"It is apparent," he says, "however, that the apprehensions arising out of the arrangements," relative to the three per cents, "not less than the great amount of the Bank's transactions, especially, in its western branches, together with other matters connected with its dealings, which have occupied the attention of one branch of the legislature since the last annual report from this department, have tended to disturb the public confidence in the management of the institution; and these, taken in connection with the necessary arrangements in anticipation of finally closing its business, have suggested an inquiry into the security of the Bank as the depositary of the public funds."

Supposing that there were grounds for these doubts, prudence, and an ordinary and honest regard for the rights and reputation of others, should have restrained their publication to the world, until actual inquiry had confirmed them. Had a responsible individual in private life thus attacked the commercial existence of an established house, whose credit was unimpeachable, the merchants upon change would have withered the calumniator with their abiding scorn, whilst the courts of justice would have taught him discretion, at the cost of half his substance. And are the laws of morality less obligatory on the functionaries of the nation? Granting it to have been possible, that these doubts did exist in the minds of the President and Secretary, it is certain, that they had instituted inquiry, and that a few hours delay would have brought to them the result of the investigation. What was the condition of the Bank at the moment these official communications were signed, according to the report of the agent? "The liabilities of the Bank amounted to $37,296,950 20, and the fund to meet them to $79,593,870 97, showing an excess of $42,296,920 77"!!! Strong as the Bank is, its stock could not stand this shock unimpaired. It fell six per cent in the market; the public treasury and private fortunes suffering this diminution, by the wanton enmity of the executive officers. What other bank in the world could have withstood such an assault, with so little injury? If in England or France, such a blow had been stricken by the government, against the National Bank, it would have gone down like the unarmed peasant before the glaive of the mailed warrior. But, Congress upon this, as upon all previous occasions, did not fail to do justice to the Bank; and we could not frame a more severe reproof of the calumny against her, than the vote of the House, 109 to 46, declaring "that the government deposits may, in the opinion of the House, be safely continued in the Bank of the United States."

Whatever may have been the professed object of the administration, when it suggested the insolvency of the Bank, it is now certain, that it was to obtain immediate possession of the deposits. Had the audacity of the Executive been, then, wound up to the pitch it has since attained, it would not have required

C

the opinion of Congress to establish the contingency, on which, alone, the Secretary of the Treasury would be justified in removing the treasure of the nation from the custody of the Bank. The vote, therefore, was an utter discomfiture, and we may not be surprised, knowing the ardent temperament of the individual, that the President should declare, "that unless the Bank was broken down, it would break us down; that if the last Congress had remained a week longer in session, two-thirds would have been secured for the Bank by corrupt means, and that the like result might be apprehended at the next Congress." The country, however, thank heaven! is saved from the stigma of shame, for her representatives, by the circumstances under which this additional calumny was uttered.

It is not to be doubted, that the same policy which induced the President to conceal his opinions on the constitutionality of a National Bank, deterred him, for a season, from removing the public treasure from the Bank of the United States into depositories under his own control. The assurance of his re-election was the motive in both cases; and that no longer operating, he resolved to remove the deposits under any colourable pretence, which the imagination might suggest. All parties had, until this time, admitted, that the power of the Secretary over the deposits could be exercised, only, in two cases; a danger of loss, or a non-performance of the engagements of the Bank with the government. A higher ground was now assumed, which overlooked all considerations of contract, all legislative provision for the security of the revenues, and gave to the Secretary the absolute possession of the funds, whenever in his opinion the "general interest and convenience of the people required it." This resolution had been adopted at the moment that the determination of Congress against the measure was known. With a hardihood, of which modern times has no parallel, in any civilized government, the President opposed his will to that of the representatives of the people. Truly has it been said, repeatedly, upon the floor of Congress, that such a stretch of absolute power in England or France, would have cost the monarch his head. Happily, in this country, the people have other, and more effectual, modes of redressing their wrongs.

