JURISDICTION-Continued. Jurisdiction of State court to declare void erroneous proceeding of Federal Court in derogation of State law. Snitterlin v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 26. Although a decree of the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois upon a bill filed to foreclose a mortgage, for the sale of the mortgaged premises, without granting to the mortgagor the right of redemption of the property within one year, as given by the statutes of the State of Illinois, is erroneous and void, yet where no appeal is taken therefrom within the allowed time, the courts of the State of Illinois have no power upon bill filed by the mortgagor to set aside the sale and allow the redemption. Ibid. Bill to set aside decree for fraud must be brought in court where decree rendered, 155. When jurisdiction of probate court can not be questioned (Mass), 259. Disqualification of judges of the Court of Appeals to hear the appeal in Buford v. Com. where prisoner was indicted for killing a member of that court, 321. Want of verification to complaint not a jurisdictional defect, though required by statute, 375. Where defendant is induced to come into the jurisdiction by fraud, process served on him will be set aside, 498. Plea of usury may be maintained in State court against national bank, 497. Has a court martial jurisdiction to try a person whose term of enlistment has expired for an offense_committed while he was a soldier. Query, VIII. 447, answer, 20. JURY. [See CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] JURY OF MATRONS. [See CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.] JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. On appeal from justice of the peace non est factum may be pleaded, 39. Justice of the peace liable for trespass in making an order without a previous complaint in writing, as required by the statute, binding the defendant over for trial, who refused to give the bail, and was therefore imprisoned, 124. Jurisdiction of, in suit for penalty for failure of railroad to stop before crossing road, 295. Judgment for amount above jurisdiction of justice; remittitur; indefinite judgment, 399. Proceedings before, when voidable and not void, 458. Is an execution issued by a justice of the peace and not returnable according to law, void or voidable? Query, 439; answer, 460. LAND LAW. What is sufficient possession under unrecorded deed, 77. Under Kansas laws actual residence is required of purchaser of school lands, 457. Effect of misdescription in application for public lands, 478. LANDLORD AND TENANT. [See also, NEGLIGENCE.] Scotch law as to deduction in rent for sterility of land, 40. Where lease stipulates for renewal upon same terms and both parties act in accordance therewith no actual renewal is required, 57. Tenant has no right without express authority or license, to cut trees upon the land, except for necessary firewood, 58. Abandonment of distress proceedings does not waive lien of landlord under Illinois statute, 119. Right of tenant as against landlord to be let alone in occupation of premises, 121. S having a term of eight years in a house and shop agreed with B to let him the house and shop at £26 a year, payable quarterly, and further agreed to let B have a lease at £26 a year at any period he might feel disposed, and not molest or disturb him, or raise his rent after he had laid out money on the premises. B having laid out $150 it was ruled that he was entitled to a lease for the residue of the term, less one day, if he should so long live, 162. Landlord suing as trustee for tenant, 176. Construction of covenant in lease not to assign or part with possession, 258. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued. A person having entered premises under written leasecovenanting to pay rent for given term can not before expiry thereof refuse to pay on ground that he himself was owner of premises when lease was made,, 375. Has a landlord's distress for rent precedence of a prior execution lien by sheriff. Query VIII 488; answer 20.. LARCENY. Finder of property when guilty of, 18. Distinction between embezzlement and, 77. May be committed if goods obtained from the owner by delivery, 122. Distinction between false pretences and, 241. Taking the property of another without his consent with intent to conceal it until the owner offers a reward for its return, and then obtain the reward is,. 419. LAW AND FACT [See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] LAW AND LAWYERS. Address of the Minnesota bar to Judge Dillon, 20; of the St. Louis bar, 78; of the Arkansas bar, 137. Meeting of the American Bar Association, 80, 200. Death of Isaac Grant Thompson, 240. LAW REFORM. Discussion of the subject of, 36. Suggestion Upon Code Procedure and Code Revision.. Articles by Hon. Asa Iglehart. III. Code Revision in General, 62, 83; IV. Illustrations from Rules of Practice, 242; V. The Methods of Trial Under the Code, 282. 