being an exception to the rule excluding oral testimony, "même pour dépôts volontaires." This express mention of one particular contract is owing to the wish expressed by Cujacius after the Ordonnance de Moulins had appeared. "Velim excipi," said that great man, "sacri arcanique depositi causam." It was to guard against this intimation from such an authority that the deposit was specified.

Toullier is of opinion that the books of tradesmen kept in the manner required by the Code de Commerce, art. 54, are sufficient to furnish a 66 commencement de preuve par écrit," because it justifies the judge in putting the suppletory oath. He infers this from a comparison of the 1329 art. of the Code with the art. 1367. If then the judge may put the suppletory oath, à fortiori he may hear evidence "in coadjuvationem scripturæ" "non debet cui plus licet quod minus est non licere”— if you can walk ten miles you can walk five. The 1335 art., No. 2, provides, that certain copies of acts made from the original by the notary who drew the original, or his successor, or a public officer, who as such public officer was the person with whom the minute of the original article was deposited, may, if not thirty years old, serve as a commencement de preuve par écrit,” and that if not drawn by one of the people above described, whether of thirty years date or not, they shall only serve as a commencement de preuve par écrit.” The same rule 1336 applies to the copy of an act transcribed from an acte on the registry of the "conservateur des hypothéques."

THE OATH (9).

There are three kinds of oaths principally to be considered in the administration of civil justice according to the French law.

1st. The oath administered to the party examined “sur faits et articles."

(q) Molinæi Op., vol 3. In 4 lib. Codicis, p. 631.

2ndly. The serment décisoire.

3rdly. The oath administered by the judge.

INTERROGATOIRE SUR FAITS ET ARTICLES.

This is one of the portions of the Code in which the wisdom of its authors is least conspicuous. They have allowed a principle sound in itself, and fraught with important consequences, to be neutralized by formalities.

In all cases, and in every stage of the cause, the parties "peuvent demander de se faire interroger," on matters relevant to the subject of dispute without any delay of the proceedings.

The party examined is to answer in person, without reading any prepared statement, and without the assistance of counsel, the facts contained in the requête of his adversary, as well as to those which the judge may think it advisable to ask about. If the party does not appear at the proper time, or appears and refuses to reply, the facts are to be taken as admitted.

1st. A copy of the faits and articles, on which the party is to be examined, is to be given to him twenty-four hours before

the examination.

2ndly. The examination of the party takes place in private, before a single judge or commissioner, not in public before the judges, who are to decide the cause.

3rdly. The Code, in spite of the authority of Dumoulin, so energetically expressed, forbids the presence of the party requiring the interrogatory (p).

The first of these restrictions, the evil of which to a certain degree, however, is neutralized by the power of the judge to put such questions as he may think proper, was formerly censured by Lamoignon (q), and takes away the benefit of an unpremeditated answer to a legitimate question.

(p) "Et in hoc curia Pessimé judicavit."

(9) Lamoignon remarks:-" On peut dire au contraire que, lorsqu'on communique les faits, c'est donner le moyen de se préparer contre la vérité, laquelle n'a pas besoin de conseil pour se produire; chacun doit

The second deprives the judge of a most important ingredient in forming his opinion.

The third prevents the truth from being elicited, by questions which the cause of inquiry or the answer of the witness might at once suggest to a person conversant with the facts of the case; "et in hoc curia Pessimé judicavit," is Dumoulin's commentary on a decision by which he was excluded from hearing the interrogatory he had prepared for his adversary. Altogether, most people will think that this law justifies the language of Mr. Bellot, of Geneva, who, in his report on the law of practice, thus characterizes it. "If a legislator were to propose to himself the problem of the surest way of not attaining truth, the French code under this title will furnish him with its solution." Toullier says, that in consequence it is almost useless, and that this is one of the pasages where the inferiority of the Code de Procédure to the Code Civil is most remarkable.

savoir ce qui est de son fait, et ne saurait être tenu de répondre sur autre chose. D'ordinaire, ceux qui sont interrogés consultent bien moins leur conscience que le palais sur ce qu'ils ont à dire ; ils apportent leurs réponses toutes faites; de sorte que tout l'effet de leur interrogatoire n'est que transcrire des réponses que la partie elle-même a rédigées par écrit. L'on n'a point vu qu'un homme préparé sur ce qu'il doit répondre, ait jamais perdu son procès par la bouche. C'est bien souvent l'occasion d'un parjure prémédité, qu'il serait beaucoup meilleur de retrancher; mais qu'au contraire, lorsqu'une partie vient prêter interrogatoire sans avoir eu communication des faits, il est difficile, quand ils sont bien dressés, qu'elle ne tombe dans quelque contradiction, lorsqu'elle veut déguiser la vérité; que, dans la province de Normandie, on se trouvait bien de cet usage, et qu'il serait peut-être avantageux pour la justice de le rendre général pour tout le royaume."

"M. Pussort, Commissaire du Roi, et redacteur du projet, ne répondit point à ces raisons décisives ;".

"M. Pussort proposait même un article qui défendait aux juges d'interroger d'office sur aucun fait dont il n'aura point été donné copie. Mais cette fois-ci la raison l'emporta, et sur l'insistance de M. de Lamoignon, on inséra, dans l'art. 7, qu'en recevant les réponses sur chaque fait et article, le juge pourra même d'office interroger sur aucuns faits, quoiqu'il n'en ait été donné copie."

The admissions on the interrogatory, "sur faits et articles," are conclusive against the maker, (art. 1356), and can be recalled only on the ground that they have arisen from an error in fact. This topic will be considered more in detail, under the title "Confession."

THE OATH (9) OFFERED BY THE PARTIES.

The oath," serment décisoire," offered and accepted, amounts to what the Roman lawyers called a "transactio," "speciem transactionis continet." It is a direct appeal to the adverse party himself, whom under the sanction of an oath it makes the judge in his own cause.

It may be offered, at any stage of the cause, in any matter of civil litigation.

If the party to whom it is offered refuses it, without referring it to his adversary he loses his cause, as does the adversary if the oath being referred to him he declines it. When the oath has been taken it is conclusive (r), and the party tendering it is not allowed to prove that the party who has taken it is perjured. The oath (s) cannot be tendered to a party who has a legal presumption (præsumptio juris et de jure) in his favour. It can only be tendered on a matter (†) within the personal knowledge of the party to whom it is offered.

The privilege of tendering this oath (serment décisoire) is that of the party; it cannot be tendered by the judge. It must be tendered in the course of a legal proceeding. Toullier

(2) "Quod in judicio pars defert pacte, vel etiam refertur, ut cum dico ad adversarium meum potes jurare rem esse tuam, dabo tibi vel si retulent adversarius meus mihi, imo si jures rem esse tuam, contineas eam." Molinæi Op., vol. 3, p. 637.

(r) Code Civil; Pothier Traité des Obligations, 817, et seq.; Art. 1357, et seq.; so Instit. de Act. 11, "Non illud quæritur an pecunia debeatur ed an juraverit ;" and Dig. 21. 4. 3, de dolo.

(8) 1352, Cod. Civ.

(t) Such was the Roman law. "Hæredi ejus cum quo contractum est jusjurandum deferri non potest quoniam contractum ignorare potest."

calls this oath "le grand moyen de terminer les procès." The Romans called it "maximum remedium (u) expediendanum litium." It follows, from what has been said, that the right referred to the oath of the adverse party, must be one of which the party offering it can (v) legally dispose. Therefore, the minor cannot tender the oath, nor the married woman without the sanction of her husband; but if the oath be tendered to them, and they are ready to take it, the party tendering it cannot then retract his offer on the ground of their incapacity (art. 1125). It cannot be tendered or accepted by the agent, or the avoué, or procureur ad lites; nor by the guardian for a minor, unless under the forms prescribed (art. 4. 6, 7). The effect of this oath may be summed up in the words of the civilians, "Jusjurandum speciem transactionis continet majoremque habet auctoritatem quam res judicata," because from it there is no appeal.

1. SERMENT SUPPLÉTOIRE,—OATH TENDERED BY THE JUDGE.

This also is one of the parts of the French code in which its admirers would desire an alteration. If a party chooses to make use of the serment décisoire it is his own affair, and he has no right to complain of the consequence he has by his own act brought upon himself. But the case where the matter is referred, not by the party but by the judge to the oath of an adversary, is different, and the rule "iniquum est aliquem suæ rei judicem fieri," a maxim founded on the clearest notions of natural justice, is plainly violated. In speaking of the "interrogatoire sur faits et articles," Lamoignon remarks, that no man with the opportunity of framing a premeditated answer, "ait jamais perdu son procès par la bouche;" and

(u) 12. 2. 1. Dig.

(v) Boehmer jus. ecc.; Protest, tit. 10, de jurejur. Locum habet hæc delatio tantum in rebus privati arbitiri et de quibus transigi potest liberé. Cod. de reb. cred. 4. 1. Adeoque de quibus transigi nequit in iis nec delatione juramenti locus est. Molinæi Op., vol. 3, p. 635.