The Osborne judgment-the decision of the Law Lords in the case of "Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants "-attained in 1910 a prominence scarcely inferior to that of the Constitutional question.

As long ago as 1874, 13 candidates stood for Parliament as direct representatives of Labour. Two (Messrs. Alexander MacDonald and Thos. Burt) were successful, but they subsequently rejoined the Liberal Party. At the General Election of 1892, 3 independent candidates were returned. Two of them (Messrs. John Burns, now Presi dent of the Local Government Board, and J. Havelock Wilson) have rejoined the Liberals; the third was Mr. Keir Hardie. In 1899 the the Trade Union Congress formed a Labour Representation Committee (in conjunction with Socialist bodies), but at the "khaki" election of 1900 only Messrs. Hardie and Richard Bell succeeded as its candidates. The decision in the case "Taff Vale Railway Co.v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants" apparently gave an impetus to the Labour representation movement, and at the General Election of 1906, 29 members (increased to 32 at subsequent by elections) were elected. The Labour Representation Committee thereupon adopted the name of the Labour Party, and constituted itself a separate organisation in the House, with its own Chairman (elected every two years) and Whips. The present Chairman is Mr. G. N. Barnes, M.P., and the Whips are Messrs. G. H. Roberts, M.P., and C. Duncan, M.P. The Secretary of the Party organisation is Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., with offices at 39, Queen Victoria Street, S. W.

The Parliamentary Fund of the Party has been raised by a levy on the affiliated societies at the rate of 2d. per member per annum of their full membership. From this fund the Party pays 25 per cent. of the returning officer's expenses for approved candidates, and £200 per annum maintenance to its elected members of Parlia

inent.

alternative-expulsion from its membership, with the confiscation of his contributions to its funds and exclusion from all share in its provident and other benefits. The majority of the members of his branch seem to have shared the opinions of the secretary. Other branches supported them, and an appeal to the executive for a ballot on the direct question of affiliation with the Labour Party having been declined, a fund was raised for the purpose of testing the legality of the new rules.

Mr. Justice Neville, before whom the case first came, decided in favour of the Society, mainly on the ground that the point appeared to him to have been settled by previous decisions. Upon appeal, however, his decision was unanimously reversed (Nov. 28th, 1908) by the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justices Moulton and Farwell. The Master of the Rolls held that the new rules were outside the scope of a trade union as defined and contemplated in the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. The two Lords Justices expressed the further objection that rules designed to procure the election of members of Parliament who should be bound to vote in a prescribed manner, and the expenditure of funds for their maintenance in consideration of a pledge to vote in that manner, were contrary to public policy.

The Society appealed from this decision to the House of Lords. The arguments were heard in July 1999, but judgment was not delivered until Dec. 21st. The Law Lords who heard the case were the Earl of Halsbury, Lord Macnaghten, Lord James of Hereford, Lord Atkinson, and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline. They unanimously upheld the judgment of the Court below. Lords Halsbury, Macnaghten and Atkinson held that the new rules were ultra vires; Lord James of Hereford and Lord Shaw based their decision upon the ground that they were contrary to public policy. Although the decision leit open to the

a voluntary for a compulsory fund, it was regarded as a fatal blow to the Parliamentary representation of Labour, and a vigorous agitation was set on foot for the legalisation of the principle of compulsory levies.

The sense of these resolutions is somewhat obscure, but their effect, as carried out by the executive, was to require every member of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants to make regular contributions out of his own pocket, and to allow payments to be made out of the society's funds for the election and other expenses of and for the payment of a salary to members of Parliament controlled by a Socialist executive.

Mr. Osborne, as a Liberal in politics, was unwilling to subscribe to the support of Socialist members of Parliament; having been a member of the Society since 1892, he was equally unwilling to submit to the threatened

The Trade Union Congress on Sept. 15th adopted a resolution which claimed the immediate restoration of the right of effective parliamentary representation to organised labour, and called upon the affiliated organisations to bring pressure to bear on the Government to provide facilities for the passing of the Labour Party's Bill.

On Sept. 30th the Executive Committee of the Labour Party took a step which seemed to point to a tactical change of position. They announced their intention of recommending to the annual meeting to be held at Leicester in Feb. 1911, a revision of the constitution in the direction of abardoning the requirement of a written pledge from their Parliamentary representatives.

More than one Liberal leader has pointed to the State payment of members of Parliament as the way to remove any legitimate grievance of the Labour Party against the judgment in the Osborne case Speaking at Manchester on Oct. 14th Sir Rufus Isaacs said it was quite

clear there never could be a complete reversal of the Osborne judgment. When payment of members and payment of election expenses had been introduced a great deal would have been done towards opening the door and keep: ing open the door for Labour members and for Parliamentary representatives of the wageearning classes.