302; VI. Appellate Proceedings, 383, 402. LEADING ARTICLES AND LEGAL ESSAYS. [See the various special titles.] LEASE. [See LANDLORD AND TENANT.] LESSOR AND LESSEE. [See LANDLORD AND TENANT.] LIBEL. [See SLANDER AND LIBEL.] LICENSE. [See also LIQUOR LAWS.] Where the owner of land gives, for a consideration, a parol license to another to build a bridge on his land, an action of trespass will lie against him for removing it without consent, 122. LIENS. [See also, MECHANICS LIEN.] Secret liens not allowed against bona fide purchasers, 356. Construction of Missouri statute as to lien on personalty for purchase price. Query VIII. 508; answers, 139, 160. Query, 120; answer, 160. LIFE INSURANCE. [See INSURANCE LAW.] LIGHT. [See EASEMENTS.] LIMITATION. The statute of limitations in its ordinary acceptation, does not apply to bank bills intended to circulate as money, 116. The statute begins to run upon the personal (statutory) liability of the stockholders from the time when the bank refuses and ceases to redeem and is notoriously insolvent, 116. Statute of limitations in suit for non-return of pledge,, 135. Possession of part of land under Missouri statute. 136.. Scire facias to revive a judgment is an "action" within the meaning of that word in the statute of limitations, (Ill.) 160. Twenty years' possession by the mortgagee of property mortgaged, without account or acknowledgment of any subsisting title, is a bar to the equity of redemption, unless the mortgagor can bring himself within the proviso in the statute of limitations. This rule is reciprocal, and the mortgagee may be equally barred by lapse of time, when the mortgagor, after the forfeiture, has been permitted to retain possession for twenty years, uniess circumstances can be shown to repel the presumption of payment. Locke v. Caldwell, 351. The possession in each case must be actual and not constructive, even when the lands are wild and un cultivated, in order to create the bar. Ibid. LIMITATION-Continued. On a bill in equity for an accounting by an administrator of one partner against another, the statute of limitations is a bar, as in a court of law, and the mere fact that the funds in the hands of the latter may be considered a trust, and that, too, a constructive trust only, does not operate to remove the bar of the statute. McKeown v. Guild, 368. In order to take a case out of the statute of limitations it is not sufficient that the debtor admits the account is correct but he must go further and admit that the debt is still due and has never been paid. Ibid. A mere non-user of all corporate powers is not a conconcealment of the corporation such as to suspend the running of the statute of limitations, 376. When action on note is barred, it is likewise barred on mortgage given as security therefor, 376. Defective description of land in tax deed cured by statute of limitations, 376. LIQUOR LAWS. [See also, "CIVIL DAMAGE" LAWS.] On indictment for selling without license, no defense that defendant was a druggist and sold the liquor on prescription, 1, 318. Voluntary payment of excessive license fee, when not recoverable, 78. Person may be punished under city ordinance or indicted under general law, 338. Where a license to sell intoxicating liquors was issued on the 7th day of March, 1879, covering a period of one year from January 7th, 1879, and the holder of such license was indicted for a sale made on March 1, 1879: Held, that the license, when issued, legalized the prior illegal sale, and defendent could not be punished therefor. State v. Wilcox, with note, 407. LOTTERIES. A person who had purchased lottery tickets to sell again, sued the managers of the lottery for the negli. gent conduct of the same, whereby the public confidence in the lottery was impaired, and a large number of his tickets remained unsold. Held, that the action would not lie, 123. LUNATIC. [See also, AGENCY.] Property of a lunatic, put into the hands of a committee, is in custodia legis, and can not be reached by a creditor for a debt or judgment, prior to the lunacy, except by an order of court, 198. Such order can not be made until first a sufficiency is ascertained and set apart for the maintenance of the lunatic and that of his family, if minors, 198. Liability of lunatic accommodation indorser, 496. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. Corporation not liable to action for, 16. In an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must show that the prosecution or proceeding of which he complains is legally at an end, and that it was instituted maliciously and without probable cause. Potter v. Casterline, 63. The legal termination of the prosecution is sufficiently shown by the refusal of the grand jury to find a bill, without a formal order of discharge by the court. A rejection of the complaint by the grand jury is prima facie evidence of want of probable cause. Ibid. A defendant can not excuse himself by showing that he acted under the advice of an unprofessional person. Ibid. Bank manager has no authority to institute criminal prosecution on behalf of bank, 258. MANDAMUS. [See also, CORPORATIONS.] Protection arising because the party was brought into the court's jurisdiction by the process of another court, is not a question addressed exclusively to the court under whose process the arrest was made; the privilege is primarily conferred for the protection of the party himself, and if the court allows its process to be used against it, an appellate court will correct the wrong by mandamus. People v. Judge of Superior Court, 8. MANSLAUGHTER. [See HOMICIDE.] MARINE INSURANCE. [See INSURANCE LAW.] MARRIAGE. [See DIVORCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE.] MARRIED WOMEN. [See HUSBAND AND WIFE.] MASTER AND SERVANT. [See also, NEGLIGENCE.] Inability of Servants to Fulfil Contracts with Masters. Article from Irish Law Times, 174. Action sustainable by master against one who entices servant to desert his employment, 197. What is the measure of damages for discharge of servant before expiration of term? Query, 59; answer, 100. MAXIMS. Omnio præsumuntur contra spoliatorem,, 378. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. [See DAMAGES.] MECHANIC'S LIEN. At what time petitioner "ceases to labor or furnish material," under Mass. statute, 77. Parties bound by judgment under, 178. An overseer is not a "laborer" within mechanic's lien law, 198. Lien for material furnished does not attach on lumber sold, which was not used in the erection or repair of a building, unless sold with an understanding that it should be so used, 235. Description of land in petition for mechanic's lien, when not sufficient, 238. When time of performance of contract an element o a, 278. Lien for work on "logs and timber," under Wisconsin statute; laths not "timber," 377. Cross bill by defendant to recover damages not allowable; claim must be made in separate suit, 399. Contract between owner and contractor; payment to be made in land; declarations of owner to sub-contractor, 417. A mechanic's lien can not be enforced against real estate belonging to a municipal corporation and in public use, 419. In proceeding for, statute must be strictly followed, 457. What is the meaning of "improvements?" Query, 99; answer, 100. MERCANTILE AGENCIES. [See NEGLIGENCE.] MINING. Where there are two mines, one being situated immediately above the other, the proprietors of the lower mine are bound at their peril not to weaken the natural supports of the upper; and if they do so and damage ensues to the owners of the upper mine, the former are liable for such damage, even though there be no negligence on their part in their mining operations. Yandes v. Wright, 348. мов. [See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.] MONTH. [See DAYS.] MORTGAGE. Of Personalty. Where a chattel mortgagee takes possession of the property mortgaged, and in good faith, according to the statute, advertises and sells the property, he is responsible to the mortgagor for only the surplus of the proceeds of such sale above the debt, interest and co-ts. But if he make other disposition he is responsible for the difference between the actual cash value at the time and place of taking possession and the amount of the debt and interest. Denny v Faulkner, 32. Destruction between conditional sale and chattel mortgage, 58. Not fraudulent when duly acknowledged and mortgagor remains in possession without power of sale, 76. As between the holder of a chattel mortgage, duly recorded, and a landlord upon whose premises the mortgaged property is used subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, and with the knowledge of the holder, the mortgagee is entitled to the prior lien, 77. A chattel mortgage upon a stock of goods in store may Covenant that goods shall be put in to keep up the stock, and it will cover goods so put in, 199. Admissious of mortgagee against his interest, 199. A general sale of a chattel mortgagor's interest does not give an immediate right to replevy without demand, 199. Chattel mortgage not void for uncertainty when, 338. When absolute conveyance, and separate agreement to recovery constitute a mortgage, 376. MORTGAGE-Continued. Of Realty. After foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate under the power, the only right of redemption by mere act of the parties is that given by statute, and can be exercised only as there prescribed, 57. After-acquired lands not used in connection with the actual operations of a railroad, can not pass under a general mortgage of the railroad itself, as a part thereof, under the doctrine of accretion. Calhoun v. Paducah &c. R. Co., 66. Where the property conveyed by such a mortgage is described as "the railroad then constructed and to be constructed, etc., and all other corporate property, real and personal, of said railroad company, belonging or appertaining to the said railroad, whether then owned or thereafter to be acquired," lands subsequently acquired and not essential to the operation of the road do not pass by the mortgage by implication. Ibid. Mortgage by tenants in common; conflicting