In the same manner mental forces impede or counteract one another. The desire of wealth, for instance, like the force of the gunpowder, may be the impelling motive, and from what we know of the laws of mind we might arrive at a tolerably correct conclusion as to its operation; but this motive might be counteracted by others, such as sympathy, or the sense of duty, so that an entirely different result would take place from what might have been expected. force and a law. It is to be noted, however, that the process here. Difference recommended-that, namely, of testing the between a various forces acting concurrently-is precisely that which the deductionists do not adopt. They have hitherto made no attempt to ascertain the action of those other motives that are concerned in the production of the phenomena under investigation. Indeed, they have only partially examined the operation of the one motive they have adopted as the basis of their system. The first step in this direction would be to discover what those other motives really were, and afterwards their mode of operation. But this field of inquiry the deductionists have left entirely unexplored. They have discovered the existence of one motive, the desire of wealth, and they have not attempted to look for any others. As, however, they admit the existence of other motives, they should ascertain what they are, and next their mode of operation, separately and concurrently. It is absurd to discuss the laws of a science before we have ascertained its forces. The law of gravi tation is that it varies directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of the distance; but the existence of gravitation as a force was known before the law was discovered. A law is the mode in which a force operates, and not the force itself, and we can have no knowledge of industrial law till we have first ascertained the forces which produce industrial phenomena. forces. A man obtains an income of, let us say, £2000 a year from business, which is all he can possibly Different earn, and he spends the whole of it on himself. kinds of Another man obtains £3000 a year, which is all he can possibly earn, but he spends half of it in charity. A third, who conducts his business on the strictest principles of honesty, obtains only £1000 a year, when, were he less scrupulous, he might as easily earn twice the amount. In each of these cases the impelling motive is undoubtedly the desire of wealth. In the first, we may assume, for argument's sake, this desire to be the sole motive; in the second, however, as one half of the amount earned was spent in charity, we must assume that social sympathy had something to do with the result; in other words, that the desire of wealth was strengthened by the social affections; but in the third, another force comes into operation which does not strengthen but impedes the impelling motive. This is the ethical sentiment. Or take another illustration. A workman is engaged by the week or month at a fixed rate of wages. If his sole motive were the desire to obtain the maximum of wealth by the minimum expenditure of labour, he will do exactly the amount of work, and no more, which will secure him continued employment. Another man, engaged in the same way, and at the same fixed rate of wages, is also impelled by the same motive, but, in addition, has a desire to please his employer, which he thinks he can best do by performing a satisfactory amount of work. The additional motive makes him more energetic, and he works all the better for it. A third man, similarly engaged, is not of a social disposition and has no wish to please anybody in particular, but has a desire to do his duty, and this additional motive induces him to work harder or better than he would otherwise do if his sole motive were a desire to obtain his wages. Here we have two forces, or motives, which the deductionist takes no account of, but which, nevertheless, have undoubted influence on industrial activity. Motives or impulses are called forces because they move or impel to action. This they do by operating on volition. A motive, however, is only one of a whole series of forces terminating in activity. There is, first, sensation, then emotion, next motive, and, last of all, volition. The muscular sensations are the primary sensibilities; the emotions are secondary, derived, or compound feelings; the sensations or emotions, when viewed in connection with an object as their cause, become motives; and volition is the connecting link between these and the resultant action. Classifica forces. Every motive concerned in industrial action may be termed an industrial force. By industrial force I understand that kind of force which produces tion of industrial action; and by industrial action I mean that kind of action which has reference to the production or exchange of wealth, using the latter term in its technical sense. According to the classification usually adopted by ethical writers, motives are of two kinds, Self-regarding and Non-self-regarding, or Egoistic and Altruistic. But we do not ascend from the Egoistic to the Altruistic at a single bound. There is an intermediate stage between the two which must be passed before we can reach the higher. As in inductive science we proceed from a single fact to a series of similar facts before we can arrive at the conception of law; as in language we rise from the concrete through the collective to the abstract; so in Ethics we can reach the Altruistic only through the collective or social stage. Motives may be classified according to the standpoint of the subject of them. As an object, person, or action, for instance, may be viewed from the I, we, or other standpoint, so motives may be viewed and designated according as they refer to one's self only, to others along with one's self, and to others apart from one's self. If regarded from the I point of view, or in a strictly personal aspect, motives may be called Egoistic (from żyć); from the we point of view, or in a semi-personal or social aspect, they may be called Hemeistic (from ñμɛs); and if from other than a self-regarding point of view, they may be termed (still preserving the Greek pronominal system of nomenclature) Allostic (from aλλos). We apprehend objects, persons, or actions from ἄλλος). the first point of view, as it were spontaneously; from the second, with more or less difficulty, according to the extent of our intimacy with those with whom we associate ourselves; and from the third, only by a great mental effort, and after we have been long accustomed to view things from a purely social standpoint. The forces with which we have to deal may therefore be classified as follows: I. The Egoistic, which have reference to things, and have for their object the gratification of those sensations and emotions which centre in self. They include :1. Wants; as food, drink, exercise, rest. 2. Desires; as the comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life. II. The Hemeistic, which have reference to persons, and have for their object the gratification of the social emotions. They include : 1. The Affections proper and friendship. 2. The Desires; as admiration, approbation, and esteem of our fellow-men. 3. Motives of the impassioned order; as love, hate, fear, resentment. III. The Allostic, which have reference to actions, and have for their object justice. They include:— Fidelity, truth, gratitude, generosity, and benefi cence. |