A few prominent Unionist members of Parliament gave expression to the feeling that if choice must be made between payment of members and a reversal of the Osborne judgment, they would advocate the payment of members. That feeling was dealt with by Mr. Balfour in his speech at Edinburgh on Oct. 5th. He did not believe, he said, that the effects of "the slow and subtle poison that would be introduced into our Parliamentary system by payment of members" could easily be exaggerated, and he refused to think that it and the reversal of the Osborne judgment were necessary alternatives.

On Nov. 18th, in the course of the statement referred to on p. 351, Mr. Asquith announced that it was the intention of the Government, if they had an opportunity and the requisite Parliamentary following next year, to propose a provision out of public funds for the payment of members. On Nov. 22 he made the further announcement that the Government would propose legislation empowering trade unions to include in their objects and organisation the provision of a fund for Parliamentary and municipal action and representation and kindred objects, and to combine for such purposes, provided that the opinion of the union is effectivelylascertained, and that there shall be no compulsion upon any member to contribute to the fund. In answer to Mr. Keir Hardie, Mr. Asquith said he thought it followed from his statement that the fund referred to must be a separate fund, and that money for parliamentary purposes must not be taken out of the general fund of a union.

Daylight Saving is the name given to a proposed alteration of the clock at certain times of the year, so as to bring it more nearly into accord with solar time. The movement in favour of the alteration owes its impetus to Mr. W. Willett, who explained his views in a pamphlet which commanded widespread interest. In the Session of 1008 the idea was embodied by Mr. R. Pearce, M.P., in a Bill which passed its second reading by what has been called "a Parliamentary accident," and was referred to a Select Committee. Mr. Pearce's Bill proposed to promote the earlier use of daylight in certain months yearly by putting forward the clock twenty minutes on four successive Sundays in April and by reversing the process on the four Sundays in September. The Committee found that the paramount advantage would be the greater use of daylight during the months named. The effect of the proposals would be (1) to move the usual hours of work and leisure nearer sunrise, (2) to promote the greater use of daylight for recreative purposes of all kinds, (3) to lessen the use of licensed houses, (4) to facilitate the training of the Territorial Forces, (5) to benefit the physique, general health, and welfare of all classes, (6) to reduce the industrial, commercial, and domestic expenditure on artificial light. The report further found that the principle of the Bill was supported by the Chambers of Commerce of London, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Sheffield, and other towns, the borough councils of Glasgow, Huddersfield, Bournemouth, Hackney, Llandudno, and other places; by the L. & N.W. Railway. L. & S. W. Railway, G.C. Railway, and G.E. Railway (except as regards Continental traffic); by the Secretary of the General Federation of Trade Unions, comprising 700,000 members, etc. The Com mittee considered that the best mode attaining the object would be one single alteration of one hour at 2 a. m. on the third Sunday of April, and a similar change in the reverse direction at 2 a.m. on the third Sunday in September. The Committee also considered that there was no practical difficulty in adjusting clocks and watches to the seasonable changes. There would be no interference with Greenwich mean time, and for all scientific

of

purposes, such as astronomy and navigation, Greenwich mean time would continue to be used. The Bill was reported on June 30th, and recommitted to a Committee of the whole House; but it failed to reach the final stages. In the session of 1909, Mr. Dobson, having been lucky enough to draw the first place in the ballot, chose a Daylight Saving Bill for the exercise of his privilege. Mr. Dobson's Bill embodied the recommendation of the Select Committee of 1908, and proposed two alterations of the clock instead of four. It passed its second reading by 130 votes to 94 on March 5th, and was committed to a Select Committee. A meeting was held at the Guildhall, under the presidency of the Lord Mayor, on April 20th, and a resolution in favour of the Bill was passed by a large majority. The Select Committee, however, reported (Aug, 26th) against it. The Chairman's draft report in favour of the Bill was rejected by 6 votes to 5, and a report adopted which stated that, "having regard to the great diversity of opinion existing upon the proposals of the Bill, and to the grave doubts which have been expressed as to whether the objects of the measure can be attained by legislation without giving rise, in cases involving important interests, to serious inconvenience, your Committee recommend that the Bill be not further proceeded with."

The Bill has now received the support of 162 Corporations and Town Councils, and also the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland (representing 199 towns), with a population equalling about 16,000,000 people; by the Conference of Urban District Councils of England and Wales in July 1909, when over 200 Councils were represented; and by 47 Chambers of Commerce, including the Associated Chambers at their meeting in London on March 30th, Chambers were represented. 1999, and March 15th, 1910, when over 100

A similar Bill has been introduced into the

Parliaments of the United States of America, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and Victoria (Australia).