liens, 199. A mortgagee is so far the owner in fee of the mortgag. ed estate that if any part of it is wrongfully severed and converted into personalty by the mortgagor his interest is not divested, but he remains the owner of the personalty and may follow it and recover it or its value of any one who has converted it to his own use. But the severance must be wrongful, and where it is made by the mortgagor or one acting under his authority, whether it is wrongful will depend upon the question whether a license to do the act has been expressly given or is fairly to be implied from the relations of the parties. Searle v. Sawyer, 466. Where the mortgaged estate is a farm, a license to cut and carry to market wood and timber to a limited extent might be implied from the relation of the parties, if in carrying on similar farms it is usual and good husbandry so to do. Ibid. Damages for failure to perform a contract to procure the discharge of a mortgage can not be claimed, if it does not appear that the mortgage was foreclosed or the claimant damnified, 459. Mortgage; foreclosure; redemption. Query, 59; answers, 100, 120, 189. MUNICIPAL BONDS, Liability of county on, where no payee expressed, 158. Where the law authorizing a township to issue railroad bonds provides that the election shall be held at a general election conducted by the supervisors and officials of the township, and the same is held instead at a meeting of the people of the township presided over by a moderator, the bonds issued in pursuance thereof are void, even where they have passed into the hands of innocent holders, and the town has paid interest for three years. In such a case the town is not estopped from denying the validity of the bonds. Lippinscott v. Town of Pana, 428. An election is absolutely void and not voidable when it is held by persons who are not officers de jure or de facto acting under colorable authority. Ibid. Under the new Constitution, which prohibits a donation by a township to a railroad, except where the same has been authorized under existing laws, the vote of the people of a township taken in a manner not pointed out by law is not such an authorization under existing laws as to prevent or remove the constitutional prohibition. Ibid. In cases depending upon the Constitution or statutes of a state, the Supreme Court of the United States adopts the construction of the Constitution or statutes given by the courts of the State, when that construction can be ascertained, and when different and conflicting interpretions have not been made by the State courts. Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 467. In a suit upon coupons of a series of bonds issued by the defendant, a county in the State of Illinois, in October, 1870, as a donation to assist in the construction of a railroad, the question presented was whether a donation to a railroad company legally authorized and approved by a majority of the legal voters of a county prior to the adoption of the new State Constitution is rendered invalid by a prohibition of such donations contained in that Constitution. In Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625, 3 Cent. L. J. 249, this court held that donations by counties to railroads were prohibited by the Constitution; that they could not lawfully be made after July 2, 1870, even although they been authorized by a prior statute and by a vote of the people of the county. It now appearing, however, that prior to the above decision by this court, the Supreme Court of Illinois in construing this same section had, unknown to this court at that time, decided that donations, if sanctioned by popular vote before the adoption of the Constitution, are not prohibited by it, this court changes its decisions as made in Town of Concord v. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Continued. Portsmouth Savings Bank, supra, and adopts the interpretation of the State Supreme Court. Ibid. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [See also, NEGLIGENCE.] A municipal corporation can not ratify an unlawful act; but this rule does not affect proceedings to recover back money or property obtained by an act ultra vires 19. Highway commissioners can not bind their township by a partial payment for work which the township could not have authorized, such as the digging of a sewer within another jurisdiction, 19. A municipality can not abridge its legislative power by contract, and it can not impair a contract by its legislative power; neither can it make a valid contract beyond its power to contract, and a contract made within its power to contract is valid. Oity of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Coke Co., 193. A contract made by a municipal corporation, not ultra vires, not against public policy, and not fraudulent, may be enforced the same as the contract of a person. Ibid. City can not agree with an owner of real estate to submit to arbitration the question of the amount due as betterments, 277. Power of, to borrow money, 335. Liability of municipality for acts of mobs; the case of the Pittsburg riots, 341. A clause in a city charter provided that "nothing in this charter shall be construed as giving power to vote money for any object except for the regular, ordinary and usual expenses of the city." This clause being in force the city council resolved to give a ball and banquet in honor of certain strangers. The resolution of the council and the preparations for the ball were well known, and September 9, 1878, the ball took place. September 27, 1878, certain tax-pay. ers of the city prayed that the city treasurer might be perpetually enjoined from paying the bills incurred. Held, that the injunction must issue. Austin v. Coggeshall, 367. Neither the fact that the city authorities had without objection given a similar ball in 1875, nor that the complainant tax-payers had waited till the expense had been incurred before filing their bill of complaint, nor that the caterers had acted in good faith and must suffer if the injunction issued, could be urged by the respondent treasurer against the prayer of the bill, as one who contracts with a muni. cipal corporation is bound at his own peril to know the limits of municipal authority. Ibid City not liable for acts of police officers, 416. Authority of council to build and maintain piers can not be delegated, 437. No power in city to offer reward for arrest of criminals, 478. Is a municipal corporation owning stock in a railroad liable like other stockholders for claims for labor. Query, 239; answer, 419. MURDER. [See HOMICIDE.] NATIONAL BANKS. [See BANKS AND BANKING; EMBEZZLEMENT.] NEGLIGENCE. Contributory Negligence. Questions of, for the jury, 38. One entering the premises of another, whether by invitation, or as a mere licensee, is himself bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence, and failing in this and suffering injury, he can not recover. Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 108. P having occasion to carry an advertisement to the defendant for publication in its newspaper late at night, found the counting-room closed. He thereupon proceeded to the editorial rooms on the second floor. At the head of the stairs there was a hall; on the right hand the door leading to the editorial rooms, and on the left an elevator entrance with folding doors. P, being a stranger to the premises, and the hall being dark, in trying to find his way fell down the elevator way, the doors of which had been left open, and was seriously injured. Semble, that his want of care and prudence having caused the injury he could not recover. Ibid. In an action for injuries to a servant, caused by the negligence of the master, the contributory negligence of a fellow servant is no defense. Contributory negligence to defeat such an action must be that of the plaintiff, or of some person for whose acts he is responsible. Stellar v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 131. In walking on bridge having no side railings, 136. NEGLIGENCE-Continued. Where the train of a railroad company starts at the regular time of starting, and the train had been in proper position to receive its passengers a sufficient time to allow all passengers who were ready at the proper time to take seats in the car, and a passenger after the train had started, and while it was in motion, attempted to get on board, and is injured, he can not recover for such injury. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Scates, 167. Burning of hotel by sparks from locomotive; contributory negligence, 178. In walking on railroad track, 199. Duty of passenger on street car to see that car is stop. ped before alighting, 218. Doctrine of "comparative negligence," 336. Contributory negligence in crossing track, 358. Negligence of driver of conveyance imputed to passenger, 416. In General. The Doctrine of Identification of Passenger with Carrier in Actions of Tort. Article by J. A. Tyng, 24. Damages caused by domestic animals, 55. The council of the city, by an ordinance, provided for putting cap logs upon wharves, and prescribed a penalty for its infraction: Held, that no civil liability at the suit of a person injured could arise from nonobservance of this ordinance, 74. A person whose land has been injured by the negligent mining of coal beneath it, or whose crops have been injured by heat and smoke from the coke ovens, is entitled to recover for damages so sustained, 75. Ordinary care and diligence must be used to keep business places, and the usual passage-way to them, safe for the access of all persons coming to them at all reasonable hours, by their invitation express or implied, or for any purpose beneficial to them. Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 108. No duty is owed to a mere licensee, and he has no cause of action for negligence in the place he is permitted to enter. Ibid. Recovery over against third party, 135. A mercantile agency is not liable for a loss to a subscriber acting upon information collected by its agents and communicated by them to him under his written contract with the agency, wherein it is expressly agreed that the mercantile agency shall not be responsible for any loss caused by the neglect of any of its servants, attorneys, clerks and employees. Under such a contract there is no liability on the part of the agency, even for gross negligence in the collection and communication of information by its agents. Duncan v. Dun, 151. To render the owner of a vicious dog liable, it is not necessary that he has previously bitten others; it is enough to show that there was within the owner's knowledge a probability that he might do so, 159. The doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, 233. Degree of care required of owner of dock, 259. A person using, or dealing with an article dangerous in itself, is bound to use great caution. If he does not do so, and if a third party is injured, the person injured has a right of action against the person dealing with the dangerous article. To support such an action there need be no privity of contract between the party injured and the person by whose breach of duty the injury is caused. Parry v. Smith, 248. Liability of board consisting of unpaid officers, for negligently allowing a dangerous obstruction to exist in a navigable river which the board were appointed to improve, 301. A, who had been for some three weeks a patient in the Rhode Island Hospital, paying $8 per week, brought an action against the hospital for damages, alleging severe injuries caused by the unskilfullness and negligence of the surgical interne, a house officer of the hospital. At the trial, a verdict for the defendant was directed by the presiding judge, on the ground that the hospital, being a public charity, was exempt for reasons of public policy from the liability charged. Held, that in the absence of legislative provisions granting such exemption, the exemption could not be allowed, public policy requiring that duty assumed should be faithfully performed. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 329. Although the attending physicians and surgeons could not be considered as servants of the hospital, yet the hospital was responsible for the exercise of reasonable care in selecting them, and liable for their negligence. Ibid. Concerning the Degrees of Negligence as Applied to the Case of Common Carriers, 343, 363. Liability of owner of building for negligence of servants of occupier. Stewart v. Putnam, 350. Negligence in signing promissory note, 378. NEGLIGENCE-Continued. The liability of a landlord for injuries to third persons in consequence of defects in premises leased, ceases with the commencement of the tenant's occupation. • But when the landlord has covenanted to repair, he is liable to the same extent that he would be if in actual occupation of the premises himself, upon the principle that by his covenant to repair he holds out to those in the lawful occupation of the premises an implied assurance that they are safe and an implied invitation to use all parts of them. Anderson v. Kryter, 385. Telegraph company responsible for injury occasioned by the breaking of its poles only by proof of culpable negligence in the construction or maintenance of the line; it is not bound to guard against storms of unusual severity. 418. Liability for damages caused by freezing of overflowing water, 458. Liability of mercantile agency for, 499. Master and Servant. Negligence of section-foreman, in taking up rail for purpose of repairing track, without putting out proper signals, the negligence of the corporation; plaintiff, a laborer employed by the corporation on a wood-train that was ditched in consequence of the negligence of the section-foreman entitled to recover, 17. Duty of master to servants as to machinery, etc., 38. A brakeman on defendant's railroad, was injured while attempting to uncouple cars. It was contended that the defendant was negligent in using a T guard rail, when a U rail would have been safer. Evidence was introduced tending to show that the U rail was safer. It was not shown that U rails were in general use in that locality. The plaintiff was an experienced railroad man, and knew of the character of guard rails in use on the road. Held, that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Smith v. St. Louis etc., R. Čo. 51. When an employee enters upon or continues in the service with the knowledge that machinery of a particular character is in use in that service, he can not recover for injuries inflicted by such machinery on the ground that other and safer machinery should have been provided. Ibid. Liability of master for injury to servant by defect in rolling stock of railroad, 156. Relation does no exist between servant of contractor for lighting street lamps and city so as to bar action by former for injury caused by defect in sidewalk, 156. What are dangers incident to service undertaken by employee, 476. Muncipal Corporations. A city is not responsible for injuries caused by destruction of its buildings