It is well known to the country, that from the time of Washington, the heads of the executive departments, that is, of the departments of State, Treasury, War and Navy, with the Attorney-General, and latterly, the Postmaster-General, form a cabinet council, whose members the President consults, either singly or together; having the benefit of their wisdom and information to guide his course. By the constitution, he may require their opinion in writing, and so uniform has been the

practice of advising with them, that, although the President is under no legal or constitutional obligation to consult them, an opinion has become general, that they form, and they are frequently called, his constitutional advisers; and the case was always deemed an extraordinary one, in which the opinion of a majority did not prevail. Their situations rendered them responsible to their country; and their influence was, therefore, the safest which could be exercised over the chief magistrate. General Jackson, it is said, with truth, which is apparent from the evidence we are about to adduce, has subjected himself to the influence of advisers of another and less responsible class; who, from their residence in the palace, have been denominated the "Kitchen Cabinet." The term, though not the most respectable that might be selected, is euphonious and appropriate enough, and being universally recognized, we must use it to distinguish this irresponsible cabal from the "Cabinet" proper.

In this secret council have the most important measures of the President originated. Its members, for purposes, apparently, purely of a party and selfish nature, have formed and steadily pursued, a plan for obtaining possession of the political and fiscal power of the country; and, as we are told, by one who was of the cabinet proper, govern it through the instrumentality of the President's passions and prejudices. The members of the cabinet proper are occasionally and formally consulted; but they are content, it seems, with the honours and emoluments of office, whilst, in the estimation of the country, its most important duties are performed by "irresponsible persons, who possess the confidence, if not the place, properly belonging to them." The historian will not fail to contrast the humility of their minds with their official elevation.

The existence of this hidden cabinet, the nature of its influence, and its direct agency in violating the laws, are established by the piquant disclosures of Mr. Secretary Duane. This gentleman, who had adhered to the President through good report and evil report, and what is more to his faithfulness as a partisan, through his own good opinion and evil opinion of the chief magistrate, consented, reluctantly, at the earnest and overpowering instances of the President, to fill the place of Secretary of the Treasury, vacated by the translation of Mr. M'Lane, his personal, and in this case, his efficient friend, to the department of State. The following is his account of his induction to his official duties under the guidance of an influence, as he justly says, unknown to the Constitution.

My commission bore the date of May 29, 1833, and on the 30th I reached Washington. After waiting upon the President, on the next day, I went to the treasury department, and took the oath of office on

*

the 1st of June. On the evening of that day, Mr. Reuben M. Whitney called upon me at my lodgings, at the desire, as he said, of the President, to make known to me what had been done, and what was contemplated, in relation to the United States Bank. He stated, that the President had concluded to take upon himself the responsibility of directing the secretary of the treasury to remove the public deposits from that bank, and to transfer them to state banks; that he had asked the members of the cabinet to give him their opinions on the subject; that the President had said, "Mr. Taney and Mr. Barry had come out like men for the removal;" that Mr. M'Lane had given a long opinion against it; that Mr. Cass was supposed to be against it, but had given no written opinion; and that Mr. Woodbury had given an opinion which was "yes" and "no;" that the President would make the act his own by addressing a paper or order to the secretary of the treasury; that Mr. Amos Kendall, who was high in the President's confidence, was now preparing that paper; that there had been delay owing to the affair at Alexandria; but, no doubt, the President would soon speak to me on the subject; that the paper referred to, would be put forth as the Proclamation had been, and would be made a rallying point; that he (Mr. Whitney) had, at the desire of the President, drawn up a memoir or exposition, showing that the measure might be safely adopted, and that the state banks would be fully adequate to all the purposes of government. He then read the exposition to me, and as I desired to understand matters so important and so singularly presented, I asked him to leave the paper with me, which he accordingly did. He also read to me divers letters from individuals connected with state banks. The drift of his further observations was to satisfy me that the executive arm alone could be relied on to prevent a renewal of the United States Bank charter.

"The communication thus made to me created surprise and mortification. I was surprised at the position of affairs which it revealed, and mortified at the low estimate which had been formed of the independence of my character. I listened, however, respectfully, to one who gave such evidence of the confidence reposed in him, and awaited the explanation which he intimated the President would give.

"Soon after this interview I took occasion to express my mortification at my position, to the member of the cabinet who had represented the President in asking me to accept office.

