PRESUMPTIONS (s).

Presumptions are consequences, drawn from a known fact, to assist in the discovery of one that is unknown. They are drawn by the judge. In one class the proof they furnish varies in degree, from almost certainty to insignificance; but the law does not interfere to decide upon the effect they are to produce. Such are the "præsumptiones hominis," "ex co quod plerumque fit," and others which the magistrate must appreciate.

(8) Des Présomptions.

"1349. Les présomptions sont des conséquences que la loi ou le magistrat tire d'un fait connu à un fait inconnu."

§ i. Des présomptions établies par la loi.

"1350. La présomption légale est celle qui est attachée par une loi spéciale à certains actes ou à certains faits; tels sont,

"1. Les actes que la loi déclare nuls, comme présumés faits en fraude de ses dispositions, d'après leur seule qualité;

"2. Les cas dans lequels la loi déclare la propriété ou la libération résulter de certaines circonstances déterminées;

"3. L'autorité que la loi attribue à la chose jugée;

"4. La force que la loi attache à l'aveu de la partie ou à son serment. (c. Div. Présompt., 553, 653 s., 720 s., 911, 1099, 1330 s., 1333 s., 1365 s., 1525, 1569, 1908).”

"1351. L'autorité de la chose jugée n'a lieu qu'à l'égard de ce qui a fait l'objet du jugement. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée par elles et contre elles en la méme qualité. (c. 2052, 2056; Pr. 478)."

"1352. La présomption légale dispense de toute preuve celui au profit duquel elle existe."

"Nulle preuve n'est admise contre la présomption de la loi, lorsque, sur le fondement de cette présomption, elle annulle certains actes ou dénie l'action en justice, à moins qu'elle n'ait réservé la preuve contraire, et sauf ce qui sera dit sur le serment et l'aveu judiciaires. (c. Exemp., 1354 s., 1357)."

§ ii. Des présomptions qui ne sont point établies par la loi.

"1353. Les présomptions qui ne sont point établies par la loi, sont abandonnées aux lumières et à la prudence du magistrat, qui ne doit admettre que des présomptions graves, précises, et concordantes, et dans les cas seulement où la loi admet les preuves testimoniales, à moins que l'acte ne soit attaqué pour cause de fraude ou de dol. (c. 1116, 1341 s.)."

As to another class of presumptions the law does interfere, and requires the magistrates to give them a certain weight ;in other words, if the fact A. be proved, it obliges the judge to pronounce that fact B. has also taken place. This class of presumptions were called, in the barbarous language of the writers on the Roman law in the dark ages, "præsumptiones juris et de jure," against which no proof was admissible. Such, in the Roman law, was the maxim "in pari causâ possessor potior haberi debet." Such in the French law are the rules, that a receipt for the capital, without mention of the interest, imports payment of the interest (1908, Code Civil), and that the giving up of the deed proving a debt to the debtor, imports payment of the debt. The French Code enumerates four such presumptions.

THE PRESUMPTION DE LA CHOSE JUGÉE.

The doctrine of the French Code is taken from the Digest 42, 13. 14, de exceptione rei judicatæ, "modo idem corpus sit, idem jus, eadem qualitas, eadem causa petendi, eadem conditio personarum, quæ nisi omnia concurrant, alia res est."

That is a "chose jugée," the judgment on which is definitive, final, and from which, at the time of the dispute, there is no appeal, So the Roman law, "res judicata dicitur quæ finem controversiarum, pronuntiatione judicis accipit quod vel condemnatione vel absolutione contingit." Therefore a provisional or interlocutory sentence is not a "chose jugée;" non omnis vox judicis, judicati continet Cod. 7. 45. 1.

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auctoritatem."

The Code does not indeed anywhere define the "chose jugée," but this was done by the Ordonnance of 1667, tit. 27, art. 5; and this is the rule which fixes the present law:

"Pour qu'un jugement ait l'autorité de la chose jugée, il faut qu'il soit définitif et contienne ou une condamnation ou un congé de demande." Favard v. Présomption.

The identity of the subject-matter of the dispute is of course an important element in this part of our inquiry.

A change in the body of the subject does not destroy the identity; for instance, if I sue for a flock of sheep and am defeated, the increase or diminution of the numbers will not enable me to recover after the previous judgment, "si petiero gregem et victus fuero et vel aucto vel minuto numero gregis iterum eundem gregem petam; obstabit mihi exceptio;" or if I demand any one of the sheep of which the flock consisted, my demand may still be met by the previous decision, "et si speciale corpus ex grege petam, si adfuit in eo grege, obstaturam mihi puto exceptionem." So if, after claiming land, I claim the trees growing on the land,—if, after claiming a house, I claim the materials of which it consists,—“si quis petierit fundum, mox arbores excisas ex eo fundo petat-aut insulam petierit deinde aream vel tigna vel lapides, item si navem petiero postea singulas tabulas vindicem,"-in all these cases the exceptio rei judicatæ is fatal to my demand. The principle "in toto et pars continetur," was followed out by the Roman jurists, (who were not fettered by our detestable system of methodized absurdity called special pleading), whether the object in dispute was material or immaterial, "nec interest utrum hoc in corpore quæratur; an in quantitate vel in jure." If, for instance, I have claimed a right over a particular farm, with cattle and horses (actus), or one still more extensive, a "via," and, after judgment has been given against my claim, demand a right more limited, a right to pass over it on foot, iter, the former judgment is conclusive, for "via, iter et actum in se continet." Dig. 8. 3. 1. But if, after the judgment, the "insula” (t) has been destroyed, I may sue nevertheless for some of the materials, for it does not follow that they, when the fabric is destroyed, belonged to the proprietor of the insula, "etenim cujus insula est non utique et cæmenta sunt, denique ea quæ fructa sunt ædibus alienis, separata dominus vindicare potest."

Among all the requisites for making the defence of the

(t) Insula "ædificium circuitum publicum vel privatum habens." Dirksen Manuale Latinitatis fontium juris civilis.

"chose jugée” conclusive, one of the most essential is undoubtedly the identity of the parties, "que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties." That no one should be condemned without being heard is a principle of natural justice, which can admit, in its strict and most limited sense, of no exception, and to which there is but one class of exceptions even if it be taken in a wider signification. Nothing illustrates more completely the rude and shapeless condition of our law, than the subject I am now about to consider. I have reserved the examination of it to the present time, though it involves an account of the Roman law, because the principle of the Roman law is embodied in French jurisprudence, and because the two systems corroborate and explain each other.

In the Roman law, then, there is no exception to the rule, that the thing required must be the same, before the exceptio rei judicatæ can be employed; but there is one exception to the rule that the parties must be the same, and this exception prevails equally in the French law.

This exception rests on very important motives, and it relates to causes of status ("causes d'état" in the French, præjudicia, actiones præjudiciales," in the Roman law), questions affecting the condition of persons in the commonwealth, whether they are legitimate or spurious, whether they are citizens or aliens. These actions were called "præjudiciales," not because they were to precede or to determine other judgments, but because they determined beforehand all questions that depended on them, and all questions that might afterwards arise on the same subject-matter, though the parties to them were entirely different.

In the Institutes, de actionibus, § 13, these questions are enumerated; they are three :

1st. Is a man free or slave ?

2nd. Is he born free, or is he a libertinus?

3rd. Is he legitimate or spurious, born of such a father and such a mother? Was there a valid marriage between such persons?

To these questions another must be added,

Is he a citizen or a stranger?

The two first questions, thanks to the efforts of the great men of the last century, can no longer form any subject of inquiry in French jurisprudence. The others are of frequent

occurrence.

Questions which concern the status of citizens are of such importance in civil society that they cannot remain uncertain. The judgment by which they are decided must be irrevocable, if (and on this condition I would fix particularly the attention of my readers as a most important element of jurisprudence) if there be a lawful opponent, that is, if the judgment pronounced be pronounced after an opposition instituted by the person whom the law considers the party properly and directly interested in opposing it,-a "contradicteur légitime:" in the words of D'Argentré, "le premier et principal intérêt;” in the words of Ulpian, "cum justo contradictore;" for, says the latter, "cum non justo contradictore perinde inefficax est decretum atque si nulla res intervenisset." For instance, in the Roman law, the "justus contradictor" of a man, whose free birth was in dispute, would have been the supposed patron. So in a case which I the rather mention, because ignorance of this rule had nearly confirmed an act of frightful injustice in our own country, in a case where the question turns upon the validity of a marriage, if there is a child born of the marriage, he is a "justus contradictor" (u), a person who must be represented, if the decision cancelling the marriage is to be binding upon him; if the children, says D'Argentré, were not parties to this decision, "ils resteraient sur leurs pieds pour se défendre de nouveau."

It is only in England, among civilized countries, that a court of justice would hold, that the son of a marriage has no right to impeach a decision by which, before he could speak,

(u) "Cum non justo contradictore quis ingenuus pronuntiatus est," etc. Dig. 43. 16, de collusione detegendâ.