by unusual and unprecedented storms, 57. Duty of municipality as to highways governed by surroundings, 75. Highway must be kept in such order that even "skittish" animals may be employed without danger, 75. Liability of, for defective highway does not extend to objects outside the traveled way, 216. When city liable for defect in sidewalk made by adjoining owner, 279. Duty of city regarding streets and sidewalks, 279, 298. Liability of cities for injuries caused by snow and ice, 355. In the absense of express legislative authority, a city can not lawfully grant to a street railroad company the right to operate a steam motor along its streets; and to do so is negligence which will render the city liable for injuries sustained by a person on the street by reason of the operation of the motor. Stanley v. City of Davenport, 392. Proximate and Remote Cause. The defendant's bar tender sold liquor to B, and an altercation ensuing, threw a glass at B, which missed him and injured plaintiff; Held, that the injury was not the proximate consequence of the sale of the liquor, 159. Sparks of fire thrown from defendants' engine set fire to combustible materials alongside of the railroad on land adjoining the plaintiff's strip of land, on which were piles of lumber, the property of the plaintiff; the fire was transmitted to combustible materials, leaves, brush, etc., on said strip of land, and by force of a high wind to the lumber. Held, that the question of remoteness or proximity was a question of fact for the jury. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McKean, 187. Liability of one person for an injury which though primarily the result of his act is more immediately the result of the intervention of another 281. NEGLIGENCE-Continued. Where defendant delivered a quantity of cotton at a wharf in a wet condition, and the plaintiff there received and shipped it while in this condition, and after such shipment the cotton was damaged by continued freezing and thawing: Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover for damages accruing to the cotton after he had received it and had exercised an independent control over it with a full knowledge of its condition and liability to injury. Brandon v. Gulf City Cotton Press Co., 289. A was injured by a horse driven by B. The horse was frightened by the overturn of a sleigh to which it was harnessed, and the overturn was caused by a heap of snow and ice wrongfully made and left in a highway by C: Held, that the act of C was the proximate cause of the injury, 377. Railroad Companies. A railroad company, using the track of another company for the purpose of transporting passengers and property, is liable for damages caused by defects in the road, or through the negligence of the servants or employees of the latter company. This rule applies as well to its own employees as to passengers and freighters. Stellar v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 131. Rule of liability of railroads for killing stock, 154. Horse railroad company liable for injury by servants of lessee of its road, 156. Duty of railroads and passengers; burden of proof, 158. It is not the duty of a railroad company to provide means by which passengers can get on board the train of cars while it is in motion. It is their duty to construct and maintain a platform at a convenient and suitable place, by which passengers can safely and securely enter the cars, when the train is placed in position for the reception of passengers. Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Scates, 167. Fires caused by railroads, 177. Action by master for injury to his servant, 176. A railroad company is not liable for the negligent mismanagemeut of one of its trains, while used and controlled by an independent contractor, for construction purposes, 241. Liability of, for injuries to stock; demand of payment, 376. Negligence in leaving unguarded turntable, 498. Person thrown from railway train may maintain action whether permanently injured or not, 496. NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER. Agreement for value made by holder of note with maker to extend time of payment for definite period beyond its maturity can not bar action on note before expiration of period, 1. A negotiable note for ten dollars was executed and delivered with blanks preceding the amount, and blank as to place of payinent. Afterwards the words and figures were changed by some one so as to make it read for one hundred and ten dollars. A place of payment was also inserted. There was nothing about the appearance of the note to excite suspicion, and it was taken by plaintiff after alteration, before maturity, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of such alteration. Held, that no recovery could be had thereon. Knoxville Nat. Bk. v. Clark, Material alteration in promissory note will avoid it against parties interested, 39. 