It is intended to reintroduce the Bill into the House of Commons when a convenient opportunity occurs.

Mr. Asquith stated in Aug. 1908 that the Government regarded it as "a binding obligation" to submit, before it went out of office, a really effective scheme of electoral reform. As a step to this end a Royal Commission was appointed in Dec. "to examine the various schemes which have been adopted or proposed, in order to secure a fully representative char acter for popularly elected legislative bodies, and to consider whether, and how far they, or any of them, are capable of application in this country in regard to the existing electorate.' The Commission consisted of Lord Richard Cavendish (chairman), Lord Lochee, Hon. Edwin S. Montagu, M.P., Sir Francis Hopwood, Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Sir Charles Eliot, Hon. William Pember Reeves, and Mr. John W. Hills, M.P.

The report of the Commission [Cd. 5163], price 6d, was published in May 1910. They summarised their conclusions as follows: "We recommend," they said, "the adoption of the Alternative Vote in cases where more than two candidates stand for one seat. We do not recommend its application to two-member constituencies, but we submit that the question of the retention of such constituencies, which are anomalous, should be reconsidered as soon as opportunity offers. Of schemes for producing proportional representation, we think that the Transferable Vote would have the best chance of ultimate acceptance, but we are unable to recommend its adoption in existing circumstances for elections to the House of Commons.' Alleged Faults of Present System. The present system of electing representatives is mainly criticised on the ground that it makes no provision for the representation of minorities, while, on the other hand, it gives majorities no security; for a party that has a large majority of votes in its favour in a minority of constituencies and small majorities against it in a majority of constituencies, will be in a minority in the House of Commons: indeed, it happened in two comparatively recent General Elections in the United Kingdom that a minority of electors returned a majority of members. Further, a candidate has no chance of being accepted unless he subscribes to the full creed of a party and obeys the party "machine." And, lastly the rise of a third party in politics raises problems in single-member constituencies of which the second ballot-a remedy tried and found wanting in other European countries -offers no solution.

The Remedy Proposed,

The advocates of Proportional Representation, which, in one form or another, has already been introduced in Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Wurtemberg, Tasmania, and in the senatorial and provincial elections of the South African Union, assert boldly that if representative government is to be a reality, it must ultimately occupy the whole area of representative institutions.

bers are returned that the representation can be divided between the different parties existing in the constituency in proportion to their strength. In the case of a city entitled to nine members, if four-ninths of the electors were Liberals, three-ninths Unionist Tariff Reformers, one-ninth Unionist Free Traders, and one-ninth supporters of the Independent Labour Party, the true representation of that city would be four Liberals, three Tariff Reformers, one Unionist Free Trader, and one Labour Member. This object can be attained by several methods, which, however, fall generally into two groups-being either systems of "lists," such as the Belgian system, or systems in which the elector votes independently of any list, as in the system of the 'single transferable vote,'

"List" Systems.

All "list" systems of proportional representation have this in common, that each party puts forward a list of candidates for which the elector votes either as a whole or with modifications of his own devising. At the close of the poll the returning officer counts the votes given to each list and allots to it a number of seats proportionate to its strength, the candidates who were nominated at the top of the list being generally elected. Thus, if there be Liberal, Conservative, and Socialist lists in a nine-member constituency, and each list gets an equal number of votes, each list will be entitled to three members, who will nearly always be those three candidates whose names appeared at the head of the list. But the "list" methods have not found wide favour with British advocates of proportional representation, as the British elector is not used to list voting, and all forms of list systems are thought to give too much power to party managers and allow too little independence to the elector.

The Transferable Vote.

The method most favoured in the United Kingdom is that of the "single transferable vote," which operates thus. Form a constituency returning several members. Give each voter one vote (for if he be given as many votes as there are candidates, as in municipal elections, a bare majority of electors, or, where more than two parties exist, the largest single party, will obtain all the representation). Then, if the electors fall naturally into equal and distinct parties corresponding in number to the vacancies to be filled-e.g. five parties in a fivemember constituency, the problem is solved, for each party will return a member, the champions of each party receiving each about the same number of votes and occupying the five places at the head of the poll. It may be observed that the Japanese actually use this system. But in practice this satisfactory result would rarely or never happen, at any rate in the United Kingdom. It is more likely that with us there would be three parties of unequal size-Liberal, Conservative, and Labour; and in such a case, if each elector has one vote, it may happen that the most numerous party will not obtain the majority of the seats because it may waste its votes in giving its most popular candidate a large majority. Thus a poll in

