusion of the present hostilities would be too absurd to be entertained for a moment. But the British Empire, however strong against foreign foes, is vulnerable from within. The swing of the political pendulum in England is proverbial, and under our system of popular Government it is vitally important that the public should be kept fully informed of every fact and every argument conducive to a just estimate of all Imperial questions.

It is easy to play with words. In connection with the Transvaal we have been dosed with magnanimity' till our gorge rises at it. What we want henceforth is justice with power to enforce its decrees.

The present political position is plain enough. The two Republics have united to invade Her Majesty's dominions with a view to the conquest of South Africa, after having suddenly declared war by means of an ultimatum couched in terms which read like the ravings of insanity. The effect of the vast military preparations so long made by the two Republics with the object of striking a sudden and crushing blow has been to secure for the Boers at the outset advantages so great as to bring home to the British public how narrowly we have escaped a great national disaster. If we are to retain our hold on South Africa at all it can only be by the subjugation of both Republics. When that work is accomplished we

shall have the right of conquest in addition to all prior rights, and no foreign Power can be allowed to interfere in any way. Of the two Republics the Orange Free State had even less excuse than the Transvaal for thus attacking us. The Orange Free State had received nothing but good at our hands ever since we committed the initial blunder of granting them independence in 1854. I dismiss as unworthy of serious discussion the contention that the Orange Free State was unjustly deprived of the province of Griqualand West by the British Government during Sir Henry Barkly's term of office as High Commissioner. The Orange Free State never had any valid right to claim the territory of Waterboer. It is true that certain Free State Boers had received from the Government at Bloemfontein title to certain farms within the borders of Griqualand West, but I was, in my then official capacity, present in the Land Court of Griqualand West when those Boers received with expressions of satisfaction and thanks British title to those same farms free of expense to themselves; and the only possible loss or damage to the Bloemfontein Government was the comparatively trifling amount of the annual quit-rents. Moreover, I happened to be present in the Volksraad at Bloemfontein when, in reply to remonstrances from some of the members, President Brand with considerable heat told them that he had concluded a binding agreement with Lord Carnarvon on the subject and had accepted on behalf of the Treasury of the Orange Free State the sum of 90,000l. in full of all demands in respect of quit-rent on those farms and of their claims in Griqualand West generally. Lord Carnarvon had further offered to make a contribution of 15,000l. towards the cost of railway construction between Kimberley and Bloemfontein, though this offer lapsed, as the Orange Free State Government took no steps in the matter. President Brand went so far as to threaten resignation and an appeal to the country in the event of an adverse vote by the Volksraad on the question, whereupon all opposition ceased and the agreement with Lord Carnarvon was duly ratified. After that, it appears to me to be too late to attempt to manufacture a grievance out of such a transaction. The Orange Free State got more than full value for all their claims, real or imaginary, and the members of the Volksraad well knew that any attempt to govern the turbulent population of the Diamond Fields in those stormy days would have involved their little State in ruin. I cannot help thinking that if recent events had occurred during the lifetime of the late Sir John Brand, and while he was still presiding over the destinies of the Orange Free State, he would have pursued a different policy from that of Messrs. Kruger, Reitz and Steyn. He would, as I believe, have firmly declined to enter into an unnecessary and ill-advised offensive and defensive alliance with the Transvaal Republic; he would have deprecated an oppressive policy towards Uitlanders;

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he would have done his best to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; and, at the worst, he would have professed neutrality; whereby he would have safeguarded the integrity and independence of his own State and left himself free to act as mediator. Whether his real sentiments towards England were friendly or not, he was an enlightened ruler, a true patriot, an honest man and a statesman. In international as in domestic politics the personal element counts for a great deal. Mr. Steyn has listened to the voice of the tempter, and between his fanatical hatred of England and his ambition to become President of the Dutch United States of South Africa he has, like a reckless gambler, staked the existence of his once happy little Republic in a contest the result of which is a foregone conclusion. As a trained lawyer, an ex-judge, Mr. Steyn must be fully aware that the declaration of war by the Orange Free State against Her Majesty has put an end to the Convention of 1854.

