its own control, rather than use other Banks, which were not created for any such purpose, are not suited to it, and over which Congress can exercise no supervision. The power in either case to use a bank, can be derived only from the fact, that it is necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers granted by the Constitution. The General Goverment is not made by the Constitution to depend, for the execution of its powers, on the uncertain aid of institutions created by other authorities and independent of its control. It is expressly authorized to carry those powers into effect by its own means, by passing the laws necessary and proper for that purpose, and in this instance by its own Bank.

But it is not on the useful agency of the Bank in treasury operations that its constitutionality is now mainly placed. The States, though forbidden by the Constitution to issue bills of credit, have, to all intents and purposes, so done, through the agency of the banks, and the notes of these banks produce the very effect the Constitution intended to prevent by the prohibition. The injustice to individuals, the embarrassments of government, the depreciation of the currency, its want of uniformity, the moral necessity imposed on the community, either to receive the unsound currency, or to suspend business transactions, all the evils consequent on the suspension of specie payments have been as great, if not greater, than those which might have flowed from a paper currency, issued directly by State authority.

We have already adverted to several provisions of the Constitution which give Congress the right and impose the duty to provide a remedy; but there is another, deserving special consideration. Notwithstanding the suspension of specie payments in Great Britain, the Bank of England, by its notes, though fluctuating and depreciated, furnished a currency which was uniform throughout the kingdom. But such we have seen was not the case with the currency supplied here by the State banks. It was not only depreciated, but multiform. It is specially provided by the Constitution of the United States, 1. That all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; and, 2. That Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, according to their respective population. Both these just provisions are violated when currencies, of different values in the several States, prevail. Upon this ground, alone, Congress would be obliged to provide means for giving effect to these constitutional provisions. The uniformity of taxes of every nature is an essential and fundamental principle of the Constitution and our political association. That uniformity depends on the uniformity of the currency. Therefore, laws to effect this are "necessary and proper," in the strictest sense of the words. But there are two means only

to attain the object, a metallic or a uniform paper currency. The one may be possible, but it is difficult of attainment, and if attainable, inexpedient; because it involves the destruction of all the State banks and the established commercial system. The other is prepared to our hands, and we know, from long and various experience, will insure a sound and uniform currency; checking and regulating the greater part which it does not itself supply.

3. We are now to examine the third reason of the Secretary, for believing that the charter of the Bank will not be renewed; which is, that public opinion had pronounced against the Bank in the result of the Presidential election. In his cabinet communication of 18th September, 1833, the President avers, that his election was put upon the question of the recharter. "Can it now be said," he exclaims, "that the question of a recharter of the Bank was not decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal, or had it not covered the whole ground-if it had merely taken exceptions to the details of the bill, or to the time of its passage-if it had not met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then there might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take his stand, that the question was brought forward at that particular time. He met the challenge, willingly, took the position into which his adversaries sought to force him, and frankly declared his unalterable opposition to the Bank, as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient.

"On that ground the case was argued to the people. And now that the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinion of others, the President considers his re-election as a decision of the people against the Bank."

In the concluding paragraph of his veto message, he said:

"I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find in the motives which impel me, ample grounds for contentment and peace. He was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his gratitude by carrying into effect their decision, so far as it depends upon him."

The Secretary echoes these declarations thus: "The question of the renewal of the charter was introduced into the election by the corporation itself. Its voluntary application to Congress for the renewal of its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the election of President, was understood on all sides, as bringing forward the question for incidental deci

sion, at the then approaching election. It was, accordingly, argued, on both sides, before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced against the Bank, by the election of the candidate who was known to have been always inflexibly opposed to it."

We have made these extracts for the double purpose of controverting and disproving the allegations, and of rebuking the political heresy which they contain. We have, elsewhere, shown, that the President, prior to his cabinet communication, had, at no time, met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency-that the veto was not equivocal, inasmuch as it declared, that the Bank of the United States was convenient for the government, and useful for the people; that the President was impressed with the belief, not that a Bank of the United States was unconstitutional and inexpedient, but that some of the powers and privileges of the EXISTING Bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, "and that, had the Executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed." Without comment upon the arrogance of the intimation, that the Executive would furnish the Legislature a plan for the regulation of the finances of the country-a matter exclusively pertaining to the latter, and the ignorance which the suggestion displays of the relative rights and obligations of the executive and legislative branches of the government, we ask whether this naked prevarication is not at once a mockery of the people, and a disgrace to the country?

"But what part of the charter, or of any law of Congress, authorises the Secretary to communicate such a reason to the House? Where is the warrant for the Secretary's instructing Congress as to the decision of the people upon a matter of future legislation? By what channel does the Secretary maintain an intercourse with the people that is not open to their representatives? How does the Secretary know any thing as to the wishes of the people, which the representatives of the people do not better know themselves? The communication of such a reason to the representatives of freemen, who are themselves freemen, is without a precedent in the history of this or any other representative Government. The alleged fact is, moreover, an assumption, and a mere assumption, without proof, and without the means of proof. It is a political inference which the people of this country will never sustain, until they are prepared to say that the election of a President is not the result af a preference founded upon his general qualifications, opinions, and actions, but is an adoption and ratification of his single will to any extent that he has at any time declared it, and even when he may have declared it in contrary directions at different times.

The constitutionality and expediency of a Bank of the United States, was not put before the tribunal of the people, nor did they understand that they were required to judge such a question. We appeal to their representatives in either House of Congress.