The essential feature of all schemes of pro'portional representation is the formation of constituencies returning several members-the number might vary from 3 to as many as 13 or more. For it is only if several mem

-a plainly unjust result, in which the great popularity of the first Conservative candidate has actually lost his party two seats. It is in order to avoid this evil that the vote is made transferable-i.e. the elector is allowed to indicate to whom he wishes his vote transferred if the candidate whom he most favours does not need his vote. This the elector does by marking the candidate he likes best by the figure 1, and indicating his second, third, and further choices by the figures 2, 3 and so on, placed opposite the names of other candidates. The task of the returning officer involves more care than the present system. He has, in the first instance, to ascertain what is the least number of votes sufficient to render certain the election of a candidate, a number usually called "the quota." [For it must always be borne in mind, in considering a proportional system, that a candidate, to ensure election, does not need to poll a majority of the votes cast-i.e. to have a majority of the electors as his own personal supporters-but only to poll a number of votes enough to make it certain that he will be one of the candidates high enough on the poll to secure a seat-e.g. where five are to be elected that he will be one of the first five.] This quota is determined as follows: just as in a single-member constituency a candidate who polls one more than half the votes must be elected, and the quota there would therefore be one more than half, so in a two-member constituency the quota is one more than a third-for not more than two candidates can poll so much-and in a three-member constituency one more than a fourth, and so on, and the general rule for arriving at the quota is to divide the total of all the votes by one more than the number of seats to be filled and add one to the result. Thus, in the above illustration, the quota would be 10,000 divided by six, or (neglecting fractions) 1666 +1 = 1667.

Having ascertained the quota, the returning officer declares elected the candidates who have received that number of votes, and then transfers in strict proportion the surplus votes of those candidates who have received more than the quota, and credits them to the unelected candidates indicated as next preferences by the voters whose votes are transferred. He then declares elected those candidates who, as a result of these transfers, have received the quota. Thus, this operation would result in the election of more Conservative candidates in the illustration given above, for the first Conservative candidate would be left with 1667 votes (one quota) only, and the balance would be transferred-if the electors had so marked their papers-to the second and third Conservative candidates, who thus would have received the quota and been elected.

votes are transferred, in accordance with the wishes of their supporters, to the candidates indicated as next preferences. This is done on the theory that their election is hopeless, and therefore their supporters are treated as being asked and (where further preferences are marked) as answering the question, "The candidate of your first choice being hopeless, whom now do you prefer?" The returning officer continues this process of elimination until the required number of candidates, having each obtained the quota, have been declared elected, or the number of candidates not eliminated is reduced to the number of seats still vacant, in which event the candidates not eliminated are declared elected.

Other Systems of Voting.

It is not possible within the limits of this article to deal with the various earlier attempts, more or less unsatisfactory, to secure more accurate representation, but we may mention in passing the cumulative and the limited vote. On the system of the Cumulative Vote each elector in a many-membered constituency had as many votes as there were vacancies, with liberty to give them all to one candidate or distribute them as he pleased. The objection to this system is the same as the objection to the non-transferable single vote above described. A very popular candidate does harm to his own cause, and a premium is put upon the undesirable calculations of machine politicians. This system was used in School Board elections.

The Limited Vote, on the other hand, is the name given to the system by which an elector in a many-membered constituency had a number of votes less than the number of vacancies without the power of giving more than one vote to one man. It was used in the " 3-cornered " parliamentary constituencies which existed from 1867 to 1885.

The Second Ballot is often mentioned in connection with proportional representation, but in reality it is a device which is the opposite of a proportional system. The Second Ballot preserves the method of single-member constituencies, which, according to the view of supporters of the proportional principle, makes true representation impossible, and (in its most usual form) provides that, where more than two candidates contest a seat, then, unless the man at the head of the poll has the support of more than half of the voters, a second election is held after an interval of seven or fourteen days, at which only the two candidates highest on the indecisive poll present themselves to the electors. It thus extinguishes minorities more completely than the present system.

As a substitute for the second ballot, the use of the Alternative Vote has been much favoured of late years By this system, which is in force in parts of Australia, the elector in a singlemeinber constituency, where three or more candidates stand, can mark with a 2 the name of his second choice. Then, if the leading candidate has not a clear majority, the candidate lowest on the poll is eliminated, and his votes are transferred, just as on the system of the transferable vote.

Further information as to all matters connected with electoral reform may be obtained from the Hon. Sec. of the Proportional Representation Society, Mr. John H. Humphreys, 179, St. Stephen's House, Westminster.

If these transfers of surplus votes do not result in filling all the vacancies, the candidates lowest on the poll are eliminated by the returning officer one after the other and their