Far too much importance has been attributed to Dr. Leyds in relation to recent events. He is regarded in South Africa as a foreigner who has no love for the Boers, and who, to gain his private ends, has done much mischief. Apart from Mr. Kruger, Dr. Leyds would have no personal influence whatever in any part of South Africa.

Mr. Reitz is a member of a highly respectable Cape family. He has had the advantages of European education and of legal training in England. I first knew him as a student at the Inner Temple; then as an Advocate of the Supreme Court at Capetown, and later on at Kimberley. Incredible as it may appear to a younger generation, he really had in the days of his youth a saving sense of humour. He is the author of most laughable translations of Tam o' Shanter and Villikins and his Dinah into Cape Dutch. He was for some years Chief Justice and subsequently President of the Orange Free State. With his attainments and experience, Mr. Reitz should have known better than to have precipitated such a conflict as that in which the two Republics are now engaged against Great Britain and her colonies; but with him, unfortunately, Anglophobia is the ruling passion. He has a mania for driving the English into the sea.

Of Mr. Kruger's conduct from first to last it is difficult to speak in terms sufficiently temperate for ears polite. He has furnished abundant proof of the shortsightedness of those who gave a bigoted peasant, ignorant of everything beyond the merest smattering of Calvinistic theology, the chance of playing fantastic tricks with the sceptre of an absolute ruler. It does not answer to entrust Caliban with Prospero's wand. Paul Kruger masquerading as an autocrat under a cloak of religion would be ridiculous but for the terrible tragedy in which the farce has ended.

I cannot agree with those who think that in the final settlement after the cessation of hostilities any distinction ought to be made

us.

between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. I consider, on the contrary, that they are tarred with the same brush, and should sink or swim together. The quarrel must be fought out till the supremacy of England in South Africa is finally established. No terms should be granted short of unconditional surrender on the part of both Republics, and surrender or conquest should be instantly followed by the annexation of the entire territories of both Republics, together with Swaziland, to Her Majesty's dominions. The comments and objections of Continental critics and ill-wishers matter nothing to We have the support of all right-minded citizens throughout a United Empire, and likewise of our kinsmen in the United States of America, and therewith we may well be content, seeing that we are in a position to defend ourselves against the rest of the world if need be. Men of all parties in the United Kingdom are now agreed on the South African question with the exception of an insignificant minority. It would indeed be strange were this otherwise. The sacrifices made to secure our Empire in South Africa have already been terribly heavy. I do not speak of the mere expenditure of vast sums of money. England is the wealthiest country in the world, and she never grudges money for a great object. The United Kingdom has already given far more than money in the lives of so many of the best and bravest of her sons. Those splendid heroes of all ranks, of every class among our countrymen, are the martyrs of a great and holy cause. They have laid down their lives freely and gladly in the service of their Queen and for England's sake. Shall it be said that they have perished in vain ? Shall it be said that the Empire they died to save fell to pieces ultimately through the craven fears, the shortsightedness, the incompetence of statesmen and diplomatists who, in their eagerness to gain at any price the pretended good will of irreconcilable enemies, ignobly sacrificed the fruits of victory so dearly bought? I trow not. I cannot believe that, after all the bitter experiences of the past, any possible Government in this country could so grossly fail in its duty as to restore even nominal independence to either the Transvaal or the Orange State. The more foreign enemies and domestic traitors press for such a measure the clearer it must become that for us it would be suicidal, that for our Empire it would mean ruin. It would be unjust as well as impolitic: unjust to ourselves, unjust to the Empire as a whole and to every part of it that has so nobly come forward to our assistance in the hour of need; unjust as regards the loyal inhabitants of South Africa who have fought so bravely and suffered so severely in our cause; unjust to the unhappy natives; unjust even as regards the half-savage and wholly misguided Boers who in their solid, stolid, stupid way have sacrificed their true interests at the bidding of knaves and fanatics.

What then, it may be asked, is the nature of the final settlement that I would recommend, assuming as I do that the hostilities in