Smith's

Wealth of

In his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith assumes as the cause of industrial phenomena "the desire of Adam every man to better his condition." This desire premisses he describes as "constant, uniform, and uni- in his versal," which "comes to us from the womb, and Nations. never leaves us till we go into the grave," and this, and this alone, he maintains, is sufficient to carry society to wealth and prosperity. Throughout his work he keeps this motive constantly in view, and from it, as cause, he traces all the phenomena of industrial life. He nowhere states that man, in the pursuit of wealth, is not influenced by other motives, but this is implied throughout.

in his

In his Moral Sentiments, on the other hand, where he had phenomena of a totally different kind And to explain, Adam Smith has recourse to Moral Sentotally different premisses. Man is no longer selfish but sympathetic; and sympathy he describes as something essentially different from selfishness.

timents.

Sympathy," he remarks, "cannot in any sense be

H

regarded as a selfish principle."1 "The desire to better one's condition" henceforth takes a subordinate place in his system. There is another principle which should determine every act, and this is the principle of justice. “There is one virtue,” he says, "which the general rules determine, with the greatest exactness, every external action which it requires. This virtue is justice. The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with them. If I owe a man ten pounds, justice requires that I should pay him precisely ten pounds, either at the time agreed on, or when he demands it. What I ought to perform, how much I ought to perform, when and where I ought to perform it, the whole nature and circumstances of the action prescribed, are all of them precisely fixed and determined.' 11 2 He even goes so far as to trace the desire of wealth to the sympathetic affections, as, he says, "it is chiefly for this regard to the sentiments of mankind that we pursue riches and avoid poverty," and, again, 'to become the natural object of the joyous congratulations and sympathetic attentions of mankind, are the circumstances which give to prosperity all its dazzling

1 Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 206. Bohn's Edition. Compare vol. i. p. 9, where he combats the views of those "who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love."

* Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 249, 250.

splendour." There is no possibility of reconciling these two sets of premisses. Man cannot at the same time be wholly selfish and wholly sympathetic. If wholly selfish, then he cannot be sympathetic, and if wholly sympathetic, he cannot be selfish. It is true he may be both selfish and sympathetic, and this is in effect what Adam Smith proves by a roundabout process. But both statements are wrong as he puts them, and the deductions which he draws from them cannot be otherwise than misleading.

Difference

his pre

those of

tionists.

Adam Smith's method of a century ago is the method of the deductionists of to-day. They not only treat the subject deductively as he did, but they between have adopted substantially the same premisses, misses and the phrase, “desire for wealth," being substi- the deductuted for "the desire to better one's condition." Viewed from the modern standpoint, man is still purely selfish. No account has been taken of that other class of motives which Adam Smith in his Moral Sentiments included under the term Sympathy. No attempt has been made to reconcile the contradictions which are apparent in the premisses of his two great works. If any advantage, in a scientific point of view, could be gained by this process, it would be a different matter but no one pretends that there is.

In Sociology we do not proceed by separating the social from the anti-social or self-regarding forces.

1 Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 66.

We do not attempt to establish the science on the basis of the social forces alone. On the contrary,

The method in Social

Science.

we recognize both as essential to the maintenance of social order and progress. In

Social Science we view the two kinds of forces from the standpoint of society, and we subordinate the interests of the individual to those of the

community if the well

Where the two interests

being of the latter requires it. clash, the lesser must give way to the greater, the individual to society. When, on the other hand, there is no clashing, the two may work side by side; as, for instance, a man may follow any pursuit he likes so long as he does no injury to his neighbour.

The

It is the same with Ethics. The moralist does not ignore either the self-regarding or the social method in tendencies of man's nature when he treats of the Ethics. Ethical Sentiment; on the contrary, he fully recognizes both. The moralist, however, takes a wider range of view than either the economist or sociologist. His standpoint is not that of the individual, or of society, but of humanity at large. He treats of human actions in the abstract, irrespective of individuals or nationalities. But so far from ignoring the existence of self-interest and the social affections, he enjoins the exercise of both. To provide for one's self and one's family he regards as a sacred duty. Prudence and temperance are virtues of a high order. The selfregarding tendencies of our nature are, indeed, indispensable, as they form the basis of the social affections

and the ethical sentiment. We can only desire for others what we would wish for ourselves. What an individual desires others should do to him is the standard by which his conduct towards others can alone be regulated. The precepts, "Do unto others as ye would others should do unto you," "Love your neighbour as yourself," embody the purest principles of morality, and they are based on the self-regarding principles of man's nature.

In order to ascertain how a man would act under

of motives.

1

a variety of motives operating concurrently The upon him, it is necessary, we are told, to isolation proceed by ascertaining how he would act under each particular motive taken separately. But this would not be sufficient. Analysis must be followed by synthesis. After ascertaining the operation of each motive taken separately, it would be necessary, next, to ascertain what the effect would be if operating together. A cannon ball is projected by the force of gunpowder. From what we know of the laws of motion, we might conclude that the ball would proceed onward through space at an uniform rate of speed, and in a straight line. But this conclusion would be erroneous, for two other forces here come into play; the one, gravity, deflects the ball to the earth's surface; the other, the resistance of the atmosphere, impedes its progress; and the result of this combination of forces is that the ball, after describing a curve, is speedily brought to the earth's surface.

1 Unsettled Questions, p. 139.