and to refute the arguments of his antagonist. The point in dispute is sometimes a question of fact. Did the defendent do, or not do, the action, with which he is charged by the plaintiff? Sometimes it is a question of right. The fact may be undeniable; and the only point in debate, Was it right, wrong or indifferent? lawful or criminal? Sometimes indeed both points may be contended by the parties. But it doth not belong to us, to enter into these minutiae, or consider the different sources of topics, whence the proof must be derived. Only from what hath been said, it is manifest that this species, from its very nature, is perfectly analogous to the second class of sermons, the controversial. It is directed to the understanding; its aim is conviction; the adversaries it professeth to combat, are doubtfulness and mistake. The demonstrative, a name given to those panegyrics or funeral orations, which were sometimes by public authority pronounced in honor of departed patriots and heroes, must from the design of insinuating the love of virtue by exhibiting such examples to their imitation, so exactly and so evidently coincide in form and composition, (however different in regard to matter or subject,) to the third class of sermons above mentioned, the commendatory, that I should think it unnecessary to attempt any further illustration of it. Only it may not be amiss to observe here by the way, that to this political expedient among the ancient Greeks and Romans, of paying such public honors to their great men departed, perhaps more than to any other, that love of their country, that contempt of life, and that thirst of military glory, for which they were so remarkable, is to be ascribed. The term deliberative is applied to speeches in the senate or in the assembly of the people, whose express aim is to persuade the audience to come to a certain resolution, in regard to their conduct as a commonwealth or state, such as, to declare war, or to make peace, to enter into an alliance, or the contrary. Discourses of this sort must evidently be in many respects very similar to the fifth and last class of sermons above mentioned. They are addressed to the will, their aim is persuasion. The enemies they combat are temerity, imprudence, and other such vices, considered particularly as political evils, as prejudicial to the interest or honor of the state. Nay, there will be often found a pretty considerable coincidence in the topics, from which the arguments, in both these kinds of persuasives, are commonly drawn. The use

ful, the honorable, the equitable, are considerations entirely well adapted to each. To the first and fourth kinds of sermons mentioned, there is not found anything in the institutes of rhetoricians which can be denominated analogous. The first, the explanatory, is indeed, of all kinds the simplest, and may in respect of form be considered as bearing a resemblance to the lessons delivered in the schools of the philosophers, in regard to which, no person, as far as I know, has: thought it necessary to lay down rules. The fourth kind, the pathetic, hath in point of aim more similarity to the eloquence of the theatre, tragedy in particular, than to that either of the bar or of the senate. But the difference in form arising from the nature of the work, between all dramatic compositions, and the discourses prepared for the pulpit, is so extremely great; that I have not judged it necessary hitherto so much as to name this species of oratory.

And as probably I shall not have occasion in these prelections to mention it hereafter, I shall now take the liberty to give you briefly, in passing, my sentiments concerning theatrical performances, and the use which may be made of them by the Christian orator. As to the drama in general, it is manifestly no more than a particular form, in which a tale or fable is exhibited; and if the tale itself be moral and instructive, it would require no small degree of fanaticism to make one think, that its being digested into so many dialogues, and dressed up in the dramatic form, can render it immoral and pernicious. So much for the question of right, as I may call it. If from this we proceed to a question of fact, to which the other very naturally gives occasion, and in-quire, whether the greater number of modern plays, be such tales as we can really denominate moral and instructive, on the contrary, such as have a tendency to vitiate the principles and debauch the practice of the spectators; to this: point, I acknowledge, it is more difficult to give a satisfactory answer. I own, indeed, that in my judgment the far greater part of our comedies, I say not all, merit the latter character, rather than the former. For not to mention the gross indecencies with which many of them abound, (and to the reproach of our national taste, as well as morals, English comedy perhaps more than any other,) what is generally the hero of the piece, but a professed rake or libertine, who is a man of more spirit, forsooth, than to be checked in his pursuits by the restraints of religion, the dictates of conscience,