"On the next evening (Sunday) Mr. Whitney again called on me, in company with a stranger, whom he introduced as Mr. Amos Kendall, a gentleman in the President's confidence, who would give me any further explanations that I might desire, as to what was meditated in relation to the United States Bank, and who then called on me because he was about to proceed forthwith to Baltimore. I did not invite nor check communication. Very little was said, and perhaps because I could not wholly conceal my mortification at an attempt, apparently made with the sanction of the President, to reduce me to a mere cypher in the administration.

"The next morning, June 3d, I waited upon the President, and, as I had been apprized by Mr. Whitney would be the case, he soon introduced the subject of the Bank. I stated that Mr. Whitney had made known to me what had been done, and what was intended, and had intimated that his communication was made at the President's desire. The President replied, in a tone of dissatisfaction, that it was true he had conferred with Mr. Whitney, and obtained information from him as to the Bank, but that he did not make him his confidant, nor had he told him to call on me. I enumerated the representations which Mr. Whitney had made, and their

* It is due to this gentleman to state, that I subsequently learned, he was opposed to a removal prior to July, 1834, and was for only a gradual change afterwards.

correctness was admitted. I said, I feared that I should not be able to see the subject in the light in which the President viewed it; to which he remarked, that he liked frankness, that my predecessor and himself had sometimes differed in opinion, but it had made no difference in feeling, and should not in my case; that the matter under consideration was of vast consequence to the country; that unless the bank was broken down, it would break us down; that if the last Congress had remained a week longer in session, two-thirds would have been secured for the Bank by corrupt means; and that the like result might be apprehended at the next Congress; that such a state bank agency must be put in operation before the meeting of Congress, as would show that the United States Bank was not necessary, and thus some members would have no excuse for voting for it. My suggestions as to an inquiry by Congress, as in December, 1832, or a recourse to the judiciary, the President repelled, saying it would be idle to rely upon either; referring, as to the judiciary, to decisions already made, as indications of what would be the effect of an appeal to them in future. After mentioning, that he would speak to me again, before he departed for the eastward, he said he meant to take the opinions of the members of the cabinet with him, but would send them to me from New York, together with his views, and would expect me, on his return, to give him my sentiments frankly and fully.

"The President left Washington on the 6th of June. During his absence further circumstances came to my knowledge, which induced me to believe, that the removal of the deposits was not advocated with any view to public utility, but urged to accomplish selfish, if not factious purposes. I sought no intercourse with those, who, I felt satisfied, had an undue influence over the President, at least in relation to the grave questions connected with the removal of the deposits. Whenever any of them called on me, there was no hesitation in urging me to accord in the proposed measure. It was contended that the removal of the deposits would be made a rallying point at the opening of Congress, or a flag up for the new members. Whenever I urged a recourse, in the first instance, to Congress, or the judiciary, such a step was scouted, and delay represented as hazardous. "I had heard rumours of the existence of an influence at Washington, unknown to the constitution. The conviction, that such an influence existed, at least in relation to the matters then pressed upon me, was irresistible. I knew that four of the six members of the cabinet, before I became a member of it, had been opposed to any present action in relation to the deposits; and I also knew that four of the six members of the existing cabinet entertained the same views. I felt satisfied, not only that the President was not in the hands of his constitutional advisers, but that their advice was successfully resisted by persons, whose views I considered at variance with the public interest, and the President's fame.

"Such were my impressions, when, on the 1st of July, I received a letter from the President, dated "Boston, June 26th, 1833," together with his views, and the opinions of four of the members of the cabinet, voluminous papers, in the examination of which I was engaged when the President unexpectedly returned to Washington, on the 4th of July.

"In the views given by the President, he expressed his opinion, that the secretary of the treasury would be wisely exercising the discretion conferred upon him by law, by directing the deposits to be made in the state banks, from and after the 15th of September, if arrangements to be made with them should be then completed.

“In his letter, he stated that the only difficulty he for some time had, was as to the time when the change should commence; that he thought the time should be from the 1st to the 15th of September; that an agent should be sent to consult with state banks upon the practicability of an arrange