29. An instrument in writing purporting to be a promis. sory note, is none the less a promissory note because it contains a stipulation to pay attorneys's fees if suit be instituted on the note. Howenstein v. Barnes, 48. Note of corporation though ultra vires valid in hands of subsequent indorsee without notice, 58. A signed his name upon a note. payable to order of maker, after it was signed upon the face, but before it was indorsed by the maker, and before negotiated; Held, that it was a note payable to bearer; that the defendant, as indorser, was entitled to notice, 56. Notes given by a purchaser to a stock broker to cover losses incurred by the broker in stock gambling, on the principal's account, are void, 61. Where one gives a warranty deed of land, and his title at the time of giving it is called in question and litigated, and a subsequent purchaser, who entertains doubts as to the force and effect of the covenants in his deed, enters into a contract by which he gives his note in contribution towards procuring a release from a litigating claimant, such note is for a valuable consideration, 98. The maker of a note, who pays it to an indorsee and holder who obtained it by fraud, is discharged from liability thereon to the payee, unless the maker had notice of such fraud; and the discharge extends NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER-Continued. as well to the original consideration. Alexander v. Horner, 111. Fraud in making negotiable paper; notice by bona fide holder, 116. Note payable in money can not be varied or changed by contemporaneous oral agreement, 118, 236. The vendor of a bill or note, notwithstanding he transfers the same by an indorsement without recourse, impliedly warrants, by the very act of transferring, that the prior signatures to the paper are genuine, and so far at least as affected by his dealings. with or relations to the paper, that it expresses upon its face the exact legal obligations of all such prior parties. Challis v. McCrum, 149. An order in the form of an inland bill of exchange not upon any particular fund, is not, before acceptance,. an assignment, and does not create any lien in favor of the holder upon funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee, 200. Alteration sufficient to invalidate note cured by subsequent erasure so as to restore it as it was originally, 181. A certificate of deposit, payable to order, of a certaim number of dollars "in currency," is negotiable. Klauber v. Biggerstaff, 488. The word "currency" in a certificate of deposit means "money," and includes bank notes issued by authority of law and in actual and general circulation at their legal standard value. Ibid. An instrument wherein maker promises to pay "the trustee of etc., church or their collector" is a promissory note, 436. Compromise of claim; transfer to bona fide holder, 437.. Waiver of demand of payment at maturity is waiver of notice of non-payment, 439. Promissory note payable "to order of myself,” 439. Liability assumed by one who puts his name on back of negotiable paper, 459. When notice of dishonor seasonable to charge indorser, 474. Note given to railroad on condition that at certain date its cars "should be running to R," 479. Construction of promissory note as to time of payments. Query, 99; answer, 139. Overpayment of note; want of consideration. Query, 99; answer, 140. A question on the negotiability of a note. Query, 460, answer, 500. NEW TRIAL. [See APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE; PLEADING AND PRACTICE.] NOTARY PUBLIC. Power of, to commit for contempt, 16. Diligence required of notary in sending notice of protest, 478., Should the seal of a notary public stamp the name of the notary to be legal? Query, 419; answer, 440. NOTICE. In book of saving's bank depositor binding when, 236 Publication of order of probate court not notice to parties, when, 236. Notice by publication in newspaper, "published and circulating in the county," 361, 439. Designation of newspaper under Minnesota laws, 395. Notice of dissolution of a partnership was published in a newspaper and a copy thereof, with a red line drawn about the notice, was mailed to a dealer residing in another place. Held, that it was not sufficient to charge the dealer with notice, 419. NUISANCE. [See also, EASEMENTS.] A house in whieh unlawful sales of liquor are habitually made is an indictable nuisance, although there is a city ordinance prescribing the penalties for such sales, 173. OFFICES AND OFFICERS. [See also, Justice of the PEACE.] Sufficiency of order of board of trustees; authority must be shown on face thereof, 18. An officer de facto is punishable for malfeasance in office the same as an officer de jure, 98. Statute of Maine declaring that if a "public officer', embezzles, etc., he shall be deemed guilty of larceny, and punished accordingly, includes officers de facto as well as de jure, 98. Judicial officer not liable for injury occasioned by error of judgment, 122. The responsibility of a county treasurer, in the absence of any statute enlarging it, is measured by the common law rule applicable to bailees for hire other |