or

the laws of society, or, (which were accounted sacred even among pagans and barbarians,) by the rights. of hospitality and of private friendship? Such a one, the poet, in order to recommend him to the special favor of the audience, adorns with all the wit and humor and other talents, of which he himself is master, and always crowns with success in the end. Hence it is, that the stage with us may, without any hyperbole, be defined, the school of gallantry and intrigue; in other words, the school of dissoluteness. Here the youth of both sexes may learn to get rid of that troublesome companion Modesty, intended by Providence as a guard to virtue, and a check against licentiousness. Here vice may soon provide herself in a proper stock of effrontery for effectuating her designs, and triumphing over innocence. But besides the evil that too commonly results from the nature and conduct of the fable, there is another, in the tendency to dissipation and idleness, the great enemies of sobriety, industry and reflection, which theatrical amusements ordinarily give to the younger part of the spectators. On the other hand, are there no advantages which may serve as a counterbalance to these evils? There are some advantages; it would not be candid to dissemble them, but they can be no counterbalance. What is just pronunciation, easy motion, and graceful action, compared with virtue? Those accomplishments are merely superficial, an external polish; this is internal and essential. But at the same time that we acknowledge that the manner and pronunciation of the orator may be improved by that of the actor, we must also admit, on the other side, that by the same means it may be injured. And I have known it, in fact, injured in consequence of too servile an imitation of the stage. I allow, that what hath been advanced regards only the modern English comedy, for, though some of our tragedies are also exceptionable in point of morals, yet they are comparatively but a few, and those by no means faulty in the same way, and much less to the same degree. And as I would with equal freedom approve, and even recommend what I think laudable and useful, as I would censure what I think blamable and hurtful, I cannot deny, but that both in regard to the sentiments, and in the wonderful talent of operating on the passions, the tragic poet will often give important lessons to the preacher. I would be far then from dissuading you from consulting occasionally whatever may contribute to your improvement. Our great apostle, as we learn

from his history and epistles, did not scruple to read the dramatic pieces of heathen poets; nay, he has even thought fit sometimes to quote their sentiments with approbation, and to give their very words the sanction of sacred writ. Where debates arise on any subject, it is almost invariably the case, that both sides run to extremes, alike deserting truth and moderation. It is the part of a wise man, like the bee, to extract from everything what is good and salutary, and to guard whatever is of a contrary quality. But I am aware, that the most of what I have said on this subject may be looked on as a digression. I acknowledge, it in a great measure is so; but as the mention of it was perfectly apposite, and as few topics have occasioned warmer disputes among Christians, I did not think it suited that decorum of character, which I would wish always to preserve, to appear artfully, when a fair opportunity offers, to avoid telling freely my opinion.

LECTURE VI.

ON THE COMPOSITION OF LECTURES.

In my last lecture on the subject of pulpit eloquence I told you, that every discourse was addressed either to the understanding of the hearers, to their imagination, to their pas sions or to their will. As those addressed to the understanding may be intended either for explaining something unknown to them, or for proving something disbelieved or doubted by them, sermons in the largest acceptation of the word may be distributed into five classes, the explanatory, the argumentative or controversial, the demonstrative or commendatory, the pathetic and the persuasive. It will not be amiss here, in order to prevent mistakes, to take notice of the particular import which I mean to give to some terms, as often as I employ them on this subject. The first.I shall mention is the term demonstrative, which in the application usual with rhetoricians, hath no relation to the sense of the word as used by mathematicians. Here it hath no concern with proof or ar-. gument of any kind, but relates solely to the strength and distinctness with which an object is exhibited, so as to render the conceptions of the imagination almost equal in vivac

ity and vigor with the perceptions of sense. This is entirely agreeable to the use, both of the Latin word demonstrativus, and of the Greek άnodɛixtizós among critics, orators and poets. Another difference I beg you will remark, is between conviction and persuasion, which, in common language, are frequently confounded. To speculative truth, the term, conviction, only with its conjugates, ought to be applied. Thus we say properly, I am convinced of the being of a God. In popular language, we should sometimes in this case say persuaded, but this application of the term is evidently inaccuThus also, he hath proved the truth of revelation to my full conviction, or, I attempted to convince him of his error. And even in regard to moral truth, when no more is denoted but the assent of the understanding, the proper term is to convince. I am convinced it is my duty, yet I cannot prevail on myself to do it. This is well illustrated by that of the poet,

rate.

Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

I am convinced, but not persuaded; my understanding is subdued, but not my will; the first term always and solely relates to opinion, the second to practice. The operation of conviction is merely on the understanding; that of persuasion is on the will and resolution. Indeed the Latin word persuadeo is susceptible of precisely the same ambiguity with the English. It is this double meaning which gave occasion to that play upon the word used by Augustine, when he said, "Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris." The import of which in plain English manifestly is, Though your arguments may convince my reason, they shall not determine my resolution; or, you may convince, but shall not persuade me. The first of the distinctions now mentioned will serve to discriminate the argumentative or controversial, from the demonstrative or commendatory, the other distinguishes the controversial from the persuasive.

I would further observe, that though any one discourse admits only one of the ends above enumerated as the principal, nevertheless in the progress of a discourse, many things may be advanced, which are more immediately and apparently directed to some of the other ends of speaking. But then it ought always to appear, that such ends are introduced as means, and rendered conducive to that which is the primary