Mr. Clay, of the Senate, replies:

"In the canvass which ensued, it was boldly asserted, by the partizans of the President, that he was not opposed to a Bank of the United States, nor to the existing Bank with proper amendments. They maintained, at least wherever those friendly to a National Bank were in the majority, that his re-election would be followed by a recharter of the Bank with proper amendments. They dwelt, it is true, with great earnestness upon his objections to the Bank, as at present modified, and especially to the pernicious influence of foreigners holding stock in it; but they, nevertheless, contended, that these objections would be cured, if he was re-elected, and the Bank sustained. I appeal to the whole Senate, to my colleague, to the people of Kentucky, and especially, to the citizens of the city of Louisville, for the correctness of this statement.”—[Speech 26 & 30th Dec. 1833.]

Mr. Southard responds:

"Due regard was observed not to close up the question. For we are assured, that after the Veto, 'a general discussion will take place, eliciting new, and settling important principles: and a new Congress, elected in the midst of such discussions, and furnishing an equal representation of the people, according to the last census, will bear to the Capitol, the verdict of public opinion, and, I doubt not, bring this question to a satisfactory result.' What Congress was to bear this verdict to the Capitol? The present-that now in actual session, in that very Capitol-members elected amidst those discussions, of which, I am one! We were to bear the verdict! Had the Secretary heard it when he acted? Did the Executive wait to hear it? How did they know what we should say? How know, that a majority would not be of the opinion, that the Bank ought to be rechartered? Or that, even two-thirds might not be found to oppose on this point, the Executive will, should that will resist their views in managing their constitutional guardianship over the Treasury? Could they not wait sixty days for that verdict, for which they had promised to wait? Was the country on the brink of ruin, sliding down the precipice into the gulph of irretrievable bankruptcy, that its drowning honour and perishing fortunes must be thus rudely rescued? That message was a solemn promise, by the Executive, to let this question be settled by Congress and to submit to it. What else can the words mean, but that, the people would consider the subject, and their representatives decide it? Did the President intend to trifle with the people? To profess regard for their opinions, as expressed through Congress, and yet to scorn those opinions by his actions? Was he giving out Delphic responses? Did he palter with us in a double sense? No, sir, he meant, then, what he said, however ill the promise has been kept, under the influence of those who have surrounded him. The people so understood-they so believed. It was to be tested, whether, without new arguments or new facts, legislative assemblies, chambers of commerce, and the great majority of the people of these States, had changed their opinions upon the new lights, which subservience to party, and devotion to men have afforded? Nay, it was even reasonable to suppose, that the President himself might yield his official opinions to the deliberate, well-considered opi. nions of a majority of the people, and to permit their judgments to govern in this land of majorities, and under institutions which have so long sanctioned the existence of such a fiscal agent. It had been so before. Mr. Madison had yielded his doubts, upon principles, and for reasons which do equal honour to his head and heart, and which are well developed in his letter of 25th June, 1831.”

And Mr. Wilkins-to be sure, the mutable nature of this gentleman's opinions may detract somewhat from the force of his testimony-but as, like the helianthus, his changeful course always looks towards the sun above the horizon, and as he is the zealous worshipper of the luminary, we may use his evi

dence with confidence, and with a compliment to the sincerity which most notably puts the President in the wrong, and reproves the Secretary most ungently for overlooking the Act of Congress, and directing his eye to political signs.

"A bill," he says, "had been introduced into Congress for the renewal of the Bank charter, and had been lost. The same Chief Magistrate, by whose veto that measure had been defeated, was subsequently re-elected by the people. And I will take occasion to observe, that I do not put the common construction upon that political event; and in the inference I draw from it, I differ in some degree from the President and Secretary of the Treasury. I do not think that result turned upon the question of the recharter of the Bank; nor was it a popular decision of that inquiry. I believe the people in that Presidential election looked beyond the Bank; and (without meaning any indelicacy towards his distinguished competitor,) were governed by higher and more interesting considerations in the re-election of General Jackson. Thousands of voters threw their weight on the side of the successful candidate, who would vote for a National Bank to-morrow.”

Has the gentleman who uses this unkind frankness no fear of the pains and penalties provided for "refractory subordinates," whether of the official or party hierarchy ?

Let us now seek the opinions of the immediate delegates of the people, in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Moore, of Va., says:

"I cannot perceive the least propriety in the Secretary introducing topics of this kind into his report: nor do I know by whom he was constituted the judge of the motives which governed the people in making choice of a chief magistrate; but I am certain, he could not have come to a more erroneous conclusion, than he has done. Every gentleman here knows, that General Jackson would have been elected whether he was for or against the Bank. The only hope entertained by his opponents of preventing his re-election, was dependent upon his vetoing the Bank charter. All admitted if he approved the charter, he would be elected by a great majority. He would have been elected if he had chartered forty banks, by even a larger vote than he received. The chartering the Bank was not the only question upon which the Presidential election turned: on the contrary, it is probable that more than one half of those who voted for the present Chief Magistrate were, at that time, in favour of rechartering the Bank."

And Mr. Wise, also of Virginia, who reports himself, as we have already noticed, "most distinctly" a friend of the administration, and an "honest man," thus expresses his sentiments to the same purpose:

"Sir, I am, undisguisedly and decidedly, a friend to the constitutional power of Congress to incorporate a Bank of the United States on proper principles; and I am more than ever convinced, that such an institution, properly organized, is absolutely necessary to conduct, not only the commercial operations of the people, but the financial operations of the government. And there is no subject on which I differ more widely with the President and with the Secretary, than on this important subject. I, for one, once did think that the President would sanction such a charter as can be made congenial to, and consistent with the Constitution. On all proper occasions when using my feeble efforts to elect him, I confidently declared this belief to many of the people whom I represent."

Mr. Chilton Allen, whom we had before occasion to quote, with much satisfaction, testifies, thus, to the same effect: